Re: [蘋論]反軍購胡說

[starfield (無)]

※ 引述《starfield (無)》之銘言：
: 標題: Re: [蘋論]反軍購胡說
: 時間: Sun Jun 26 20:28:56 2005
:
: 這篇文章不留底不行
: 要不然等一下可能會被刪掉...
: 大家一起來看看那篇文章是什麼時候的東西...
: 再努力看看文章裡寫了什麼，
: 再看看是誰要舉證。
:
: 來吧，這是原文，都幫你做到這個地步了，不要逃避了...
:
: “The Naval Component of the Chinese Defense Budget”
: Remarks prepared for the U.S.-China Security Review Commission
:
: December 7, 2001
:
: Bernard D. Cole, Ph.D.
: Professor of International History, National War College, Washington DC
:
:
:
: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect
: the official policy or position of the National War College, the Department
: of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
:
:
:
: Allow me to begin by thanking you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this
: distinguished Commission for the opportunity to take part in the hearings you
: are holding today on the topic of the budget of the Chinese People’s
: Liberation Army (PLA). As requested, I will focus my comments on the PLA Navy
: ’s (PLAN) role in determining and sharing the PLA’s budget.
:
: Introduction
:
: This topic has potentially important implications for U.S. interests and
: policy in East Asia, and thus warrants continued close attention by American
: observers of China. As a student of China’s military, especially its navy,
: and its foreign policy, I am very pleased to be able to share my views on
: this subject.
:
: Any discussion of Chinese military spending would do well to begin with Mark
: Twain’s acerbic reminder that “there are three kinds of lies . . . . lies,
: damned lies, and statistics.”1 For instance, estimates of the PLA’s 1994
: budget range from the Chinese government’s $6.3 billion, to the $92 billion
: given by two American observers; those for 1995 include the Chinese government
: ’s $7.5 billion figure, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s
: $63.5 billion, and a later estimate of approximately $150 billion provided by
: a RAND Corporation analyst.2 Hence, what figure are we to use when Beijing
: announces, as it did early this year, that it is increasing its military
: budget by 17.7 percent?
:
: It is difficult to estimate accurately the amount of the Chinese navy’s
: budget, for several reasons. First is the innate sense of secrecy by the
: Chinese government and military. They simply do not agree with American (and
: other foreign) conceptions as transparency as a commendable means of reducing
: international tension and building bilateral confidence.
:
: Second, Beijing has more than one way of describing the resources it puts
: into its military’s budget. “Defense budget” is not a commonly used term
: in China (or in many other countries, for that matter); Beijing prefers “
: defense expenditure” or “military expenditure,” and covers many categories
: of spending. Third, the Ministry of Finance categorizing allocations as
: either central or local complicates budget determination. Local government
: funding probably includes much of the budget of People’s Armed Police (PAP)
: and militia land forces. There are also sea borne militia units, and there is
: very little evidence about how these forces are organized, funded, and
: operated.
:
: Fourth, budgeted defense spending is not clear with respect to the
: inclusiveness of allocations for many categories, including research and
: development, capital construction, and some personnel accounts, including
: some retirement and demobilization costs. For instance, money allocated under
: one account may well be obligated for other purposes. Fifth, the military
: draws on non-central government funding, including profits from commercial
: enterprises.3 These unofficial funding sources which complicate any
: evaluation of China’s defense budget result from what one distinguished
: observer notes as the “overriding financial fact in the development of the
: PLA: inadequate funding.”4
:
: Sixth, the navy has achieved an increasingly important status during the past
: decade and probably has increased the percentage of China’s defense spending
: it receives. It is not apparent, however, that this has resulted in a
: meaningful shift of national security emphasis in China from continental to
: maritime security concerns.
:
: Analyzing The PLAN Budget
:
: The following remarks are based on four general assumptions. First, the
: Chinese military continues not to be accorded top priority by China’s
: leaders. Second, the land forces continue to dominate the Chinese military,
: as evidenced in the size and leadership role of that service. Third, the PLA
: has to deal with inter-service rivalries similar to those experienced in the
: United States and other militaries. Fourth, I further assume that within the
: PLAN, the different naval arms—including submarines, surface ships, and
: aviation—compete with each other for budget resources.
:
: Despite these difficulties and uncertainties, we must attempt to understand
: the budget resources being allocated to the PLAN. Such knowledge will help us
: understand the purposes for which Beijing is engaged in modernizing the PLAN
: and increasing its capability to serve as an instrument of national security
: policy.
:
: During the past ten years, China has been converting its very large but
: generally obsolete navy into a force more able to participate effectively in
: achieving national security goals. These goals do not, in my view, include
: deploying a PLAN able to operate globally, as a conventional force. By that,
: I mean that Beijing does not htmire to deploy aircraft carrier battle groups
: around the globe; it will continue to engage in a program of naval diplomacy,
: based on sending groups of two-three ships on long cruises. China is also
: likely to continue trying to deploy a small sea-based nuclear deterrent
: force, which of course has global implications.
:
: Instead, Beijing is attempting to build a navy able to operate effectively in
: Asia, where China’s most vital maritime interests lie. These include first
: and foremost, defense of the homeland, a relatively simple task given the
: current lack of military threats. Second is the reunification of Taiwan with
: the mainland, while third is other sovereignty claims, including the land
: features and associated water areas of the South China Sea, the Diaoyu Tai
: (or Senkaku Islands) that lie northeast of Taiwan, between that island and
: Okinawa, and various maritime boundary disputes.
:
: Fourth is the maritime economic interests vital to China. These include,
: first, the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) located in Asia’s coastal
: waters, a term I define as those ocean areas within 200 nautical miles (nm)
: of the coast.5 Beijing is also vitally concerned about much more far-ranging
: SLOCs, of course, especially those that pass through the South China Sea and
: the Indian Ocean to the Middle East, and across which is imported
: approximately 30 percent of the daily oil requirements of China’s growing
: economy.6 Second are offshore mineral and biological resources; these include
: approximately 10 percent of China’s known petroleum (oil and natural gas)
: reserves, and the fisheries industry, an important source of protein to the
: Chinese diet. Third is the heavy concentration of modern economic enterprises
: in China’s coastal region.
:
: Beijing’s goal is to deploy naval and air forces sufficient to deter and if
: necessary defeat any threats to the security of these maritime interests.
: This in turn requires an estimate of the operational situation, based on
: likely threats. There is little doubt that China views the United States as
: the primary maritime threat to its perceived vital national interests in East
: Asia.
:
: The strength of the PLAN increased significantly between 1990 and 2000, a
: decade of growth between the end of the Soviet Union and the continued
: intensification of the Taiwan issue. The trend during that decade, a trend
: that continues today, is a modest addition of approximately 1.5 new surface
: combatant ships and one submarine per year. The total number of combatants
: has remained about the same, as older ships are decommissioned, but today’s
: PLAN includes more modern—if rarely state of the art—warships and
: submarines, and is significantly more capable than its 1990 fleet.
:
: The most significant new ships and submarines have been acquired from Russia.
: China’s navy was begun in 1950 with large-scale Soviet assistance in all
: areas, from training schools to ships, and Beijing continues to rely on
: Moscow for naval support.
:
: Four Kilo-class conventionally powered submarines were ordered from Russia in
: 1993. Although a 1970s design, these are still very capable conventionally
: powered attack submarines. In 1998, Beijing purchased two Sovremmeny-class
: guided-missile destroyers (DDGs) for approximately $900 million; both of
: these ships are now homeported with China’s East Sea Fleet. Armed with the
: formidable SS-N-22 Moskit missile, these ships were designed by the Soviets
: in the 1970s to attack aircraft carriers and cruisers.
:
: These foreign purchases were likely funded not from the annual PLAN budget,
: but by special allocation from the Chinese government through the Central
: Military Commission (CMC). The annual budget would have been still stressed
: by these new purchases, however, since they required specialized personnel
: training, maintenance packages, and spare parts supplies. In fact, it is
: probable that the PLAN tried to save money with the first two Kilo-class
: submarines by attempting to have both commissioning crews share one crew’s
: training package; the results were, predictably, poor performance by these
: first two boats.
:
: China has also been modernizing its navy with indigenously-built surface
: combatants, submarines, and aircraft. This latter category is significant,
: given the central importance of airpower to modern naval forces; apparently
: none of the Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft acquired from Russia have been assigned
: to the PLAN.
:
: In the category of warships, however, the PLAN now deploys two Luhu-class and
: one Luhai-class DDGs. These are powered by gas-turbine engines acquired from
: the United States during the 1980s in the case of the Luhus, and from Ukraine
: in the case of the Luhai.7 Despite these modern power-plants (more efficient
: than the Sovremmenys’ trouble-prone steam plants), the three Chinese-built
: DDGs possess limited weapons and sensor suites, especially in the areas of
: anti-air and anti-submarine warfare. It is presently unclear whether the PLAN
: will receive funding sufficient to both buy additional Sovremmenys, although
: there has been much open-source press reporting to that effect, and to build
: more Luhais. I do not think the navy will receive that funding, and has opted
: to acquire additional Luhais, although it may well improve the ship’s
: capabilities by arming it with the Moskit anti-surface ship cruise missile,
: and with a phased-array type of anti-air warfare (AAW) radar. This will still
: require the Chinese to purchase the ships’ gas-turbine engines from a
: foreign source, probably Ukraine.8
:
: China is building the successful Ming and potentially more capable
: Song-classes of conventionally-powered submarines, turning out one per year
: of the former and one of the latter about every two years. This construction
: probably means Beijing will not purchase additional Kilo-class boats from
: Moscow. Rather, China may be holding back on foreign purchases until a
: successful submarine-design incorporating air-independent propulsion (AIP) is
: available, perhaps the Russian Amur-class, long under development.
:
: Hence, the PLAN budget must be assumed to have to accommodate a continued
: indigenous submarine-construction program, without the supplementary funding
: that would presumably be allocated if additional Russian submarines were
: purchased. The most significant addition to the future Chinese submarine
: force, however, will likely be the nuclear-powered ship (SSN) designated “
: Type 093,” now under construction, almost certainly with extensive Russian
: assistance.
:
: The PLAN already deploys five Han-class SSNs, but these have never been
: completely reliable, and it is doubtful that more than three of them are
: currently operational. The Han is modeled on the old Soviet November-class,
: designed in the 1950s, which had a troublesome nuclear engineering plant; the
: Type–093 is presumably modeled on the more modern and far more capable
: Victor III-class of Soviet boat (designed in the 1970s). The design and
: construction dollars for this new PLAN SSN probably come from the navy’s “
: regular” budget, but it is likely that the central government has provided
: additional, extra-budgetary funds to pay for the Russian assistance in
: building the boat.
:
: The Budget Process
:
: The PLAN’s budget process involves a number of steps. First, the navy
: leadership formulates its request within a paradigm of several categories.
: These may be listed under the following headings:
:
: Personnel. Pay and fringe benefits to naval personnel, to include some food,
: uniforms, pensions, and possibly allowances provided personnel who are
: demobilized; this category also includes the pay and fringe benefits provided
: civilian employees.
:
:
: Education and training. This category would include each of the three
: geographic fleet’s shore-based training establishments; recruit and new
: officer training; naval academies; thirteen naval colleges ranging from
: entry-level academies for officer-candidates to training for commanding
: officers in over 200 technical, tactical, and operational subjects; and
: possibly the PLAN contributes to the cost of operating various inter-service
: schools. Not included in this category may be specialized training packages
: for newly-purchased foreign systems, such as the Kilo-class submarines
: obtained from Russia.
:
:
: Operations and Maintenance. This includes ships, submarines, and aircraft, as
: well as the Marine Corps and other units under PLAN command; everything from
: fuel to spare parts for most equipment. Other budget lines include
: meteorological-oceanographical support and shore-based communications
: systems. An important sub-category here for the PLAN is “hotel services”:
: these include housing and shore-support for ships and other operating units
: and their crews.
:
:
: Research and Development (R&D). The bulk of PLA R&D likely is conducted and
: funded on a centralized basis, but the PLAN probably has its own R&D
: establishment for addressing such navy-specific areas as anti-submarine
: warfare (ASW). This category should include the complete range of research
: (categorized into four levels in the U.S. Navy), from basic laboratory
: experiments to afloat-testing of operational systems.
:
:
: Procurement. While headline-grabbing items purchased from foreign
: concerns--primarily Russian, French, and Israeli during the past decade—are
: almost certainly funded directly by the central government, the PLAN must
: allocate resources for indigenously produced items, ranging from Luhai-class
: DDGs and Song-class submarines to small arms and personal equipment for its
: personnel.
:
:
: Construction. This budget category focuses primarily on naval base and other
: facility construction, ranging from piers to warehouses to personnel housing
: and recreational facilities. Another important line item here concerns the
: navy’s fuels systems, including storage, pipelines, and pumping facilities.
:
:
: Civil Sector. This is a particularly uncertain category, and would include
: funding the PLAN may be obligated to provide naval militia units ashore and
: afloat. It also refers to budgetary interactions between the navy and local
: governments, ranging from provincial support to inland PLAN facilities to
: support of navy personnel draft and recruiting teams; these involve some
: naval expenditures, but also accrue monetary and other support to the PLAN.9
: The budgetary process within the navy remains opaque. Extrapolating from the
: annual cycle the PLAN uses for requesting special operational assignments,
: and basing my discussion on the cyclical nature of governmental budgeting
: procedures in other navies, I offer the following description. The PLAN
: includes five operational forces:
:
: surface vessel units,
: submarine units,
: aviation units,
: coastal defense units, and
: Marine Corps.10
: Each of these has a stake and an input in the PLAN’s budget process, as
: would, presumably, the PLAN Headquarters departments and the operating
: fleets: North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea. The process itself no doubt
: follows a formal schedule of analysis, estimate, submission, review, and
: resubmission, but also no doubt is relatively continuous throughout the year.
: This continuous process results from competition for scarce budgetary
: resources both within the PLAN, and from that service’s competition with the
: air and ground forces.
:
: Conclusion
:
: Our lack of precise knowledge of the procedures followed by the Chinese navy
: is obtaining and spending its share of the nation’s defense budget is not
: surprising, given the commitment to secrecy by the PLA. However, a review of
: the PLAN’s changes in force structure and operational capabilities during
: the past decade can serve as an indicator of the efficacy of the navy’s
: budget gamesmanship.
:
: Future Spending
:
: As for the next decade, we are forced to estimate PLAN expenditures based on
: the international situation, especially that in East Asia, policy statements
: by China’s government; and observed acquisitions and doctrinal developments
: within the PLAN. Another factor is the future of the Chinese economy, which
: is likely going to be subject to major perturbations resulting from
: membership in the World Trade Organization.
:
: There is little doubt, despite the post- September 11th developments in west
: China, that Taiwan will remain the preeminent concern of the Chinese navy.
: That concern translates into a primary PLAN focus on the U.S. Navy. Hence,
: PLAN budget priorities will continue to concentrate on those systems and
: capabilities that may facilitate a successful campaign in the East China Sea
: against possible U.S. intervention, should China’s determination to reunify
: Taiwan with the mainland result in Beijing using the military instrument of
: statecraft.
:
: The development of an aircraft carrier, interestingly, would not very
: significantly affect this operational situation: during any contest in the
: vicinity of Taiwan, the PLAN would be able to rely on airpower based on the
: mainland. The presence of one or two carriers would present the PLAN with
: more of a burden—the carriers would embody so much political capital for
: Beijing that they would have to be protected at all costs—than a advantage.
:
: Four factors serve as more significant harbingers of Chinese intent to
: increase its navy’s role in a Taiwan scenario. First would be an increased
: rate of acquisition of SS-N-22 anti-ship cruise missiles and the ships,
: probably of the Luhai-class, aboard which to deploy them. The decision to
: build additional Luhais would be signaled by Beijing’s acquisition of
: numbers (two per ship) of maritime gas-turbine engines, probably from
: Ukraine, as discussed above. This program might also be supported with
: significantly increased production of Chinese-manufactured C-802 anti-ship
: cruise missiles.
:
: Second would be the immediate transfer to the navy of Su-27s and Su-30s being
: acquired as a result of contracts with Russia (and the exercising of
: newly-acquired AWACs and aerial refueling aircraft with these fighters).
: Third would be the acquisition/conversion of naval craft dedicated to
: mine-laying, with a concomitant build-up of the PLAN’s stock of modern sea
: mines.11
:
: Fourth, a purchase of several more Kilo-class submarines from Russia, and a
: store of wake-homing torpedoes to arm them, would demonstrate China’s
: determination to rapidly expand this most dangerous naval warfare capability.
: This determination would be further buttressed by a significant increase in
: the production of the indigenously designed Song-class submarine. China is
: also building the first of a new class of SSN, the Type-093. It is very
: doubtful, given China’s record of indigenous production of very complex
: military platforms, that more than one or possibly two of these new SSNs will
: be deployed before the end of the decade. In any event,
: conventionally-powered submarines still pose a threat sufficiently serious
: enough to serve Beijing’s national security purposes in East Asian waters.
:
: Finally, and perhaps most important, would be dramatically increased
: expenditures on PLAN training in ASW, AAW, and anti-surface warfare (ASUW). I
: deliberately omit amphibious warfare training/exercises from this list of
: indicators, given China’s demonstrable lack of interest in the relatively
: easy acquisition of the ships necessary to execute this mission in the
: classic sense.
:
: A range of expenditures for future major ships and systems is provided by
: Bates Gill in the article cited above. His high and low “Estimate Range of
: Costs for Annual Chinese Defense Procurement, circa 2000-2005” for 21 large
: surface combatants, 20 submarines, and 500 cruise missiles runs from $10.75
: billion (low estimate), to $14.3 billion (high estimate). As noted above,
: however, budget allocations serve as indicators which must be considered in
: conjunction with the tenor of the political climate in Beijing and in East
: Asia.
:
: The processes by which China’s navy requests, receives, and spends its
: funding is no clearer than are many of the other processes through which
: Beijing administers the PLA. Nonetheless, it is a process we must continue to
: try to understand, since it provides the skeletal structure of PLAN
: capabilities and hence may serve as a important indicator of China’s
: intentions and capabilities in the contested East Asian security issues. That
: understanding requires not only classic intelligence work, but the closest
: interaction possible between our military and academic observers and their
: Chinese counterparts. The PLAN is a closely guarded book, but it is not
: closed.
:
:
: FOOTNOTES
:
:
: 1. Cited by Bates Gill, “Chinese Defense Procurement Spending: Determining
: Intentions and Capabilities,” in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.),
: China’s Military Faces the Future (Washington, D.C.: AEI and M.E. Sharpe,
: 1999), p. 195.
:
: 2. Charles Wolf, “Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications,”
:  RAND, MR-1143-OSD/A,2000, p. 19, estimates Chinese military spending on an
: exchange rate and parity basis: $120-180 billion is the figure for 2000;
: $249-373 billion is projected for 2015 under conditions of stable growth in
: China.
:
: 3. See Arthur S. Ding, “China’s Defense Finance: Content, Process and
: Administration,” The China Quarterly (June 1996), pp. 428-442; and Shaoguang
: Wang, “The Military Expenditure of China, 1989-98,” SIPRI Yearbook 1999:
: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University
: Press, 1999), pp. 334-349, for discussion of this process.
:
: 4. Ellis Joffe, “The PLA and Economy: the Effects of Involvement,” paper
: presented at IISS/CAPS Conference on “Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on
: Security Policy,” Hong Kong (8-10 July 1994), p. 12.
:
: 5. One nautical mile equals 2076 yards, or approximately 1.15 statute miles.
: I am not aware of an authoritative description of these waters by Chinese
: strategists.
:
: 6. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates China’s daily oil use at 4.6
: million barrels per day, with 1.4 million barrels of that imported. See: .
:
: 7. The United States sold China five LM-2500 marine gas-turbine engines
: manufactured by GE; four of these engines power the two Luhus; the location
: of the fifth is not known. China has acquired an unknown number of engines
: from Ukraine; two of these power the Luhai.
:
: 8. The first gas-turbine powered warship went to sea in 1936, and one of the
: curious shortcomings of China’s military-industrial complex is its apparent
: inability to design and produce an effective maritime gas-turbine engineering
: plant.
:
: 9. This discussion draws on two articles by Shaoguang Wang, who lists
: thirteen categories of “the Chinese official defense budget” in his SIPRI
: Yearbook article (p. 37), and eleven categories of China’s “military
: expenditure” in his China Quarterly article (p. 890).
:
: 10. Described by PLAN commander Admiral Shi Yunsheng: quoted in Huang
: Caihong, Chen Wanjun, and Zhang Zhao, “China Enhances the Navy’s
: Comprehensive Strength—Interview with Naval Commander Vadm Shi Yunsheng,”
:  Liaowang, Nr. 16 (Beijing), 19 Apr 99, 13-15, in FBIS-CHI-99-0513. Also see
: Ren Yanjun, “Forging A Shield of Peace for the Republic—Part 1 of Roundup
: on 50 Years of Achievements in Army Building,” Jiefangjun Bao, 6 Sep 99, 1,
: 2, in FBIS-CHI-99-0911; and Xu Zuzhi, “Backgrounder on National Day
: Celebrations,” Zhongguo Xinwen She (Beijing), 1 Oct 99, in FBIS-CHI-99-1002.
:
: 11. The PLAN currently operates one dedicated minelayer, although some of its
: surface combatants (and presumably its submarines) are nominally required to
: exercise at least once a year at laying mines.
:
: 12. Gill, pp. 220, 222. Estimates are in $U.S. and, while obviously very
: approximate, are useful when attempting to decipher China’s defense spending.
:
:
: ※ 引述《come (我想一個人靜一靜)》之銘言：
: : ※ 引述《starfield (無)》之銘言：
: : : 這句話是誰說的：
: : : 台灣的潛艇如果跟中共的KILO一樣便宜，一樣有AIP
: : : 如果有人討論時這樣一直硬凹，
: : : 亂引過時的東西..
: : : 我不知道要怎麼討論。
: : 我上面的文章已經告訴你中國新買的KILO潛艇具有AIP了
: : 我再把連結給你看一次
: : http://www.armystar.com/new_page_143.htm
: : 如果你硬要說人家是自爽文
: : 那的確沒什麼好討論了
: : 除非你拿的出證據說中共的KILO沒有AIP
:
: --
: ※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
: ◆ From: 220.132.126.57
: → starfield:還有另一個也要留底..                         220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:日本生產親潮級本來就有退役的..               220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:可以給台灣...                                220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:10229篇...                                   220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:文章有錯沒關係..有錯還一直想當大師...        220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:還真的是....                                 220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:結果又射後不理了....                         220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:每次詞窮就來這招...                          220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:過一陣子再來故左右而言他...                  220.132.126.57 06/26
: → starfield:上次倒是引出merlin大的好文                   220.132.126.57 06/26
: 推 jamexz:其實現在最奇妙的是張飛戰岳飛，軍購變潛艇～～      219.68.240.4 06/26
: 推 GiantTW:樓上的，張飛岳飛是敝人高中同學的國文作文喔      61.64.124.135 06/26
: → GiantTW:而且是敝人po到高中的BBS，然後才擴展至全國的喔   61.64.124.135 06/26
: 推 olaqe:其實我想說的是 中國是紙老虎 討論他軍備幹嘛???    61.229.232.234 06/27
: → olaqe:中國軍事力量在世界上不是遠不及美日嗎 怪哉??      61.229.232.234 06/27
: ※ 編輯: starfield       來自: 220.132.126.57       (06/27 00:45)
: 推 come:你這是在自打嘴巴吧! XD!                             163.23.212.5 06/27
: → come:裡面推測中共自己生產潛艦會排擠KILO的預算            163.23.212.5 06/27
: → come:事實上證明中共這兩者並行                            163.23.212.5 06/27
: → come:後來還說，中共會停止購買外國潛艇，除非有AIP         163.23.212.5 06/27
: 推 come:還有核潛艇根本不算是AIP                             163.23.212.5 06/27
: → come:核潛艇根本不需要燃燒氧氣所以也不需要"AI"P           163.23.212.5 06/27
: 推 come:越想越好笑，這篇文章根本就是在幫我說話              163.23.212.5 06/27
: → come:竟然沒人噓，真是太奇妙了!                           163.23.212.5 06/27

你是不到黃河心不死啊？
你的那篇簡體連結就是從這篇文章翻過來的
什麼幫你說話，這篇文章根本就是在第二批Kilo成交前的預測
2001年的預測，你拿來證明2002才下定的第二批Kilo有AIP，可不可笑？
你卻拿來證明買的第二批Kilo有AIP，
況且文中提到的也不是中國要求在Kilo加裝AIP，而是中國有可能買Amur
連英文也看不懂我不知道該說什麼才好。

還有在下面V版友的文章幫你一下，
也要攻擊可見你急成什麼樣子了
AIP的原始意義是什麼？絕氣推進系統，
核子動力需不需要從外引進氧氣？當然不用，所以我才說「廣義」上，
核子動力也算AIP的一種，當然這是你轉移話題的意圖而已。

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◆ From: 220.132.126.57
※ 編輯: starfield       來自: 220.132.126.57       (06/27 08:34)
※ 編輯: starfield       來自: 220.132.126.57       (06/27 08:37)
推 HsinTai:國學大師的英文不好..請多擔待
推 yiyichi:快被來大師笑死了XD
※ 編輯: starfield       來自: 220.132.126.57       (06/27 08:51)
推 starfield:期待Richthofen大來的時候有什麼更進一步的發
→ starfield:展^^