推 Vicky1016:推推推 感謝翻譯 10/11 05:40
推 AirWinters: 10/11 10:26
推 ernie80168:推！ 10/11 13:06
推 zeSil:推推 借轉網誌 10/11 18:14
Blame greedy bankers. Blame Alan Greenspan’s careless stewardship of the US
Federal Reserve. Blame feckless homeowners who took out loans they could
never expect to repay. Blame politicians and regulators everywhere for
closing their eyes to the approaching tempest.
怪貪婪的銀行家。怪葛林斯班沒管好聯準會。怪不負責任的屋主，借根本還不出來的貸款
買房子。怪政治人物和管制人員對逼近的風暴睜一隻眼閉一隻眼。
All of the above are culpable. I am sure there are even more villains lurking
out there. Sometimes, though, it is worth looking through the other end of
the telescope. The wreckage of the financial system holds up a mirror to the
changing geopolitical balance. It offers advice, and a warning, as to what
the west should make of the emerging global order.
以上皆可怪。我相信還有很多壞蛋四處趴趴走。但有時候從望遠鏡另一頭看看也是挺好
的。金融系統僅存的斷壁殘垣反而是一面明鏡，照出了正在改變中的地緣政治平衡，
對必須面對新興全球秩序的西方來說，既是建議，也是警訊。
Until quite recently, the talk was about the humbling of America’s laisser
faire capitalism. The US government’s $700bn bail-out was the price to be
paid for past hubris. For reasons that still elude me, one or two European
politicians seemed to delight in the troubles of an ally that still
guarantees their security.
最近正夯的話題是美國自由放任資本主義的崩解。美國政府的七千億抒困方案是過去
瀟灑的代價。一兩個歐洲政治人物似乎看講義氣願意擔保歐洲證券的美國陷入危機
看得很爽。至於為何，我不太清楚。
Schadenfreude comes before a fall. Solid, conservative Germany has been among
the European nations forced to shore up its banks. Angela Merkel, the
chancellor, has been driven to assure German voters publicly that their
savings are safe.
幸災樂禍總先於墮落。穩定保守的德國是被迫擔保自己銀行系統的歐洲列國之一。
總理梅克爾被迫出面安撫德國選民，讓他們覺得他們的存款無虞。
Belgium and the Netherlands have rescued Fortis. Ireland and Greece have
issued blanket guarantees to bank depositors. Others have done something
similar. Most dramatically, Gordon Brown’s British government has
part-nationalised all of its leading banks in a desperate bid to crack the
ice of the credit freeze.
比利時與荷蘭則救了FORTIS。愛爾蘭與希臘則提供銀行存款戶全面擔保。其他國家
也有類似行動。最誇張的是英國政府，首相布朗把把幾間最大的銀行部分國有化，
拼了命要把信貸冰封給敲碎。
If the toxic mortgage securities and opaque credit swaps that infected the
world’s financial system came with a made-in-the-US stamp, European banks
were eager buyers. For the humbling of America, we should substitute the
humbling of the west.
雖說拖垮世界金融體系的毒債跟暗盤信貸交易是美製的，但歐洲銀行可是積極買家。
說弱掉的美國，不如說弱掉的西方。
Asia, as we have seen in the markets this week, is not immune from the shocks
and stresses. Japan, which has only quite recently emerged from the long
twilight of its 1990s banking collapse, has now been hit anew by the global
storm. China felt compelled this week to follow western central banks in
cutting interest rates. So did a host of smaller Asian countries. Recession
in the US and Europe will slow the growth of Asia’s rising economies.
這週市場顯示，亞洲並非免疫。日本最近才從90年代銀行系統癱瘓的過去站起，卻又
被全球級的風暴給打了下去。中國這週覺得必須要跟西方一樣調降利率。許多更小
的亞洲國家也如法炮製。歐美衰退的確會拖累亞洲竄升的經濟體。
Standing back, though, two things mark out this crisis as unique. First, is
its sheer ferocity. I am not sure how useful it is to make comparisons with
the 1930s. History never travels in a straight line. What is evident is that
governments and central banks have had no previous experience of coping with
shocks and stresses of the intensity and ubiquity we have seen during the
past year.
若後退幾步看，這次危機有兩個特點。第一，強度。我不確定拿1930年代來比到底多
有用。歷史一向不是直線前進。可知的是，眾多政府和中央銀行對於過去一年風暴的
震撼和壓力所帶來的緊繃度和廣度毫無應變經驗可言。
The second difference is one of geography. For the first time, the epicentre
has been in the west. Viewed from Washington, London or Paris, financial
crises used to be things that happened to someone else – to Latin America,
to Asia, to Russia.
第二，地域。這可是西方做震央的第一次。華盛頓、倫敦、巴黎角度總是看到別人
的系統垮掉，如拉丁美洲、亞洲、和俄國。
The shock waves would sometimes lap at western shores, usually in the form of
demands that the rich nations rescue their own imprudent banks. But these
crises drew a line between north and south, between the industrialised and
developing world. Emerging nations got into a mess; the west told them
sternly what they must do to get out of it.
偶爾震波會輕拍西方的沙岸，通常是一些希望有錢政府救救自己不明智的銀行的要求。
但這些危機是南北分野的，是工業化和開發中國家分野的。崛起中的國家搞得亂七八糟，
西方很嚴肅的告訴他們要如何做才能脫困。
The instructions came in the form of the aptly-named Washington consensus:
the painful prescriptions, including market liberalisation and fiscal
consolidation, imposed as the price of financial support from the
International Monetary Fund.
這些只是來自所謂的華盛頓共識：痛苦的藥方（包括市場自由化和會計制度健全化）
必須落實，才能獲得IMF的金援抒困。
This time the crisis started on Wall Street, triggered by the steep decline
in US house prices. The emerging nations have been the victims rather than
the culprit. And the reason for this reversal of roles? They had supped
enough of the west’s medicine.
這次華爾街是爆點，房價直直落則是雷管引信。崛起國家反而從禍首成為受害者。
角色翻轉的理由？這些國家把西方開的藥給吃夠夠了。
A decade ago, after the crisis of 1997-98 wrought devastation on some of its
most vibrant economies, Asia said never again. There would be no more going
cap in hand when the going got rough. To avoid the IMF’s ruinous rules,
governments would build their own defences against adversity by accumulating
reserves of foreign currency.
十年前，97-98的危機把幾個最蓬勃的經濟體給攪爛了，而亞洲矢言絕不能再發生。
勢頭不好時，沒有再拿帽子要錢的了。為了避免IMF超痛的規矩，各政府會自己架起
防禦網，用不斷累積的外匯存底來抵抗不測。
Those reserves – more than $4,000bn-worth at the present count – financed
credit in the US and Europe. There were other sources of liquidity, of
course, notably the Fed and the reserves accumulated by energy producers. It
also took financial chicanery to turn reckless mortgage lending in to triple
A rated securities. But as a Chinese official told my FT colleague David
Pilling the other day: “America drowned itself in Asian liquidity.”
這些外匯存底（現在估計超過四兆）供給了歐美信貸龐大的資金。當然，市場上還有
其他流通資產的來源，如聯準會以及能源生產單位的儲備物資。靠些金融騙術把瘋狂
房貸借貸變成評等3A的債券也是一招。但如一個中國官員對我在FT的同事
David Pilling所說的，「美國把自己給淹死在亞洲流動資產裡了。」
Owning up to the geopolitical implications will be as painful for the rich
nations as paying the domestic price for the profligacy. The erosion of the
west’s moral authority that began with the Iraq war has been greatly
accelerated. The west’s debtors cannot any longer expect their creditors to
listen to their lectures. Here lies the broader lesson. The shift eastwards
in global economic power has become a commonplace of political discourse.
Almost everyone in the west now speaks with awe of the pace of China’s rise,
of India’s emergence as a geopolitical player, of the growing roles in
international relations of Brazil and South Africa.
對富國來說，承認地緣政治因素跟負擔揮霍積累的國內帳單一樣難受。西方道德權威
的融蝕自伊拉克戰爭開始就已經加快速度了。西方債權人不再能夠期待他們的借貸人
聽得進他們的勸說。同時，大道理就是：全球經濟權力東移的過程已經成為政治語言
尋常的詞彙。幾乎所有的西方人現在都以感嘆的語氣議論中國崛起的步伐，印度在地緣
政治玩家中嶄露頭角，以及巴西和南非在國際關係中逐增份量。
Yet the rich nations have yet to face up properly to the implications. They
can imagine sharing power, but they assume the bargain will be struck on
their terms: that the emerging nations will be absorbed – at a pace, mind
you, of the west’s choosing – into familiar international forums and
institutions.
但富國還沒有正視這些影響。他們能想像分享權力，但他們假設情勢會對他們自己有利：
崛起國家會被吸納進入西方熟悉的國際會議和機構之內，並且是採取西方訂定的步伐。
When American and European diplomats talk about the rising powers becoming
responsible stakeholders in the global system, what they really mean is that
China, India and the rest must not be allowed to challenge existing standards
and norms.
當歐美外交人員討論崛起勢力應該成為負責任的全球系統玩家時，他們其實是在說
中國、印度、和所有其他國家必須不挑戰現存的標準和常規。
This is the frame of mind that sees the Benelux countries still holding a
bigger share than China of the votes at the IMF; and the Group of Seven
leading industrialised nations presuming this weekend that it remains the
right forum to redesign the global financial system.
這種觀點就是看到荷比盧關稅同盟國家仍比中國在IMF裡頭多幾票的觀點；以及G7領先
工業國這禮拜自以為自己仍是重新設計全球金融系統的正統機構。
I have no inhibitions about promoting the values of the west – of preaching
the virtues of the rule of law, pluralist politics and fundamental human
rights. Nor of asserting that, for all the financial storms, a liberal market
system is the worst option except for all the others. The case for global
rules – that open markets need multilateral governance – could not have
been made more forcefully than by the present crisis.
我不反對推銷西方價值─稱頌法治的優點、多元政治主義和基本人權等等。我也不會假設
自由經濟市場系統是所有其他選擇中最壞的一個，即便有這麼多的金融風暴。全球規範
的概念─即開放市場需要多邊控管─就是在現在風暴中才最能體現其重要性。
Yet the big lesson is that the west can no longer assume the global order
will be remade in its own image. For more than two centuries, the US and
Europe have exercised an effortless economic, political and cultural
hegemony. That era is ending.
但大道理是西方不在能夠假設全球秩序會依自己的形象塑成。過去兩世紀以來，歐美
行使了幾乎不費力的經濟、政治和文化霸權。那個時代正在終結。
More columns atwww.ft.com.philipstephens
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0ed4a750-961e-11dd-9dce-000077b07658.html
philip.stephens@ft.com
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
煩請注意附上原稿來源
--
--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 220.129.162.93
※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.162.93 (10/11 02:59)