Sorry, my laptop crashed. can't type in chinese at the moment. so please bear
with me.
Seems to me that IsaacStein has made it clear that for Kripke, Aristotle (
the person) could have been given any other name (such as Adam, if you will)
It might righly be wondered that if that's the case, why the name "Aristotle"
refers to Aristotle the person in all possible worlds? Why doesn't it fail to
refer in a world where Aristotle the person is named "Adam"?
Think about the following statement
"Aristotle could have been named Adam".
or "It could have been the case that Aristotle was named Adam"
Kripke's point, I take it, is that in all the counterfactual worlds,
Aristotle must refer rigidly to Aristotle the person. Otherwise, the
counterfactual statement is not really about Aristotle but rather about
someone else. But remember, what we are talking about here in the
counterfactual statement
is that "Aristotle" could have been named Adam. Not anyone else.
So "Aristotle" must refere to Aristotle the person in all counterfactual
worlds (or situations).
So even in a counterfactual world where Aristotle is named Adam, the proper
name "Aristotle" still refers rigidly to Aristotle the person whose name
is Adam in that world.
anyway..just my two cents..
※ 引述《A1Yoshi (好想做愛（♀）)》之銘言：
: 似乎，Kripke對於專名的嚴格指稱性的因果說明，還是有些問題（而
: 其實他本人好像也知道）。
: 我有想到一個問題，這問題來自：因果關係本身是偶然而非必然的關
: 係。
: 我們可以設想這樣的狀況是可能的：
: 可能，在某命名儀式中，亞理司多德並不被命名叫做「亞理司多德」。
: 而在同樣的可能設想下，或說，在那樣的可能世界，亞理司多德叫做
: 「亞當」。
: 如果說嚴格指涉關係的建立仰賴因果鍊，而且在那樣的世界裡也一樣
: ，那麼，當我們在那樣的可能世界裡做可能性設想時，「亞理司多德
: 」就不是嚴格指稱到亞理司多德這個人了，因為在那個世界裡，「亞
: 當」才是指到亞理司多德的嚴格指稱詞。
: 講到這兒似乎有些弔詭。
: 因為，「亞理司多德」是嚴格指稱詞，且指到所有可能世界裡的亞理
: 司多德才對。但在上述的「雙重」可能設想下，顯然「亞理司多德」
: 並沒在所有可能世界裡都有指到亞理司多德。
: 我沒學過模態，可能這其實不是問題，還望有能者分享看法。
: 我想到可能的回應是：
: 當我們在進行雙重可能性設想時（即在可能世界裡進行可能性設想），
: 我們並不是在use那個專名，而只是mention它。而當它只是被mention
: 的時候，自然不是一個嚴格指稱詞了。
: 但當我們use it as a propername，它就是一個嚴格指稱詞，在所有可
: 能世界都挑選出那一個東西。
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