The American Economic Review Vol. 93, No. 3, June 2003
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/contents/june2003.html
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Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics 465-508
Vernon L. Smith
(就是那個Smith嘍,談他的實驗經濟學對理性的假設)
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Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand 509-529
Ilya Segal
The standard profit-maximizing multiunit auction intersects the submitted
demand curve with a preset reservation supply curve, which is determined
using the distribution from which the buyers’ valuations are drawn. However,
when this distribution is unknown, a preset supply curve cannot maximize
monopoly profits. The optimal pricing mechanism in this situation sets a price
for each buyer on the basis of the demand distribution inferred statistically
from other buyers’ bids. The resulting profit converges to the optimal
monopoly profit with known demand as the number of buyers goes to infinity,
and convergence can be substantially faster than with sequential price
experimentation. (JEL D42, D44, D82, D83)
應該是基於賣方對買方願出價格的不完全資訊對原有模型做的修正
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Animal Spirits Through Creative Destruction 530-550
Patrick Francois and Huw Lloyd-Ellis
We show how a Schumpeterian process of creative destruction can induce
rational, herd behavior by entrepreneurs across diverse sectors as if
fueled by “animal spirits.” Consequently, a multisector economy, in which
productivity improvements are made by independent, profit-seeking entrepreneurs,
exhibits regular booms, slowdowns, and downturns as part of the long-run growth
process. Our cyclical equilibrium has higher average growth, but lower welfare
than the corresponding acyclical one. We show how a negative relationship can
emerge between volatility and growth across cycling economies, and assess the
extent to which our model matches several features of actual business cycles.
(JEL E0, E3, O3, O4)
建立一個模型，看看引進<創造性破壞>跟沒有這種情形的經濟體有何不同。結論是福利
會降低喔(trivial)另外一點是這個模型跟現實經濟相符的特性...
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Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information
551-572
George P. Baker and Thomas N. Hubbard
Explaining patterns of asset ownership is a central goal of both organizational
economics and industrial organization. We develop a model of asset ownership in
trucking, which we test by examining how the adoption of different classes of
on-board computers (OBCs) between 1987 and 1997 influenced whether shippers use
their own trucks for hauls or contract with for-hire carriers. We find that
OBCs’ incentive-improving features pushed hauls toward private carriage, but
their resource- allocation improving features pushed them toward for-hire
carriage. We conclude that ownership patterns in trucking reflect the importance
of both incomplete contracts and of job design and measurement issues.
(JEL D23, L14, L22, L23, L92)
談外包跟自行處理的效率比較，以及若外包契約應如何設計
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Wages and Employment in the United States and Germany: What Explains the
Difference? 573-602
Paul Beaudry and David A. Green
Over the last 20 years the wage-education relationships in the United States
and Germany have evolved very differently, while the education compositions
of employment have evolved in a parallel fashion. In this paper, we show how
these patterns shed light on the nature of recent technological change and
highlight the importance of taking into account movements in the ratio of
human capital to physical capital when examining changes in the returns to
skill. Our analysis indicates that the United States could have prevented the
increase in wage inequality observed in the 1980’s by a faster accumulation
of physical capital. (JEL J3, O3)
談技術報酬跟人力資本比率之間的關係。
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