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: → aletheia:這是Kripke本人的論證嗎? 10/15 02:05
: 推 realove:我其實跟一樓滴a兄有同樣滴疑問.. 10/15 08:47
: 推 realove:有可能是I對K的詮釋?我是對pw是本體論上滴還是知識論上滴 10/15 09:58
: → realove:那一段不太清楚囉... 10/15 10:00
In these lectures, I will argue, intuitively, that proper names
are rigid designators, for although the man (Nixon) might not have
been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been
Nixon (though he might not have been called 'Nixon'). Those who
have argued that to make sense of the notion of rigid designator,
we must antecedently make sense of 'criteria of transworld identity'
have precisely reversed the cart and the horse; it is because we can
refer (rigidly) to Nixon, and stipulate that we are speaking of what
might have happened to him (under certain circumstances), that
'transworld identifications' are unproblematic in such cases.
The tendency to demand purely qualitative descriptions of couter-
factual situations has many sources. One, perhaps, is the confusion
of the epistemological and the metaphysical, between a prioricity
and necessity. If someone identifies necessity with a prioricity,
and thinks that objects are named by means of uniquely identifying
properties, he may think that it is the properties used to identify
the object which, being known about it a priori, must be used to
identify it in all possible worlds, to find out which object is Nixon.
As against this, I repeat: (1) Generally, things aren't 'found out'
about a counterfactual situation, they are stipulated; (2) possible
worlds need not be given purely qualitatively, as if we were looking
at them through a telescope. And we will see shortly that the prop-
erties an object has in every counterfactual world have nothing to do
with properties used to identify it in the actual world.
以上節錄自Saul A. Kripke, "Naming and Necessity" Lecture I, pp. 49-50
是他本人的論證，但原先的敘述不排除我個人的主觀認知和詮釋。
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