The vulnerabilities that lie behind Putin’s belligerence
By Philip Stephens
Published: August 14 2008 19:19 | Last updated: August 14 2008 19:19
Some time ago when the Kremlin distributed photographs of a shirtless
Vladimir Putin brandishing a hunting rifle the temptation was to snigger.
Another middle-aged man; another mid-life crisis. Alas, this week’s invasion
of Georgia has confirmed that the Russian prime minister’s swagger was
indeed a metaphor for his government’s foreign policy.
不久之前，克里姆林宮發了幾張上身坦露的普丁拿著把獵槍耀武揚威時，就是一股
想笑的衝動。又一個中年男子；又一個中年危機。啊，這禮拜的喬治亞侵略行動證實了
俄國總理的瀟灑，的確是他政府外交政策最好的隱喻。
The argument about who started the latest war in the Caucasus will doubtless
continue for some time. The Russian-backed separatists of the breakaway
province of South Ossetia were engaged in a continuous strategy of
provocation; and Georgia’s Mikheil Saakashvili badly miscalculated in
thinking he could reclaim the province by force. The hot-headed Mr
Saakashvili is no innocent in this grim affair.
關於誰先掀起高加索山區戰役的辯論大概還會持續一陣子。俄國支持的南奧賽梯分離份子
不斷在進行挑釁的策略；喬治亞總統Saakashvili嚴重失算，認為可以用武力重新奪回
該省。一頭熱的Saakashvili在此次的紛爭中絕不無辜。
Yet the precise casus belli has been rendered irrelevant by the manner and
scale of Moscow’s response. If there were ever any doubts about Mr Putin’s
plan to re-establish hegemony over the former Soviet space, they were
dispelled by the ferocity of Russia’s assault.
但確切的原因已經因為莫斯科回應的方式與規模而變得不重要了。如果曾有任何關於
普丁希望能在舊有的蘇維埃勢力範圍上建立起新的霸權表示懷疑，這些疑慮已經被
俄國兇狠的攻勢給徹底瓦解了。
Mr Putin and his colleagues go through the motions of denying it but the
self-evident aim is to annex Georgia to Russia’s sphere of influence. Mr
Saakashvili has never accorded Mr Putin the respect the Russian leader
assumes is his due. A government in Tbilisi paying homage to Moscow would
assure it monopoly control of Caspian oil and gas.
普丁還有他的同事們不厭其煩地否認俄國不辯自明的目的：將喬治亞併入俄國的影響力
範圍之中。Saakashvili從來沒有給予普丁認為做為俄國領袖的應得尊重。提伯利希政府
對莫斯科磕頭就會確保喬治亞能控制裏海油氣資源。
The message for Mr Putin’s apologists in Europe – why does Italy’s Silvio
Berlusconi always spring so readily to mind? – could not be clearer. Mr Putin
’s worldview has no place for the post-modern approach to international
relations of his western neighbours. Europe stands for a global order based
on co-operative norms and rules. Moscow prefers the use of force. Appeasement
invites only further contempt.
歐洲的普丁支持者所傳遞的訊息（為什麼義大利的Berlusconi總是馬上浮現？）再清楚
不過了。普丁的世界觀裡，是沒有給他的西方鄰邦在後現代的國際關係留上位置的。
歐洲代表基於合作與規範的世界秩序。莫斯科則傾向使用力量。姑息只會換得進一步的
鄙視。
Much has been said during the past few days of the striking parallels with
the behaviour of the great powers during the 19th century. But there are
plenty of unappealing echoes too of some of the more dismal moments of the
20th century.
過去幾天，許多人提到各強權的行為模式與十九世紀列強的行為模式驚人地相似。但也有
更多與二十世紀相似的一些令人不安的時刻。
Mr Putin cites a duty to protect Russian citizens (Moscow has been handing
out passports in South Ossetia and the other breakaway province of Abkhazia
for some time). Hitler used a similar pretext. Likewise the talk from the
Kremlin of saving Georgians from a misguided leadership comes straight from
the script written by Brezhnev. Did not the Soviets march into Prague in 1968
in order to liberate Czechoslovakia?
普丁引述保衛俄羅斯公民的職責（許久以來莫斯科已經發護照給南奧賽梯和Abkhazia
的人民）。希特勒採用了類似的前奏。克里姆林宮拯救喬治亞人免受錯誤的領導者
誤導的說詞簡直是從Brezhnev的劇本抄來的。難道紅軍1968年沒有邁入布拉格，解放
捷克斯拉夫？
One intended implication, of course, is that Russia reserves the right to
intervene on behalf of its citizens in Ukraine, in the Baltic states and in
former Soviet republics in central Asia. Force, or the threat of it, sits
alongside dominance of Europe’s oil and gas market as a supposedly
legitimate instrument of Russia’s regional hegemony.
一個明顯的暗示，當然就是俄國保有權力為其在烏克蘭、波羅的海諸國、以及中亞
的幾個前蘇維埃共和國理的俄國公民進行干預行動。力量，或威脅使用力量，就在
歐洲油氣市場旁招搖著，形同俄國作為區域霸權的正當工具。
We should not be surprised. Mr Putin’s bare-chested vanity has scarcely been
the only clue to his intentions. Not so long ago Mr Putin threatened to
target Russia’s nuclear arsenal on Ukraine if that country persisted,
alongside Georgia, with its effort to join the Nato alliance. Moscow has
waged cyber-war against the Baltic states. Gazprom routinely disrupts gas
supplies to former communist states that earn the Kremlin’s disfavour.
我們不應驚異。普丁赤裸的傲慢決不是他意圖的唯一線索。不久前普丁威脅要把俄國的
核子武器指向烏克蘭，若烏克蘭與喬治亞持續致力於加入北約。莫斯科對波羅的海諸國
發動了網路戰爭。俄國石油公司規律地切斷通往惹火克里姆林宮的前共產國家的油氣
資源。
There were some hopes that Dmitry Medvedev’s elevation to the presidency
would temper Mr Putin’s belligerence. Instead we have seen the hapless Mr
Medvedev in the role of a finger-puppet tucked into the prime minister’s
breast pocket – taken out from time to time only to affirm the
reasonableness of his master.
曾有些希望Medvedev即位總統後能約束普丁的好戰性子。反而我們看到無助的Medvedev
成為總理塞在胸前口袋裡的指頭人偶，偶爾拿出來好證明他主人仍保持理性。
Many in the west seem to think there is nothing to be done. Authoritarianism
is back in fashion and Russia’s return as a great power is one of the
ineluctable geopolitical trends of the 21st century. The west must adjust to
the reality, ceding the ground that Mr Putin seeks.
許多西方觀點認為這沒有辦法。集權主義回來了，而俄國以強國姿態重返國際舞台
是二十一世紀地緣政治無法避免的趨勢。西方必須調整來面對現實，對普丁讓出
普丁要的東西。
This analysis misses one of the paradoxes of Russia’s power. The riches and
political leverage provided by gas and oil have restored Russia’s economic
and geopolitical standing. Yet, for the medium and long term, almost all the
other indicators point to a future of relative decline.
這個分析忽略了俄國權力的矛盾。油氣可能提共了俄國財富與政治力量，進而恢復了俄國
的經濟和地緣政治排行。但，在中程和長程而言，基呼所有其他的指標都指向俄國會在
未來進入相對衰退。
Low fertility and high mortality rates hold the prospect of a fast-shrinking
population in a country where vast tracts of territory are already empty.
Demographers estimate that the present Russian population of about 140m will
fall by about 10m within a decade or so. By 2020 Moscow will struggle to find
sufficient recruits to maintain its conscript army.
低生育率與高死亡率掌握了一個人口急速縮減的國家，並有許多土地已經荒廢。人口學家
估計，現在俄國一億四千萬的人口會在十年內少去約一千萬人。2020時，莫斯科會開始
缺乏足夠的兵源來維持他的徵兵制軍隊。
Demographic decline is mirrored by crumbling health and education systems and
by decaying civil infrastructure. Corruption is rife. The present political
leadership is better described as a kleptocracy than an autocracy. Vast
amounts of Russia’s wealth are being siphoned off in bank accounts abroad
rather than reinvested at home.
人口收縮同時，也伴隨崩毀的健康和教育系統，以及逐漸脆弱化的基礎建設。貪腐橫行。
現在的政治領導比較像是竊國政權而非集權政體。廣大的俄國財富都被吸出進入海外
銀行帳戶而非投資在國內。
The price of Mr Putin’s aggressive nationalism has been to starve the oil
and gas industry of foreign technology and investment. In spite of the
emergence of a Russian middle class, there are few signs that the petro
windfall is being used to broaden and deepen Russian prosperity.
普丁積極的國族主義伴隨的代價就是逼迫油氣工業拒絕外國科技和資金。儘管有一批
俄國中產階級崛起，仍少有跡象顯示油氣的資金被用作發展俄國的財富。
The second paradox concerns Mr Putin’s deep sense of grievance against the
west. For all the talk that the US and Europe conspired in Russia’s
humiliation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the strategic threats
facing Moscow lie elsewhere: in unresolved border disputes with a resurgent
China in the depopulated far east and in Russia’s own separatist movements
in the south.
第二個矛盾則顯出普丁隊於西方極深的牢騷。蘇聯瓦解後，儘管有許多關於美國和歐洲
密謀對俄國不利的聲音，莫斯科所面臨的戰略危機則在別處：特別是一些與中國在罕有
人煙的東方未定界問題，以及俄國自己南部境內的分離運動問題。
They may share an authoritarian political instinct, but all logic says that
Moscow and Beijing are more naturally strategic rivals than partners. Mr Putin
’s support for separatism in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, meanwhile, sends a
curious message to those in Chechnya and elsewhere on Russia’s southern
border who want to be free of Moscow’s rule.
莫斯科和北京可能都共有極權政治的直覺，但一切邏輯顯示莫斯科和北京是很自然的
戰略對手而非同伴。普丁支持南奧賽梯和Abkhazia的分離運動對於車臣地區以及其他
俄國南部邊境希望獨立於莫斯科控制的人們傳遞了奇特的訊息。
None of this, many will say, is of much help in resolving the crisis. If
Europe’s impotence has been long apparent, the invasion of Georgia has also
humiliated the US. Washington’s protestations have been brushed aside by Mr
Putin almost as flea bites.
以上沒有任何一項可以解決這次危機。如果歐洲的無能自事件開始就非常明顯，則
入侵喬治亞也讓美國蒙羞。華盛頓的抗議幾乎如跳蚤包一樣被普丁撥開。
It will not always be so. Longer term, the west’s strategic response should
be guided by a clear-sighted appreciation of Russia’s weaknesses as well as
its strengths. There will come a time when Moscow itself badly needs the
shelter of the international order Mr Putin now so visibly disdains. The US
and Europe should not seek confrontation with Russia; but nor should they
retreat when Mr Putin brandishes his gun.
不會永久如此的。就長期而言，西方的戰略回應應該是由明確洞悉俄國弱點以及強項的
策略所引導。會有莫斯科自己需要普丁現在厭惡的國際秩序保護傘的時候的。美國和
歐洲不應該與俄國對峙；但他們也不應該在普丁耍槍的時候往後退。
More columns at www.ft.com/philipstephens
[email protected]
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/463bc8aa-6a17-11dd-83e8-0000779fd18c.html
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※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 220.129.162.4 (08/18 01:39)