推 BIGP:都已經2013了............... 10/16 00:08
14號的文，今天看到就順便發了
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※ 編輯: always0410 來自: 118.232.220.96 (10/16 00:16)
※ 編輯: always0410 來自: 118.232.220.96 (10/16 00:19)
→ JeremyEvans:肯德基 晚點補噓 10/17 11:17
這篇蠻多是在討論三分球
只把爵士部分貼上
The Jazz make an extra point
Then there's this point about the Jazz. For starters: This team is a total
outlier, an oddity, a cherry-picked example. You can't find three more like
it; nearly all the best offenses are 3-focused these days. Of course a team
with John Stockton and Karl Malone, probably the best pick-and-roll
combination ever, was efficient. They both had conservative shot selection.
The whole squad carefully worked Sloan's system to find easy looks. And boy
did they ever know how to draw fouls -- those teams got a mind-blowing
percentage of their points from the free throw line. Those are enough
ingredients to make a great offense whether you shoot a lot of 3s or not.
This is like my grandma. She ate tons of healthy stuff and walked her dogs
hours a day, seven days a week. That she lived to a ripe old age -- it
probably wasn't the butter, you know? It was the other stuff.
Despite all that, as I'll explain, even your handpicked example still
demonstrates my point that an uptick in 3s can help almost any offense.
In the first five years Jerry Sloan coached Stockton and Malone, the Jazz
offense typically ended the season as the league's eighth-best. They were
good.
Then things went crazy.
The Jazz went on a four-year run starting in 1994-95 when they averaged
almost 114 points per 100 possessions, a big improvement. In this period they
never had an offense worse than fourth. In the final year of that run, before
age caught up to them, they didn't have their best offense ever, but they did
have the very best offense in the league. This production carried Stockton
and Malone to their only two Finals appearances, in 1997 and 1998.
What made the Jazz offense so special in those four years? The most obvious
innovation, to my eyes, was the arrival of marvelous shooter Jeff Hornacek.
He came from the Sixers at the end of the 1993-1994 season, and by the time
they worked him into the offense the next fall, the Jazz started scoring like
water.
Now opponents would pay for crowding Stockton and Malone.
And, importantly: Now the Jazz, at long last, whether in deference to
Hornacek or the league's three-year dalliance with a shorter 3-point line,
dramatically increased the number of 3s they shot. In Sloan's first five
years, when the offense was merely good, his Jazz attempted an average of 504
a season. In the four seasons the offense peaked, they nearly doubled that
number, averaging 847 a season. They went from an average of 505 points a
season from 3s, to 946.
Today, teams shoot twice as much as that, and even then the Jazz lagged the
league.
But nevertheless the truth is their offense took off when they did exactly
what I'm prescribing: embrace the 3.
Which is common, and probably could have happened a lot more. You say it's
about personnel, and of course you're right. But the Jazz had the shooters.
In 1997-98 Hornacek made 44 percent of his 3s. Stockton was at 43 percent,
with Howard Eisley at 41. Wonderful numbers! This is a team that led the
league with 113 points per 100 possessions, but on plays when they attempted
a 3 their rate soared up around 130. I don't know why they were so
conservative with them, but I know those were almost certainly the team's
best plays, and it's a cinch to suggest the Jazz could have scored more by
doing more of that. Assume diminishing returns from tougher looks and you can
still pencil in a few more points per game, not to mention more space in the
paint for Malone to operate.
In the Finals that year, the Jazz lost games to your Bulls by one, four and
five points.
That teams have been too conservative with 3s is not just an idea of
analysts. Coaches have ever so slowly, three-and-a-half decades after the
shot arrived, come to the same conclusion. Seven 3s per game was typical in
the 1980s. Now that number is around 20 and rising. The green light is coming
on.
What took those coaches so long?
One big part of it, I believe, is that people in the NBA, like everywhere,
just don't have much of an appetite for change. You've written about this as
much as anyone. Even your blatantly effective triangle, bedrock of 11 title
teams, hasn't become mainstream.
But blending the right lessons of the past with the right innovations from
the future can come with big rewards. And that's why some of today's
basketball wisdom sounds old, and some of it sounds new.
前文大概是在談三分和肯德基的一些戰術上的觀念，然後就以爵士為例
前面
統計學描述爵士(史馬時代)
爵士是聯盟離群值，是採櫻桃謬誤的典範
史馬是最佳擋拆典範
爵士在戰術執行上，投籃選擇相當保守，卻又可以很有效率的執行教皇的戰術
爵士就像肯德基的阿罵知道自己要幹嘛
中間
Then things went crazy
1994-95年爵士的進攻有了大幅的進步(100次持球可以得114分)
直到97、98兩年，史馬僅有的兩次總決賽，進攻一直維持高效
肯德基認為老何的到來使一代爵的進攻行雲流水
他認為老何的外線解放了史馬
老何到來前爵士投三分球總數為504，到來後變847
得分從505躍升到946
然後肯德基認為
以97-98年的數據來看
老何三分球命中率44%
老史43%
Howard Eisley有41%
肯德基認為這些命中率數字很漂亮
每一百次持球可以得113分
結論
肯德基認為以統計數字來看爵士過於保守
感覺有點暗婊
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