Re: [閒聊] 老共的新戰機

[ryannieh (new)]

http://tinyurl.com/2cgosb2
What China's Stealth Fighter Means
Jan 10, 2011
By David Fulghum, Bill Sweetman, Robert Wall
Washington, Washington, London
With the surprise rollout and high-speed taxi tests of China’s newest J-20
fighter, a stealth prototype, the U.S.
 Navy’s top intelligence official admits that the Pentagon
 has erred in its estimates of the speed with which Beijing
 is introducing new military technology.
(驚訝於J20的推出和試跑，美國海軍官員承認對於中國推出新武器
的速度估計錯誤)
The aircraft’s existence was not a surprise to the
 intelligence community, but “one of the things that is . . .
 true is that we have been pretty consistent in
 underestimating the delivery and initial operational
 capability of Chinese technology weapons systems,” says
 Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, deputy chief of naval
 operations for information dominance and director of
 naval intelligence. Two recent examples of misanalyses
 have been the J-20 fighter and the DF-21D anti-ship
 ballistic missile (AW&ST Jan. 3, p. 18). Moreover, there is
 evidence that China’s advances include high-performance
 engines and missiles that display a new level of technical
 maturity and performance.
(一位美國海軍主管情報及資訊管制的中將說，他們並不驚訝於此機
的存在，但他們一直低估了中國推出以及投入新武器服役的速度。
近期兩個例子為J20和DF21D。另外，中國在高性能引擎及飛彈
上的進步也顯示了技術成熟度和能力上了個新台階)
“In terms of the [J-20] stealth photos, it’s not clear to me
 when it’s going to become operational,” Dorsett says. “Do
 we need to refine our assessments better? I think so.”
Other Washington-based intelligence officials say they are
 watching the J-20’s testing with interest. “They have done
 several high-speed taxis with the nosewheel off the
 ground,” says another veteran analyst. “They could still
 be working out some kinks before they try an actual first
 flight.”
(老美認為他們要改進他們的情報能力。他們不清楚J20何時才能真
正服役，但從中國仍在試跑J20的情況來看，中國很可能仍在進行
第一次試飛前的調整。)
There also are a lot of unknowns about the aircraft’s real
 importance.
“Operational impact is a tough call to make at this point,
 given that this plane, even if it flies, is not going to be a
 full-up fifth-gen [aircraft],” the analyst says. “In essence,
 this is going to be a novelty for the next decade before it
 starts to roll off the series production lines and gets to the
 line units in any numbers that would impact any of our
 mission planning. A lot of things can happen, good and
 bad, between now and then to either speed this up or
 severely put the brakes on things.
(J20能造成的影響目前仍無法清楚得知。就算它能飛，它仍不算一
架完全的第五代戰機。它還很新，現在到未來進入生產線前，一大
堆事都可能發生。)
“As far as radar cross section goes, this is not [a Lockheed
 Martin] F-22, nor should we be thinking that they are
 going for low RCS right out of the chute,” he says. “We
 have to keep in mind that this is the first attempt and it’s
 also the very first prototype of that first attempt. There’s
 a lot of tweaking . . . before they get to the final version.
 I see too many people . . . making sweeping assessments.
 That has always been a mistake.”
(就RCS而言，它不像F22，一開始不會有低RCS。它是中國第一
次的匿蹤戰機嚐試，很多部分都要調整。在最後的構型出現前，太
早進行評估永遠是個錯誤。)
Engines have been an Achilles’ heel for Chinese
 high-performance aircraft. The Chinese have not
 produced an indigenous engine that has the performance
 they need for a world-class fighter. Under earlier military
 doctrine, which favored mass over advanced technology,
 the People’s Liberation Army Air Force was equipped with
 adapted versions of 1950s-era Soviet aircraft designs
 using old-technology engines. Analysts offer different
 assessments of China’s first high-performance engine,
 the Shenyang WS-10; but recent images of the J-11B
 fighter—China’s bootleg version of the Sukhoi
 Su-30—appear to show a nozzle design that differs visibly
 from the Russian AL-31F and resembles that of WS-10
 engines displayed at air shows.
(中國的引擎科技一直是其軟肋。但近來在J11B上出現的WS10
引擎顯示了中國在這方面的進步。)
Dorsett downplays the immediate impact of the new fighter
 and new anti-ship missile.
“I’m more worried about Chinese game-changing
 capabilities in nonkinetic [areas such as information
 dominance, network invasion and electronic warfare],” he
 says. “I am most concerned about China’s focus on trying
 to develop [the ability] to dominate the electromagnetic
 spectrum, to counter space capabilities and to conduct
 cyberactivities.
（該名美國海軍中將認為中國在電磁、太空和網絡方面的威脅比
J20和DF21D所能帶來的要大）
“The other concern I have is China’s ability to become
 operationally efficient in a sophisticated, complex, joint
 war-fighting environment,” Dorsett says. “I don’t see
 China with those capabilities now. I do see them
 delivering individual components and weapon systems
 [such as the J-20 and DF-21D], but until they acquire
 proficiency [with them], how competent are they really
 going to be?” The Chinese military’s self-proclaimed
 timeline is mid-century, Dorsett notes. In that context,
 he denies that the Pentagon is overestimating its threat.
“I’m not alarmed,” Dorsett says. “I am intrigued by
 developments and am quite interested in the quantities
 and different types of technologies that we didn’t expect
 or overestimated.”
(該將領很老神在在。他表示他對於中國在複雜條件下的聯戰能力
比較關注。中國目前仍缺乏這些方面的熟練度，而中國自己宣稱的
時間表是本世紀中才會實現。)
There is a marked relationship between China’s booming
 economy and its military buildup, he points out. But
 there are equally obvious shortfalls.
“The Chinese don’t have a great integrated ISR capability
 or an anti-submarine capability at all,” Dorsett says.
 “They don’t demonstrate a sophisticated level in joint
 warfighting. They are at the early stages of operational
 proficiency across the board. What would be dangerous
 is underestimating the timeline of synchronizing these
 various elements.”
(中國目前的反潛、ISR整合和聯戰能力都還在未成熟的早期階
段。但低估其發展整合的速度是危險的。)
Dorsett returned to the unexpected appearance of the
 J-20.
“How far along are they?” he asks. “I don’t know. They
 clearly have an initial prototype. Is it advanced and how
 many trials, tests and demos do they have to go through
 before it becomes operational? That’s not clear to me.”
However, the evidence of the design’s sophistication is
 mounting. The J-20 is supposed to carry new weaponry
 with some of it tucked away internally. China is
 continuing an effort to expand the military’s air-to-air
 missile inventory. Although Avic officials have not
 discussed what comes after the PL-12A radar-guided
 medium-range missile, new information suggests that
 work is progressing on several enhanced versions. These
 include a combined solid-motor, ramjet-powered PL-21.
 The missile, with a single inlet for the ramjet, may have
 undergone ground tests last year.
(該老美中將稱不知J20實際發展到什麼進度。但一些跡象顯示其
先進的程度，如中航發展中的數個PL12A後繼型飛彈，如衝壓引
擎的PL21。)
Work may be slightly more advanced on the PL-12D, a
ramjet upgrade of the basic PL-12 with more modest
 changes to the airframe and less endgame
 maneuverability than the PL-21 would feature. Chinese
 industry also appears to be working on the PL-12C with
 smaller aft control fins for internal carriage on the J-20.
 The mid-body fins are believed to be similar to the basic
 PL-12 and PL-12B with improved electronic
 counter-countermeasures.
(另外，還有一個較PL21不先進的衝壓引擎版本，PL12D，也在
發展中。PL12C，有著較小氣動控制面使其得以被收納入J20內
置武器艙內的固燃火箭版本，也在發展中。)
The close-in battle would use the PL-10, whose design
 may resemble South Africa’s Denel A-Darter. China’s
 ability to increasingly use standoff weapons, also in
 air-to-ground and anti-ship missile roles, is already
 affecting planning among potential adversaries.
 Japanese military officials are showing interest in
 missiles with greater ranges to be able to engage
 Chinese threats earlier, and there are discussions in the
 U.S. about the need for weapons with greater
 engagement capability.
(近戰用的PL10近似A-Darter。中國進展中使用空對空／地的能
力已影響多個潛在對手，包括美國和日本的國防計劃)
Dorsett also expanded on earlier remarks about the
 DF-21D missile by U.S. Navy officials.
“[U.S. Pacific Command’s] assessment is that it has
 reached an initial operational capability,” he says.
 “They’ve tested it over land sufficient times that the
 missile system itself is competent and capable. Could
 they start to employ that in a fielded, operational
 [environment]? I think so. [However,] there is a question
 of fusing all the information they need for targeting.
 There are still some [unknowns] about how proficient
 they would need to be to fully deploy it at this point.”
Meanwhile, the Navy has changed its assessment of the
 DF-21’s ability to threaten a ship. Until now, the service
 has essentially rated as “poor” the possibility of China’s
 hitting an aircraft carrier with a ballistic missile.
(中國已多次在陸上測試DF21D。美國太平洋司令部的評估是其已
達到初始作戰能力的地步。但對於中國有多少能力融合標定目標所
需的資訊仍不清楚。到目前為止，美國海軍仍估計中國用BM擊中
航艦的機率為不佳。)
“The technology that the Chinese have developed and are
 employing in the DF-21 system has increased their
 probability of hitting a maneuvering target with a salvo of
 several missiles,” Dorsett says. “What that probability is,
 we don’t know. I’m assessing that they don’t know. To
 our knowledge they haven’t test-fired this over water
 against a maneuvering target.”
（中國在發展中的科技已增加在齊射條件下BM擊中航艦的機率。
但機率為何？老美不知道，可能中國自己也不知道。中國目前未有
對海上機動目標試射該飛彈的紀錄）
That leaves Dorsett with the problem of improving
 intelligence-gathering to make the Pentagon’s
 predictions more reliable.
“One area we haven’t made much progress on was
 processing, exploiting and disseminating [data],” he
 says. “It’s high on our list for the upcoming year. We’re
 tackling imagery exploitation first. I think an awful lot
 can be automated. You don’t need to look at every piece
 of electro-optical imagery. You need tools that alert you
 to key issues.”
（該將領聲稱自動化反PS／偽裝的科技將是改善情報作業的重
點。）

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推 toosimple   :關鍵地主家也沒余糧啊
推 gs1         :老米老是在幫中國訂目標趕進度
推 houkoferng  :美軍：喔~元老~我要錢~我需要你的錢
→ eemail      :話說美軍驚嚇度怎會大於我國 = =
推 timchenegg  :因為需錢度遠大於我國吧
推 aixm        :然後奧巴馬找中國要錢，成軍後打中
→ blakespring :這篇沒很明顯要錢
→ undeadsin   :今年被元老院砍了760鎂呢XD
→ undeadsin   :更正 是萬鎂
→ MOONRAKER   :年度總預算663800M, 7.6M算什麼…
→ undeadsin   :億鎂.....一大早腦袋燒壞了
→ MOONRAKER   :九牛一毛…7.6B還比較像個數字…
→ undeadsin   :不過是五年砍78Billion鎂
→ MOONRAKER   :喔，78B是不少…美國海外用兵太多了
→ valenci     :            砍陸跟海陸
推 MPSSC       :美帝海航要錢發展六代戰機阿 超級蟲
→ MPSSC       :原本就是墊檔的傢伙~~~~~~~~~
推 markelf     :翻譯:元老院該吐錢囉~~
→ darkness0918:翻譯：啟稟眾元老,我口袋有點扁
→ undeadsin   :元老院:這群傢伙比抄期末報告的研究
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推 Rechtsstaat :五年七百八十萬，平均一年還不到兩百
→ Rechtsstaat :約佔一年預算的兩三趴，真少啊
推 reinherd    :這篇寫得不錯 我試圖翻譯出來好了
推 reinherd    :http://tinyurl.com/4bg3z2a
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