[編譯] The big freeze: A year that shook faith in finance

[pursuistmi (common people)]

The big freeze: A year that shook faith in finance
By Gillian Tett

Published: August 3 2008 19:46 | Last updated: August 3 2008 19:46


Just over a year ago, Hiroshi Nakaso, a senior official at the Bank of Japan,
started to fear that the global financial system was heading for a jolt. Back
then, most American policymakers assumed that the western banking system was
extraordinarily strong. Thus while US mortgage defaults were rising, western
officials were convinced that such losses would be easily “contained”.

一年多以前，日本中央銀行的資深官員中曾宏開始憂心全球金融系統即將面臨亂流。
那時，多數美國政策制訂者都認為西方銀行體制非常堅固。以致當美國房貸違約加遽，
西方官員仍深信這些損失能被輕鬆「控管」。

But as Mr Nakaso watched western markets in July 2007, he had a sense of déj
à vu. “I see striking similarities in what I see today with the early
stages of our own financial crisis [in Japan] more than a decade ago,” he
privately warned international contacts shortly after IKB, a German lender,
imploded as a result of subprime losses. “Probably we will have to be
prepared for more events to come ... the crisis management skills of central
banks and financial authorities will be truly tested.”

但中曾宏2007年七月再看西方市場時，發現有種似曾相識的感覺。「我看見現在市場與
十年前日本經歷過的金融危機之間有明顯的相似性，」當德國貸款公司IKB因為次貸損失
倒閉後，中曾宏如是私下警告國際金融單位。「或許我們要當心更多後續事件接踵而來...
各央行與財經單位的危機管理機制會飽受挑戰。」

His fears proved well-founded. On August 9 2007, the European Central Bank
sent shock waves around world financial capitals when it injected €95bn
($150bn, ￡75bn) worth of funds into the money markets to prevent borrowing
costs from spiralling sharply. The US Federal Reserve soon followed suit. But
while the central banks had billed these moves as “pre-emptive” actions to
quell incipient market tensions, they did not bring the panic to an end.

中曾宏的恐懼是有根據的。2007年八月九日，歐洲央行挹注950億歐元（1500億美元、
750億英鎊）進入貨幣市場，以避免借貸成本陡降，同時震撼了世界各個金融中心。
美國聯準會也馬上跟進。但當各中央銀行以「防範措施」定義這些動作，以平息初期
的市場緊張時，他們並沒有使恐慌平息。

On the contrary, as markets that were crucial for raising funds started to
dry up last August, a network of financial vehicles slid into crisis, causing
the price of many debt securities to collapse. That started a chain reaction
that created liquidity and solvency crises at US and European banks – on a
scale last seen in Japan almost exactly a decade ago.

反而，當融資市場於八月開始乾涸時，整個籌資工具網絡陷入危機，造成債務證券價格
狂跌。這啟動了連鎖反應，讓美國與歐洲銀行界面臨流動性與清償性危機，且此規模與
十年前在日本發生的規模相當。

A year later, there is still no sign of an end to these problems. Instead,
the sense of pressure on western banks has risen so high that by some
measures this is now the worst financial crisis seen in the west for 70 years.

一年後，這些問題仍然沒有解決。反而，西方銀行界的壓力積累到看起來變成七十年以來
西方最嚴重的金融危機。

What has made this upheaval so shocking is not simply its scale and duration
but the fact that almost all western policymakers and bankers were caught
unawares. “If you had said a year ago that America could suffer a banking
crisis on the scale of Japan, people would have laughed,” one former senior
US regulator admits.

這次的波瀾之所以如此震撼，不單純是因為它的規模和延宕的時日，而是幾乎所有的西方
政策制訂者和銀行家都沒有準備。「如果你一年前說美國可能會面臨日本等級的金融危機
，你會被嘲笑，」一位資深的前美國金融管制官員承認道。


Or as the Bank for International Settlements, which groups central banks,
observes in its latest annual report: “The duration of the turmoil, its
scope and the growing evidence of effects on the real economy have come as a
great surprise to most commentators, private as well as public.”

或就多國中央銀行集團組成的國際結算銀行（BIS）在最近的年報裡觀察到的來說：
混亂的延續，其廣度及對經濟實體漸顯的後果，對許多私人或公家的評論家來說都是
並未預料到的。

Adding that it “is essential we understand what is going on”, the BIS
points out that the crucial question is: “How could problems with subprime
mortgages, being such a small sector of global financial markets, provoke
such dislocation?”

另外，BIS提到「我們瞭解到底在發生什麼事致關重要，」並指出最關鍵性的問題：
「次貸問題這在國際金融市場上這麼小的部分到底為什麼會造成這麼大的窒礙？」

The answer to this seeming mystery lies in the slippery concept of financial
“faith”. Over the past decade, western banking has experienced an
extraordinary burst of innovation, as financiers have discovered ways to
slice and dice their loans – such as the now controversial subprime
mortgages – and then turn these into securities that can be sold to
investors all over the world.

問題的答案在於金融「信心」這難定義的概念。過去十年，西方銀行界經歷了非常澎湃的
創新期，財金業者發現很多切分信貸的方法，如次級房貸就是一例，並把這些轉換成債券
，銷售給世界各地的投資者。

Tracking the scale of this activity with any precision has always been hard,
since much of it occurs in private deals. However, industry data suggest that
between 2000 and 2006, nominal global issuance of credit instruments rose
twelvefold, to $3,000bn (￡1,519bn, €1,929bn) a year from $250bn. This
activity appears to have become particularly intense from 2004, partly
because investors were searching for ways to boost returns after a long
period in which central banks had kept interest rates low.


精準監管這種規模的商業行為總是困難，因為多牽涉私人交易。但金融行業資料顯示，
約2000到2006年之間，全球信用工具債券發行量增加12倍，從2500億增加到3兆美金。
這個動向在2004年最頻繁，因為投資者在尋求抬高利益的方法，以回應長期以來中央
銀行壓低利率的作法。

To be sure, ahead of last summer’s crisis some policymakers and investors
were uneasy about the scale of this explosion. In particular, there was
growing concern that “slicing and dicing” was fuelling a credit bubble,
leading to artificially low borrowing costs, spiralling leverage and a
collapse in lending standards. When world leaders gathered in Davos for the
annual economic forum in January 2007, Jean-Claude Trichet, governor of the
ECB, complained about the opacity of some financial innovation and warned
that there could soon be some “repricing of credit risk”.

在去年夏天的危機發生之前，一些政策制訂者與投資人對於這個爆量感到憂慮。特別是
市場產生對於切分信貸會吹起信貸泡沫的憂慮，擔心會導致人為介入的低成本借貸，
攀升的資金槓桿，以及借貸制度的崩毀。當世界領袖於2007年一月齊聚DAVOS參加年度
經濟會談時，歐洲央行行長Jean-Claud Trichet抱怨了一些財經產品缺乏透明度，
並警告馬上可能會有「信貸風險的重新定價」。

From 2005 onwards, Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Federal
Reserve, called on banks to prepare for so-called “fat tails” – a
statistical term for extremely negative events which occur more commonly than
usual banking models suggest. Behind the scenes, a few bankers and investors
also prepared for a crash. Deutsche Bank, for example, started betting on
subprime defaults as early as 2006, while JPMorgan Chase placed trades to
protect itself from a crash in spring 2007 and asset managers such as Pimco
and BlackRock stopped purchasing many debt instruments in early 2007. Yet
most investors, bankers and even regulators did not change their behaviour to
any significant degree, owing to a widespread adherence to three big
assumptions – or articles of faith – that have steathily underpinned 21st
century finance in recent years.

2005年開始，紐約聯準會主席Timothy Geithner呼籲銀行預防所謂的「肥尾」：一個
統計學術語，代表極端負面的影響發生的情形比銀行設定的模型來得頻繁。幾位銀行家
和投資人還在抬面下為經濟崩盤作準備。例如德意志銀行最早於2006年就在賭會有
次貸違約風暴，而JP摩根在2007年春天就在進行防護性交易來預防崩盤，一些理財專員
如Pimco和BlackRock在2007年初就停止購買債務證券。但多數投資人、銀行、甚至管制
人員都沒有顯著改變自己的行為模式：這是因為三個大假設（或「信念」論點）在近年
悄然籠罩了21世紀的金融界。


The first of these was a belief that modern capital markets had become so
much more advanced than their predecessors that banks would always be able to
trade debt securities. This encouraged banks to keep lowering lending
standards, since they assumed they could sell the risk on. “Abundant market
liquidity led some firms to overestimate the market’s capacity to absorb
risk,” says the Institute of International Finance, a Washington-based lobby
group, in a recent report. “The same buoyant environment resulted in market
pressure for high returns ... and high levels of competition among financial
firms.”

第一個假設，是認為現代資本市場已經遠比它的前身先進，且到了銀行會永遠能夠交易
債務證券的境界的信念。這個信念鼓勵各銀行不斷降低借貸標準，因為他們假設風險
永遠能夠賣得出去。「豐富的市場流動性讓一些機構高估市場吸收風險的能力，」位於
華盛頓的說客組織國際金融機構在近期的報告中提道。「這樂觀的環境產生所求高回報的
市場壓力...以及金融組織之間激烈的競爭。」

Second, many investors assumed that the credit rating agencies offered an
easy and cost-effective compass with which to navigate this ever more complex
world. Thus many continued to purchase complex securities throughout the
first half of 2007 – even though most investors barely understood these
products.

第二個假設是，很多投資課假設，信貸評比機構會提供簡單而有成本效益的指南，指引
投資人遨遊這愈漸複雜的世界。於是，許多投資人2007年前半季持續購買複合型證券，
即便多數投資人幾乎完全不瞭解這類產品。

But third, and perhaps most crucially, there was a widespread assumption that
the process of “slicing and dicing” debt had made the financial system more
stable. Policymakers thought that because the pain of any potential credit
defaults was spread among millions of investors, rather than concentrated in
particular banks, it would be much easier for the system to absorb shocks
than in the past. “People had looked at what had happened to the Japanese
banks and said, ‘this simply cannot happen here’, because the banks were no
longer holding all the credit risk,” one senior European policymaker recalls.

第三個假設，或許最關鍵的假設，就是有普遍認知，認為切分債務的機制讓財金系統
更加穩定了。政策制訂者想，因為任何潛在信貸違約的痛楚被分散至數以百萬計的投資人
身上，而非集中於某特定的銀行，那就會讓系統比以前更容易吸收震盪。「人們看著
日本銀行界然後說，在這裡絕不可能發生，因為銀行不在承擔所有信貸風險了，」一位
資深歐洲政策制訂者回憶道。

In private, some central bank officials harboured doubts about this new
creed. From 2003, senior officials at the BIS in Basel, for example,
repeatedly warned that risk dispersion might not always be benign. However,
such warnings were largely kept out of public view, partly because the US
Federal Reserve was convinced that financial innovation had changed the
system in a fundamentally beneficial way.

一些中央銀行官員私底下對於這新的信念存疑。2003年，在Basel的BIS資深官員就
不斷警告散播風險並非絕對有益。但是，這些警告都被控制，不讓外界知道，因為
美國聯準會深信，財金創新已經讓系統徹底往正途轉型。

Consequently, no attempt was made to force banks to boost their capital
reserves to offset exploding debt issuance; instead, regulatory rules
permitted banks to cut their capital levels sharply, which they duly did. “
People really believed that the world was different,” recalls Larry Fink,
head of BlackRock investment group. “There was this huge trust in the
intellectual capital of Wall Street – and that appeared to be supported by
the fact that banks were making so much money.”

後果就是沒有任何企圖逼迫銀行增加他們的資本儲備來因應債券發行崩盤的危機；反而，
管制機制放任銀行大幅消減他們自己的資本量，而這些銀行十分配合地做了。人們真的
以為世界完全變了個新樣子，」BlackRock投資集團總裁Larry Fink回想道。「那時
華爾街的智庫有個極大的信念，而這個信念也似乎是有根據的，因為銀行賺了非常多的
錢。」

As a result, when high rates of subprime default emerged in late 2006, there
was initially a widespread assumption that the system would absorb the pain
relatively smoothly. After all, the system had easily weathered shocks
earlier in the decade, such as the attacks of September 11 2001 or the
collapse of the Amaranth hedge fund in 2006. Moreover, the US government
initially estimated that subprime losses would be just $50bn-$100bn – a tiny
fraction of the total capital of western banks or assets held by global
investment funds.

於是，當高比例的次貸違約於2006年尾浮上抬面，普遍有種相信財金系統會順利吸收這次
陣痛。畢竟，財金系統在前十年已經成功地承受過許多經濟危機，如911事件或是200年
Amaranth投資基金倒閉事件。況且，美國政府一開始預測次貸損失應不過只是500億到
1000億之間，對於西方銀行界和全球投資基金的資產相比只是九牛一毛。

In fact, the subprime losses started to hit the financial system in the early
summer of 2007 in unexpected ways, triggering unforeseen events such as the
implosion of IKB. And as the surprise spread, the three pillars of faith that
had supported the credit boom started to crumble.

事實上，次貸損失是以意料之外的方式於2007年夏天襲擊金融系統，引發沒預想過的事件
，譬如德國工業銀行。而意料之外的事情不斷擴散，讓那三根擎天撐起信用財富的信念
支柱開始崩塌。


First, it became clear to investors that it was dangerous to use the ratings
agencies as a guide for complex debt securities. In the summer of 2007, the
agencies started downgrading billions of dollars of supposedly “ultra-safe”
 debt – causing prices to crumble. Last week, for example, Merrill Lynch
sold a portfolio of complex debt at 22 per cent of its face value, even
though this had carried the top-notch triple-A rating.

一開始，投資者發現，用評比機構來選擇複合型債務證券風險提高。2007年夏天，
這些機構開始以數十億的金額下修一些理論上是「超穩定」的債券，引發價格崩跌。
譬如上個禮拜，美林以面額22％的價格賣了多種複合型債券的投資組合，即便這
組合一開始被評比為三A的超優組。

Then, as bewildered investors lost faith in ratings, many stopped buying
complex instruments altogether. That created an immediate funding crisis at
many investment vehicles, since most had funded themselves by issuing notes
in the asset-backed commercial paper market. It also meant that banks were no
longer able to turn assets such as mortgages into subprime bonds and sell
these on. That in turn meant the second key assumption that had underpinned
21st-century finance – that the capital markets would always stay liquid –
 was overturned. Worse still, the third pillar of faith – that banks would
be better protected from a crisis because of risk dispersion – also cracked.
As investment vehicles lost their ability to raise finance, they turned to
their banks for help. That squeezed the banks’ balance sheets at the very
moment that they were facing their own losses on debt securities and finding
it impossible to sell on loans.

接著，昏頭的投資者對評比失去信心，許多乾脆完全不再買複合型債券。這馬上使多種
投資工具陷入融資危機，因為多數都在資產支持商業票據市場上發行承諾書作為融資
手段。這也意味著銀行不再能夠將房貸等資產轉換成為次級債券並販賣之。這代表著
第二個大假設（即21世紀財金新世界裡，資本市場永遠會保持流動）被推翻了。更糟的
是，第三條擎天的信念支柱（即銀行會因為分散風險所以更能免除危機）崩裂瓦解了。
當投資工具喪是他們融資的能力時，他們就轉向他們的銀行求救。這就擠壓了銀行
的資產報表，且是當銀行正面臨自己在債券上的損失，且發現幾乎不可能販賣債務
之時。

As a result, western banks found themselves running out of capital in a way
that no regulator or banker had ever foreseen. Peter Fisher, a managing
director of BlackRock and former US Treasury undersecretary, wrote in a
recent paper: “It seems clear that risk dispersion did not work as expected.
Major financial institutions did not succeed in shedding risks so much as
transferring them among their own business lines.”

結果就是西方銀行發現自己資產耗盡，且規模與方式是沒有任何管制者或銀行家有預測
到的。Peter Fisher，BlackRock主管以及前美國財政部次長，在最近於報紙發表的文章
說，看來風險分散並沒有發揮預期的功效。主要金融機構並沒有成功分散風險，反而是
把風險分散到他們自己公司的各個部門去了。」

Banks started hoarding cash and stopped lending to each other as financiers
lost faith in their ability to judge the health of other institutions – or
even their own. “Firms became reluctant to participate in money markets ...
as a result subprime credit problems turned into a systemic liquidity crunch,
” says the IIF.

各銀行開始搜刮現金，並且因為各融資專員完全對自己評估其他機構的健全度喪失信心
（或甚至評估他們自己的信心）而終止相互借貸。「各機構開始不願參與貨幣交易市場
...此為因為次級信貸問題轉化成為系統性資金流動危機，」國際金融協會（IIF）說道。

Then a vicious deleveraging spiral got under way. As banks scurried to
improve their balance sheets, they began selling assets and cutting loans to
hedge funds. But that hit asset prices, hurting those balance sheets once
again. What made this “feedback loop” doubly intense was that the
introduction of mark-to-market accounting earlier this decade forced banks to
readjust their books after every panicky price drop – in contrast to the
pattern seen in the 1990s Japanese banking crisis, or the Latin American debt
debacle of the 1980s.

接著惡性資金槓桿攀升席捲而來。當銀行忙著美化他們的債務報表時，他們開始販賣
資產並消減貸給投資基金的量。但這打擊了資產價格，再一次打擊債務報表。而這個
「回饋循環」衝擊加倍，因為前幾年引進的市場對市場會計制度逼迫銀行每次價格
暴跌時，都要調整各銀行自己的帳簿（與90年代的日本金融危機還有1980年代的拉丁
美洲信貸危機不同）。

At several points over the past year, policymakers have hoped that this
vicious cycle might be coming to an end. Last autumn, for example, conditions
briefly improved; early this year brought another respite when central banks
pumped more liquidity into the system. Similarly, when the Fed stepped in to
prevent the implosion of Bear Stearns in March, sentiment stabilised for a
period.

過去這一年內，政策制訂者數次認為這個惡性循環即將告一段落。例如去年秋天，
情況有短暫轉好；今年初，當中央銀行注入更多資金時卻又讓情勢急轉直下。同樣地，
當聯準會於三月入場干預，力挽Bear Stearns免於倒閉時，情況似乎又有所改善。

However, in practical terms, the real challenge for financiers and
policymakers now – as in Japan a decade ago – is how to build a new sense
of trust in finance. In the medium term, regulators are preparing reforms
that aim to make the system look credible, even in a world where the benefits
of risk dispersion are no longer taken as a creed. These would force banks to
hold more capital and ensure that the securiti- sation process is more
transparent. Separately, groups such as the IIF are trying to introduce
measures that could rebuild confidence in complex financial instruments.

但實際上來說，對財金業者和政策制訂者而言，真實的挑戰（一如十年前的日本）是
如何建立對於金融業的新信心。在這段中間期，管制者正在準備改革，目的在於重新
讓金融系統看起來可以信任，即便現在的世界已經完全不把風險分散必定有利當作信條。
這些調整會逼銀行持有更多資本，並確保債務證券化的機制更加透明。同時，一些機構
如IIF正在是著引介新制度來讓複合型融資工具重新取得投資者信心。

More immediately, the banks are trying to rekindle investor trust by
replenishing their capital bases. The IIF calculates that in the year to
June, banks made $476bn in credit writedowns, as debt prices plunged in the
panic (although tangible credit losses are hitherto just $50bn). However,
they have also raised $354bn in capital. Financiers are also trying to
restart trading in frozen debt markets. Experience from earlier financial
crises suggests that this will only occur when investors are convinced that
they have seen true “clearing prices”. Events such as Merrill Lynch’s
recent fire sale of its CDO portfolio may be a step in this direction.

更迫切地，銀行正在試著藉由補充資本基礎來挽回投資者的信任感。IIF統計，今年
一月到六月，銀行總共沖減信貸債券約4760億美元，因為債務價格在慌亂中暴跌
（雖然實體信貸虧損只大約500億美元）。然而，銀行也總共集資了3540億的資本。
財金業者也在試圖重新活絡幾近冷凍的債務市場。早期的金融危機經驗顯示，交易活絡
只會在當投資者都認為他們看到真實的「清算價」時才會發生。如美林最近把自己的
CDO投資組合給賤賣這類事件應該就是朝活絡交易努力。

But while confidence is returning in some areas, it continues to be
undermined in others. A decade ago in Japan, the banking woes started with a
property slump but later spread when banks were forced to cut their lending –
 which unexpectedly created more bad loans. Thus far, banks have not yet
encountered this “second round” effect on a significant scale.

但雖然在一些部門信心開始重建，在其他地方仍然低迷。十年前的日本，是因為財產價格
暴跌而使銀行陷入低潮，但到後來當銀行被迫要減少他們的借貸額度，反而出乎意料地
製造了更多壞帳。目前為止，各銀行還沒有顯著地經歷這第二回合的效應。

Though defaults are rising on consumer loans, for example, losses on
corporate debt remain modest. However, most bankers and policymakers fear
that a second wave is simply a matter of time. That makes it hard to predict
when the credit crunch will end, how big the total losses may eventually be
or even whether the banks are adequately capitalised yet.

雖然消費者借貸違約情勢增長，企業債務損失仍然可忍受。但是，多數銀行業者和政策
制訂者怕的是市場面臨第二波危機只是時間問題。這危機使得預測信貸危機何時解除
很難判斷，同時到底那十總損失會多少，或是否各銀行已經囤積足夠資本，都非常難說。

“What we learnt in Japan is that banks have a tendency to underestimate how
their assets could deteriorate due to the feedback problems,” Mr Nakaso
recalls.

「我們從日本那學到的，就是銀行總有低估自己資產會如何因為回饋問題而貶值的
趨勢，」中曾宏提到。


A year into the credit crisis, in other words, trust remains a rare commodity
in the banking world. It will take years, not months, to restore that crucial
ingredient – particularly given that so many of the assumptions underlying
21st-century finance have turned out to be so dangerously wrong.

信貸危機已經一年，換言之，信用在銀行界裡仍然是稀有財。要使信用恢復大概要好
幾年而非好幾個月，特別是當這麼多關於21世紀財經世界的假設都被證明是非常危險的
錯誤認知時。


The writer, the FT’s capital markets editor, is on sabbatical writing a book
about the credit crisis. Her first book, on Japan’s banking crisis, was
published in 2003 as ‘Saving the Sun’
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008




http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a09f751e-6187-11dd-af94-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=
13e90304-4dc0-11dd-820e-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1

                                                煩請注意附上原稿來源

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◆ From: 220.129.163.228
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 220.129.163.228      (08/06 05:14)
→ Edsel:FT的文不好譯呢，加油。
→ Edsel:此外，這文也有可能幾天內會出現在FT中文網，屆時
→ Edsel:還可以對照一下對岸別人的譯法。
→ pursuistmi:@@謝謝我繼續努力中，有點偷懶
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 220.129.163.228      (08/06 07:17)
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 220.129.163.228      (08/06 08:11)
→ pursuistmi:我不是財經背景，有錯誤請指正