推 chirmanmao:法蘭西斯.福山.... 歷史並沒有終結，才剛剛開始 09/08 01:44
標題:Russia and a new democratic realism
俄國核心民主現實主義
By Francis Fukuyama
Published: September 2 2008 19:34 | Last updated: September 2 2008 19:34
One idea that you will never hear expressed by either Barack Obama or John
McCain in this presidential race is the notion that a chief task of US
foreign policy in the next administration will be to gracefully manage an
adversely shifting global power balance and significantly diminished US
influence. This is not a hypothetical issue, but one that stares us in the
face today.
有個想法是不會從歐巴馬或馬坎陣營提出的：美國下一任執政政府在外交政策上的
主要任務會是優雅地控管不利於美國的全球權力平衡變動以及顯著消退的美國影響
力。這不是假設性議題，而是眼睜睜上演的現實。
The failure to recognise this shift in power has been all too evident in the
events leading up to the Russian intervention in Georgia. Since the Yeltsin
years, the US has had a series of policy differences with the Russians,
including Nato expansion, the Balkans, missile defence, policy towards Iran
and human rights in Russia itself. Diplomacy, such as it was, consisted of
persuading Russia to accept all of the items on our list and telling them
their fears and concerns were groundless. The US never regarded the
relationship as a bargaining situation in which it would give up things it
wanted in return for things the Russians wanted. Like the proverbial
Englishman speaking to a foreigner, we thought we could make them understand
us by repeating ourselves in a louder voice.
美國無法正視全球權力變動十分明顯：就因此俄國才介入喬治亞爭端。葉爾欽時代
以來，美國與俄國意見不合屢見不鮮，包括北約組織擴張，巴爾幹問題，飛彈防禦
問題，對伊朗政策，以及在俄國境內的人權問題。諸如此類的美國外交政策目的是
說服俄國接受我們所有的條件，並告訴他們那些恐懼和擔憂都是沒有根據的。美國
從沒有認為美俄之間是談判關係，要為了美國要的東西而讓步，給予俄國要的東西
。如俗語中英國人對外國人說話：我們認為我們可以用更大聲的聲音，重複一遍我
們所說的，來讓他們瞭解我們。
This posture by the Bush administration reflected the balance of power that
existed in the 1990s, when Russia was weak and had few cards to play. But
that has changed. The contrast between Moscow’s intervention in Chechnya in
1994 and Georgia in 2008 is dramatic: much as the US did not like Russian
behaviour in crushing Chechen separatism, the Russian military operation was
so incompetent that it seemed to set few ominous precedents. Today, all
thoughts are on where Russian power will be used next.
布希政府的這個態度代表的是90年代的權力平衡，那是俄國國力弱，沒什麼牌可打。
但這已經改變了。莫斯科1994年介入車臣與2008年介入喬治亞之間的反差是戲劇性
的大：美國再怎麼不喜歡俄國打壓車臣獨立運動的行徑，俄國軍事行動是如此無能，
似乎成不了什麼危機的先例。如今，所有顧慮都是接下來俄國力量會落在哪裡。
If we could roll the clock back to before February when Kosovo declared
independence with US support, the elements of a bargain were there. Of the
desiderata on the American list, the most expendable were anti-ballistic
missile defence and support for Kosovo independence. The former was a
pointless irritant to the Russians who never believed the US story that it
was a response to a threat from Iran. Kosovo independence does not improve
the security of Kosovars, but sets an unhappy precedent of legitimising
separatism, which explains why Nato members such as Spain did not back it.
如果我們可以把時鐘撥回到二月柯索沃在美國支持下宣佈獨立，談判的元素就在那裡。
美國談判選項中最能丟出的就是反彈道飛彈防禦系統和支持柯索沃獨立兩個選項。
前者對俄國來說是個無意義的刺激物：俄國從不相信美國那套針對伊朗做出回應的說詞。
柯索沃獨立不會讓柯索沃人安全更有保障，反而是建立起合法化分離主義的不祥先例。
這也可以解釋為什麼北約成員如西班牙並沒有支持這個議題。
A more difficult choice was Nato membership for Georgia and Ukraine. These
democratic countries deserve strong US support. But Angela Merkel, German
chancellor, is right in believing that the core of the Nato alliance is its
Article V guarantee that an attack on one member should be regarded as an
attack on all. This means that the US should be prepared to station forces on
a permanent basis to defend any alliance member under threat, as it did on
the inter-German border during the cold war. Nato membership is not a
talisman that magically confers protection. It requires operational planning
and expensive defence commitments.
比較難選擇的是喬治亞與烏克蘭的北約會員資格。這些民主國家配得美國的強力支持。
但德國總理梅克爾是對的：她相信北約聯盟的核心是北大西洋公約第五條保證：對任一
締約國之攻擊應視為對全體之攻擊。這意味著美國應該準備永久部屬部隊護衛任何受
威脅的北約成員，一如美國在冷戰時期於兩德邊境所做一般。北約會員資格不是護身符，
神奇地提供保護。北約會員資格需要軍事部屬以及極為昂貴的防禦承諾。
The Bush administration was not and could not have been serious about Nato
membership for Georgia and Ukraine to the extent that it meant providing not
just arms and advisers, but real security guarantees of US forces. To the
extent that that was so, leading the Georgians on to believe that we would
get them into the club soon was a big mistake.
布希政府沒有也不可能對喬治亞和烏克蘭的北約資格持認真態度─至少美國不可能提供
超過軍備和顧問以外的美軍軍勢的真實安全保障。就這個限度來說，讓喬治亞方相信
美方會把他們弄進北約是個極大的錯誤。
An understanding that may have been possible a year ago is not workable now.
The Bush administration has turned Kosovo independence and ABM defence in
Poland into faits accomplis, making them unusable as bargaining chips. And
rushing to accommodate Moscow while Russian troops are still occupying parts
of Georgia proper is unthinkable. In saying this, I do not want to be seen as
apologising for Moscow’s behaviour. Russia is not justified in holding on to
Georgian territory or trying to overturn a democratically elected regime. Mr
Putin’s talk about Georgian “genocide” and US conspiracies is unsettlingly
reminiscent of the “big lie” of Soviet times. The fact that Russian
feelings of resentment are understandable does not make them morally right.
一年前可能實現的共識現在已經不可能了。布希政府已經把柯索沃獨立和反彈道飛彈防禦
系統這兩生米煮成熟飯，無法再成為談判籌碼。而當俄國部隊還在蠶食喬治亞領域的同時
讓莫斯科舒舒服服的也不可能。就此而言，我不希望被視為幫莫斯科的行為說話。俄國
沒有依據持有喬治亞領域，沒有依據推翻民主程序選舉出來的政府。普丁談話中關於
喬治亞方的「種族屠殺」以及美國陰謀論與蘇聯時期的「大謊言」十分類似。俄國的
情緒是可以理解，但這並不代表他們道德正確。
As Kishore Mahbubani of the National University of Singapore pointed out on
this page (August 21), one of the chief ways that US power has been
diminished in this decade is in its moral credibility. After the Russian
intervention, US officials asserted that “21st century powers don’t violate
the sovereignty of other countries to overturn regimes”. Adding the
qualifier “in Europe” reduced the snickering only marginally. Democracy
promotion – a good thing – has been deeply tainted by its association with
the Iraq war and US security interests.
如國立星加坡大學的Kishore Mahbubani指出的，這十年內美國力量衰退的主要原因之一
是美國的道德信用。俄國介入之後，美國官員稱「二十一世紀強權不會侵犯其他國家主權
並推翻其政權。」加上「在歐洲」的修飾語能減少的譏笑有限。推動民主─好事一件─
已經因為和伊拉克戰爭和美國安全利益掛上鉤而深受污染。
The past two US administrations could assume American hegemony in both
economics and security. The next administration cannot, and a critical task
will be for it to better balance what we want with what we can realistically
achieve.
過去兩任美國政府可以維持美國經濟和安全的霸權姿態。下任美國政府則不可能，而其
需承擔的關鍵任務就是讓我們想要的和我們真能掙到的保持較好的平衡。
This does not mean giving up on idealistic goals such as promoting democracy.
But the next president will have to “detoxify” (in the phrase of Tom
Carothers from the Carnegie Endowment) the very concept of democracy
promotion. We will have to think of ways of supporting Georgia and Ukraine
other than by new alliance commitments. And we need to plan in concrete terms
how to defend existing Nato members – particularly Poland and the Baltic
states – from an angry and resurgent Russia.
這不代表我們需要犧牲如推廣民主的這種理想目標。但下任總統必須「去污名化」
推廣民主的概念。我們必須思考如何用新的聯盟承諾以外的方式支持喬治亞和烏克蘭。
我們必須計畫用具體的方案來保衛現存的北約成員─特別是波蘭和波羅地海諸國─
免受一個生氣並正崛起的俄國的威脅。
The writer is professor of international political economy at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and, most recently, author
of ‘After the Neocons’ (Profile, 2006)
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/66ca01da-78fa-11dd-9d0c-000077b07658.html
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※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.167.223 (09/03 23:20)
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