http://www.foreignaffairs.org/current/
這個網站的文章都有一定水準
只是除了試看的文章以外 其他要全看要錢
我私下翻譯過一篇半:p
－－－－－－
例：
The Law of War in the War on Terror 4之1
內容：
The Law of War in the War on Terror
反恐戰爭裡的戰爭法規
Summary: The Bush administration has literalized its "war" on terrorism,
dissolving the legal
boundaries between what a government can do in peacetime and what's allowed
in war. This move may
have made it easier for Washington to detain or kill suspects, but it has
also threatened basic
due process rights, thereby endangering us all.
Kenneth Roth is Executive Director of Human Rights Watch.
大意：
布希當局對於恐怖主義所用的字眼「戰爭」一如字面上的意思，使得戰時與承平
時期在法律上的界限變得模糊。這些動作讓華府擱置或消滅了相關質疑，也威脅
到基本的法律執行程序是否存在，使全體國民都陷入危險之中。
Kenneth Roth是人權觀察團體的執行長
What are the boundaries of the Bush administration's "war on terrorism?" The
recent battles fought
against the Afghan and Iraqi governments were classic wars between organized
military forces. But
President George W. Bush has suggested that his campaign against terrorism
goes beyond such
conflicts; he said on September 29, 2001, "Our war on terror will be much
broader than the battlefields
and beachheads of the past. The war will be fought wherever terrorists hide,
or run, or plan."
布希當局對抗恐怖主義的戰爭，其界限為何呢？不管是提到對阿富汗或是對伊拉
克的軍事行動，它們都是在兩個有組織的軍事力量之間典型的戰爭行為。不過布
希總統卻暗示他的反恐戰爭將會超越（兩個軍事組織）「戰爭」的定義。「我們
反恐戰爭的範圍會比之於以往在戰區或軍事據點以外更大。」「這場戰爭在恐怖
份子藏匿、活動、甚至計劃之處都會發生衝突。」
This language stretches the meaning of the word "war." If Washington means
"war" metaphorically,
as when it speaks about a "war" on drugs, the rhetoric would be
uncontroversial, a mere hortatory
device intended to rally support for an important cause. Bush, however, seems
to think of the war on
terrorism quite literally -- as a real war -- and this concept has worrisome
implications. The rules that
bind governments are much looser during wartime than in times of peace. The
Bush administration
has used war rhetoric precisely to give itself the extraordinary powers
enjoyed by a wartime
government to detain or even kill suspects without trial. In the process, the
administration may have
made it easier for itself to detain or eliminate suspects. But it has also
threatened the most basic due
process rights.
這樣的語言擴展了「戰爭」一詞的涵義。如果華府只是把這個字眼當作一種比喻，
比方說用在反毒（戰爭），那這個字眼殆無疑義；將僅僅代表一種為了重要理由所
表現的強力聲援、一個激勵人心的工具罷了。然而，布希當局似乎認為反恐戰爭一
如字面所指就是戰爭，如此的認知將使得這些動作產生令人驚駭的涵意。因為，布
希當局已經明確地將戰爭時政府才能擁有的權限套在它身上，甚至在毫無檢視的情
形下消滅了一切質疑。在這個過程中，華府要去消弭或減低質疑的動作更為方便，
但也因此威脅到最基本的，執法時人民在程序上所應享有的權利。
LAW AT PEACE, LAW AT WAR
By literalizing its "war" on terror, the Bush administration has broken down
the distinction between
what is permissible in times of peace and what can be condoned during a war.
In peacetime,
governments are bound by strict rules of law enforcement. Police can use
lethal force only if necessary
to meet an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Once a suspect
is detained, he or she
must be charged and tried. These requirements -- what one can call
"law-enforcement rules" -- are
codified in international human rights law.
法律在戰時與承平時期的不同
藉由將反恐制裁定義成戰爭，布希當局已經模糊了政府在戰時與承平時期之間政府
應守的分際。在平常的時候，政府受限於執法上嚴格的規範，除非當下遭遇到足以
致命或嚴重傷害的威脅，否則警察不能使用致人於死的武力；一旦嫌疑犯被逮捕，
必須交由司法起訴及審判。這些要求（所謂執法規範"law-enforcement rules"） 都是一
一編纂在國際人權法律裡的。
In times of war, law-enforcement rules are supplemented by a more permissive
set of rules: namely,
international humanitarian law, which governs conduct during armed conflict.
Under such "war rules,"
unlike during peacetime, an enemy combatant can be shot without warning
(unless he or she is
incapacitated, in custody, or trying to surrender), regardless of any
imminent threat. If a combatant is
captured, he or she can be held in custody until the end of the conflict,
without any trial.
而戰爭的時候，執法規範會援引更寬鬆的規定。顧名思義，用來處理軍事衝突時所
定的國際人道法規，在像是諸如戰時法規（ war rules ）的規定下：不像承平時候，
不管任何一種立即性的威脅，對敵人可不經警告便加以射殺；（除非敵人已無行為
能力、被監禁、或試圖投降例外。）如果敵軍被逮捕，直到戰役結束前，都可以在
沒有審判的情況下將他拘禁起來。
These two sets of rules have been well developed over the years, both by
tradition and by detailed
international conventions. There is little law, however, to explain exactly
when one set of rules
should apply instead of the other. For example, the Geneva Conventions -- the
principal codification
of war rules -- apply to "armed conflict," but the treaties do not define the
term. Fortunately, in its
commentary on them, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the
conventions' official
custodian, has provided some guidance. One test that the ICRC suggests can
help determine whether
wartime or peacetime rules apply is to examine the intensity of hostilities
in a given situation. The
Bush administration, for example, has claimed that al Qaeda is at "war" with
the United States because
of the magnitude of its attacks on September 11, 2001, its bombings of the
U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, its attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and the bombing of
residential compounds in
Saudi Arabia. Each of these attacks was certainly a serious crime warranting
prosecution. But technically
speaking, was the administration right to claim that they add up to a war?
The ICRC's commentary does
not provide a clear answer.
不管是就慣例或國際公約裡的細目，這兩套規定在過去都發展得很完備。然而，對
於在什麼時機要去應用哪一套規定這點，相關法律卻著墨有限。舉例來說，戰時規
定的主要法典日內瓦公約（ the Geneva Conventions ），認為戰時意指發生武裝衝
突
，但條約並沒有定義武裝衝突又是什麼？幸運的是，在國際紅十字會──也就是日
內瓦公約的正式起草機關（ official custodian ）對此提供了一些指標，其中之一是
：
在特定時空下，決定是否為戰爭狀態的指標為檢視雙方敵對的張力大小（the intens-
ity of hostilities）。比方說， 因為９１１事件所造成的傷亡程度、肯亞及坦桑尼亞
美
國大使館被炸的事件、在葉門美國參議員Cole 所遭到的攻擊、發生在沙烏地阿拉伯
住宅區的爆炸事件等等，讓布希當局聲明美國和基地組織現在是戰爭狀態。這裡面
的每一件犯罪都無疑地應該依重大犯罪的程度加以起訴，但要說布希當局將之拉高
到戰爭的定義，在手法上來看，可以說是對的嗎？這點，國際紅十字會的評析卻不
能提供明確的是非。
In addition to the intensity of hostilities, the ICRC suggests considering
factors such as the regularity
of armed clashes and the degree to which opposing forces are organized.
Whether a conflict is
politically motivated also seems to play an unacknowledged role in deciding
whether it is a "war" or
not. Thus organized crime or drug trafficking, although methodical and
bloody, are generally
understood to fall under law-enforcement rules, whereas armed rebellions,
once sufficiently organized
and violent, are usually seen as "wars." The problem with these guidelines,
however, is that they were
written to address political conflicts rather than global terrorism. Thus
they do not make it clear
whether al Qaeda should be considered an organized criminal operation (which
would not trigger
the application of war rules) or a rebellion (which would).
除了敵對張力以外，國際紅十字會也建議了其他指標像是武裝衝突的頻率、敵對勢
力組織化的程度等等。在決定何者的侵害為戰爭與否的標準上，政治動機似乎扮演
著檯面下決定的因素，比方組織化的犯罪或毒品走私；雖然兩者都是組織化而且手
段血腥的罪行，卻通常被認定是受到執法規範保護的；而武裝叛變，一旦在有相當
規模及暴力行為的條件下，就常被認為是（國內）「戰爭」。然而，這些指標所衍
生的問題，都還只是在談政治衝突而非全球性的恐怖主義；因此，它們都無法辨別
究竟「基地組織」（ al Qaeda ）的活動是應該被認為作一個有組織的犯罪而已呢？
（如此將不會受到戰時法規的挶限。），還是一個武裝叛變呢？（會受到戰時法規
的挶限。）
Even in the case of war, another factor in deciding whether law-enforcement
or war rules should
be applied is the nature of a given suspect's involvement. Such an approach
can be useful because
war rules treat as combatants only those who are taking an active part in
hostilities. Typically, this
category includes members of a military who have not laid down their arms as
well as others who
are fighting or approaching a battle, directing an attack, or defending a
position. Under this rule,
even civilians who pick up arms and start fighting can be considered
combatants and treated
accordingly. But this definition is difficult to apply to terrorism, where
roles and activities are
clandestine and a person's relationship to specific violent acts is often
unclear.
即使用戰爭的角度來看，任何決定是否採取執法規範或戰時法規的因素，都還必須
考慮到特定嫌犯參與的狀況。這種考量能夠派上用場是因為戰時規定只限於在敵對
狀態下有動作的戰鬥人員。而通常的狀況是：包括沒有放下武器的士兵、以及持續
抵抗或靠近戰鬥現場的人，另外指揮官和在軍事位置有防禦動作的人員都包括在內
。照這個標準，即使拿起武器開始戰鬥的市民都可以被認定是適用對象比照處理。
但這些定義很難用到恐怖主義，因為他們所扮演的角色和行動秘而不宣，個人與特
定暴力行動的關係也常常難以判定。
（待續）
發言人 竑廣 層 級 2 時間 2004/2/21 15:42
主題：The Law of War in the War on Terror ４之２
內容：
The Law of War in the War on Terror ４之２
反恐戰爭裡的戰爭法規 文／Kenneth Roth人權觀察團體的執行長
HARD CASES
不易釐清的個案
Given that so much confusion exists about whether to apply wartime or
law-enforcement
rules to a given situation, a better approach would be to make the decision
based on its
public policy implications. Unfortunately, the Bush administration seems to
have ignored
such concerns. Consider, for example, the cases of Jose Padilla and Ali Saleh
Kahlah
al-Marri. Federal officials arrested Padilla, a U.S. citizen, in May 2002
when he arrived
from Pakistan at Chicago's O'Hare Airport, allegedly to scout out targets for
a radiological
("dirty") bomb. As for al-Marri, a student from Qatar, he was arrested in
December 2001
at his home in Peoria, Illinois, for allegedly being a "sleeper" agent: an
inactive terrorist
who, once activated, would help others launch attacks. President Bush,
invoking war rules,
has declared both men to be "enemy combatants," allowing the U.S. government
to hold
them without charge or trial until the end of the war against terrorism --
whenever that is.
既然在分辯戰和之間就援引法律方面存在諸多困惑，比較好的辨別方式是基於
公共政策意涵來判定。不幸的是，布希當局似乎一直忽略這一點。讓我們想想
聯邦政府逮捕Jose Padilla和Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri的過程好了。Jose Padilla是
美
國公民，在２００２五月當他從巴基斯坦飛到美國在芝加哥 O'Hare 機場下飛
機時，因為聯邦政府聲稱要找出放射性炸彈位置所在的緣故逮捕了他；而Ali
Saleh Kahlah al-Marri是出自Qatar的學生，在２００１年１２月在伊利諾州位於
Peoria的家被抓，聯邦政府的理由是指稱他為潛伏性("sleeper" agent)－－意即未
活動的－－恐怖份子成員，也就是將來可能會去幫助其他恐怖份子活動，因此
加以逮捕。布希總統引用戰時法規宣稱他們兩個都是敵軍士兵，使美國政府在
沒有任何起訴與審判的情形下對他們加以拘禁，直到反恐戰爭結束－－不管究
竟是什麼時候哪一天才到。
But should Padilla and al-Marri, even if they have actually done what the
government
claims, really be considered warriors? Aren't they more like ordinary
criminals? A simple
thought experiment shows how dangerous are the implications of treating them
as
combatants. The Bush administration has asserted that the two men planned to
wage war
against the United States and therefore can be considered de facto soldiers.
But if that is
the case, then under war rules, the two men could have been shot on sight,
regardless of
whether they posed any immediate danger to the United States (although they
might have
been spared under what is known as the doctrine of "military necessity,"
which holds that
lethal force should not be used if an enemy combatant can be neutralized
through lesser
means). Under the administration's logic, then, Padilla could have been
gunned down as
he stepped off his plane at O'Hare, and al-Marri as he left his home in
Peoria. That, after
all, is what it means to be a combatant in time of war.
即使他們真的做了美國政府所指控的罪行，Padilla和al-Marri真的應該被視為戰犯
嗎？他們不是應該更接近一般罪犯的定義嗎？用一個簡單的思辨來檢驗便可以發
覺到，將他們視為戰犯的作法隱含多大的危險：布希當局宣稱這兩個人因為從事
危害美國的戰爭，因此可以被認定為準（敵方）軍士。但倘若真是如此，不管他
們對美國有任何立即性的危險，這兩人都可以被當場擊斃。（如果可以用更輕易
的方式使他們免於危害美國，基於所謂的戰事必要，對他們就不應該使用致命武
力，雖然如此，但這一點在處理他們的過程中可能被忽略掉。）在美國當局的邏
輯下，Padilla 可以在O'Hare下機門時就被射殺。同樣的，al-Marri在Peoria出家門
口時也可以被格斃。畢竟，這就是對戰時敵方士兵該做的做法。
But the Bush administration has not claimed that either suspect was anywhere
near to
carrying out his alleged terrorist plan. Neither man, therefore, posed the
kind of imminent
threat that would justify the use of lethal force under law-enforcement
rules. Given this
fact, it would have been deeply disturbing if they were shot as enemy
soldiers. Of course,
the White House has not proposed killing them; instead, it plans to detain
the two men
indefinitely. But if Padilla and al-Marri should not be considered enemy
combatants for
the purpose of killing them, they should not be considered enemy combatants
for the
purpose of detaining them, either.
但布希政府並未宣佈他們兩人有哪一個人是在什麼地方即將進行被政府指控的恐
怖活動。在缺乏諸如此類的犯罪事實下，受執法規範限制，美國政府無法合理地
解釋對他們使用致命性的武力；基於這樣的事實，如果他們被當作敵方士兵當場
射殺的話將對法理造成嚴重的扭曲。當然，美國政府並不打算殺了他們，而是無
限期地拘禁他們，如果從能否當場格斃的考量認定他們不該被當作戰時敵方的士
兵的話，在拘禁他們時，也不應該比照敵方士兵的方式來扣留他們。
A similar classification problem, although with a possibly different result,
arose in the case
of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi. Al-Harethi, who Washington alleges was a
senior al Qaeda
official, was killed by a drone-fired missile in November 2002 while driving
in a remote
tribal area of Yemen. Five of his companions, including a U.S. citizen, also
died in the attack,
which was carried out by the CIA. The Bush administration apparently
considered al-Harethi
to be an enemy combatant for his alleged involvement in the October 2000
U.S.S. Cole
bombing. In this instance, the case for applying war rules was stronger than
with Padilla or
al-Marri (although the Bush administration never bothered to spell it out).
Al-Harethi's mere
participation in the 2000 attack on the Cole would not have made him a
combatant in 2002,
since he could have subsequently withdrawn from al Qaeda; war rules permit
attacking only
current combatants, not past ones. And if al-Harethi were a civilian, he
could not have
legally been attacked unless he was actively engaged in hostilities at the
time. But the
administration alleged that al-Harethi was a "top bin Laden operative in
Yemen," implying
that he was in the process of preparing future attacks. If true, this would
have made the use
of war rules against him more appropriate. And unlike in the cases of Padilla
and al-Marri,
arresting al-Harethi may not have been an option. The Yemeni government has
little control
over the tribal area where he was killed; indeed, 18 Yemeni soldiers had
reportedly died in
an earlier attempt to arrest him.
一個相似的典型案例（雖然結果不同）是Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi的案子，因為
被政府指控身為蓋達組織的高級幹部，al-Harethi在葉門僻遠的村落開車時，在２
００２年１１月被遙控飛彈擊斃；和他同行的五人，其中包括一個美國公民，也
死於這次ＣＩＡ所進行的攻擊。由於他涉及在２０００年參議員Cole被炸彈攻擊
的事件，很明顯布希當局因此將他當成戰時敵軍處理。在這個例子裡，顯然比
Padilla or al-Marri更像在引用戰時法規的權限來處理罪犯（雖然布希政府不厭其煩
地重申這項法規）。Al-Harethi只參與了２０００年攻擊參議員Cole行動，這不會
讓他在２００２年也搖身一變成為戰時敵軍士兵；（因為他或許從那以後就不再
是蓋達組織的一員。）戰時法規只限定對當下的敵軍而不是已成過去的敵軍，而
且如果al-Harethi的身份是一位公民，除非他當時正在從事與政府敵對的情事，否
則都不該遭受到任何攻擊。但布希政府指稱他是賓拉登在葉門的手下，暗示他正
在準備未來會發生的恐怖活動。如果屬實，那麼在處理他的過程中引用戰時法規
會更適切，並且不像Padilla和al-Marri的例子，以逮捕的方式處理可能就不是布希
當局的選擇了。的確，當擊斃al-Harethi時，葉門政府對於這件事只有縛雞之力可
掌握，早先逮捕他的行動裡，有１８名葉門士兵喪命。
Although there may have been a reasonable case for applying war rules to
al-Harethi, the
Bush administration has applied these rules with far less justification in
other episodes
outside the United States. For example, in October 2001, Washington sought
the surrender
of six Algerian men in Bosnia. At first, the U.S. government followed
law-enforcement
rules and secured the men's arrest. But then, after a three-month
investigation, Bosnia's
Supreme Court ordered the suspects released for lack of evidence. Instead of
providing
additional evidence, however, Washington simply switched to war rules. It
pressured
the Bosnian government to hand the men over anyway and whisked them out of
the
country -- not to trial, but to indefinite detention at the U.S. naval base
at Guant?mo Bay.
雖然我們可能已經有了一個更適於引用戰時法規處理的案例，但在美國國土以外
的其他案子，布希當局就相當缺乏合理的解釋了，比方說，２００１年１０月華
府要求波士尼亞引渡六個阿爾及利亞人出來這件事。最初，美國政府遵守執法規
範，並且拘留他們時給予安全保護。但之後經過３個月的調查，波士尼亞最高法
院因為罪證不足要釋放他們，美國政府在沒有提出更強的罪證的情況下，就這樣
以戰時規定加以處置：它對波士尼亞施壓無論如何要交出這些人，並且將他們帶
出國境──然後他們得到的不是一個（合理的）審判，而是在Guant?mo Bay的美
國海軍基地無止盡的拘禁。
The administration followed a similar pattern in June 2003, when five al
Qaeda suspects
were detained in Malawi. Malawi's high court ordered local authorities to
follow the law
and either charge or release the five men, all of whom were foreigners.
Ignoring local law,
the Bush administration then insisted that the men be handed over to U.S.
security forces
instead. The five were spirited out of the country to an undisclosed location
-- not for trial,
but for interrogation. The move sparked riots in Malawi. The men were
released a month
later in Sudan, after questioning by Americans failed to turn up any
incriminating evidence.
美國當局在２００３年６月做了一樣的事，當五位蓋達的嫌犯在馬拉威被拘留。
馬拉威最高法院有權或者起訴或者釋放這五個外國人，在忽視當地法律的情況下
布希當局堅持這些人一定要交給美國的安全部隊。然後這五個人就突然在這個國
家人間蒸發到不知名的地方──不是去接受審理，而是去接受訊問。這種動作在
當地引起暴動，在美國政府未能提出任何牽連到他們的罪證後，過了一個月他們
在蘇丹被釋放。
A BAD EXAMPLE
These cases are not anomalies. In the last two and a half years, the U.S.
government has
taken custody of a series of al Qaeda suspects in countries such as
Indonesia, Pakistan, and
Thailand. In many of these cases, the suspects were not captured on a
traditional
battlefield. Yet instead of allowing the men to be charged with a crime under
local
law-enforcement rules, Washington had them treated as combatants and
delivered to a
U.S. detention facility.
一次惡劣的示範
這幾個案例不是個案，在最近兩年半內，美國政府在印尼、巴基斯坦、泰國等等
國家，已經監禁了許多被指控是蓋達組織成員的嫌疑犯。而其中有許多不是在傳
統的戰場上被逮捕，卻不受當地執法規範的限制，也沒有依罪名起訴，華府便把
他們都當成戰犯處理，送到美國的拘留所。
--
想得到幸福的方法一共有兩種；第一就是心中的願望能夠幸運實現。
想得到幸福的方法一共有兩種；另一個就是將願望割捨得乾淨。
遙不可及；遙不可及，這兩種都是奢求。遙不可及；遙不可及，下一步又該怎麼走？
真希望能得到幸福。（幸せ／任賢齊 傷心太平洋原曲 by 中島美雪）
線上連署中島美雪來台演唱 http://chnbin.twbbs.org/miyuki/index.html
--
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