標題:A Deal with Moscow? Don't Bet on It
There's still good reason not to get excited about Russian cooperation on
Iran.
BY DAVID J. KRAMER | SEPTEMBER 25, 2009
U.S. officials were practically giddy when they heard Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev on Wednesday indicate possible Russian support for new
sanctions against Iran. "We believe we need to help Iran to take a right
decision," Medvedev said with President Barack Obama standing next to him.
"Sanctions rarely lead to positive results, but in some cases, the use of
sanctions is inevitable." Obama's chief Russia advisor, Michael McFaul, was
"delighted," according to the New York Times. "I couldn't have said it any
better myself," he said. You could almost hear the champagne corks popping in
the American delegation's suites.
But will Medvedev's words actually translate into Russian actions when it
comes time to draft a tough resolution and vote? The Obama team appears to
expect the Russians to go along, especially after its decision last week to
scrap Bush administration plans for missile defense sites in Poland and the
Czech Republic. McFaul and other senior officials have rejected the notion of
such a deal. "Is it the case that it changes the climate? That's true, of
course. But it's not cause-and-effect," McFaul argued.
Deal or no deal, Obama officials might want to recall that Russia has voted
for U.N. resolutions against Iran in the past, but those texts were
significantly watered down at Moscow's insistence. Russia has also defied the
spirit of those resolutions by continuing a business-as-usual approach to
Tehran, including continued sales of arms and nuclear reactors. And Russian
support for a sanctions resolution is far from a fait accompli. Just last
week, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov voiced
their opposition to new sanctions.
Still, the Obama administration seems determined to argue that its push for
Iran sanctions has absolutely, positively nothing whatsoever to do with its
missile defense decision. Said Obama:
"Russia had always been paranoid about this, but George Bush was right, this
wasn't a threat to them. So my task here was not to negotiate with the
Russians about what our defense posture is. ... If the by-product of it is
that the Russians feel a little less paranoid and are now willing to work
more effectively with us to deal with threats like ballistic missiles from
Iran or nuclear development ... then that's a bonus."
Methinks thou doth protest too much. That the administration made its
decision a week before Obama's meeting with Medvedev seems more than a
coincidence. (That the Poles were informed of the decision on the 70th
anniversary of the Soviet invasion of their country was callous treatment of
a loyal ally.) The administration needs Medvedev's support on possible new
sanctions against Iran. It also wants to remove a major obstacle to
conclusion of a post-START arms control deal; the Russians threatened to
scupper that accord if the United States went ahead with 10 interceptor
missiles in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic. And yet if the
administration is to be believed, Russia wasn't a factor in the decision, and
there was no deal.
Then again, the positive reaction in Moscow to the president's decision last
week may start to dissipate as Russian officials focus on the details of the
new missile defense configuration. Under phase two of the administration's
plans, the United States will look to deploy land-based SM-3 missiles by
2015. A distinct candidate for hosting those missiles, according to
officials, is Poland. The agreement signed last year between Washington and
Warsaw would still cover deployment of the SM-3s, obviating the need to
negotiate a new accord with another country.
Despite being stiffed last week, some Polish officials seem interested in
hosting the new system. According to Reuters, Slawomir Nowak, a senior
advisor to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, said, "If this system becomes
reality in the shape Washington is now suggesting, it would actually be
better for us than the original missile shield program."
The possibility that Poland could wind up hosting U.S. missiles after all is
not likely to go over well in Moscow. Indeed, it was the fact that the United
States would be cooperating on missile defense with two states that the
Russians used to control that was most disturbing to the Kremlin. Even former
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, certainly no hard-liner, hinted at this
in his op-ed in the Sept. 25 New York Times. "A week ago, [Obama] announced
that the United States will not deploy -- at least, not in the foreseeable
future -- a missile defense site in Central Europe..." (emphasis added).
Should the land-based phase of Obama's plans include stationing missiles in
Poland, the Russian reaction is likely to turn very negative. They will feel
tricked after initially thinking Obama's decision was a victory for them. If
that's the case, the administration will have raised doubts in the minds of
our Central European allies about our reliability while also pissing off the
Russians. That will be another reason to keep those champagne bottles on
ice.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/09/25/dealing_with_moscow?page=0,1
新聞來源: (須有正確連結)
--
--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 59.127.21.59