噓 vintw:這文章的立場還真鮮明，而且說法跟政府文宣如出一轍 03/28 15:37
→ vintw:先說這是兩黨惡鬥，又說不簽服貿沒信用，又扯拉丁美洲當救援 03/28 15:41
The Diplomat也是極具公信力的外交期刊
本文作者Jonathan Spangler現為政大亞太研究博士生
對於這次的學運有相當深入的了解，中譯版本製作中
新聞網址:http://ppt.cc/v5ON
Taiwan and the Future of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement
The protests over the past week leave Taiwan in an awkward position.
By Jonathan Spangler
March 27, 2014
Taipei, Taiwan — After months of simmering tensions between Taiwan’s ruling
Kuomintang (KMT) and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) backed
by members of civil society, the debate over the Cross-Strait Services Trade
Agreement (CSSTA) has finally reached a breaking point. During the past week,
demonstrators – whom media outlets continue to misleadingly refer to only as
“students” – successfully occupied the Legislative Yuan and Executive
Yuan, managing to hold off police attempts to evict them from the former for
almost a week. Yet amidst the commotion and calls to either renegotiate the
agreement article by article or disband it in its entirety, three key issues
have fallen by the wayside: the legality and implications of reneging on a
bilateral agreement, the significance of international image and reputation
for diplomatic relations, and most importantly, how to design feasible and
effective ways to protect the most vulnerable members of Taiwanese society.
When the KMT concluded negotiations with the mainland and signed the CSSTA
last July, it marked the beginning of a series of orthodox democratic
attempts to force the ruling party to take into consideration the concerns of
opposition lawmakers, labor groups, and civil society. Lobbying, public
hearings, and tame demonstrations, all standard fare in today’s
representative democracies, had limited impact. Brawling between politicians
in the legislature, a local tradition, was equally ineffective. In effect,
the domesticated backlash has thus far allowed the government to appear
democratic while simultaneously pushing a run-of-the-mill neoliberal agenda
supported by conservative lawmakers, the mainland Chinese government, and
powerful business interests on both sides of the strait. The move by the
ruling party to sign the agreement without prior consultation was admittedly
undemocratic – even by the weakest standards of what constitutes democratic
policymaking behavior. Nevertheless, it was successful, and therein lies the
crucial issue whose implications must be now be reckoned with.
For months, demands for an article-by-article review of the agreement have
been the central focus of opponents’ strategic roadmap. In theory, such a
review would have major benefits in that the impacts of each article for
specific sectors of society and the economy could be analyzed and the
democratic process would be utilized. In practice, however, it is not a
feasible option for three reasons. First, the agreement would remain
indefinitely vulnerable to political impasse. Protracted negotiations would
increase the potential for ultimate failure as well as the opportunity cost
for legislators who have remained predominantly focused on promoting or
opposing the agreement instead of on alternative political engagements.
Second, renewed renegotiations with the mainland would be required.
Proponents have long suggested that article-by-article discussion would
legally force a return to negotiation with the mainland over the agreement,
and only recently have opponents finally begun to come to terms with this
reality. This realization should have come long ago. Had the agreement’s
detractors accepted this earlier on, their energy could have been focused on
more realistic and creative approaches to confronting the issue. Third,
failure to implement the agreement may invite a confrontational reaction from
Beijing and, perhaps needless to say, will not result in any further
concessions in Taiwan’s favor. As with any bilateral agreement, it is the
expectation of both parties that signing will be followed by political and
logistical implementation. Not fulfilling this expectation will be seen as
either ineptness or resistance on the part of the Taiwan government, which
may provoke confrontation with the mainland. As historical evidence can
attest, such a situation does not bode well for the future of cross-strait
and regional relations. In short, the threadbare article-by-article
renegotiation model forwarded by opponents is fruitless and poorly conceived,
as it implies a return to negotiations with Beijing that are unlikely to be
advantageous for any members of Taiwanese society.
Yet the deleterious effects of failure to implement the CSSTA would not only
be domestic or bilateral; the international implications would be equally
grave. Taiwanese history over the past decades has represented an arduous
struggle for diplomatic recognition. Indeed, it is the foundation upon which
almost all of the island’s foreign policy depends. Reneging on a bilateral
agreement, such as the CSSTA, would serve as a clear indication to the
international community that the local government lacks the capacity to
effectively engage in international relations. The logic runs like this: If
Taipei cannot succeed in fulfilling an already signed trade agreement with
its closest neighbor and most significant trading partner, the risks involved
for other countries in deepening economic ties with Taiwan may outweigh the
potential benefits. For better or worse, international image and reputation
are key to diplomatic relations. Should Taiwanese lawmakers fail to push
through the agreement at this late a stage in negotiations, they are shooting
themselves in the foot.
Yet the most potent criticism of the CSSTA is not that its proponents
neglected to use the democratic process in its signing but the fact that the
agreement may well have serious negative impacts on certain members and
sectors of Taiwanese society. Given that the explicitly stated purpose of the
agreement is to open the gates to cross-strait investment, opponents envision
a flood of Chinese businesses entering the Taiwanese market and competing
with Taiwanese local businesses. The fear of an economically powerful
neighbor is a rational one. Latin American countries, for example, have long
had to cope with the challenges of living under the shadow of U.S. economic
and political influence. Though the analogy may seem far-fetched, the ongoing
impasse in cross-strait relations is not altogether different.
Today, in Taiwan, the fear and uncertainty over the CSSTA is palpable. None
can predict with accuracy how exactly it will affect local industries. The
most critical issue is ensuring that the most vulnerable sectors of the
economy and members of society are not negatively impacted by the CSSTA. The
first step is to accept the reality that the agreement has already been
signed into law and may be pushed through the Legislative Yuan or handed off
to the Executive Yuan for final approval. The second and most vital step will
then be to design and implement a system of safeguard mechanisms to guarantee
that select sectors and groups will be sheltered from the hypothetical storm
of Chinese investment.
There is good news and bad news. The good news is that implementing such
safeguards is a real possibility both legally and logistically. Forward
progress on the issue will rest heavily on Article 8 of the agreement, which
stipulates that both parties can call for negotiations in the event of a
service industry sector or population being negatively impacted. Blueprints
for these safeguard mechanisms should take advantage of the wealth of issue-
and industry-specific domestic and international expertise that is available
to assess the policy impacts of the bilateral free trade agreement. The plans
should provide quantifiable limits on acceptable CSSTA-inflicted impacts,
clear guidelines on measurement of these impacts, and details on how the
government will respond when impacts exceed stated limits. Moreover, they
should also outline a plan for periodic reassessment of the safeguard
mechanisms to ensure that they can adapt to changing economic and political
trends. The other good news is that guaranteeing the continued wellbeing of
Taiwanese society is an issue that can be agreed upon. At least in principle,
KMT and DPP lawmakers, business and labor groups, and activists of all
stripes express interest in the island’s economic and social development,
and many are committed to investing significant time and effort into the
issue.
The bad news is that it will require a concerted effort amongst these diverse
interests. Whether or not the capacity to do so in contemporary two-party
democracies has all but vanished is difficult to say. Given that it is in the
best interest of all parties involved to overcome this obstacle, the
possibility is there, and now is the time to take advantage of it. How the
debacle will play out in the coming days and weeks is anybody’s guess. Yet
the realization that there are opportunities for basic agreement on the
creation of safeguard mechanisms may bring some focus and rationality to the
seemingly intractable dispute. This should come as a breath of relief for all
those so deeply invested in its outcome.
Jonathan Spangler is a doctoral student with the International Doctoral
Program in Asia-Pacific Studies (IDAS) at National Chengchi University in
Taipei, Taiwan. He is also a member of the South China Sea Research Team at
the Center for Security Studies (CSS), based at the Institute of
International Relations (IIR), and a research assistant at Academia Sinica.
The views expressed in the analysis do not necessarily reflect those of the
institutions with which he is affiliated.
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