朋友丟給我一篇對Brian Leiter的訪談，其中談到對分析--歐陸的區分。
有興趣的人可以自己對號入座看看，看自己是自然主義--實在論這一邊的，還是非自
然主義--應然主義這一邊的。
Brian Leiter對後現代的批評我就不引了。原連結如下：
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/leiter-reports/
引述的部分原文：
There are real dividing lines in the history of philosophy, but the one
between the “analytic” and the “Continental” isn’t one of them, though
it’s interesting today from a sociological point of view, since it allows
graduate programs in philosophy to define spheres of permissible ignorance
for their students. A real dividing line, by contrast, one that matters for
substantive philosophical questions, is between “naturalists” and “
anti-naturalists.” The naturalists, very roughly, are those who think human
beings are just certain kinds of animals, that one understands these animals
through the same empirical methods one uses to understand other animals, and
that philosophy has no proprietary methods for figuring out what there is,
what we know, and, in particular, what humans are like. The anti-naturalists,
by contrast, are (again, roughly) those who think human beings are different
not just in degree but in kind from the other animals, and that this
difference demands certain proprietary philosophical methods - perhaps a
priori knowledge or philosophical ways of exploring the distinctively “
normative” realm in which humans live.
So on the naturalist side you get, more or less, David Hume, Ludwig
Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Ludwig Büchner, Friedrich Nietzsche, Rudolf Carnap,
W.V.O. Quine, Jerry Fodor, Stephen Stich, and Alex Rosenberg and on the
anti-naturalist side you get, more or less, Gottfried Leibniz, Immanuel Kant,
G.W.F. Hegel, Edmund Husserl, Gottlob Frege, Jean-Paul Sartre, G.E.M.
Anscombe, Wilfrid Sellars (at least for part of his career), the older Hilary
Putnam, Alvin Plantinga, and John McDowell, among many others. This
disagreement - a disagreement, very roughly, about the relationship of
philosophy to the sciences - isn’t one that tracks the alleged
analytic/Continental distinction. Indeed, the founders of the 20th-century
traditions of “analytic” and “Continental” philosophy (Frege and Husserl,
respectively) are both on the anti-naturalist side, and both are reacting
against hardcore naturalist positions in philosophy that had become dominant
on the European Continent in the late 19th-century. And the first explosion
of what anti-naturalists would derisively call “scientism” came in Germany
in the 1840s and 1850s, as a reaction to Hegel’s obscurantist idealism.
Naturalism and anti-naturalism mark a profound dividing line in modern
philosophy, but it has nothing to do with “analytic” vs. “Continental’
philosophy.
The other distinction that I think is increasingly important is that between
what I call “realists” and “moralists,” between those who think the aim
of philosophy should be to get as clear as possible about the way things
really are, that is, about the actual causal structure of the natural and
human world, how societies and economies work, what motivates politicians and
ordinary people to do what they do, and, on the other hand, those who think
the aim of philosophy is to set up moral ideals, to give moralistic lectures
about what society ought to do and how people ought to act. On the realist
side, you find Thucydides, Marx, and Nietzsche, but also Max Weber, Michel
Foucault, Richard Posner, and Raymond Geuss. On the moralist side, you find
Plato and Kant, but also John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Martha Nussbaum,
among many others. Many, but not all, naturalists are realists, since it’s
reasonable to think that if you want to understand the way things really are,
you ought to rely on the methods of the sciences, which have been the most
successful ones over the past several centuries.
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