Trouble in Taiwan

[skibo (做人要厚道)]

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040301faessay83205-p0/michael-d-swaine/trouble
-in-taiwan.html

Trouble in Taiwan
Michael D. Swaine
From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004

Summary: George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan's president over his plans
 for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume
that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the "one China" principle
 is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But
 they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that
 may lie ahead.

Michael D. Swaine is Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program
 at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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作者: skibo (做人要厚道) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Re: Trouble in Taiwan
時間: Tue Feb 24 03:42:40 2004

還是轉來看看啦

STRAIT TALK

On December 9, 2003, in the presence of visiting Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao, President George W. Bush broke significant new ground in U.S.
 relations with China and Taiwan. Having pledged in April 2001 to do
"whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself, Bush changed tack,
reaffirming U.S. support for maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan
 Strait. Of even greater significance, he rebuked Taiwan's president,
 Chen Shui-bian, stating that "the comments and actions made by the leader
 of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally
 to change the status quo, which we oppose."

Bush's volte-face was prompted by moves by Chen in the run-up to Taiwan
's March 2004 presidential election. Chen is pushing for an unprecedented
 public referendum that would condemn China's growing missile threat
and its refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. He has also
 proposed a new constitution to replace the version used by the island
 since the 1940s. The Chinese government believes that Chen's proposals
 would move Taiwan much closer to permanent separation from the mainland
, and so Beijing has threatened coercive measures to prevent such an
outcome. This scenario would almost certainly lead to a confrontation
 with the United States, possibly involving armed conflict.

Although Wen and other senior Chinese officials have expressed appreciation
 for Bush's words and have moderated their reaction to Chen's proposals
, the situation is by no means under control. Chen continues to downplay
 Bush's efforts to restrain him, claiming that he is advancing the democratic
 cause and strengthening Taiwan's ability to resist Chinese intimidation
. These arguments have received a sympathetic hearing from some conservatives
 and liberals in the U.S. Congress, who were enraged by Bush's rebuke
 and argue that Washington has a moral obligation to endorse Chen's call
 for national plebiscites and a new constitution. Some critics even advocate
 ignoring China's concerns over Taiwan altogether, abandoning support
 for the "one China" policy (the view that Taiwan is a part of China)
, and endorsing Taiwan's right to self-determination, thus compelling
 Beijing to accept the reality of Taiwanese independence.

But these critics make three faulty assumptions: that Beijing would ultimately
 permit Taiwanese independence rather than confront the United States
; that an expression of democratic self-determination is sufficient to
 establish territorial sovereignty and that democracy is incompatible
 with any political arrangement short of formal independence; and that
 it is immoral, as well as fundamentally contrary to U.S. interests,
to oppose any manifestation of democracy in Taiwan. Once these assumptions
 are debunked, the prudence of maintaining the status quo becomes apparent
.

A HIGH-STAKES GAME

China very much wants to avoid conflict over Taiwan. But this does not
 mean that it would be unprepared to go to war over the island. For China
's leaders, the Taiwan issue is inextricably related to national self
-respect and regime survival. The island -- ruled as a prefecture by
the Manchu Qing Dynasty for more than two hundred years before becoming
 a Chinese province in 1887 -- was forcibly seized by imperial Japan
in 1895 and came under de facto U.S. protection shortly after Japan's
 defeat in World War II. Beijing regards the eventual reunification of
 China and Taiwan as essential to China's recovery from a century of
national weakness, vulnerability, and humiliation, and to its emergence
 as a respected great power.

Today, however, China's main objective is not to assert direct territorial
 rule over Taiwan but to avoid the island's permanent loss. Losing Taiwan
 against Beijing's will would deal a severe blow to Chinese prestige
and self-confidence: Chinese leaders believe that their government would
 likely collapse in such a scenario. Taiwanese independence would also
 establish a dangerous precedent for other potentially secession-minded
 areas of the country, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. This
 is the primary reason why the Chinese leadership will not jettison the
 one-China principle, the recognition of which remains a precondition
 to any serious political negotiations with Taipei. To discard such a
 principle would cast serious doubt on the Chinese government's claim
 that the island and the mainland are parts of a single sovereign authority
. China has offered Taiwan a form of political reunification that would
 grant the island operational autonomy in domestic affairs, but, in return
, Taipei would have to acknowledge a single shared sovereignty. China
 also refuses to renounce its use of force over the island, claiming
that the ability to employ force over one's territory is an essential
 attribute of sovereignty. Removing that threat would also lift what
China regards as an essential deterrent to the island's moving even more
 determinedly toward independence.

China's leaders are under few illusions about the detrimental effects
 a coercive strategy would have on Beijing's ties with the United States
. But China would almost certainly sacrifice good relations with the
West (and the economic benefits that accrue from those relations) in
order to avoid losing Taiwan. The damage to China's political and social
 stability in being seen to lose territory, in other words, would be
even greater than the diplomatic and economic damage resulting from a
 conflict with the United States.

The Chinese leadership would thus almost certainly fight to avoid the
 loss of Taiwan if it concluded that no other alternative existed, even
 if its chances of prevailing in such a conflict were low. Exactly how
 much blood and treasure China would be willing to expend over the issue
 is unclear, but it might be considerably more than the United States
 would be prepared to shoulder. Indeed, many Chinese believe that, in
 the final analysis, Taiwan matters far more to China than it does to
 the United States. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that the Chinese
 government can be persuaded or coerced to alter its calculus regarding
 Taiwan, especially not by a U.S. government that appears to be supporting
 Taiwan's independence. This notion directly contradicts a key assumption
 held by critics of the status quo.

Moreover, the maintenance of cooperative, if not necessarily amicable
, relations with the Chinese government is critical to U.S. regional
and global objectives. These objectives include preserving a stable,
peaceful, and prosperous Asia; resolving the North Korean nuclear weapons
 crisis; maintaining peace between India and Pakistan; advancing the
United States' ever-burgeoning economic interests in China; strengthening
 enforcement of international nonproliferation regimes; and prosecuting
 the war on terrorism.

A war with China over Taiwan would, of course, be far more dangerous
than any of the United States' post-Cold War operations. Although not
 a match for the United States, China is nonetheless a continental power
 with very large conventional ground, naval, and air forces, as well
as a nuclear weapons arsenal capable of reaching any target in the United
 States and beyond. Taiwan's proximity to China, the difficulty involved
 in interdicting Chinese attacks without directly striking the Chinese
 mainland, and the historical inclination of both sides to display resolve
 in a crisis through decisive -- and sometimes rapid -- military action
 suggest that escalation might prove extremely difficult to control.

None of this is intended to imply that Taiwan is not worth supporting
 or defending. In fact, the island is of considerable importance to the
 United States for at least three reasons. First, Washington's policies
 toward Taipei directly affect the credibility of U.S. commitments to
 other potentially destabilizing regional or global issues. Second, U
.S. support for Taiwan is closely tied to U.S. interests in nurturing
 newly established democracies, especially those that are threatened
by authoritarian governments. And third, it is always important to demonstrate
 loyalty to long-time friends.

It is a mistake, however, to think that safeguarding these interests
and warding off a confrontation with China are mutually incompatible
goals. That would be true only if Beijing were clearly and irrevocably
 committed to employing force against Taiwan, which is not the case.
Rather, China's deployment of military forces along the Taiwan Strait
 is intended to deter Taiwan and the United States from closing off the
 option of eventual reunification. The chances of a confrontation between
 Beijing and Washington, in other words, could be reduced further if
China's leaders believed that the option of ultimate reunification remained
 on the table for the foreseeable future. Any such judgment is directly
 related to U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Not only can the United States
 decisively affect Taiwan's behavior, but determined U.S. support for
 an independent Taiwan could eventually elicit the backing of the majority
 of the international community. Thus U.S. policymakers must not ignore
 or downplay Chinese views. In particular, Washington must reassure the
 Chinese that their worst fear -- independence for Taiwan -- will not
 be realized without their consent.


CARROTS AND STICKS

At the same time, however, the United States must avoid giving Taiwan
 the impression that it will permit China to coerce the island into submission
. This would undermine the United States' credibility and its support
 for democracy. Even worse, it might convince Taiwan to seek alternatives
 to U.S. military support, perhaps even raising the specter of nuclear
 deterrence. The United States should also attempt to convince China'
s leaders that they must soften their stance toward Taiwan and make China
 more attractive to Taiwanese citizens. The best way to do this would
 be to encourage democratization in China via greater social and economic
 contact and sustained efforts to promote the rule of law. Any unilateral
 attempt to compel China to drop essential elements of its long-standing
 policy -- such as the one-China principle or the use of force -- would
 simply alarm Beijing and could result in unnecessary conflict.

Military and diplomatic deterrence, balanced by an adequate level of
reassurance, is also essential to the maintenance of stability. Under
 existing conditions, words alone will not convince Beijing that force
 is irrelevant or too dangerous to employ in an effort to avoid losing
 the island. The Chinese leadership continues to fear that the United
 States might eventually support the permanent separation of Taiwan from
 China. Washington must therefore minimize the risk of China's miscalculating
 its interests, by keeping the stakes of a first military move by Beijing
 extremely high. This requires a consistent and energetic reiteration
 by the United States that it will not tolerate any attempt by Beijing
 to coerce Taiwan into submission. It also requires the creation and
maintenance of a credible military deterrent by both the United States
 and Taiwan.

Taipei, in particular, must develop a genuine ability to defend itself
 against possible Chinese attacks, including a rapid decapitation strike
 timed to occur before any U.S. assistance can arrive on the scene. There
 is considerable evidence that China is seeking to acquire the ability
 to launch just such a strike. Unfortunately, Taiwan is unable to credibly
 deter or deflect a Chinese attack (especially a rapid strike) at present
, despite greatly increased levels of U.S. assistance. Indeed, it appears
 that many Taiwanese political and military leaders incorrectly believe
 that the island does not need to acquire such capabilities and can rely
 on the United States entirely.

Ultimately, the extent to which the United States and Taiwan must rely
 on deterrence is inversely related to the success of Washington's efforts
 to reassure China that it is committed to the status quo. As President
 Bush has recognized, such efforts are likely to be more successful if
 greater levels of trust can be created through the establishment of
a stronger, more cooperative, Sino-American relationship. They are likely
 to be less successful if the relationship is allowed to deteriorate
through insufficient attention to each other's interests. Chinese officials
 will be less bellicose and more patient if they believe Washington is
 not colluding with Taipei to favor independence. Insufficient reassurance
 -- even if it is combined with a strong deterrence posture -- could
eventually provoke China into a desperate use of force, in the belief
 that Washington might use its superior military capabilities to protect
 Taiwan from a Chinese attack as the island moved toward independence
. Efforts to strengthen deterrence, in other words, must be carefully
 coordinated with a larger strategy of reassurance if stability is to
 be maintained.

DEMOCRATIC MYTHS

Taiwan has been free to prosper and develop a vibrant democracy largely
 thanks to an understanding reached during the normalization of U.S.-
China diplomacy in the 1970s. At that time, China pledged that it would
 seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue in exchange for a U.S.
commitment not to challenge (and, by implication, not to undermine) the
 one-China position. The Taiwanese government concurred that it understood
 the island to be part of China. But Taiwan's recent emergence as a democracy
 has cast doubt on -- if not eliminated altogether -- that commitment
. The political influence of the Chinese nationalist minority on the
island has waned, in favor of a growing separatist-leaning Taiwanese
leadership.

It is imperative that the United States not follow Taiwan's lead in pressing
 for a unilateral change in the status quo. Given the high risks involved
, the original understanding achieved between the United States and China
 should be adjusted only as a result of negotiations between the two
powers, rather than through unilateral actions undertaken by either side
 or by Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan's democratization and the consequent
 "Taiwanization" of the island's political system do not automatically
 justify the unilateral abandonment of the United States' original pledge
.

Furthermore, the U.S. government must not assume that Taiwan's citizens
 are uniformly committed to achieving full and permanent independence
 from China. Public opinion polls over the past decade have consistently
 shown that most Taiwanese people oppose any abrupt movement toward either
 independence or reunification. Moreover, a highly reputable recent study
 indicates that older Taiwanese citizens (who experienced the sometimes
 brutal rule of the Chinese nationalists) are more likely to view themselves
 as purely Taiwanese than their younger counterparts. Many of the latter
 identify themselves with both Taiwan and China, thus suggesting that
 Taiwan's population might become less inclined toward formal independence
 in the future. Overall, a clear majority recognizes the value of remaining
 pragmatic and open-minded about the future, acknowledging China's stance
 toward Taiwan, Beijing's growing military capabilities, and the enormous
 benefits that accrue to Taiwan as a result of deepening economic and
 social contact with the Chinese mainland. That said, most of Taiwan'
s citizens do not want to be ruled by the current Chinese regime and
would prefer a greater level of international recognition as a nation
.

The Taiwanese people's national aspirations -- and their willingness
to undertake risks in achieving those aspirations -- are heavily influenced
 by the cues they receive from their political leaders, as well as the
 actions, or inaction, of the United States and China. In short, Taiwan
's leaders significantly shape, and do not merely reflect, the island
's sense of self-identity and its population's moves toward self-determination
. For this reason, the United States must carefully evaluate the behavior
 of Taiwan's leaders and not shirk from shaping it in ways that support
 U.S. interests.

As part of this process, the United States must dispel the assumption
 -- held by conservatives in the United States and pro-independence politicians
 in Taiwan -- that a people's expression of self-determination is tantamount
 to actual territorial sovereignty. Neither the United States nor the
 international community has ever validated the notion that the majority
 views of a given people, whether expressed through democratic processes
 (such as a referendum) or other means, justify an inherent right to
independence. Territories such as Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosovo, and Tibet
 are not recognized by the international community as independent states
, despite the fact that a majority of their inhabitants would likely
support independence. Rather, recognition of a people's status as a nation
-state is conferred by the international community and is highly subject
 to the calculations and interests of the most influential powers involved
. By this standard, Taiwan is not currently an independent nation, since
 the vast majority of the international community -- including the United
 States -- does not accept it as such.


THE GREATEST GOOD

Moral imperatives to intervene in international relations emerge only
 when another entity, usually a government, inflicts grave harm on innocent
 people. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and slaughter are examples
 of morally repugnant activities that warrant such interventions. Other
 deprivations may also be sufficient for the international community
to act: economic enslavement, systemic state-imposed poverty, or denial
 of political rights and liberties, for example. These types of maltreatment
 do not typically lead other nations to initiate war, but they may prompt
 concerted political and economic pressure on the injuring state. Taiwan
 suffers none of these injuries. Its people are not being killed, ethnically
 cleansed, or raped by China. And it enjoys economic liberty and growing
 prosperity under freely elected democratic rule. The main limitation
 that China imposes on Taiwan is against its establishing de jure independence
, as distinct from the de facto independence it currently enjoys. This
 hardship is regrettable, but no reasonable standard of international
 morality requires the United States to risk military intervention to
 redress it. From a moral standpoint, Washington's top priority should
 be to avoid precipitating war across the Taiwan Strait, a situation
that would inflict incomparably greater suffering on the island than
would continuing its de facto autonomy.

Critics of the one-China policy are also wrong to suggest that support
 for democracy in Taiwan obligates the United States to endorse the formation
 of an independent and sovereign nation-state. On the contrary, democracy
 will continue to thrive only if unilateral strides toward independence
 are rejected, because moves to alter the status quo would probably result
 in a devastating conflict on the island. U.S. strategic, political,
and moral interests are thus best served by a policy that seeks not only
 to deter the use of military force but also to ensure that reunification
 between Taiwan and China remains an option.

At present, the most immediate threat to such a policy is presented by
 the actions of President Chen. Upon taking office in 2000, Chen pledged
 that he would avoid taking unambiguous steps toward independence --
including holding referendums that affect Taiwan's sovereign status -
- as long as China did not intend to attack Taiwan. Now, claiming that
 such an intention exists, Chen wants to hold a national referendum on
 Taiwan's presidential election day, March 20, ostensibly to gauge the
 public's views of China's missile deployments and "use of force." To
 justify this move, Chen has invoked a recently passed law that permits
 the president to call "defensive" referendums in response to dire threats
 against Taiwan's national security.

Yet China's buildup of missiles and the country's refusal to renounce
 the possible use of force to prevent Taiwanese independence are not
new threats. They have been a major element of the cross-strait imbroglio
 for many years and do not constitute clear evidence that Beijing actually
 intends to attack the island. As indicated above, China's posturing
reflects Beijing's deterrence calculus and is an expression of its claim
 to sovereign authority over Taiwan. There is no doubt that the vast
majority of Taiwan's citizens would express concern about Chinese saber
-rattling if asked. But this begs the question, If the popular response
 is so predictable, why hold a referendum at all?

Chen is using the referendum to bolster his standing with Taiwan's voters
 and, perhaps even more important, may use it to create for himself a
 handy excuse for disregarding his original pledge not to alter the status
 quo. If the referendum passes, Chen could claim that the Taiwanese public
 has confirmed China's intention to attack the island and thereby could
 justify further moves toward independence. His next step would most
likely be to enact an entirely new constitution via a second national
 plebiscite (as opposed to revising or amending the existing constitution
). Such a move would sever any legal or procedural continuity with Taiwan
's existing political system. Most important, it would negate the past
 source of Taiwanese sovereignty, which, according to the existing constitution
, resides with the people of "China." Although this provision may seem
 fictional, it has proved highly useful, indirectly helping to preserve
 the peace for more than 50 years. Redefining the source of state legitimacy
 as belonging to the citizens of Taiwan alone would almost certainly
persuade a large number of Taiwanese that "one China" no longer exists
 and that Taiwan is a separate sovereign state. Although such a self-
definition would not be tantamount to independence, China would perceive
 it as precluding the possibility of reunification, which would greatly
 increase the chances of a conflict between the United States and China
 over Taiwan.

Washington is thus fully justified in discouraging Chen from holding
a referendum, as part of its broader effort to establish the conditions
 underlying its political and military support to the island. The current
 leadership must be disabused of the notion that the United States will
 defend the island under any circumstances. Such a policy would be entirely
 morally justified, would in no way threaten Taiwan's democracy, and
-- most important -- would best protect U.S. interests. On the Chinese
 side, Washington must seek both to deter China militarily and to assure
 Beijing that the reunification option remains on the table. To these
 ends, President Bush's recent policy shift is a step in the right direction
.



※ 引述《skibo (做人要厚道)》之銘言：
: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040301faessay83205-p0/michael-d-swaine/trouble
: -in-taiwan.html
: Trouble in Taiwan
: Michael D. Swaine
: From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004
: Summary: George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan's president over his plans
:  for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume
: that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the "one China" principle
:  is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But
:  they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that
:  may lie ahead.
: Michael D. Swaine is Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program
:  at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 128.2.62.155

> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- <

作者: mafa (上海小混混) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Trouble in Taiwan - 對話開始
時間: Tue Mar 23 20:01:06 2004

Trouble in Taiwan
　　
作者（Michael D. Swaine）
譯者 強華 www.tianyaclub.com
（轉載請注明）
　　
　　摘要﹕喬治布什斥責了台灣總統就同中國的關系舉行公投的計劃﹐布

什這一做法是正確的。批評美國政府的人們有如下假設﹐1、民主同獨立是

分不開的﹐2、一個中國的政策不再有用﹐3、中國決不會為台灣走向戰爭

。但他們在這三個問題上都錯了﹐並且他們也未看到其中的危險。
　　
對話開始
　　
　　 2003年12月9日﹐在來訪的中國總理溫家寶在場的情況下﹐布什總統

就美國同中國和台灣的關系﹐確立了具有重要意義的新基調。布什在2001

年曾經誓言﹐要“不惜一切”幫助台灣保衛自己。但他已經改變了立場﹐

他現在重申美國支持維持台灣海峽的現狀。而更具有意義的是﹐布什斥責

了台灣領導人陳水扁﹐他申明﹐“台灣領導人的言論和行動顯示﹐他可能

願意做出單方面改變現狀的決定﹐這是我們所反對的。”
　　
　　 布什的大轉彎﹐是由陳水扁為贏得2004年3月總統大選所采取的行動

造成的。陳水扁正在推動一項前所未有的公民投票﹐目的是譴責中國逐漸

增大的導彈威脅和中國拒絕放棄對台灣使用武力的政策。他還提議用一部

新憲法﹐取代自20世紀40年代就在該島使用的原憲法。中國政府相信﹐陳

的這些動向會加速台灣走向與大陸永遠分離。對此﹐北京已經威脅會用強

力手段阻止出現這種情況﹐而這種局面幾乎肯定會導致中國與美國的對抗

﹐甚至武裝沖突。
　　
　　 雖然溫家寶和其他中國高層官員對布什的講話表示了讚賞﹐並且緩和

了他們對陳水扁的回應﹐但是局面一點也沒有得到控制。陳水扁繼續淡化

布什試圖節制他的壓力﹐他聲稱他是在推動民主事業及加強台灣抵抗中國

恐嚇的能力。陳水扁的這些理由得到了美國國會一些保守派和自由派人士

的同情﹐他們為布什對陳水扁的斥責感到憤怒﹐並認為華盛頓有道義責任

認同陳對公投和新憲法的訴求。一些批評者甚至主張美國完全不理會中國

在台灣問題上的立場﹐美國放棄支持「一個中國」的政策（即台灣是中國

一部分的觀點）﹐並認同台灣民主自決的權利﹐從而迫使北京接受台灣獨

立的事實。
　　
　　 然而﹐這些批評者有三個錯誤的假設﹕一、北京寧願最終允許台灣獨

立﹐也不會同美國對抗﹔二、有了民主自決的要求就理應對領土擁有主權

﹐並且民主同任何非正式獨立的政治安排﹐都是不相容的﹔三、反對台灣

的任何民主表現﹐都是不道德也不符合美國利益的。但是一旦這些假設的

漏洞被捅破﹐則維持現狀這一審慎政策就凸顯可取。

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◆ From: 219.233.217.107
→ oeil:I want the original text to improve my
→ oeil:English.XD
> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- <

作者: mafa (上海小混混) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Trouble in Taiwan - 高風險遊戲
時間: Tue Mar 23 20:03:00 2004

　　高風險遊戲
　　
　　 大陸非常想避免因台灣而引發沖突﹐但這並不意味著它沒有準備為台

灣而走向戰爭。對於中國領導人來說﹐台灣問題緊緊地關系到民族自尊和

政權存亡。台灣島在1887年成為滿清帝國的一個省之前﹐在長達兩百多年

的時間裡﹐它一直是滿清的一個地方政區。1895年﹐日本帝國強行奪取台

灣。二次世界大戰後不久﹐台灣事實上又處於美國的保護之下。北京認為

﹐中國同台灣的最終統一﹐對於中國從一個世紀以來的民族虛軟、脆弱和

恥辱中復興﹐對於它成為一個受尊重的大國﹐至關重要。
　　
　　 然而﹐中國今天的主要目的﹐不在於對台灣實施直接的領土控制﹐而

在於防止永遠失去台灣。如果在北京非情願的情況下使它失去台灣﹐這將

是對中國威望和自信的沉重打擊。中國領導人認為﹐在這種情形下﹐他們

的政府有可能倒台。台灣獨立也會為其它有潛在獨立意識的地區樹立危險

的先例﹐例如西藏、新疆及內蒙古。這就是中國領導人不會放棄一個中國

原則的主要原因。北京一直堅持﹐認同一個中國原則﹐是與台北進行任何

嚴肅政治談判的前提。若北京拋棄一個中國原則﹐人們就有理由質疑中國

政府所堅持的﹐台灣和大陸是同一個主權國家不同部分的說法。中國也向

台灣提出了一個政治統一的模式﹐台北承認雙方共有一個主權﹐但由台灣

自治其內部事務。中國拒絕放棄對台灣使用武力﹐它說﹐一個主權國家在

自己領土內運用武力﹐是主權國家的一項基本權利。中國覺得﹐如果放棄

武力威脅﹐它也就失去了威懾台灣使其不頑固地走向獨立的一個重要手段

。
　　
　　 中國領導人非常清楚﹐對台灣使用脅迫性的戰略﹐會損害中美關系。

但為了避免失去台灣﹐幾乎可以肯定﹐中國會寧願犧牲與西方國家之間的

良好關系（及這種關系帶來的經濟利益）。因為從中國政治與經濟穩定層

面來講﹐若被視為喪失國土﹐這種損失將大過由於同美國的沖突在外交及

經濟方面產生的損失。　　
　　
　　 一旦中國領導人確信已別無選擇﹐為免失去台灣﹐即使在沖突中取勝

的機會很低﹐他們幾乎肯定也會不惜一戰。我們不知道中國願意為保住台

灣付出多少鮮血和財富﹐但中國人願意付出的可能要比美國準備承擔的多

得多。許多中國人確實認為﹐台灣對中國的意義要比對美國大得多。因此

﹐要說服或強迫中國政府改變它在台灣問題上的立場﹐幾乎是不可能的﹔

如果美國政府看起來像是支持台灣獨立的話﹐想讓中國改變它的立場﹐可

能性就更小。這個結論同華府批判者的一個關鍵假設﹐是直接相矛盾的。
　　
　　 此外﹐同中國政府保持合作關系﹐如果不是友善關系的話﹐是對美國

的地區及全球目標極為重要的。這些目標包括﹐保持一個穩定、和平與繁

榮的亞洲﹐解決北朝鮮核武危機的﹐維持印巴和平﹐擴大美國在中國的不

斷發展的經濟利益﹐防止國際核擴散以及從事反恐戰爭。
　　
　　 如果美國因為台灣而爆發同中國的戰爭﹐那麼這場戰爭的危險性﹐將

遠遠大於美國在冷戰過後參預過的任何戰爭。中國雖然不是美國的對手﹐

但中國仍然是一個大陸強國﹐有非常大的常規陸軍、海軍和空軍力量。除

此之外﹐中國的核武器能達到美國及美國以外的任何目標。下面三點預示

﹐一旦台海出現沖突﹐要控制沖突的升級和擴大會極其困難。1、台灣貼近

中國﹐2、不直接攻擊中國大陸就很難阻斷中國的進攻﹐3、歷史上﹐雙方

在危機時都傾向於通過軍事決戰（有時是快速決戰）來顯示決心。
　　
　　 上述觀點無意暗示台灣不值得支持或保衛。事實上﹐至少有三個理由

說明台灣對美國有重要價值。第一﹐華盛頓的對台政策﹐直接影響到美國

對其他潛在動盪地區或全球事務所作承諾的信用。第二﹐美國對台灣的支

持﹐同美國培育新生民主體制的利益緊密相連﹐特別是培育被專制政權威

脅的民主體制。第三﹐顯示出對老朋友的忠誠非常重要。
　　
　　 但是﹐把維護這些利益同避免與中國發生對抗看作是無法調和的矛盾

﹐這是錯誤的。隻有在北京明顯而又無回旋余地的準備對台灣運用武力時

﹐上述看法才正確。可現實不是這樣。目前中國沿台灣海峽部署軍事力量

﹐其目的是為了阻嚇台灣及美國﹐使他們不要排除台灣同中國最終再統一

這樣一個選項。也就是說﹐如果中國領導人相信﹐在可預測的將來﹐國家

最終統一的選項一直存在的話﹐中美直接對抗的機會﹐就會進一步降低。

中國能否有這樣的判斷﹐倒過來又與美國對台政策有直接關系。美國不僅

能夠決定性地影響台灣方面的行為﹐若美國堅定支持台灣獨立的話﹐美國

最終也能吸引到國際社會大多數的支持。所以﹐美國的政策制定者決不能

不理會或忽視中國的觀點﹐尤其重要的是﹐華盛頓必須讓中國人放心﹐若

沒有他們的同意﹐他們最擔心的台灣獨立是不會實現的。

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作者: mafa (上海小混混) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Trouble in Taiwan - 胡籮卜及大棒
時間: Tue Mar 23 20:03:47 2004

　　胡籮卜及大棒
　　
　　 與此同時﹐美國也必須避免讓台灣造成一種印象﹐美國會允許中國用

武力強迫台灣屈服﹐這樣會破壞美國的信譽和它對民主的支持。更糟的是

﹐如果有了這種印象﹐它會讓台灣確信﹐它需要尋求美國以外的軍事支持

﹐可能甚至需要尋求核威懾。美國亦應當設法使中國領導人認識到﹐他們

必須軟化對台灣的姿態﹐他們需要使中國對台灣民眾有更大的吸引力。要

做到這一點﹐最好的辦法大概就是鼓勵中國的民主化﹐途徑是同中國建立

更多的社會、經濟聯系並持續不斷地促進中國的法治化。任何單方面迫使

中國放棄其一貫政策中的核心成分的企圖﹐如一個中國原則或者對武力的

使用﹐都隻能引起北京的警覺﹐並會導致不必要的沖突。
　　
　　 軍事上和外交上的威懾（加上北京充分放心）﹐是維持台海兩岸穩定

的重要因素。在目前條件下﹐單用語言無法讓北京相信他們無須使用武力

去防止失去台灣﹐也無法使他們相信使用武力非常危險。中國領導層始終

擔心的是﹐美國最終會支持台灣永久從中國分離出去。因此﹐華盛頓必須

盡量降低中國由於錯誤判斷形勢而引起的風險﹐為做到這一點﹐美國可以

通過行動﹐迫使北京意識到﹐它不得不為其首先挑起的軍事行動付出極高

的代價。這需要美國始終一致並不厭其煩地重復﹐美國不會容忍北京以武

力迫使台灣屈服。這也需要美國和台灣共同創造和維持一種可信賴的軍事

威懾。
　　
　　 其中尤其重要的是﹐台北必須發展出實在的能防衛自己、對抗中國進

攻的能力。要對抗的進攻包括中國選擇在美國救援到達之前﹐對台灣采取

迅速的斬首打擊。有相當的跡象表明﹐中國正在尋求獲得發動類似打擊的

能力。不幸的是﹐盡管美國對台灣援助的水準越來越高﹐但目前台灣沒有

可以令人信服的能力﹐去阻嚇或攔擊中國的進攻（尤其是快速打擊）。實

際上看來﹐很多台灣政治及軍事領導人錯誤地相信﹐台灣不需要獲得這種

軍事能力﹐因為他們感覺台灣能夠完全依賴美國。
　　
　　 最後﹐美國和台灣必須在多大程度上依靠阻嚇能力﹐相反﹐又同華盛

頓在多大程度上能夠成功地讓中國相信﹐美國是志在維持現狀有關。在這

一點﹐正如布什總統已經認識到的那樣﹐如果雙方建立更堅固﹐更合作的

中美關系﹐並能夠創建更高層次信任的話﹐那麼美國說服中國的努力就更

有可能成功。相反﹐如果雙方未能對互相的利益給予足夠重視﹐而任由雙

方關系惡化的話﹐那麼美國的努力就更不易取得成功。若中國的官員相信

﹐華盛頓不會串謀台灣並傾向獨立﹐他們就會有更多的耐心﹐更少的咄咄

逼人。若未能令中國對此感到放心﹐則即便是美國保持強硬的威懾姿態﹐

也可能會由於中國確信﹐當台灣走向獨立而中國對其發起進攻時﹐華盛頓

定會使用其優勢的軍事力量保護台灣﹐從而最終激起中國不顧一切地使用

武力。也就是說﹐如果要想台灣海峽維持穩定﹐美國增強威懾的努力必須

小心同一個更大的使中國安心的戰略相協調。

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作者: mafa (上海小混混) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Trouble in Taiwan - 民主的迷思
時間: Tue Mar 23 20:04:43 2004

　　民主的迷思
　　
　　 台灣得以自由興旺並發展出一個激盪的民主政體﹐很大程度上要感謝

20世紀70年代美中關系正常化期間﹐雙方外交上達成的諒解。當時﹐中國

保証它會尋求用和平手段解決台灣問題﹐以換取美國承諾不會挑戰（亦暗

含不會破壞）一個中國的立場。當時台灣政府也認同台灣島是中國的一部

分。但是﹐台灣最近向民主政體的成功演變﹐使得人們開始質疑（如果不

是完全擯棄）美國當時的承諾。在台灣居於少數的國民黨人的政治影響力

已經衰退﹐而同時﹐有分離主義傾向的台灣領導層正在壯大。
　　
　　 對美國而言有一點是是極其重要的﹐就是美國不要跟從台灣去強求單

方面改變台海現狀。若要對美中雙方當初達成的共識進行任何調整﹐考慮

到可能涉及的高風險﹐這些調整都應該由兩個大國通過談判決定﹐而不是

由兩大國中的任何一方單方面行動﹐也不是由台灣單方面行動進行。易言

之﹐台灣的民主化和緊接著的台灣政治體制的[台灣化]﹐都不能自動使美

國可以正當地單方面拋棄其原有承諾。
　　
　　 另外﹐美國政府千萬不要假定﹐台灣公民已經一致要求從中國完全、

永久地獨立出去。過去十年的民意測試都一直表明﹐大多數台灣人民反對

任何急劇的變化﹐無論是統一還是獨立。此外﹐近期一項受到高度尊重的

研究表明﹐年長的台灣人（他們經歷了國民黨有時是殘酷的統治）﹐甚至

較他們年輕的後輩更傾向於視自己為純粹的台灣人。而後者中的許多人對

台灣和中國都有認同﹐這顯示﹐未來台灣人要求正式獨立的傾向可能會減

弱。整體而言﹐十分明顯﹐台灣多數人都能認識到對未來持務實、開放態

度的重要性﹔他們也知道中國對台灣的立場、北京日益增長的軍事能力、

以及加深與中國大陸在經濟和社會方面的聯系可給台灣帶來的巨大利益。

盡管如此﹐大多數的台灣公民不願被現在的中國當局統治﹐他們更願意國

際上更高程度地承認他們是一個國家。
　　
　　 對於台灣人的民族主義的渴望﹐以及他們為了實現這一渴望而情願冒

險的行為﹐台灣政治領導人的引導以及美國和中國的作為或不作為﹐都可

以對其施加重大影響。簡言之﹐台灣領導人可以極大地塑造台灣的自我認

識﹐以及台灣民眾的自決運動﹐而不僅僅是反映他們的訴求。為此﹐美國

必須仔細地評估台灣領導人的行為﹐並主動規范之﹐使其有利於美國的利

益。
　　
　　 在這一過程中﹐美國必須拋棄一種假設﹐即人民要求自決的表示等於

實際的領土主權﹐而美國的保守派人士和台灣具獨立傾向的政治領導人都

主張這一假設。但不論美國還是國際社會都從未認同過此一理念﹐即如果

一個民族的大多數人表示願意獨立﹐不論是通過民主進程（例如公民投票

）還是其它手段表述出來﹐他們就擁有當然的獨立權。國際社會並沒有承

認諸如車臣、克什米爾、科索沃、西藏這些地域是獨立國家﹐盡管事實上

﹐那裡的大多數居民都可能會支持獨立。實際上﹐是否承認一個民族具有

國家地位要取決於國際社會的協商結果﹐這裡面又高度取決於所涉及的最

有影響力的大國的考慮和利益。照此標準﹐台灣目前不是一個獨立國家﹐

因為國際社會的絕大多數成員--包括美國在內--並不接受其為獨立國家。

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> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- <

作者: mafa (上海小混混) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Trouble in Taiwan - 上上策
時間: Tue Mar 23 20:06:02 2004

　　上上策
　　
　　 在國際關系中﹐國際社會出於道義需要進行幹預的情況僅僅出現在﹐

當一個實體（通常為一個政府）對無辜的民眾施加嚴重傷害之時。嚴重傷

害包括諸如種族滅絕、民族清洗、集體強姦及大規模屠殺﹐這些都屬於道

德淪喪的行為﹐可以成為國際幹預理由。對於其它種類的剝奪行為﹐諸如

經濟奴役、國家系統性地制造貧困、或者剝奪人的政治權利與自由﹐這些

也足以成為國際社會采取行動的理由。一般來說﹐國際社會不會對這類施

虐行為發起戰爭﹐它們可能會協調行動﹐對施暴國家在政治及經濟上施加

壓力。台灣未受到任何上述行為的損害。它的民眾沒有受到中國的屠殺、

民族未受到清洗、也沒有被強姦。台灣正在自由選舉的民主體制下﹐享受

著經濟自由和日益增長的繁榮。中國現在對台灣的主要限制在於﹐中國反

對台灣建立法律上的獨立﹐他不反對台灣目前享受的事實上的獨立。台灣

的這一困境令人惋惜﹐但沒有任何符合國際道義的理據要求美國冒軍事幹

涉的風險去改變現狀。從道義觀點來看﹐華府應該最優先考慮的﹐是避免

台灣海峽兩岸陷入戰爭。發生戰爭這種情況對台灣帶來的傷害之大﹐同台

灣繼續維持其目前事實上的自治﹐簡直無法相比。
　　
　　 對“一個中國政策”持批評意見的人還錯在﹐他們認為﹐既然美國支

持台灣的民主﹐美國同時也就有義務支持建立一個獨立而又擁有主權的民

族國家。恰恰相反﹐隻有不支持單方面走上獨立的圖謀﹐台灣民主才會繼

續成長﹐因為改變現狀的行為﹐將很可能在台灣引致一場破壞性的沖突。

就美國的戰略、政治及道義利益而言﹐美國隻有執行如下政策﹐才能最好

的維護這些利益﹐這政策就是﹐美國不僅要致力於阻嚇中國對武力的使用

﹐它還要確保﹐台灣和中國重新統一始終是一個選項。
　　
　　 目前﹐對此政策最直接的威脅﹐來自台灣總統陳水扁的一系列動作。

2000年上台伊始﹐陳水扁當時保証﹐隻要大陸不打算進攻台灣﹐他不會搞

明顯走向獨立的行為﹐包括不搞影響台灣主權地位的公投。現在﹐陳水扁

宣稱中國有進攻的打算﹐他要在三月二十日台灣總統大選日舉行一場全民

公投。陳水扁的表面理由是﹐要以此統計台灣民眾對中國部署導彈和「使

用武力」的看法。為了將這一行為正當化﹐陳水扁發起通過了一項法律﹐

允許總統在台灣的國家安全受到嚴重威脅時﹐舉辦「防御性」公投。
　　
　　 然而中國部署導彈﹐為防止台灣獨立中國拒絕宣布放棄使用武力﹐這

些並非新的威脅。它們已經成為多年來兩岸紛爭的一個主要成分﹐這並不

能構成北京確實打算進攻台灣的明顯証據。正如上面已經指出的那樣﹐中

國的以上姿態﹐反映了北京的威懾意圖﹐也是對其宣稱擁有台灣主權的一

種表示。若問台灣民眾他們對中國武力威嚇的看法時﹐毫無疑問﹐他們中

的絕大多數會表示擔心。但是﹐這又引來另一個問題﹐如果公眾的答案如

此可預料﹐為什麼還要舉辦公投﹖
　　
　　 陳水扁是在利用公投獲取台灣選民的支持。也許更重要的是﹐他可能

在利用公投﹐為自己造台階﹐以便放棄他不改變現狀的原有承諾。如果公

投通過﹐陳水扁就可以宣稱﹐台灣民眾已認定大陸有攻擊台灣的打算﹐所

以台灣可以進一步走向獨立。他的下一步﹐很可能是通過第二次全民公投

制定一部全新的憲法﹐而不是對現有憲法進行修補。這一舉動將在所有法

律或程序上﹐斬斷台灣現存政治體系的延續性。最為重要的是﹐這將否定

台灣主權過去的淵源﹐按照現行憲法﹐台灣主權屬於“中國”人民。雖然

這一條文看起來好似虛構﹐但該條文大有用處﹐它間接幫助兩岸維持了超

過五十年的和平。若台灣重新界定國家合法性的淵源﹐將其淵源歸屬台灣

人民﹐則這事件本身﹐就幾乎肯定會讓相當數量的台灣民眾相信﹐“一個

中國”已不存在﹐台灣是另一個主權國家。在這種情況下﹐即便這一自我

定義不直接等於獨立﹐中國方面也會將其視為排除了統一的可能性﹐這將

會大大增加美國和中國因台灣而起沖突的機會。
　　
　　 由此看來﹐華府有完完全全正當的理由不鼓勵陳水扁舉辦公投。此外

﹐這種不鼓勵應該是華府建立范圍更廣的一個政策的一部分﹐這一范圍更

廣的政策應該是旨在界定美國對台灣提供政治及軍事支持的前提條件。現

今的台灣領導人有一個觀念﹐美國在任何條件下都會保衛台灣﹐對此﹐應

使現今的台灣領導人醒悟。美國采取這樣一種政策在道義上是完完全全正

當的﹐它絲毫不會損害台灣的民主﹐更為重要的是﹐它會最好地保護美國

的利益。對中國方面﹐華盛頓必須尋求兩條腿走路﹐既要用軍事阻嚇中國

﹐又要向北京保証﹐重新統一的選項始終在桌上。從這些地方看﹐布什總

統最近的政策轉變﹐是在正確道路上的邁進。

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> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- <

作者: mafa (上海小混混) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Re: Trouble in Taiwan - 對話開始
時間: Tue Mar 23 22:10:27 2004

本文由強華譯自美國《外交》2004年3/4月期﹐
作者（Michael D. Swaine）是美國卡內基國際和平基金
中國項目的高級研究員及聯席主任。
英文版見
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040301faessay83205-p0
/michael-d-swaine/trouble-in-taiwan.html

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> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- <


作者: Vkhanna (VK) 看板: CrossStrait
標題: Re: [阿嗚]po篇《外交》的……
時間: Tue May  4 12:09:45 2004

這篇文章以前看過了

撇開文內中美兩國對台灣的態度不談
其中引述台灣人的想法
似乎與事實有些距離

1. 作者說
   「美國政府千萬不要假定，臺灣公民已經一致要求從中國完全、
    永久地獨立出去。過去十年的民意測試都一直表明，大多數臺灣人民反對
    任何急劇的變化，無論是統一還是獨立。」

   作者似乎忘記 台灣對統獨現狀的選擇是在面對中國武力威嚇下的結果
   維持現狀不過是台灣人面對中國威嚇下的妥協罷了
   把維持現狀輕易解讀成台灣人反對獨立似乎過於一廂情願
   只有在台灣人民不受壓力下的民意調查
   才能確知台灣人民對統獨的真正想法
   且事實上, 台灣人對統獨的定義, 與中國人對統獨的定義完全不同
   即便台灣內部所謂的統派, 也是主張中華民國是一個主權獨立的國家
   依中國政府的說法, 兩個中國也是搞台獨
   用中國對台獨的定義
   除了像李敖主張一國兩制的偏激份子外, 所有台灣人幾乎都是台獨

2. 文中又提到
   「近期一項受到高度尊重的研究表明，年長的臺灣人（他們經歷了國民黨
    有時是殘酷的統治），甚至較他們年輕的後輩更傾向于視自己是純粹的臺灣人。
    而後者中的許多人對臺灣和中國都有認同」

    我努力想要得知此『高度尊重的研究』為何, 但可惜文章沒有標明出處

    不過事實上, 台灣過去某些族群由於是在中國出身成長, 對中國擁有感情
    但現在台灣的下一代, 都是在台灣長大, 對中國的感情事實上遠不及
    他們的上一代。

    台灣的年輕人對中國的認同, 你也不需外人告訴你
    你自己其實就可以觀察
    政治版和此版可以不要看, 因為這兩版的網友相信都是政治意識較強的人
    看法或許會失之偏頗
    但你若去耶林日本版和天涯遊子心版看台灣留學生之間的閒聊
    就可得知台灣學生在國外面對外國人時
    如何擔心自己被誤認是中國留學生
    又如何的向外人強調我們是台灣人 而非中國人

  我也用華盛頓郵報的另一篇文章以為對照

標題: New National Identity Emerges in Taiwan
Culture Shifting Away From Mainland China

原文:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&
contentId=A48076-2004Jan1&notFound=true


中文評論
華盛頓郵報：台灣浮現新國家認同

中央社華盛頓二日電〕華盛頓郵報今天報導，台灣經歷五十年的自我治理和民主演化，民
意出現重大變化，已然浮現新的國家認同，多數人已放棄與中國統一的想法，
認為自己是獨立國家的國民，這對中國和美國都構成挑戰。

這篇發自台北的報導描寫了台北一班國小六年級學生對國家認同問題的反應。
被問到有沒有人是中國人時，同學們發出咯咯的笑聲，互相交換困惑的眼神；
被問到有沒有台灣人時，全部都舉起手來喊說：「我」。

報導指出，中國寄望用經濟吸住台灣，但台灣民族主義的興起可能讓中國的期望受挫，
同時也強化北京方面用武派的立場；而這對美國總統布希也是問題，其政府承諾
保衛台灣，但又擔心捲入經台灣刺激而引發的戰爭。　　

郵報報導，北京、華府和台北的官員都說他們主張維持台灣海峽現狀，
問題是台北對現狀的定義不同於其他兩者。儘管中國和美國都警告台灣不要宣佈獨立，
台灣人普遍認為台灣已經獨立，可以自由的舉辦公投、制定新憲法及採取其他中國
反對的行動。

華盛頓郵報也引用聯合報十多年來民調的變化，說明一個世代下來，
台灣民眾對自己的看法出現的根本變化，也就是多數或者接近多數的住民不再認同自己
是中國人，而偏好自稱台灣人。

報導指出若干促成這種轉變的因素：中國的武力威脅反使很多台灣住民漸行漸遠；
出生在大陸而對中國有最強烈情感的人漸漸凋零；民主改革讓人民有自由
去質疑蔣中正版本的台灣史，民主改革也激發出新生的驕傲。

報導也指出，台灣文化活力最明顯的現象，或許是當年蔣中正的國民黨禁止在
學校使用的閩南話，現在越來越普遍，年輕人用閩南話唱饒舌歌、所有主要政黨
的政治人物都用閩南話發表競選演說、大部份的電視劇中也講閩南話。

這項報導概述了台灣的歷史，包括清朝割台後為期甚短的創建獨立的台灣民主國
的行動、光復後的二二八事件、蔣中正政府遷台形成的新人口結構、戒嚴統治
和對台灣意識的壓制，以及後來的民主運動。

華盛頓郵報引述五十歲的陳姓計程車司機的話，「小時候我知道有鄰居不見了，
但我的父母那時候不敢談論白色恐怖。過去十年來聽競選演說，我才知道國民黨
欺騙大家，也才知道我是台灣人，不是中國人。」

郵報報導，中國政治改變速度之慢，也使台灣漸行漸遠，高雄一黃姓漁民說，
「我們為自由奮鬥了這麼多年，不是為了拿來送給北京。」中國經濟吸引了上千億
美元的台灣資金，台灣民眾對與大陸經濟整合的感受是複雜的，有時候住在大陸
和在那裡做生意反而加強了台灣民眾的分離感。一名工廠經理說，「我在中國賺錢，
但我還是台灣人。」

該報引述國民黨蘇起的話說，台灣民眾內心自認是驕傲的台灣人，
痛恨中國的欺嚇；但他們的頭腦知道要避免引發戰爭，因此沒有正式與大陸分離。

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