On Sat, 30 Sep 2006, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
> III. Impact
>
> An attacker sending specially crafted packets to sshd(8) can cause a
> Denial of Service by using 100% of CPU time until a connection timeout
> occurs. Since this attack can be performed over multiple connections
> simultaneously, it is possible to cause up to MaxStartups (10 by default)
> sshd processes to use all the CPU time they can obtain. [CVE-2006-4924]
>
> The OpenSSH project believe that the race condition can lead to a Denial
> of Service or potentially remote code execution, but the FreeBSD Security
> Team has been unable to verify the exact impact. [CVE-2006-5051]
>
> IV. Workaround
>
> The attack against the CRC compensation attack detector can be avoided
> by disabling SSH Protocol version 1 support in sshd_config(5).
>
> There is no workaround for the second issue.
Doesn't TCP wrappers restriction mitigate or work around this issue or
is it done too late ?
--
Pekka Savola "You each name yourselves king, yet the
Netcore Oy kingdom bleeds."
Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings
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