[新聞] 年輕的中國人可能不那么熱衷西式民主

[yanke (謝煙客)]

【大西洋月刊】 http://ppt.cc/7Efg


龍騰網翻譯 www.ltaaa.com


原文標題：Young Chinese People May Just Not Be That Into Western-Style
          Democracy

年輕的中國人可能不那么熱衷西方式的民主

A new study shows that the country's youth have an increasingly lukewarm att
itude about democratic political systems.

一項最新調查表明國家的年輕一代對民主制度態度趨向于不溫不火

Chinese economic surveys and data are everywhere. Their quarterly or annual
release regularly generate excitement, fretting, and plenty of interpretatio
n. And this last round was no exception, leading the Wall Street Journal to
wryly quip that China's second quarter data release was "As eagerly awaited
as the first sight of Kim Kardashian's baby, but probably less attractive...
"

Far fewer surveys and data are available on Chinese politics, however,
or at least in the English-speaking world. Although such studies tend to be
rather obscure, they do exist, and even explore seemingly "third rail" subje
cts like democracy and political governance. In fact, in the mid-2000s, an o
fficial in the Translation Bureau of the Central Committee, Yu Keping, made
a splash with his essay "Democracy is a Good Thing".

     關于中國經濟的調查和數據到處都是，我們對他們的季度年度定期發布（的數據）
而興奮，煩躁，就此還出現了大量關于數據的解譯。上一輪也不例外，諷刺的是華爾街
日報表明，等待中國公布第二季度的數據“就像急切等待金·卡戴珊（明星）的小孩出
世，但可能不會那么有吸引力……”

     然而很少有調查是針對中國的政治，至少在英語世界。盡管研究往往不聲不響，但
確實存在，甚至在探索繼民主政治之后的第三大主題。事實上，在本世紀中期中央翻譯
局的一位官員俞可平（音譯），他的文章《民主是個好東西》引發了轟動。


In my occasional search for contemporary Chinese political studies, I stumbl
ed upon an interesting new study. Titled "What Kind of Democracy do Chinese
Want?", it's a study from the leading state think tank in China, the Chinese
 Academy of Social Sciences. Zhang Mingshu, the study's author, apparently h
opes to distinguish between different types of "democracies". He explains th
usly:

     "Generally speaking, one type is Western democracy. It originated from
Greece ... and through the catalyst of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, pr
oduced the type of democracy we see today in the United States and England.
But another type is China's democracy today, which we call "socialist democr
acy with Chinese characteristics."

      在我研究中國政治時，偶然發現了一個有趣的東西，一篇標題為《什么樣的民主
是中國想要的？》的文章。該文章的作者是中國社會科學院的張明書，他顯然希望有不
同類型民主的區分，他解釋說：

     “一般來說，一種是西方民主，它起源于希臘…是文藝復興和啟蒙運動催生的民主
，也就是今天的美國式和英國式。但還有另一種，中國式的民主，我們稱之為“有中國
特色的社會主義民主政治。”


     At this point, groans are emanating from astute China analysts about ho
w such arguments typify Chinese political discourse today.      What's more,
 Zhang goes on to say that his exploration of the kind of democracy Chinese
want is largely determined by the existing political and civic culture, citi
ng the work of American political scientist Gabriel Almond on how specific c
ivic cultures can shape the type of political system. This, of course, sound
s awfully close to the longstanding debate over the lack of suzhi -- loosely
 translated as civic values -- that make Chinese society unprepared for majo
r systemic changes.

     But putting aside these issues for now, some of Zhang's key findings no
netheless may offer some insight into the current state of political attitud
es among Chinese, particularly of a younger generation of Chinese. [I can't
vouch for the soundness of the methodology, but the author claims that he co
nducted a survey with 1,750 random samples across four different regions in
China. Each of the participants was given a 40-question survey to fill out.]


     關于這一點，由于有爭論，而這決定性影響了現今中國的政治話語，中國分析家中
的精英因而產生了很多抱怨。更重要的是，張繼續說，他的研究關于中國想要什么樣的
民主，很大程度上是由現有的政治和公民文化決定的，他引述美國政治學家Gabriel Al
mond的話，不同公民文化可以塑造不同政治制度。當然，這聽起來與素質的缺乏這一長
期爭論的話題（大致譯為公民的價值觀）非常相近—這使得中國社會對重大的系統性變
化措手不及。但撇開這些問題不談，關于中國的政治態度，張的一些研究仍然可能有所
啟示，尤其是對年輕一代。

【不能保證該方法的合理性，但筆者認為，他在中國四個不同地區調查了1750個隨機樣
本每個參與者填寫了含四十個問題的問卷調查]


There is plenty more data from the study (including breakdowns based on educ
ational attainment), but a couple things stand out here. One, there is a cle
ar generational difference, particularly between the post-1980s generation (
the so-called balinghou) and those who are older and lived through a more tu
multuous era in Chinese modern history. Two, there appears to be a shift to
a centrist attitude, also more pronounced among the younger cohorts ("left"
in China traditionally meant more hardcore communist/socialist or neo-Maoist
s and "right" typically meant more pro-West and pro-market). Overall, more t
han half of the respondents hold a more nuanced view that the Chinese politi
cal system cannot simply be compared to that of the United States, presumabl
y implying that each has its own strengths and weaknesses.



     這里有大量的研究數據（包括基于教育程度的分析），但有幾個提示很明顯。一，
明顯的年代差異，特別是“80后”（所謂的balinghou）與生活在動蕩的中國近代史上的
老一代相比。二，中立的態度的轉移，也更突出在年輕人群（“左”在中國傳統上意味
著更多的鐵桿共產主義/社會主義或新毛派，“右”通常意味著更多的親西方和親市場）
。總的來說，超過一半的受訪者認為很微妙，中美政治制度無法比較，兩者各有利弊

     In an interview with the liberal Guangdong paper Southern Weekend, the
author further explains his findings (select translation below

     SW: For similar questions, what was the biggest difference in results t
his time (Zhang had conducted a virtually identical survey in the 1980s)

     Zhang: There was a new focus this time, particularly in terms of the de
lineation between "left, right, and center." The survey results show that th
e percentage on the "right" is lower, on the "left" higher, and the majority
 of the public seems to be moving in conjunction with the mainstream media.
These three findings were contrary to my expectations. When I did the survey
 in 1988, there was clearly a much higher proportion of pro-West views among
 the respondents. That was the early reform era, and society was embracing a
ll things Western ..

     ... According to these findings, 38.1 percent of the respondents are co
nsidered "left", 51.5 percent "centrist," and 8 percent "right." I was not a
nticipating these results. But if you calmly and rationally think about the
people around you, not just those in intellectual circles, but those from yo
ur hometown or those you encounter on the street, these percentages aren't t
oo far off.

     SW: In your view, will there be some kind of collision among the three
groups you identified above?

     Zhang: The study shows that whether your political attitude leans towar
d liberalism/libertarianism (or "right") is somewhat positively correlated w
ith the level of educational attainment. But at the same time, the higher th
e level of education, the higher the tendency of taking a more moderate and
pragmatic political view. So we can roughly generalize that the more "cosmop
olitan" the respondent, the more likely he or she will lean toward centrist
or to the right ...

     ... The mainstream intellectual classes in China today all basically ha
ve their own vested interests. If they deviate from the mainstream path even
 a little bit, they will see their interests damaged. So they can only act i
n moderation and accommodate the current institutional arrangements.

     Will the intellectual elites collide with other social classes over dif
ferent political views and values? I think a lot of this is still dependent
on the decision-makers in taking the initiative, in proactively understandin
g and incorporating both from the elites and other social classes and examin
ing the issues comprehensively.

     SW: In your findings, a large proportion is considered "political centr
ists." You believe that this has a strong relationship with the growth of th
e middle class. But in China, scholars continue to heatedly debate what kind
 of people are considered middle class, how many are actually in the middle
class, and are the middle class' political views more radical or more conser
vative. In other words, can we then say that China's "political centrists" a
re also a highly variable group?

     Zhang: Yes. For the sake of this study, we basically equated those who
shared the view "They have different national conditions, can't be simply co
mpared" to political centrists ...

     .. In reality, decision-makers are by and large centrists. On some issu
es they may take a position slightly to the "right" and on others, they take
 a more "left" approach. This often amounts to murky and fuzzy policy adjust
ments, and that's intentional too, to prevent Chinese society from falling i
nto the extreme conflicts of the past.

     在廣東報刊—南方周末的采訪中，筆者進一步闡述了他的研究結果（選擇翻譯下）
：

     SW：都是一些相似的問題，這一次最大的區別是什么？（80年代張進行了一個幾乎
相同的調查）

     張：這一次有新焦點，尤其是在劃定“左，右，和中間派。”調查結果顯示，右派
百分比降低，“左”派在增加，多數民眾似乎趨向于迎合主流媒體。這三個結果跟我的
預期完全相反。1988年的時候，顯然受訪者中親西方的比例更高，那是改革初期，社會
接受西方的一切。

     …據調查，38.1%的受訪者認為“左”，51.5%的選“中間派”，8%認為是右。“我
要的不是這樣的結果，但是，如果你冷靜、理性的考慮你的周遭，不僅在知識界，在你
老家，或者大街上的路人，調查出來的百分比也不會相差太遠。

     SW：在你看來，以上你提到的三種人群會不會有沖突？

     張：研究表明，無論你的政治態度傾向于自由主義或者自由意志主義（或右派），
都跟教育水平息息相關。與此同時，受教育水平越高，支持更為溫和和務實的政治傾向
的可能越大。因此我們可以大致概括，更“國際化”的受訪者，他或她會傾向于中立或
右派的可能越大…

     …在中國的主流知識分子基本上都有各自的利益，他們如果偏離主流，即使是一點
點，利益也會受損，所以他們只能溫和適應當前的制度。

     知識精英和其他社會階層擁有不同的政治觀和價值觀？我想這主要依賴于決策者的
主動性，主動了解、融合精英和其他社會階層，全面審視問題。

     SW：在你的調查中，很大比例的“政治中間派",你認為這與中產階級的增長有密切
關系。但在中國，學者們仍在激烈的辯論什么是中產階級？中產階級又有多少？中產階
級的政治觀是更激進還是更保守？換句話說，我們可不可以說，中國的“政治中間派”
也都是高度可變的群體？     張：是的。我們研究的目的，其實等同于那些認為“他們
國情不一樣，不能作比較”的政治中間派…實際上，決策者大部分是中間派。有些事務
他們可能右傾，有些事務他們更偏左。這些往往是晦暗和模糊的政策調整，當然也是故
意的，以防中國的社會陷入過去的極端。

.

     Now what to make of all this? Many will likely dismiss these findings a
s simply a study meant to provide some intellectual heft for perpetuating th
e current status quo. Or perhaps the official narrative and media are simply
 driving these attitudes. At a minimum, surveys like these bolster emerging
Chinese public intellectuals who are championing Chinese exceptionalism, lik
e Eric X. Li, contending that China needs an indigenous model, excavated fro
m Chinese soil, not something borrowed and repackaged from the West.

     Whatever the reasons or causes, I'll contend that they are somewhat irr
elevant. What is more important is to further determine whether these findin
gs are in fact representative of the prevailing political reality in China t
oday. If this shift is indeed happening on a large, generational scale and w
ill endure, then foreign observers may need to adjust their expectations abo
ut what kind of China we may see when the post-80s generation rise into posi
tions of power.

     Of course, nothing is preordained, and I have few answers. But I do kno
w that grasping this political reality is as, if not more, important than wh
ether GDP grows at 7 percent or 7.5 percent.

     現在是什么主導？很多人誤以為這些研究只是為了延續現狀提供的一些智力的分量
，或許受到官方和媒體驅使。至少，這樣的調查鼓勵了那些“中國優越論”的知識分子
，認為中國需要土著模式，從中國本土挖掘，而不是從西方借來的和包裝的。

     不管有什么理由或原因，我認為與此無關。重要的是要進一步確定調查結果是否是
當今中國的主流政治現狀。如果確實發生了極大的時代性的規模的改變，并將持續，那
么外國觀察家們可能需要調整他們的期望，當80后執掌政權時中國會成為什么樣子。

     當然，沒有什么是注定的，我有了一些答案。但我知道，把握政治現狀似乎比明確
GDP是增長7%還是7.5%更重要。


======================================
     評論：

     1、Actually, I think we live in a plutocracy. The rich call all the sho
ts.In any event, democracy ain't lookin' all that good these days, Chinese o
r not.

     2、Why would the Chinese want to emulate American democracy when they c
an see the total inability of our system to address the pressing problems of
 today?

     3、The advantages of American democracy are subtle and hidden, while it
s disadvantages are loud and apparent. And yes, American democracy is on the
 decline.

     4、Why can't they emulate European democracy? Besides, how does the fai
lure of politicians equal the failure of a system. Our problem isn't the sys
tem a conceived. It's the people in the system.

     5、Young Chinese People May Just Not Be That Into Western-Style Democra
cy"So they re kind of like young American people then?

     1、實際上，我認為我們是財閥統治，完全由富人左右，無論如何今天的民主看起
來不是那么好，中國民不民主都一樣。

     2、當中國人看到美國民主系統完全無法解決緊迫的問題后，為什么還會想要效仿
？

     3、美國民主的優點微妙隱秘，而其缺點刺眼明顯，并且美國民主的（程度）正在
下滑。

     4、他們怎么不效仿歐洲？此外，政客失敗等同于制度失敗。問題不在制度而在深
陷制度里的人們。

     5、年輕的中國人可能不那么熱衷西方民主”—他們跟美國年輕人一樣？

     6、We have democracy and regular elections, and are stuck with a financ
ial oligarchy that sucks us, and the economy, dry. The EU is a democratic en
tity only in their press releases, elected politicians act merely as the fal
l-guys to failed economic policies to keep the European banks solvent. India
 is a democracy, and corrupt down to its very core. Argentina and Venezula e
lect leaders who have, and will continue to, strip the wealth of their count
ries in favor of the political class, seemingly without end.

     Chinese attitudes towards democracy aren't very useful, other than ther
e are alot of them, they don't currently have it, and if you want stay in ai
ry-fairy land, that's them. But it might be more useful to ask a about attit
udes in countries whose democratic process actually creates positive change,
 and works, say Estonia, there are some other examples.

     7、Argentina and Venezula elect leaders who have, and will continue to,
 strip the wealth of their countries in favor of the political class, seemin
gly without end.

     It's worth noting that, between Chavez's election in 1998 and 2006, the
 poverty rate (% of people living on less that $2/day, purchasing power pari
ty; World Bank stats) fell from 20% to 13%. (World Bank site doesn't have mo
re recent stats.) Venezuela's progress on the Human Development Index has al
so been faster by far in the 2000s than it was in the 1980s and 1990s, espec
ially in the area of education, where the average years of schooling a child
 receives has risen from 5.9 to 7.6.

     Oil wealth has been invested in raising standards of living rather than
 simply going to the oil companies overseas. There's a reason why he, and no
w his successors, continue being elected: he made a genuine difference in th
e lives of the poor after years of neoliberal policies that neglected them.

     6、我們擁有民主和定期選舉，而這些與金融寡頭密切相連，他們吸干了我們還有
我們的經濟。歐盟是只在新聞稿中出現民主實體，為了還貸，政治選舉成為了失敗經濟
政策的替罪羊。印度是一個民主國家，已經腐敗到核心阿，根廷和委內瑞拉選舉的領導
人，在政治界的支持下將繼續狠抓國家財富，看似還沒有底線。（調查）中國人對民主
的態度是沒有用的，沒很多人支持，他們現在也不具備民主。如果你只是不著邊際，那
還差不多。去調查那些因為民主進程，而帶來了積極的變化和影響的國家，可能會更有
意義，比如愛沙尼亞，還有一些其他例子。

     7、“阿根廷和委內瑞拉選舉的領導人，在政治界的支持下將繼續狠撈國家財富，
看似沒有底線”—值得注意的是，在1998和2006年查韋斯的任期里，貧困率（生活水平
低于2美元/天百分比的，購買力平價，世界銀行統計）從20%下降到13%。（世界銀行網
站沒有看到最近的數據。）委內瑞拉在人類發展指數的進步也很迅速，2000年與20世紀
80年代和90年代相比，特別是在教育領域，兒童平均上學的年頭從5.9上升到7.6。

     來自石油的財富用在了提高生活水平上而不是簡單的送給了海外石油公司。這就是
為什么他以及他的接班人，能繼續當選，在新自由主義拋棄窮人時，他為改善窮人的生
活標準，做出了不一般的貢獻（注釋：烏戈·查韋斯，曾任委內瑞拉總統，查韋斯主張
用激進的措施進行改革、削減中央集權、實行地方分權。）

     8、I'd say these polls are somewhat representative of my experience in
talking with people in China, except for the high numbers of youngish people
 saying "China is better than the US"--I've rarely found that. ("You can't c
ompare" is much more common.) Young Chinese admire many things about America
, but they don't necessarily want to become America.

     Americans have this mistaken idea that Chinese think like them, and yea
rn for the same democratic ideals that they do. But China has a very differe
nt history than America with traditional roots and perspectives on society t
hat go back thousands of years. America was founded, and then populated, by
people unhappy with the political or economic conditions in their former cou
ntry, people who valued independence and political freedom as paramount. Mos
t Chinese see stability and families/social ties as more important than free
dom and independence.

     Likewise, Americans believe that given the chance, regular Chinese woul
d overthrow their autocratic government and install a fully democratic one j
ust like America (though whether the US is indeed "fully democratic" is a su
bject for another debate). That is a profound misconception based on a lack
of understanding of Chinese way of thought and culture.

     Certainly Chinese want more freedom of expression. But they value other
 things even more. They are generally happy with "knowledgeable people" maki
ng the decisions and don't yearn to play a huge part in decision-making. In
a couple of generations, this may change, but not now.

      8、我想說，除開“大量中國年輕人說中國比美國好”這一項外，調查結果跟我與
中國人接觸的經歷是一致的，（無法相比較這種想法更為常見。）。在很多地方，中國
年輕一代羨慕美國，但他們不一定想成為美國。美國人誤以為，中國和他們想的一樣，
同樣渴望民主。但是中國歷史不同，傳統平民的社會觀形成已有幾千年。美國成立后，
由不滿國家之前的政治經濟體制的人落戶生根，認為人的獨立性和政治自由是最高價值
。而在大多數中國人眼里，國家穩定和家庭社會聯系比自由和獨立更重要。

     同樣，美國人以為只要有機會，中國就會推翻專制政府建立一個完全民主的國家
（類似美國）（盡管美國是否真的“完全的民主”還存在爭議）。這是由于缺乏中國思
維和文化而形成的深刻的誤解。當然，中國也想要更多表達的自由，他們樂于遵從智者
的決策，但是并不渴望親自參與決策。過個幾代，情況可能會有所改變，但現在不可能
。

      9、Chinese don't want to be Americans. Now that's a shock

     10、how harmful it is to sort people in to "left" "right" and put the r
est in the middle. If the right means "Western democracy" and the left means
 "Chinese communism" ... what room is there for a meaningful debate? Same pr
oblem we have in the West obviously.

      That one is disillusioned by the West should not surprise anyone. The
US shows pretty shockingly that "democracy" is just a word, and the idea beh
ind it can get lost, even if you're allowed to make a cross every four years
. If it's only white old millionaires up for election, then something is goi
ng on - but it's not democracy.

     On the other hand, when I read things like 'China's democracy today, wh
ich we call "socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics."' - I must th
ink someone drank the Chinese government's Koolaid. There is no democracy, a
nd it's by all means not socialist in any sense of the idea.

     It's these lies that "intellectuals" like Eric X. Li are spreading - th
ey are willfully destroying possible discussions.

     Anyways, a little note about the survey's reliability would have been n
ice too - experts on the subject tend to not trust questionnaires      in Ch
ina... since one has to be fearful to be too honest when it's possible the g
overnment wouldn't like your answers.

     11、I  totally agree that despite these words being used in the officia
l country and party names, Chinese is no more "democratic" than it is "commu
nist". "Socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics" is complete double
speak. (Of course, we Americans have our own doublespeak as well, but that's
 besides the point.)

     I also agree all official surveys of this sort are inherently unreliabl
e. However, as I mentioned in another comment, I'd say they somewhat reflect
 my own experience in living here in China.



      9、中國人不想當美國人，這太震驚了。

     10、將人劃分為“左”和“右”而其他人是中間派，危害性太大了。如果右派意味
著“西方民主”，左派意味著“中國共產主義“，辯論還會有什么余地？明顯西方也存
在這種問題

     對西方的幻滅是不足為奇的，美國的“民主”只是一句話，民主背后的東西可能都
將丟失，即使四年選舉輪換一次，如果只有百萬富翁可參選，當然選舉還在繼續，但它
就不再是民主了。

     另外，當我看到類似于“中國的民主，我們稱之為“有中國特色的社會主義民主政
治。”這類讀物，我想肯定有人喝了中國政府的酷愛（一種以兒童為銷售對象的飲料）
。 他們都沒有民主，怎么也稱不上社會主義。

     知識分子的謊言正在擴散-他們在故意破壞討論的可能性。

     不管怎么說，調查可靠性不高，專家們傾向于不相信中國的問卷調查，因為（受調
查者）擔心政府不喜歡，可能害怕說實話。

     11、我完全同意，盡管官方政府和政黨常用這句話（注：中國特色社會主義民主政
治），但比起”民主“中國更“共產主義”。“具有中國特色的社會主義民主政治”完
全是故弄玄虛。（當然，我們美國人也故弄玄虛，但那不是重點。）這種官方調查本質
上是不可靠的。

     12、"Democracy", "Productivity", and "Legitimacy" all have different me
anings however. China may very well be a productive society in terms of outp
uts, and that may well confer some form of legitmacy to its form of governme
nt in the eyes of its citizens, but this doesn't necessarily make it a Democ
racy. Democracy doesn't simply mean "good."

     13、No, democracy means "rule by the people". The "one man, one vote" f
orm is just one. The hardcore Maoism of the Cultural Revolution is another.
No, democracy is definitely NOT (always) good.

     14、Incomes double every ten years, 90% home ownership, peace, universa
l health insurance, 3 weeks mandatory paid vacation, 600 million raised from
 poverty, peace, security, more participation in democracy than ever in Chin
a's history, best school systems on earth.....

     15、What are even you talking about? You are the one erroneously equati
ng America and China. Just because older students can and do get around the
censorship, does not mean that they haven't already been brainwashed by the
regime. Even a cursory knowledge of China's netizens reveal them to be extre
me nationalists. Are you so foolish as to believe that this is by accident?
Or some kind of Chinese genetic quirk? It's by design

    12、”民主”，“生產力”，和“合法性”都有不同的意義，中國的（出口）生產
力可能很強，在他的公民看來也是合法政權，但這并不一定使它成為民主國家。民主并
不單純指“好”。

     13、民主是指“人民統治”。一人一票是一種，硬派毛的文化革命是另一種。不，
民主肯定是（常常）不好的。

     14、每十年收入翻一番，90%的房屋所有權、和平、全民醫療保險、三個星期的帶
薪假，六億人脫離貧困、和平、安全、以及中國歷史上從未出現過的民主參與性、地球
上最好的教育系統.....

     15、（注：此條評論針對中國國旗下的宣誓、中國接受高等教育的人能避開國家審
查）我的高中從沒宣誓過，也不打算，你想說什么？你錯誤的評估了美國和中國。高年
級學生能避開審查，也不意味著他們沒被政府洗腦。只粗略的了解下中國網民，也能發
現他們是極端民族主義者。你這么蠢，相信這是偶然嗎？或者遺傳特質？都是設計好的
！

     16、OK... people are free to criticize... until they're not. Petitioner
s are regularly hassled and often enough incarcerated for periods without tr
ial. Local people without wealth or power can be roughed up by local street
cops without much recourse. Rule of law is weak (though there are positive s
igns of change). Crackdowns and the paranoid self-censoring behavior engende
red by the threat of crackdowns recur. Organization that is seen as any kind
 of threat to Party power is regularly squelched. Lawyers, artists, and writ
ers are closely watched by security and know their lives can become very dif
ficult indeed if they step over the line. Lots to praise about contemporary
China, but no need to be all 五毛黨 about the PRC!

     17、China is worse than us in some of those areas and ahead of us in ot
hers – like unarmed cops who people yell at very loudly if they don't like
the way they're being treated. And safe streets at night. And everyone (90%)
 sleeping under a roof they still own even after the GFC. And everyone, ever
yone, having gotten 100% raises every ten years for almost 40 years. In our,
 much richer, unscarred-by-200-years-occupation-and-war, country, we have be
en getting poorer over that time by about 1% per decade.

     China's government has solved some expensive governance and financial m
anagement problems cheaply. We should study those solutions and adapt them t
o our needs. Instead of approaching them with negative expectations, let's s
ee the Chinese government as its citizens see it: the best they've ever had.
 If you have Chinese friends you'll know that they're still heatedly discuss
ing the Duke of Zhou's term of government. It ended 3,700 years ago.

     16、好吧…大家有批評的自由…直到不吵了。請愿受到滋擾，不審判就把你監禁，
沒有錢和權的本地人遭受到當地警察的毆打，也沒地方求助。法治很弱（雖然有積極的
跡象）。鎮壓和偏執的自我審查導致了威脅性的鎮壓反復出現，任何威脅政黨的組織會
遭到定期清理。律師，藝術家，和作家密切關注當局，他們知道如果越界，生活將會很
難過，贊美中國，但沒必要每個人都成為中國的五毛黨（嘿，他們竟然也知道五毛）！


     17、某些領域中國比我們差，有些地方比我們領先。（中國）手無寸鐵的警察如果
不喜歡別人對待他的方式會大聲罵，夜晚街道也很安全。即使是在全球金融危機后，每
個人（90%）都有房子住。每個人，每一個人收入每十年會增加100%，已經有40年了。我
們更富有，但在經歷過200年的占領和戰爭后，（我們的）國家已經越來越窮，每十年下
降1%，中國政府將昂貴的治理和財務管理開銷精簡化，我們應該學習他們。與其帶著悲
觀的預期和他們接觸，不如看看中國公民眼中的政府—是（歷史上）存在過的最好的。
如果你有中國朋友你會知道，他們還在熱烈地討論著周公的政治模式，而它在3700年前
就已經結束了。（注釋：周公認為：民意決定著天意，中國政治哲學的傳統就是“民本
”政治，這種傳統是由周公奠定基礎的。“民本”思想的實質乃是“人民主權”；而不
論是我們正在建設的現代民權政治，還是中國歷史上的王權政治和皇權政治，都不過是
實現這種人民主權的不同方式而已。而此表現形式之變革，又無不基于中國政治哲學傳
統的正義原則：正當性、適宜性。因此，現代民主應僅僅被視為民本的一種特定表現形
式。）

--
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※ 文章網址: http://www.ptt.cc/bbs/CrossStrait/M.1413206561.A.E19.html
※ 編輯: yanke (140.206.149.38), 10/13/2014 21:24:30
推 inebriety: 熱衷也沒用
推 Chynagirl: 西式民主會完全瓦解土共的階級次序
→ Chynagirl: 一個大學教授和一個文盲，一人一票等值
→ Chynagirl: 上司下屬也是一人一票
推 shimo: 廢話，西式民主在大陸就跟一國兩制在台灣一
→ shimo: 樣都是負面名詞了
→ shimo: 「你結婚後要住傳統大家庭，還是小家庭？」
推 shimo: 落實憲法中的地方自治，把宅鬥的力氣省下
→ shimo: 來好好發展，不要互扯後腿不是很好嗎
推 mstory: 因為西式民主不好，所以就可以限制人民的
→ mstory: 言論自由嗎?
噓 william2001: 西式民主就是金主政治。
→ william2001: 共和民主兩黨也是被有錢人操控。
推 mstory: 原來保障人民的言論自由是不應該的
→ mstory: 保障人民的言論自由等於被有錢人操控
→ mstory: 口口聲聲西式民主不好，其實是在捍衛中共
→ mstory: 的特權，真是可笑的中國式民主
→ mstory: 中共是給了你多少好處，來捍衛他的特權呢?
推 william2001: 言論自由有個屁用。你天天在這個板上
→ william2001: 喊，都幾年了，是改變了什麼？
→ william2001: 美國有4千多萬窮人需要食物銀行等的
→ william2001: 幫助啊。
推 koukai4: 英國人表示:現在跳過我是怎樣....
推 wo2323: 金主政治正解
→ wo2323: 二樓說錯了 對岸已經知道西方民主玩什麼了
→ wo2323: 而且知道的比哈洋的鄉民更詳細
→ wo2323: 他們只是懶得跟鄉民表演布袋戲而已
→ wo2323: 還不如單純用一個身份給所有人檢視更實際
→ RIFF: 民主人權是人性
→ RIFF: 標題意味著中國人停止人性的成長