標題:Soviet roots to Georgian conflict
Diplomatic correspondent Bridget Kendall traces the fault lines in the
current Georgian conflict back to the Soviet era and finds some ominous
echoes of the Cold War.
My first visit to Georgia was in 1977. I was staying with an old lady, the
widow of a rather famous Russian artist called Vassily Shukhaev¸ who spent
10 years in exile in Siberia under Stalin.
She came to live in balmy Georgia because, she told me, "I've seen enough
snow in my life. I never want to be cold again."
Tbilisi then was chaotic, ramshackle and delightfully wayward after the
stifling torpor of Brezhnev's Soviet Russia.
Georgians, to my amazement, blithely referred to "the Soviet Union" as
another country, somewhere in the north over the mountains, distancing
themselves from it psychologically.
With the Soviet lid still firmly on, if there were resentments, they simmered
beneath the surface. It was a long way off yet from the burning knotted
frustrations which ignited this latest violent conflagration.
But this is not a eulogy for Soviet times and its duplicitous Cold War
slogan, that hailed "Friendship of Nations."
Soviet legacy
Far from it. Because it is in part the legacy of the Soviet Union - that
network of autonomous regions and republics still peppering the landscape,
which engendered the so-called frozen conflicts.
Like so many Soviet concepts, the idea of autonomous regions, inside the 15
main republics that made up the USSR, was both laudable and devious.
In theory, it gave smaller ethnic groups some autonomy, a structure within
which to nurture culture, language and history.
And in the Caucasus especially, each language and culture, whether Abkhazian,
Georgian, Ossetian or any of dozens more, should be a jewel to be treasured
and protected, especially in our inter-connected world, where bland
homogeneity threatens to wash over all of us.
'Moscow's safety net'
But in the Soviet era, the Kremlin's patronage of smaller ethnic minorities
was not only about protecting difference.
It was also a deliberate ruse and a political safety net, so elites in these
autonomous regions could be encouraged, when needed, to play the part of a
Trojan horse, a loyal legion to curb the ambitions of any upstart republic,
by ensuring disobedience to Moscow was challenged from within.
This is, of course, what happened when the Soviet Union fell apart.
Independent Georgia found that its two enclaves on Russia's border were
resisting the new order.
South Ossetia wanted to retain close links with North Ossetia on the Russian
side.
Abkhazia feared losing its identity altogether if Georgia's first president
made good his threat of delivering a, "Georgia for Georgians."
Even more alarming is the dangerous international fault line opening up
Plenty of blame has been thrown around in the last week, both contemporary
and historical.
One of the tragedies of this conflict is that there are now two opposing
accounts of what happened - one Ossetian, backed by Russia - one Georgian,
backed by many Western countries.
Two contradictory views of events that divide not just political leaders, but
ordinary people - the Orwellian inversion inherent in that old Soviet claim
of Friendship of Nations finally stripped of its cloaking.
Galloping crisis
But even more alarming is the dangerous international fault line opening up.
Only one week on, and this is no longer about Trojan horses and tiny frozen
conflicts. The crisis is galloping full tilt towards a wider battle.
Already Russia and the West are at loggerheads over the real reasons for this
latest violence and where it might be heading.
Russia insists it moved into South Ossetia to respond to a humanitarian
crisis.
This is what any civilised country does, say its spokesmen, like Nato
attacking Serbia to protect Kosovo refugees in 1999, or the US after 11
September, retaliating for a murderous attack on its citizens.
The United States is now openly accusing Russia of a blatant land grab to
punish Georgia for daring to try to join Nato and integrate with the West, to
reclaim the Caucasus as its sphere of influence, and to send a veiled threat
to other former Soviet client states .
And what is interesting about that, is that it reveals the US too sees this
as a battle for geostrategic power, and is marshalling its diplomatic
defences.
Already Poland has rushed to conclude negotiations with the US over the
controversial missile defence shield Russia had protested so vigorously about.
Ukraine's defiance
Ukraine's President Yushchenko, another Nato aspirant, has sent early defiant
signals, that if the Kremlin hopes to intimidate him too, it is not working.
His shot across the bows was to warn Russia its Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol
in the Crimea sits in harbour on Ukrainian soil. He has provocatively
demanded Russia give notice before vessels leave port.
But Putin's government has already in recent months made noises about the
desirability of the Crimea, with its vociferous pro-Russian population, being
Russian territory, despite Stalin's gifting it to Kiev.
Ukraine could be the next battleground.
And if it goes on like this a wider East-West split looks inevitable.
Not a return to the Cold War, but it could mark a chilling end to the post
Cold War era of collaboration.
From Our Own Correspondent will be broadcast on Saturday, 16 August, 2008 at
1130 BST on BBC Radio 4. Please check the programme schedules for World
Service transmission times.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/7563623.stm
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