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標題: Defrosting Doha
解凍多哈
Jul 17th 2008
From The Economist print edition
Within a week the Doha round of trade talks could be ready to serve or left
to rot
一週之內，多哈回合的結果就可能準備啟動或者等待棄置
FROM hope to acrimony; from acrimony to apathy; and now back towards hope
again: the Doha round of world trade talks has almost come full circle.
Launching the round in Qatar’s capital city in November 2001, as the world
reeled from terrorist outrages and the dotcom bust, trade ministers declared
their determination to liberalise trade so that “the system plays its full
part in promoting recovery, growth and development.” By 2003 the hope had
gone: a ministerial meeting in Cancún, a Mexican resort, broke up early amid
angry recriminations. Two years ago progress was so feeble that Pascal Lamy,
director-general of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), suspended
negotiations.
從希望到對峙；從對峙到意興闌珊；現在又回到希望。多哈回合的世界貿易會談幾乎要
走完一個循環。自2001年十一月多哈會談在卡達的首都開啟，以因應囂張的恐怖攻擊還有
達康產業泡沫化，各國貿易首長宣示了他們要將貿易自由化的意念，好讓「系統能夠
充分展現自行恢復、成長、發展的機制。」到2003年，所有希望幻滅了：一場在墨西哥
CANCUN的首長會談在相互攻訐的氣氛下宣告破裂。兩年前，進展幾乎停滯的情況讓
世貿組織總幹事PASCAL LAMY宣布所有談判停擺。
Many wrote the round off at that point. Yet for the past year or so trade
negotiators in Geneva have been chiselling away at the areas of disagreement.
They have sculpted enough, Mr Lamy believes, for him to gather a group of
around 40 ministers at the WTO’s lakeside headquarters to try to shape a
deal. Their deliberations, which are due to last a week, begin on July 21st.
Success would mean that a conclusion to the round the world forgot could at
last be contemplated. At the core of an agreement would be cuts in allowable
subsidies to farmers and lower tariff ceilings for both agricultural and
industrial goods.
之後，許多評論宣布多哈回合已死。但從去年開始，在日內瓦的貿易談判人員開始
搓和各方歧異。LAMY相信這些談判人員的成果足夠讓他得以召集近四十位部長級
官員齊赴WTO的湖邊總部擬出一份協議。他們約一週左右的協商過程會於7月21號開始。
若協商成功，則可意味世界已經逐漸遺忘的多哈會談可能終於有個值得討論的結論。
協議的核心將會是降低農業補貼額度以及更低的農業與工業產品的關稅上限。
Mr Lamy’s invitation is something of a gamble, but he attaches great
importance to reaching agreement in 2008. Early in the year, some trade
officials hoped for a ministerial meeting in April, then the talk turned to
May, then June. Mr Lamy could not have left it much later. The timetable is
getting tight. European officialdom is about to enter its summer lull, India’
s minority government is in a precarious position and America’s presidential
and congressional elections are looming.
Details, details
LAMY的邀請賭博成分居多，但他將仍強調逾2008年達成協議的重要性。今年初，一些
貿易官員表示希望於四月會有一場部長級會議，接著又變成五月，然後六月。LAMY幾
乎不可能延到更後的日期了。時間表越來越緊。歐洲各部會即將進入他們的夏日假期，
而印度的少數政府處境正尷尬，且美國的總統和國會選舉就將要舉行。
Even if ministers reach agreement in Geneva, officials will still have lots
to sort out. The deal’s basic formulae will have to be converted into tariff
schedules for thousands of products, controversial rules on anti-dumping must
be thrashed out, and the services negotiations must catch up. And success is
far from guaranteed. Talks have centred on two main areas: trade in farm
goods and industrial products (non-agricultural market access, or NAMA, in
WTO jargon). The ambassadors who chair the WTO’s agriculture and NAMA
negotiations have smoothed out a lot of rough areas, but would still have
liked to leave ministers with less work to do. Talks on NAMA have continued
this week.
就算各部長在日內瓦達成協議，各部會官員仍然有很多善後要做。協議的基本公式需要
被轉換成為幾千項商品的關稅日程，而爭議性極大的反傾銷規章要被廢止，服務部門
談判必須要趕進度。會談主要集中在兩個面向：農業商品貿易與工業產品貿易（或非農業
產品之市場進入，NAMA）。主持WTO的農業和NAMA協商的大使們已經把麻將大致搓平了，
但他們應該還希望能夠讓各部長的工作能更平順一點。NAMA協商這禮拜仍在持續。
Broadly speaking, Europe and India are under attack for wanting to spare too
many farm products from deeper tariff cuts; some developing countries are
being asked to reduce industrial tariffs further and faster; and America is
under pressure to do more to cap trade-distorting subsidies to its farmers.
大體上來說，歐洲和印度多受責難，因為他們希望能讓太多像農產品免受過高的關稅
之苦；一些發展中國家責備要求以更大幅度和更快的速度來降低工業關稅；而美國
則被要求要抑制他們干預貿易市場的農民補助津貼上限。
This last issue, in particular, could be a deal-breaker. India’s commerce
minister, Kamal Nath, wants America to cap its farm spending at last year’s
total minus one dollar. The draft agreement suggests limits much higher than
this ($13 billion-16.4 billion). That would do little to constrain America’s
potential spending, except perhaps on cotton and sugar.
特別是最後這個議題可能使協議訂定失敗。印度的商業部長KAMAL NATH希望美國能夠抑制
政府的農業項目支出到去年總額減一美元。協議草案則訂出更高的限度（130億至164億
美元）。這對於控制美國潛在農業支出意義不大（可能除了棉花跟糖之外）。
The chief reason for urgency is to complete a deal before George Bush leaves
office. This may seem curious, because he is in no position to get a Doha
deal through Congress. He lacks “trade promotion authority” (TPA)—the
right to negotiate a trade agreement and present a bill to lawmakers for a
straight yes-or-no vote without amendment—and will not get it now. Congress
is in no mood to give it to him, and time is running out.
協議訂定時間表如此緊迫的原因是，要趕在布希卸任之前。這或許看來很奇怪，因為
布希並沒有任何空間讓多哈協議自國會通過。他並沒有「貿易促進權」（TPA）─即
權力進行貿易協定談判並提出法案給國會不修正直接表決─現在也不會有。國會不爽
給他，時間也快沒了。
The best hope instead is to pass a finished, or nearly finished, agreement on
to John McCain or Barack Obama. It is possible that the new president may
dislike the deal so much that he seeks to renegotiate it or rejects it
altogether. But renegotiation would be time-consuming at best, impossible at
worst. Rejection would wreck the WTO for years, perhaps for good.
最理想的狀況反而是通過一個完整的、或幾乎完整的協定給MCCAIN或OBAMA。新總統可能
不愛這個協議到他希望要重新談判或徹底棄置這個協定。但重新談判的最好情況是
曠日廢時，而最壞的情況則是完全不可能。棄置決定則會重創WTO多年，甚至摧毀WTO。
If he were to inherit a package that is complete or close to it, President
McCain or President Obama would have something to press on the new Congress,
perhaps after asking for TPA to wrap up the remaining details. He could even
sell it as much-needed balm for an ailing global economy. Craig VanGrasstek,
of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and Washington Trade Report, a
newsletter, points to a precedent: when Bill Clinton took office in 1993, he
asked Congress for a brief extension of fast-track authority, as TPA was then
known, to complete the Uruguay round of world trade talks. Mr Clinton used
this to get the round through in 1994 with relatively little fuss; he also
secured the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), although with rather
more.
如果新任總統會繼承一份完整或幾乎完整的協定，新總統至少會有個立足點要求新國會
至少給個TPA來完成協定。新總統甚至可以用之為急盼的甘霖來解救陷入困境的全球
經濟。哈佛甘乃迪政府學院和WASHINGTON TRADE REPORT的CRAIG VANGRASSTEK提出了一
個前例。CLINTON於1993年掌政時，就要求國會短暫延長貿易談判快線權（TPA的前身）
好完成烏拉圭回合的世貿會談。CLINTON就以此權限讓1994年烏拉圭回合在極少的風波下
有個結果；他也把北美自由貿易協定給定了下來，雖然過程比較複雜些。
But if Mr Bush leaves him with a lot of work still to finish, the new
president may well conclude that he has better things to do. By 2010 such
momentum as there is for a Doha round agreement may have been lost. “If it’
s not concluded this year, it won’t be concluded next year and by 2010 the
caravans will have moved on elsewhere,” said Peter Mandelson, the European
Union’s trade commissioner, at the World Economic Forum in January. “Not
only will the caravans have moved on in different directions of trade
negotiations, but what has already been on the table…will have been put into
deep freeze.”
但如果BUSH把一堆事情留給新總統，那新總統可能會覺得他有更重要的事情要做。
若拖到2010年，現在湧起的多哈回合協定契機可能就蕩然無存了。「不是這年完成的話，
下年就不可能，然後到了2010年各商隊就會自求生路去了，」歐盟貿易執行長
PETER MANDELSON在一月的世界經濟論壇李說道。「不僅各商隊會朝不同的商貿協商
前進，那些已經擺在桌上的就會被冷凍起來。」
Back into the fridge
回到冰庫裡
The consequences of putting the Doha round into cold storage come in two
parts. The more nebulous, but arguably more important, is the long-term
effect on the future of trade and the world economy.
多哈回合冷凍的結果有兩個部份。比較隱晦但比較重要的，未來貿易以及全球經濟的
長期影響。
You might suppose that it would not matter much. Despite all Doha’s
difficulties, world trade has been growing nicely without it (see chart).
Developed countries’ tariffs on industrial goods, at least, are already low.
Developing countries have been opening up too, cutting tariffs to levels well
below the ceilings negotiated at the WTO. Trade in services has been getting
freer, although many countries’ WTO commitments are still patchy. And
countries have become much more welcoming to foreign investment, which the
Doha round does not even address.
或許你會認為關連性沒這麼直接。儘管多哈回合歷經多劫，世界貿易仍然持續成長。
已開發國家的工業產品關稅已堪稱甚低。開發中國家也在逐漸開放，將關稅降低到
遠低於WTO協商的上限。服務貿易部分也逐漸自由化，即便許多國家的WTO承諾仍嫌簡陋。
各國也越來越歡迎外資進注，而這是多哈回合連提都沒提的面象。
Look beyond the formalities of tariffs and investment agreements, to the nuts
and bolts of modern commerce, and you may even conclude that it had become
irreversibly integrated. Time was when almost every bit of a car, say, was
made in one country, from the steel that formed its body to the leather on
its seats. Now a supply chain of myriad links runs all around the world,
connecting designers, chipmakers, car-parts firms and assembly lines.
若看穿形式化的關稅和投資協定，注意現代商貿的每個螺絲螺帽，你可能會下個結論，
認為現代商貿已經整合到無法反轉的地步了。曾有個時代是一部車的每個部件都產自於
同一個國家，從車身的鋼到座椅的皮革。現在則是一個以世界組成的複雜供給鏈，
連結社記者，晶片製造者，汽車配件商還有各種生產線。
Granted, if the Doha round fails, the world will not end. Nevertheless, it
would be wrong—and complacent—to suppose that failure would be costless.
For a start, the world economy is troubled. Doha will not repair housing
markets or ease credit constraints. But in difficult times calls for trade
protection get louder, and may be heard favourably by politicians. This would
be a bad moment, therefore, to turn away from further liberalisation. And the
WTO as an institution would be damaged. The chances of another go at
liberalisation soon, after an abject failure, would be slim.
或可大膽的說，世界不會因為多哈回合的失敗而毀滅。但要認為這個失敗會沒有代價
是太果斷（甚至太脫節）了些。首先，世界經濟有困擾了。多哈不會修補房市或減緩
信貸困局。但時節困難時貿易保護主義高漲，甚至可能會獲得政客的青睞。這種時候
背離自由經濟會是個不恰當的時機。而WTO這個機構會受重創。一次自由化步伐悲慘
受挫後馬上又來一次的機率甚低。
Already there are some signs of rising hostility to trade. The plainest are
the taxes or bans imposed by some countries on food exports in response to
the rapid increase in prices. This is not protection as usually practised—in
the Doha round, countries have been negotiating to end subsidies, not taxes,
on farm exports. But had the negotiations been starting now, such gross
impediments to trade might well have been on the agenda.
已經開始有一些反貿易的跡象出現了。最明顯的就是一些國家為因應食物價格飆漲而
針對食物出口所訂定的各種稅制還有禁令。這不是正常的保護主義手段─在多哈回合中，
許多國家都在協商要終止農業出口的補貼，而非稅制。但若此時協商已然開始，這種
粗糙的貿易限制就會成為討論焦點。
Another straw in the wind is the difficult progress of some regional trade
agreements. Last year America’s Congress passed a free-trade deal with Peru;
this year it has stalled on one with Colombia. Any misgivings in Washington
about an agreement with South Korea have been more than matched on the
streets of Seoul, where thousands have protested against the prospect of
American beef imports. Economists view bilateral and regional deals as a
mixed blessing. But if hostility towards such agreements denotes unease about
trade in general, it is a worrying sign.
另一個明顯的跡象就是一些地域性貿易協定進展牛步。去年，美國國會通過了與秘魯
的自由貿易協定；今年與哥倫比亞的自由貿易協定則毫無進展。美國與南韓的牛肉進口
貿易協定在華盛頓引起的疑慮足可與首爾街頭數千名抗議民眾匹敵。經濟學家視雙邊和
地域性協定為利弊交雜的利多。但如果針對這些協定的敵意實際上是對於貿易整體的
戒心，那就是個值得憂心的現象了。
And it is possible to imagine the world economy becoming less integrated. It
has happened before: the fairly free world economy of the late 19th century
was riddled with protectionism by the 1930s. Then, says Jeffry Frieden, a
political scientist at Harvard, trading powers turned towards their empires;
nowadays they would be more likely to turn towards regional blocks, such as
the EU and NAFTA. An unwinding of globalisation, he thinks, is not likely but
not implausible either. “The picture of an irreversibly integrated and
globalised international economy is overdrawn,” he says.
當然，也可能把世界經濟視為整合性沒有這麼強的經濟體。這之前也發生過：19世紀
末葉頗為自由的世界經濟被1930的保護主義給意志了。那時，哈佛政治學者
JEFFRY FRIEDEN，貿易強權就指望著他們的帝國後盾；現在他們比較傾向倚仗區域集團，
如歐盟跟北美自由貿易協定。FRIEDEN認為，鬆弛的全球化不是太可能，但也不是沒有
根據。「一個緊密整合的全球化國際經濟體是太誇張了些，」他說。
The second lot of costs is more direct. If there is no agreement, what will
the WTO’s members leave on the table? Measuring this is hard, partly because
members of the WTO negotiate over “bound” (maximum) tariffs and ceilings on
agricultural subsidies. Much of the deal would lower these ceilings rather
than produce true cuts. For example, the latest text implies that Chile would
cut its bound industrial duties from 25% to around 12%; its applied rate is
only 6%. This is still worth doing because it limits backsliding.
多哈失敗的第二個後果比較直接明顯。如果沒有協定，WTO會員們在台面上還會留什麼？
要衡量這個比較困難，因為WTO會員國討論的是關稅上限以及農業補貼上限。協議主要
會是降低這些上限，而非任何確實的數字遞減。例如，最近的文獻指出智利會把工業關稅
上限從25％調低至12％；實際採用的稅率只有6％。當然，降低上限仍有價值，因為可以
限制走回頭路的空間。
Another reason is the sheer complexity of any likely deal. In NAMA, the basis
of the draft text is a formula connecting new tariffs to old ones. But there
are different parameters for developed and developing countries. Developing
countries will be able to choose between shallower cuts across the board and
exempting some goods from the formula in return for deeper cuts on the rest.
Some have additional exceptions. In agriculture, there are similar
complications. For instance, countries can declare some goods to be “
sensitive” products. They will be permitted to cut their tariffs on these
goods by less, in exchange for letting in larger amounts at lower rates of
duty.
另一個原因則是任何協議都有明顯的複雜度。NAMA的基本草案是個把新關稅跟就關稅
連接起來的公式。但已開發國家跟開發中國家有不同的參數。開發中國家可以就較低
幅度的關稅減免，和排除計算某些商品於公式之中來換取其他商品較大幅度的關稅減免
這兩項中二擇一。一些國家有額外的特例。農業協商也有同樣的複雜問題。舉例來說，
一些國家可以列舉一些商品為「敏感」產品。他們於是可以用較低的幅度調降這些商品
的關稅，來換取這些商品必須以更大的進口量來換取更低關稅的條件。
Even so, despite all the exemptions and wiggle room, the deal contains the
promise of real liberalisation. Cuts in some bound tariffs will bite into
applied rates too. The EU’s duty on cars would come down from 10% to about
4.5%; its rate on canned tuna would tumble from 24% to about 6%. China’s
tariff on cars could come down from 25% to 18% even if it takes advantage of
the exemptions to the NAMA formula.
即便有這麼多的特例跟斡旋空間，多哈協定有真正自由化的希望空間。一些關稅上限的
調降也會影響真實關稅的數字。歐盟的汽車關稅會從10％掉到4.5％；鮪魚罐頭的關稅
會從24％掉到6％。就算中國要採用NAMA公式的特例，中國的汽車關稅仍會從25％降到
18％。
Importantly for developing countries, tariff escalation—the levying of
higher tariffs on processed goods than on raw materials—would be scaled
back. Tariff escalation is, in effect, a tax on every step a country takes
along the value chain. For instance, coffee that has been neither roasted nor
decaffeinated enters the EU duty-free; decaffeinated and roasted, it incurs a
tariff of 7.5%. Under the latest draft, the duty would be cut by half.
對開發中國家重要的是，關稅級距（即加工過後的商品比為加工過的商品徵收更多的
關稅）會按比例降低。關稅級距是每個國家都隨價值鏈採取的方案。例如，沒有烘焙過
或去咖啡因的咖啡豆進入歐盟是無關稅的；一旦去咖啡因和烘焙過，咖啡豆就會被
課徵7.5％的關稅。依據最新的草案，這個關稅會減半。
What does all this amount to? The WTO’s staff reckon that consumers and
firms will pay around $125 billion less in tariffs if a deal is struck. Yvan
Decreux and Lionel Fontagné, of CEPII, a French economic research institute,
have tried to measure the effect on global growth. They estimate that the
world economy would eventually be $43 billion a year better off. Throw in
some liberalisation of services too, and the sum rises by $30 billion.
這些總得來說代表什麼？WTO的幹部認為，這份協議能夠讓消費者和事務所少花
1250億美元的關稅費用。法國經濟研究機構CEPII的YVAN DECREUX和LIONEL FONTAGNE
曾經試圖衡量世界性成長的影響。他們預估，世界經濟會增值430億美元。加點自由化
的服務，增值的總值會再增加300億美元。
Set against the scale of the world economy, these are not vast gains—around
0.1% of global GDP. But they are gains nonetheless, and they are probably an
understatement: no one knows the value of the likely scale economies,
productivity gains and extra variety that freer trade brings. Add to that the
value of lowering bound tariffs and avoiding the institutional damage of
failure, and the benefits do not look so puny after all. Will ministers grab
them? Time to find out.
若用世界經濟的規模來看這個成長，其實不是非常顯著─只是全球GDP的0.1％。但
增值仍然是成長，且數目可能還是低估值：沒有人知道更自由的貿易會帶來什麼樣子的
經濟規模、多少生產力增長、以及何種的複雜度。若加上更低上限的關稅，以及避免
一些會對經貿機構造成傷害的失敗，或許利益看起來不會如此稀薄。各國部長會不會
好好把握？拭目以待。
新聞來源:
http://www.economist.com/world/international/displaystory.cfm?story_id=
11745498
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◆ From: 220.129.164.182
※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.164.182 (07/21 02:18)