Re: [新聞] 若蔣介石贏得國共內戰 英媒：亞洲大不同

[Allen0315 (大Allen艾倫)]

經濟學人原文:
What if Mao Zedong’s Communist Party had lost the Chinese civil war to 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party?
http://goo.gl/1Xg7kl

WHEN the second world war ended, the 3.7m-strong army of China’s leader,
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was badly weakened by its fight with the
Japanese and a Communist insurgency. But it still had the upper hand against
the Communists: superior by far in numbers and equipment. As Soviet forces
withdrew from Manchuria in the north-east, which they had taken from the
Japanese, Chiang’s forces surged forward to regain the territory. Chinese
Communists in the area, who had hitherto been backed by the Russians, were
shattered by the onslaught.

But in 1946 the Americans, anxious to prevent an all-out civil war between
Chiang and the Communists’ leader, Mao Zedong, persuaded Chiang to stop
fighting. It was a moment that may have changed history: the few weeks’
hiatus enabled Mao to replenish his forces with Soviet aid. When the truce
broke down, Chiang lost Manchuria and eventually the civil war. Americans—
particularly right-wingers—kicked themselves about it for many years
afterwards. What if Mao’s victory had been avoided?

China’s spectacular rise in the past three decades has helped the Communists
parry suggestions that the country would have been better off without Mao.
But it may well have been. Chiang’s army fled to the island of Taiwan, which
prospered. Mao’s China suffered economic ruin before Deng Xiaoping
eventually began to turn its fortunes around in the late 1970s. Had China’s
economy grown at the same pace as Taiwan’s since 1950, its GDP would have
been 42% bigger by 2010 than it actually was. In other words, it might have
achieved its growth miracle plus another one about the size of France’s
economy.

Chiang would have remained in charge of a corrupt, autocratic government with
a brutal secret police. His Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), would
have faced discontent among the rural poor who formed the bulwark of Mao’s
forces. However, Chiang’s brand of authoritarianism may have proved a softer
one than Mao’s. There would have been no killings of millions of landlords
purely on ideological grounds, and no Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s,
which caused a famine that killed tens of millions. Unlike Mao, he would not
have wiped out private enterprise and forced peasants to surrender their land
to “People’s Communes”, a policy that exacerbated the famine and that—
though long since officially repudiated—still plagues the development of
China’s countryside. Neither would Chiang have plunged China into the chaos
of the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 70s, during which millions more
were killed or persecuted.

Under Chiang, China would not have had to wait 30 years before becoming part
of the global economy. To be sure, Chiang would have tried to protect China’
s markets from foreign competition, just as Taiwan and other Asian economies
did during their periods of rapid take-off. But he would have been quicker to
relax such restrictions. Taiwan was ready for membership of the World Trade
Organisation long before China joined in 2001.



Asia reimagined

The strategic map of Asia would have been very different had Chiang won the
civil war. He would not have supported North Korea’s invasion of the South
in 1950. Without China’s backing, Kim Il Sung would probably not have got
Stalin’s support for such a venture either. Chiang would not have had a
Taiwan problem: Mao’s rebels never had a foothold there.

But Chiang was an ardent nationalist. His relationship with Japan would have
been fraught. Millions of Chinese had been killed during Japan’s occupation
of China, with the KMT rather than Mao’s forces suffering by far the worst
casualties. Animosities between China and Japan, which Mao did not appear
eager to play up, might have bedevilled east Asian security long before they
did emerge in the 1990s as a source of regional tension. Chiang’s domination
of Taiwan as well as the mainland would have given him control over the
shipping lanes on which the economy of Japan depends. America’s restraining
hand in the region may still have been needed.

The cold war might have turned hotter too. Chiang did not accept the Soviet
Union’s control of Mongolia. Under Mao, brief battles broke out on the
Chinese-Soviet border in the 1960s. They might have turned bigger and
bloodier under Chiang. The Chinese public, indoctrinated by the KMT into a
belief that Mongolia was China’s, might have clamoured for their government
to assert the claim more forcefully once the Soviet threat was gone.

But China by then may have become a more politically liberal country. Moves
towards democracy would have been slowed by fears of secessionism, especially
in Tibet and other ethnic-minority regions (many Taiwanese would have been
chafing at the KMT’s rule; they had begun to even before Chiang fled to the
island). But a middle class would have grown far sooner than it has under the
Communists.

Despite the autocratic rule of Chiang’s KMT, China would have remained an
ally of America. Asia would therefore not be riven as it is today by a
struggle for supremacy between America and China. Perhaps even Japan would be
learning to live with its powerful, rich neighbour.

Much of the tension that now plagues Asia relates to the nature of China’s
Communist Party. Neighbouring countries worry about the way the party
behaves: secretively, high-handedly and sometimes (at home at any rate)
brutally. But all of them fear what might happen were the party now to follow
the KMT’s path and liberalise. The KMT was voted out of power in Taiwan in
2000, before returning in 2008. It is likely to be voted out again next year.
Few in Asia believe that the Communist Party could ever accept the vagaries
of democratic politics. Its eventual demise might well involve bloody tumult;
a return, even, to the chaos of the 1940s. The rest of Asia would prefer the
devil it knows.

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HAD CHINA’S ECONOMY GROWN AT THE SAME PACE AS TAIWAN’S SINCE 1950, ITS GDP
WOULD HAVE BEEN 42% BIGGER BY 2010 THAN IT ACTUALLY WAS
http://goo.gl/NjI9zZ

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※ 引述《Ashes (阿虛)》之銘言：
: http://tinyurl.com/qbc7v64 2015年08月05日16:22 蘋果日報
: 如果國民黨當年贏得國共內戰，今天的中國和亞洲、甚至世界會是什麼狀況？英國《經濟
: 學人》最近推出歷史回顧專題，分析當年若蔣介石打敗毛澤東，中國經濟將更早起飛，而
: 亞洲局勢也會和今日大不同。
: 《經濟學人》指出，二戰結束後，美國因為不想中國引爆大規模內戰，力勸蔣介石別趁勝
: 追擊毛軍，卻因此讓共產黨有時間重獲俄國援助，奪下中國政權。文中分析，當年若國民
: 黨擊退共產黨，以國民黨統治台灣的經濟起飛速度來看，中國2010年的GDP（Gross
: Domestic Product，國內生產毛額）將比共產黨統治下的GDP還高出42%。
: 文章表示，蔣介石政府或許仍會傳出貪汙、獨裁醜聞，但其獨裁手腕應該比毛澤東柔軟許
: 多，也不會封殺所有私人企業，60和70年代的文化大革命也不會發生，「在蔣介石的統治
: 下，中國也許提早30年就成為全球經濟強權。可以確定的是，蔣介石會保護中國市場不被
: 外國競爭者入侵，就如他統治台灣時所做的事相同。」
: 《經濟學人》還說，蔣介石統治中國後，亞洲戰略也會大幅改變。尤其在中日關係上，當
: 年國民黨遭受日軍殘殺的人數遠比共產黨多，對日本的仇恨也更深。不像共產黨直至1990
: 年才和日本有較緊張的區域關係。文章分析，「蔣介石同時統治台灣和中國大陸，讓他可
: 以控制日本經濟仰賴的海洋運輸線，因此該區域仍需要美國出手管控」。
: 文章最後分析，目前亞洲國家最擔憂的是中國共產黨的統治手段，且幾乎沒人相信共產黨
: 會接受民主政治，而共產黨的沒落很可能伴隨著國家混亂、甚至血腥暴動。（桂家齊／綜
: 合外電報導）

感覺這篇報導還是漏提了些東西...不過大同小異就是了...

話說"民主的中國" 這玩意兒台灣人會埋單嗎@@?

感覺老外很愛...成天掛在嘴邊講~~~

--
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※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/Gossiping/M.1438765177.A.CB1.html
推 jim66356: 郇痍^文放過蔣介石
→ carter7013: 我覺得應該是差不多 貪污腐敗國民黨不會比共產黨差
噓 aa1052026: 翻譯一下不會?當八卦板每個人都多益滿級分?
                阿新聞都貼翻譯好的內容上去了 我只是提供原文來源罷了...
※ 編輯: Allen0315 (114.44.69.212), 08/05/2015 17:02:06
→ a1122334424: 幻想 阿共還在 就辦不到
推 coutji3184: 老蔣不是那種人，或許獨裁不比毛，但他上不了那位
→ aa1052026: 你說有漏提 漏提的部分翻譯一下啊
推 CCNK: 他們那時候承認共產中國耶，怪我囉
推 FMANT: 台灣人反中反到腦子進水  看不進去der
→ soria: 他在統治中國的時候就已經不是民主中國了，發幻想文幹嘛
推 jaeomes: 我覺得差不多 當時從戰敗來台的國民黨軍
→ jaeomes: 跟經過文革後的中國人還是沒兩樣
→ rogergon: 別傻了。看看金圓券，老蔣加上宋氏王朝的中國是印度化。
噓 Destiny123: 吱吱臉都腫了