Re: [蘋論]反軍購胡說

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這篇文章不留底不行
要不然等一下可能會被刪掉...
大家一起來看看那篇文章是什麼時候的東西...
再努力看看文章裡寫了什麼，
再看看是誰要舉證。

來吧，這是原文，都幫你做到這個地步了，不要逃避了...

“The Naval Component of the Chinese Defense Budget”
Remarks prepared for the U.S.-China Security Review Commission

December 7, 2001

Bernard D. Cole, Ph.D.
Professor of International History, National War College, Washington DC



The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the National War College, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. Government.



Allow me to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this
distinguished Commission for the opportunity to take part in the hearings you
are holding today on the topic of the budget of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA). As requested, I will focus my comments on the PLA Navy
’s (PLAN) role in determining and sharing the PLA’s budget.

Introduction

This topic has potentially important implications for U.S. interests and
policy in East Asia, and thus warrants continued close attention by American
observers of China. As a student of China’s military, especially its navy,
and its foreign policy, I am very pleased to be able to share my views on
this subject.

Any discussion of Chinese military spending would do well to begin with Mark
Twain’s acerbic reminder that “there are three kinds of lies . . . . lies,
damned lies, and statistics.”1 For instance, estimates of the PLA’s 1994
budget range from the Chinese government’s $6.3 billion, to the $92 billion
given by two American observers; those for 1995 include the Chinese government
’s $7.5 billion figure, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s
$63.5 billion, and a later estimate of approximately $150 billion provided by
a RAND Corporation analyst.2 Hence, what figure are we to use when Beijing
announces, as it did early this year, that it is increasing its military
budget by 17.7 percent?

It is difficult to estimate accurately the amount of the Chinese navy’s
budget, for several reasons. First is the innate sense of secrecy by the
Chinese government and military. They simply do not agree with American (and
other foreign) conceptions as transparency as a commendable means of reducing
international tension and building bilateral confidence.

Second, Beijing has more than one way of describing the resources it puts
into its military’s budget. “Defense budget” is not a commonly used term
in China (or in many other countries, for that matter); Beijing prefers “
defense expenditure” or “military expenditure,” and covers many categories
of spending. Third, the Ministry of Finance categorizing allocations as
either central or local complicates budget determination. Local government
funding probably includes much of the budget of People’s Armed Police (PAP)
and militia land forces. There are also sea borne militia units, and there is
very little evidence about how these forces are organized, funded, and
operated.

Fourth, budgeted defense spending is not clear with respect to the
inclusiveness of allocations for many categories, including research and
development, capital construction, and some personnel accounts, including
some retirement and demobilization costs. For instance, money allocated under
one account may well be obligated for other purposes. Fifth, the military
draws on non-central government funding, including profits from commercial
enterprises.3 These unofficial funding sources which complicate any
evaluation of China’s defense budget result from what one distinguished
observer notes as the “overriding financial fact in the development of the
PLA: inadequate funding.”4

Sixth, the navy has achieved an increasingly important status during the past
decade and probably has increased the percentage of China’s defense spending
it receives. It is not apparent, however, that this has resulted in a
meaningful shift of national security emphasis in China from continental to
maritime security concerns.

Analyzing The PLAN Budget

The following remarks are based on four general assumptions. First, the
Chinese military continues not to be accorded top priority by China’s
leaders. Second, the land forces continue to dominate the Chinese military,
as evidenced in the size and leadership role of that service. Third, the PLA
has to deal with inter-service rivalries similar to those experienced in the
United States and other militaries. Fourth, I further assume that within the
PLAN, the different naval arms—including submarines, surface ships, and
aviation—compete with each other for budget resources.

Despite these difficulties and uncertainties, we must attempt to understand
the budget resources being allocated to the PLAN. Such knowledge will help us
understand the purposes for which Beijing is engaged in modernizing the PLAN
and increasing its capability to serve as an instrument of national security
policy.

During the past ten years, China has been converting its very large but
generally obsolete navy into a force more able to participate effectively in
achieving national security goals. These goals do not, in my view, include
deploying a PLAN able to operate globally, as a conventional force. By that,
I mean that Beijing does not htmire to deploy aircraft carrier battle groups
around the globe; it will continue to engage in a program of naval diplomacy,
based on sending groups of two-three ships on long cruises. China is also
likely to continue trying to deploy a small sea-based nuclear deterrent
force, which of course has global implications.

Instead, Beijing is attempting to build a navy able to operate effectively in
Asia, where China’s most vital maritime interests lie. These include first
and foremost, defense of the homeland, a relatively simple task given the
current lack of military threats. Second is the reunification of Taiwan with
the mainland, while third is other sovereignty claims, including the land
features and associated water areas of the South China Sea, the Diaoyu Tai
(or Senkaku Islands) that lie northeast of Taiwan, between that island and
Okinawa, and various maritime boundary disputes.

Fourth is the maritime economic interests vital to China. These include,
first, the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) located in Asia’s coastal
waters, a term I define as those ocean areas within 200 nautical miles (nm)
of the coast.5 Beijing is also vitally concerned about much more far-ranging
SLOCs, of course, especially those that pass through the South China Sea and
the Indian Ocean to the Middle East, and across which is imported
approximately 30 percent of the daily oil requirements of China’s growing
economy.6 Second are offshore mineral and biological resources; these include
approximately 10 percent of China’s known petroleum (oil and natural gas)
reserves, and the fisheries industry, an important source of protein to the
Chinese diet. Third is the heavy concentration of modern economic enterprises
in China’s coastal region.

Beijing’s goal is to deploy naval and air forces sufficient to deter and if
necessary defeat any threats to the security of these maritime interests.
This in turn requires an estimate of the operational situation, based on
likely threats. There is little doubt that China views the United States as
the primary maritime threat to its perceived vital national interests in East
Asia.

The strength of the PLAN increased significantly between 1990 and 2000, a
decade of growth between the end of the Soviet Union and the continued
intensification of the Taiwan issue. The trend during that decade, a trend
that continues today, is a modest addition of approximately 1.5 new surface
combatant ships and one submarine per year. The total number of combatants
has remained about the same, as older ships are decommissioned, but today’s
PLAN includes more modern—if rarely state of the art—warships and
submarines, and is significantly more capable than its 1990 fleet.

The most significant new ships and submarines have been acquired from Russia.
China’s navy was begun in 1950 with large-scale Soviet assistance in all
areas, from training schools to ships, and Beijing continues to rely on
Moscow for naval support.

Four Kilo-class conventionally powered submarines were ordered from Russia in
1993. Although a 1970s design, these are still very capable conventionally
powered attack submarines. In 1998, Beijing purchased two Sovremmeny-class
guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) for approximately $900 million; both of
these ships are now homeported with China’s East Sea Fleet. Armed with the
formidable SS-N-22 Moskit missile, these ships were designed by the Soviets
in the 1970s to attack aircraft carriers and cruisers.

These foreign purchases were likely funded not from the annual PLAN budget,
but by special allocation from the Chinese government through the Central
Military Commission (CMC). The annual budget would have been still stressed
by these new purchases, however, since they required specialized personnel
training, maintenance packages, and spare parts supplies. In fact, it is
probable that the PLAN tried to save money with the first two Kilo-class
submarines by attempting to have both commissioning crews share one crew’s
training package; the results were, predictably, poor performance by these
first two boats.

China has also been modernizing its navy with indigenously-built surface
combatants, submarines, and aircraft. This latter category is significant,
given the central importance of airpower to modern naval forces; apparently
none of the Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft acquired from Russia have been assigned
to the PLAN.

In the category of warships, however, the PLAN now deploys two Luhu-class and
one Luhai-class DDGs. These are powered by gas-turbine engines acquired from
the United States during the 1980s in the case of the Luhus, and from Ukraine
in the case of the Luhai.7 Despite these modern power-plants (more efficient
than the Sovremmenys’ trouble-prone steam plants), the three Chinese-built
DDGs possess limited weapons and sensor suites, especially in the areas of
anti-air and anti-submarine warfare. It is presently unclear whether the PLAN
will receive funding sufficient to both buy additional Sovremmenys, although
there has been much open-source press reporting to that effect, and to build
more Luhais. I do not think the navy will receive that funding, and has opted
to acquire additional Luhais, although it may well improve the ship’s
capabilities by arming it with the Moskit anti-surface ship cruise missile,
and with a phased-array type of anti-air warfare (AAW) radar. This will still
require the Chinese to purchase the ships’ gas-turbine engines from a
foreign source, probably Ukraine.8

China is building the successful Ming and potentially more capable
Song-classes of conventionally-powered submarines, turning out one per year
of the former and one of the latter about every two years. This construction
probably means Beijing will not purchase additional Kilo-class boats from
Moscow. Rather, China may be holding back on foreign purchases until a
successful submarine-design incorporating air-independent propulsion (AIP) is
available, perhaps the Russian Amur-class, long under development.

Hence, the PLAN budget must be assumed to have to accommodate a continued
indigenous submarine-construction program, without the supplementary funding
that would presumably be allocated if additional Russian submarines were
purchased. The most significant addition to the future Chinese submarine
force, however, will likely be the nuclear-powered ship (SSN) designated “
Type 093,” now under construction, almost certainly with extensive Russian
assistance.

The PLAN already deploys five Han-class SSNs, but these have never been
completely reliable, and it is doubtful that more than three of them are
currently operational. The Han is modeled on the old Soviet November-class,
designed in the 1950s, which had a troublesome nuclear engineering plant; the
Type–093 is presumably modeled on the more modern and far more capable
Victor III-class of Soviet boat (designed in the 1970s). The design and
construction dollars for this new PLAN SSN probably come from the navy’s “
regular” budget, but it is likely that the central government has provided
additional, extra-budgetary funds to pay for the Russian assistance in
building the boat.

The Budget Process

The PLAN’s budget process involves a number of steps. First, the navy
leadership formulates its request within a paradigm of several categories.
These may be listed under the following headings:

Personnel. Pay and fringe benefits to naval personnel, to include some food,
uniforms, pensions, and possibly allowances provided personnel who are
demobilized; this category also includes the pay and fringe benefits provided
civilian employees.


Education and training. This category would include each of the three
geographic fleet’s shore-based training establishments; recruit and new
officer training; naval academies; thirteen naval colleges ranging from
entry-level academies for officer-candidates to training for commanding
officers in over 200 technical, tactical, and operational subjects; and
possibly the PLAN contributes to the cost of operating various inter-service
schools. Not included in this category may be specialized training packages
for newly-purchased foreign systems, such as the Kilo-class submarines
obtained from Russia.


Operations and Maintenance. This includes ships, submarines, and aircraft, as
well as the Marine Corps and other units under PLAN command; everything from
fuel to spare parts for most equipment. Other budget lines include
meteorological-oceanographical support and shore-based communications
systems. An important sub-category here for the PLAN is “hotel services”:
these include housing and shore-support for ships and other operating units
and their crews.


Research and Development (R&D). The bulk of PLA R&D likely is conducted and
funded on a centralized basis, but the PLAN probably has its own R&D
establishment for addressing such navy-specific areas as anti-submarine
warfare (ASW). This category should include the complete range of research
(categorized into four levels in the U.S. Navy), from basic laboratory
experiments to afloat-testing of operational systems.


Procurement. While headline-grabbing items purchased from foreign
concerns--primarily Russian, French, and Israeli during the past decade—are
almost certainly funded directly by the central government, the PLAN must
allocate resources for indigenously produced items, ranging from Luhai-class
DDGs and Song-class submarines to small arms and personal equipment for its
personnel.


Construction. This budget category focuses primarily on naval base and other
facility construction, ranging from piers to warehouses to personnel housing
and recreational facilities. Another important line item here concerns the
navy’s fuels systems, including storage, pipelines, and pumping facilities.


Civil Sector. This is a particularly uncertain category, and would include
funding the PLAN may be obligated to provide naval militia units ashore and
afloat. It also refers to budgetary interactions between the navy and local
governments, ranging from provincial support to inland PLAN facilities to
support of navy personnel draft and recruiting teams; these involve some
naval expenditures, but also accrue monetary and other support to the PLAN.9
The budgetary process within the navy remains opaque. Extrapolating from the
annual cycle the PLAN uses for requesting special operational assignments,
and basing my discussion on the cyclical nature of governmental budgeting
procedures in other navies, I offer the following description. The PLAN
includes five operational forces:

surface vessel units,
submarine units,
aviation units,
coastal defense units, and
Marine Corps.10
Each of these has a stake and an input in the PLAN’s budget process, as
would, presumably, the PLAN Headquarters departments and the operating
fleets: North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea. The process itself no doubt
follows a formal schedule of analysis, estimate, submission, review, and
resubmission, but also no doubt is relatively continuous throughout the year.
This continuous process results from competition for scarce budgetary
resources both within the PLAN, and from that service’s competition with the
air and ground forces.

Conclusion

Our lack of precise knowledge of the procedures followed by the Chinese navy
is obtaining and spending its share of the nation’s defense budget is not
surprising, given the commitment to secrecy by the PLA. However, a review of
the PLAN’s changes in force structure and operational capabilities during
the past decade can serve as an indicator of the efficacy of the navy’s
budget gamesmanship.

Future Spending

As for the next decade, we are forced to estimate PLAN expenditures based on
the international situation, especially that in East Asia, policy statements
by China’s government; and observed acquisitions and doctrinal developments
within the PLAN. Another factor is the future of the Chinese economy, which
is likely going to be subject to major perturbations resulting from
membership in the World Trade Organization.

There is little doubt, despite the post- September 11th developments in west
China, that Taiwan will remain the preeminent concern of the Chinese navy.
That concern translates into a primary PLAN focus on the U.S. Navy. Hence,
PLAN budget priorities will continue to concentrate on those systems and
capabilities that may facilitate a successful campaign in the East China Sea
against possible U.S. intervention, should China’s determination to reunify
Taiwan with the mainland result in Beijing using the military instrument of
statecraft.

The development of an aircraft carrier, interestingly, would not very
significantly affect this operational situation: during any contest in the
vicinity of Taiwan, the PLAN would be able to rely on airpower based on the
mainland. The presence of one or two carriers would present the PLAN with
more of a burden—the carriers would embody so much political capital for
Beijing that they would have to be protected at all costs—than a advantage.

Four factors serve as more significant harbingers of Chinese intent to
increase its navy’s role in a Taiwan scenario. First would be an increased
rate of acquisition of SS-N-22 anti-ship cruise missiles and the ships,
probably of the Luhai-class, aboard which to deploy them. The decision to
build additional Luhais would be signaled by Beijing’s acquisition of
numbers (two per ship) of maritime gas-turbine engines, probably from
Ukraine, as discussed above. This program might also be supported with
significantly increased production of Chinese-manufactured C-802 anti-ship
cruise missiles.

Second would be the immediate transfer to the navy of Su-27s and Su-30s being
acquired as a result of contracts with Russia (and the exercising of
newly-acquired AWACs and aerial refueling aircraft with these fighters).
Third would be the acquisition/conversion of naval craft dedicated to
mine-laying, with a concomitant build-up of the PLAN’s stock of modern sea
mines.11

Fourth, a purchase of several more Kilo-class submarines from Russia, and a
store of wake-homing torpedoes to arm them, would demonstrate China’s
determination to rapidly expand this most dangerous naval warfare capability.
This determination would be further buttressed by a significant increase in
the production of the indigenously designed Song-class submarine. China is
also building the first of a new class of SSN, the Type-093. It is very
doubtful, given China’s record of indigenous production of very complex
military platforms, that more than one or possibly two of these new SSNs will
be deployed before the end of the decade. In any event,
conventionally-powered submarines still pose a threat sufficiently serious
enough to serve Beijing’s national security purposes in East Asian waters.

Finally, and perhaps most important, would be dramatically increased
expenditures on PLAN training in ASW, AAW, and anti-surface warfare (ASUW). I
deliberately omit amphibious warfare training/exercises from this list of
indicators, given China’s demonstrable lack of interest in the relatively
easy acquisition of the ships necessary to execute this mission in the
classic sense.

A range of expenditures for future major ships and systems is provided by
Bates Gill in the article cited above. His high and low “Estimate Range of
Costs for Annual Chinese Defense Procurement, circa 2000-2005” for 21 large
surface combatants, 20 submarines, and 500 cruise missiles runs from $10.75
billion (low estimate), to $14.3 billion (high estimate). As noted above,
however, budget allocations serve as indicators which must be considered in
conjunction with the tenor of the political climate in Beijing and in East
Asia.

The processes by which China’s navy requests, receives, and spends its
funding is no clearer than are many of the other processes through which
Beijing administers the PLA. Nonetheless, it is a process we must continue to
try to understand, since it provides the skeletal structure of PLAN
capabilities and hence may serve as a important indicator of China’s
intentions and capabilities in the contested East Asian security issues. That
understanding requires not only classic intelligence work, but the closest
interaction possible between our military and academic observers and their
Chinese counterparts. The PLAN is a closely guarded book, but it is not
closed.


FOOTNOTES


1. Cited by Bates Gill, “Chinese Defense Procurement Spending: Determining
Intentions and Capabilities,” in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.),
China’s Military Faces the Future (Washington, D.C.: AEI and M.E. Sharpe,
1999), p. 195.

2. Charles Wolf, “Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications,”
 RAND, MR-1143-OSD/A,2000, p. 19, estimates Chinese military spending on an
exchange rate and parity basis: $120-180 billion is the figure for 2000;
$249-373 billion is projected for 2015 under conditions of stable growth in
China.

3. See Arthur S. Ding, “China’s Defense Finance: Content, Process and
Administration,” The China Quarterly (June 1996), pp. 428-442; and Shaoguang
Wang, “The Military Expenditure of China, 1989-98,” SIPRI Yearbook 1999:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 334-349, for discussion of this process.

4. Ellis Joffe, “The PLA and Economy: the Effects of Involvement,” paper
presented at IISS/CAPS Conference on “Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on
Security Policy,” Hong Kong (8-10 July 1994), p. 12.

5. One nautical mile equals 2076 yards, or approximately 1.15 statute miles.
I am not aware of an authoritative description of these waters by Chinese
strategists.

6. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates China’s daily oil use at 4.6
million barrels per day, with 1.4 million barrels of that imported. See: .

7. The United States sold China five LM-2500 marine gas-turbine engines
manufactured by GE; four of these engines power the two Luhus; the location
of the fifth is not known. China has acquired an unknown number of engines
from Ukraine; two of these power the Luhai.

8. The first gas-turbine powered warship went to sea in 1936, and one of the
curious shortcomings of China’s military-industrial complex is its apparent
inability to design and produce an effective maritime gas-turbine engineering
plant.

9. This discussion draws on two articles by Shaoguang Wang, who lists
thirteen categories of “the Chinese official defense budget” in his SIPRI
Yearbook article (p. 37), and eleven categories of China’s “military
expenditure” in his China Quarterly article (p. 890).

10. Described by PLAN commander Admiral Shi Yunsheng: quoted in Huang
Caihong, Chen Wanjun, and Zhang Zhao, “China Enhances the Navy’s
Comprehensive Strength—Interview with Naval Commander Vadm Shi Yunsheng,”
 Liaowang, Nr. 16 (Beijing), 19 Apr 99, 13-15, in FBIS-CHI-99-0513. Also see
Ren Yanjun, “Forging A Shield of Peace for the Republic—Part 1 of Roundup
on 50 Years of Achievements in Army Building,” Jiefangjun Bao, 6 Sep 99, 1,
2, in FBIS-CHI-99-0911; and Xu Zuzhi, “Backgrounder on National Day
Celebrations,” Zhongguo Xinwen She (Beijing), 1 Oct 99, in FBIS-CHI-99-1002.

11. The PLAN currently operates one dedicated minelayer, although some of its
surface combatants (and presumably its submarines) are nominally required to
exercise at least once a year at laying mines.

12. Gill, pp. 220, 222. Estimates are in $U.S. and, while obviously very
approximate, are useful when attempting to decipher China’s defense spending.


※ 引述《come (我想一個人靜一靜)》之銘言：
: ※ 引述《starfield (無)》之銘言：
: : 這句話是誰說的：
: : 台灣的潛艇如果跟中共的KILO一樣便宜，一樣有AIP
: : 如果有人討論時這樣一直硬凹，
: : 亂引過時的東西..
: : 我不知道要怎麼討論。
: 我上面的文章已經告訴你中國新買的KILO潛艇具有AIP了
: 我再把連結給你看一次
: http://www.armystar.com/new_page_143.htm
: 如果你硬要說人家是自爽文
: 那的確沒什麼好討論了
: 除非你拿的出證據說中共的KILO沒有AIP

--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 220.132.126.57
→ starfield:還有另一個也要留底..
→ starfield:日本生產親潮級本來就有退役的..
→ starfield:可以給台灣...
→ starfield:10229篇...
→ starfield:文章有錯沒關係..有錯還一直想當大師...
→ starfield:還真的是....
→ starfield:結果又射後不理了....
→ starfield:每次詞窮就來這招...
→ starfield:過一陣子再來故左右而言他...
→ starfield:上次倒是引出merlin大的好文
推 jamexz:其實現在最奇妙的是張飛戰岳飛，軍購變潛艇～～
推 GiantTW:樓上的，張飛岳飛是敝人高中同學的國文作文喔
→ GiantTW:而且是敝人po到高中的BBS，然後才擴展至全國的喔
推 olaqe:其實我想說的是 中國是紙老虎 討論他軍備幹嘛???
→ olaqe:中國軍事力量在世界上不是遠不及美日嗎 怪哉??
※ 編輯: starfield       來自: 220.132.126.57       (06/27 00:45)
推 come:你這是在自打嘴巴吧! XD!
→ come:裡面推測中共自己生產潛艦會排擠KILO的預算
→ come:事實上證明中共這兩者並行
→ come:後來還說，中共會停止購買外國潛艇，除非有AIP
推 come:還有核潛艇根本不算是AIP
→ come:核潛艇根本不需要燃燒氧氣所以也不需要"AI"P
推 come:越想越好笑，這篇文章根本就是在幫我說話
→ come:竟然沒人噓，真是太奇妙了!