工作的關係拿到，我不是謝國忠迷，不過他的名氣應該可以支持讓大家看一下
這篇文章吧~~~
恕不翻譯‥因為小弟的英翻中實在爛到不行‥呵
Korea vs. Taiwan
*****Taiwan appears to be more efficient in wealth accumulation than
Korea
Taiwan's industrial organization is based on family owned and managed
businesses that produce for global companies that own brands. Korea's
is based on big chaebols that create their own brands to compete against
global companies. Taiwan's model requires less investment and so far
looks to be more efficient in wealth accumulation.
*****But Korea seems to be winning lately in a rising cost environment
Rising costs in China, due to overheating, have dented the effectiveness
of Taiwan's model. Korean companies, mainly the top three, have been
able to protect their profits with their brands. Korea's currency has
been appreciating against Taiwan's as a result.
*****The futures are different but challenging for both
Taiwan is meshing its capital and labor into China's economy, which I
believe is an optimal scenario for its business class but does not
create competitiveness in Taiwan to keep its currency strong. Korea may
face weak demand in China, if the Fed keeps raising interest rates, and
strong competition from restructured Japanese companies.
Summary and Investment Conclusion
---------------------------------
Korea and Taiwan have pursued export-led development but have used
different industrial organization models. Medium-sized and family-owned
businesses that pursue cost arbitrage dominate Taiwan's economy. Large
conglomerates that pursue branding and spend heavily on R&D dominate
Korea's economy. The perception is that Korea has been more successful,
especially since the Asian Financial Crisis.
However, I believe that the data do not yet support this conclusion.
The real GDP growth rates in both were similar before and after the
Asian Financial Crisis, even though Korea has invested 10% of GDP more
in fixed investment in the past 35 years. So despite the perception, it
would seem that Taiwan has been far more efficient than Korea.
One major trend since the Asian Financial Crisis is the real
appreciation of the Korean won (KRW) against New Taiwan dollar (NT$).
In this period, Korea's exports have performed better than Taiwan's
despite the appreciation. This is the strongest evidence yet that Korea
has been gaining competitiveness against Taiwan, i.e., Korea's
expenditure in R&D and branding is beginning to pay off.
Korea's success is mainly due to three companies: Samsung Electronics,
LG Electronics and Hyundai Motor. The increase of their gross sales has
been equivalent to 23% of Korea's GDP increase since 1996. As they use
mainly local suppliers, their gross sales tend to translate into GDP.
If these three companies continue to be as successful in future, the KRW
could continue to appreciate against the NT$.
However, in future the success of Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics,
and Hyundai Motor may not mean a higher GDP growth rate for Korea vs.
Taiwan. Rising export competitiveness translates into currency
appreciation when a domestic economy is too rigid to grow. I believe
Korea needs to further liberalize the domestic economy to translate
external competitiveness into a higher GDP growth rate rather than
currency appreciation.
Taiwan's per capita wealth is much higher than Korea's, despite a
similar per capita income, because Taiwan has been more careful in
making fixed investment.
In my view, Taiwanese companies are more efficient in managing
factories, but Taiwan may need to go beyond cost minimization.
Taiwan has not moved beyond its outsourcing model for income generation
despite rising wages at home. Taiwanese companies have merely shifted
production to China without changing their fundamental business models.
As pricing power continues to shift from production in Asia to
distribution companies in the West, Taiwan's model for wealth
accumulation appears to be at risk.
I believe Taiwan's strength is that its domestic economy is flexible.
Hence, despite an uncertain future for its export competitiveness, it
could achieve good GDP growth rates through a flexible monetary policy.
The investment implications of this are: 1) weak currency and good
domestic economy in Taiwan, and 2) strong currency and strong export
economy in Korea.
Exhibit 1
Per Capita Income and Consumption Comparison
--------------------------------------------
Korea Taiwan Japan US
Per Capita Income (nominal US$)
1970 275 384 1947 5064
1980 1674 2315 9055 12257
1990 6129 7850 24023 23222
1996 12238 12985 37239 29449
2004 14129 13476 36578 39934
Per Capita Income Growth Rate
(annual % change, nominal US$)
1970-80 19.8 19.7 16.6 9.2
1980-90 13.9 13.0 10.2 6.6
1990-96 12.2 8.8 7.6 4.0
1996-2004 1.8 0.5 -0.2 3.9
Per Capita Private Consumption (nominal US$)
1970 202 216 1017 3164
1990 1034 1194 5328 7719
1996 6306 7678 20697 19804
2004 7119 8499 20675 27956
Per Capita Private Consumption Growth Rate (annual % chg, nom. US$)
1970-80 17.7 18.6 18.0 9.3
1980-90 11.5 13.7 10.1 7.1
1990-96 12.8 10.1 6.8 4.3
1996-2004 1.5 1.3 0.0 4.4
--------------------------------------------
Source: CEIC and Morgan Stanley Research
Asia's Manufacturing Twins
--------------------------
Korea and Taiwan followed Japan's export-led development model and have
achieved spectacular success. Korea's per capita income was 5.4% of the
US's in 1970 and rose to 31.6% in 1996; Taiwan's per capita income was
7.6% of the US's in 1970 and rose to 44.1% in 1996. These economic
successes came from expanding trade and using the income from it for
domestic capital formation through high savings rates. Both have
doubled the export shares in their GDP since 1970.
Korea has been growing slightly faster than Taiwan and this has added up
to a big difference over a 35-year period. While Taiwan's per capita
income was 40% higher than Korea's in 1970 it dropped below Korea's in
2004. However, I believe this comparison is unfair to Taiwan. Korea
has invested 10% of GDP more in fixed investment in this period.
Taiwan's private consumption was 7% higher than Korea's in 1970 and 19%
higher in 2004. Although Korea has a higher per capita income, Taiwan
still enjoys a higher level of consumption.
Different Organization Models
-----------------------------
The differences in investment intensity reflect the different approaches
towards economic development. Taiwan has focused on a capital-light OEM
structure, with businesses tending to be family-owned/run, medium-sized
enterprises that supply US companies, which own the product brands.
Korea has focused on capital-intensive industries and building up
consumer brands. Its industrial organization centers on a few big
business groups (or chaebols) with numerous small and medium-sized
enterprises as their suppliers. The chaebols are still
family-controlled businesses but are often run by professional managers.
Exhibit 2
GDP Growth Comparison (annual % change)
---------------------------------------------
----Korea----- ---Taiwan----
Real Nominal Real Nominal
1970-80 7.2 30.2 9.7 20.7
1980-90 8.7 17.0 7.9 11.2
1990-96 7.7 15.7 6.9 10.1
1996-2004 4.2 7.1 4.0 3.6
---------------------------------------------
Source: CEIC and Morgan Stanley Research
The difference between Taiwan and Korea's industrial organization (IO)
is more than just in the size of family-owned businesses. Social
dynamics appear to be key in Korea. Korean companies tend to be viewed
as quasi families for their workers, in addition to being controlled by
the chaebol family. Just as in any family dispute, when these implicit
obligations between workers and companies are not honored, the disputes
can be heated and Korea has a history of troubled labor strikes.
Taiwanese SMEs, on the other hand, tend to resemble more "textbook"
firms in that workers are hired inputs and capital has control. In
Taiwan's case, labor is competitively priced. Family owners are focused
on profit maximization.
Economic textbooks tell us that Taiwan should be more efficient than
Korea, and this has indeed been the case. Between 1970-2004, Korea
invested 32% of GDP and achieved 10.1% average annual GDP growth, Taiwan
invested 22% of GDP and achieved 10.6% average annual GDP growth.
The difference in growth efficiency over such a long span makes a
significant difference to household wealth. The broad money, stock
market capitalization, and cumulative current account surpluses amount
to 400% of GDP in Taiwan and 240% in Korea. This is why, despite
similar per capita income, most surveys show Taiwanese households to be
much richer than their Korean counterparts.
The development of Korea and Taiwan appears to vindicate traditional
economics. However, the perception in recent years has been the
opposite. Globally successful companies have put Korea on the map,
while Taiwan is still associated with outsourcing and low-cost
manufacturing. Korean companies have been reporting better earnings
recently, and this is occurring despite the won's rapid real
appreciation against the NT$. Is the Korean model winning finally?
Different Response to 'China Shock'
----------------------------------
The Asian Financial Crisis cut the prices of manufacturing products and
Korea and Taiwan used currency devaluation to cope with the situation
temporarily. Longer-term growth challenges, however, could not be met
with devaluation. Korea and Taiwan then used cost competitiveness to
win market shares to grow their economies. China has taken that away
from them and it took a new strategy to grow their economies.
Korean companies focused on selling to China, while Taiwan's companies
accelerated production relocation to the Mainland. At the time, the
Korean approach looked risky, as Korea was known for low-quality
imitations of Japanese goods. The Taiwanese approach looked safer. It
continued its low-cost approach by tapping into the Mainland's labor
pool and this allowed more Taiwanese to become managers to grow Taiwan's
per capita income.
The data suggest that neither has overcome the China challenge to resume
high growth. In 1996-2004, Korea's per capita income in nominal US$
terms grew by 1.8% and Taiwan's by 0.5%, compared to 3.9% for the US.
Korea's better performance is due to a stronger currency. In the same
period, Korea achieved 4.2% real GDP growth per annum and Taiwan 4%.
While GDP data are inconclusive, Korea's China strategy appears to be
working at a corporate level. Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics and
Hyundai Motor have achieved strong sales gains in China, and the sales
are quite profitable judging by their reported earnings. The key to
their success is improving quality and design, investing in branding,
and pricing at a significant discount to comparable Japanese products.
However, in some cases, like Samsung's mobile phones, the Korean
discount is gone. Half of the growth of Korea's exports since 2000 has
come from China plus Hong Kong.
Aside from the successes of flagship Korean companies, many Korean SMEs
have struggled. Many of them moved to China to cut costs like their
Taiwanese counterparts but have been far less successful, as they have
had trouble winning the cost game against Chinese companies. Korea's
SME sector has been a burden to Korea's financial sector.
The Taiwanese model has suffered setbacks in the past few years.
China's overheating has increased the prices of raw materials. The
consolidation of the distribution system in the US continues to exert
downward pressure on product prices. Many Taiwanese companies are not
making money in their core business and have been engaging in property
and currency speculation to stay profitable.
Over-invoicing exports, for example, is a major mechanism for bringing
hot money into China. However, both the property and currency markets
could suffer. China's currency appreciation may not offset the holding
cost due to its low interest rates. The property sector is also
entering a period of adjustment due to oversupply and speculation
unwinding. This could mean a fairly negative scenario for Taiwan ahead.
One piece of strong evidence for Korea's better performance than Taiwan
is its currency strength. In nominal terms, KRW/US$ averaged 805 in
1996 and is now around 1030, down by 22%; in 1996 the NT$/US$ averaged
27.5 and is around 33, down by 17%, i.e., NT$ has outperformed the won.
In real terms, however, due to higher inflation in Korea, the won has
appreciated by 15% against the NT$ since 1996.
Even in nominal terms, the won has been appreciating against the NT$
since 2001. KRW/NT$ averaged 45 in 2001 and is at 31 now. Korea's
exports grew by 68.7% between 2001-04 and 11.6% in the first eight
months in 2005, Taiwan's grew by 41.6% and 6.7%, respectively. These
data suggest that there is a competitiveness factor in the appreciation
of KRW against the NT$.
Different Futures
-----------------
I would term Taiwan's economy as individualistic and Korea's as
collectivist. In addition, Taiwan's capital and labor have the option
to integrate further with China to achieve the optimal outcome on an
individual basis. With a lack of prominent companies to mobilize
resources in Taiwan, thus creating a cluster effect in human capital,
Taiwan is becoming much more closely entwined with the Mainland's
economy.
The evolution of Taiwan's economy may be optimal for its business class
but it has created a dilemma for financial investors. Because Taiwan's
government limits investment in China, most Taiwanese businesses invest
via private vehicles rather than listed companies.
Korea's options in China are more limited but I believe it is coping
with the challenge collectively and successfully so far. However, there
are some caveats to this.
First, in my view, Chinese companies still cannot organize like Korean
and Japanese companies to focus on R&D and branding. The best and
brightest in China tend to focus on financial engineering, thus yielding
profits quickly. Ample money supply and government heavy handedness are
the reasons behind China's business culture.
Why invest in R&D or branding when it is fairly simple to get land from
the government and make a 40% profit from selling it with just bank
financing? If you can create a concept company and spin it off to
foreign fund managers for billions of dollars, why focus on developing a
real businesses? China's business culture will only change when money
becomes tight, I believe, which is likely if the Fed decides to burst
the US property bubble.
Second, Japanese companies have not been aggressively competing against
their Korean counterparts. In mobile phones, for example, Korean
companies moved early and aggressively. Japanese companies were very
slow in recognizing the importance of Asia or China in this market.
Korea has been lucky. The global liquidity bubble has inflated Chinese
demand for Korean products. But China's competitiveness in branded
consumer products has not improved due to the easy money environment.
Japanese companies have been distracted by the restructuring challenges
they faced and have not focused on the Korean competition.
China's cyclical outlook determines Korea's short-term outlook and there
is little doubt that the Chinese government wants to keep the cycle
going for as long as possible. China's cycle will likely turn down
significantly if the Fed continues to tighten or China's property
inventory financing becomes a problem. The odds of a significant
correction in China in 2006 are high, in my view.
On the competition side, Japan is emerging as a big challenge for Korea,
as its economy is recovering and corporate restructuring is winding
down. The yen is weak because Japanese consumers are spending more,
i.e., declining current account surplus. Reinvigorated Japanese
companies and a weak yen could lower Korean companies' market shares in
China and elsewhere.
Korea has done well in the past five years, partly due to luck, but
mostly due to the efforts of a few of its companies. The environment is
likely to become tougher in 2006 from both demand and competition
perspectives. So Korea will have another challenge to overcome.
Andy Xie (Hong Kong)
真長，以後還是找個地方放文件好了= =
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