http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/18/opinion/18iht-edcohen.html?_r=1&ref=opinion
Internatinal Herald Tribune 專欄作家 Roger Cohen
稍微翻譯了一下，煩請指教。
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在本週前幾天的大規模示威中，我問一位年輕婦女她叫什麼。他回答：「我叫伊朗」
一個國家隱然成形。漸漸被挑起、漸漸浮出檯面。一面布條寫著：「沈默等於抗議」。大
批群眾從一陣憤怒之中提煉出緘默的本質。
較之過去。伊朗人在一個向神效忠而非向人民效忠的政權下，已買進了更大量的民主資產
。將近有400萬人參與投票。現在，他們的選票被侵犯了，許多人跨越對伊斯蘭共和不情
願的默認的藩籬，進而表示反對。這可說是根本上的變遷。
伊斯蘭共和已失去了他的正當性（legitimacy），並產生裂隙。情勢再不會像過去一樣了
。過去她總是在神權政體的本質下，在人民投票時。玩弄模稜兩可的伎倆。對新一代來說
。已經沒有模稜兩可的空間了。
群眾憤怒對上訴諸武力的國家統治。誰會讓步呢？我認為這畢竟得看Mir Hussein
Moussavi的反應。身為一個改革派，以及無懈可擊的革命背景，若他卻步，那就會像1999
年和2003年那位守法的前總統Mohammad Khatami一樣，一切都玩完了。
異於當時由學生領導的抗議，現在有更多不同年齡層和不同階級的群眾湧入街頭。商人和
學生肩並著肩，建設工人坐在高台上用光線照著人群，映出代表勝利的「V」。
抗議規模擴大了，還伴隨著比以往更多的統治菁英分裂。這些分裂將最高領導人
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei從他習慣的崇高地位，推向爭端之中。
之間的平衡已經起了變化，但也不是說結果就會不同，但總是有可能。
該政權犯了最根本的錯誤，就是侮辱了伊朗人民的智慧。這群自信的民族並不會輕易給人
當作傀儡般戲弄。
在經濟蓬勃發展的北德黑蘭，通訊記者是否低估了Mahmoud Ahmadinejad總統的支持者，
還有待商榷。
我並不懷疑在他的虔誠、恩寵和民粹下，能夠鞏固幾百萬張的選票。在伊朗核計畫的擁護
下，他是狂傲民族主義的化身。但是能夠以將近三分之二的選票所獲得的絕對勝利，應該
不需要靠頒佈近似於戒嚴的法律來保護。
其實也沒什麼好爭論的。支持Ahmadinejad的保守派報紙Kayhan，在一個小時之內就在網
站上恭賀其現任總統贏得65％的選票。國家通訊社也不遑多讓。全國不同選區的投票模式
，竟然有高達98％的關連性。
以西邊的Lorestan為例，本區人口是密集的地方忠誠份子組成。本地是國家改革派神職人
員Mehdi Karroubi的故鄉，他也是四位候選人之一。在他的家鄉Aligoodarz，Karroubi獲
得14,512票，而Ahmadinejad則有39,640票。總體來說，Karroubi從2005年的500多萬票，
降到30萬票，連廢票都比他多。
就操縱選舉來說，看起來挺業餘的。
但伊朗政權並不業餘。對我來說，這場混亂只算得上是瞎攪和，當初在關鍵時刻發動「綠
潮」（green wave）的Moussavi支持者，才真是令人無法忍受。
回顧四天前，在革命衛隊（Revolutionary Guard）政治處主席Yadollah Javani投票前，
曾表示，若Moussavi想打絲絨革命（velvet revolution）（譯註：捷克1989的民主革命
）的主意，那他會親眼見到革命「出身為捷身先死」（quashed before it is born）。
這話意義深遠。
支持Ahmadinejad 的Khamenei的確有與Moussavi和平共處的意思，但卻沒有先打好草稿。
他高呼奇蹟般的結果，但馬上又命令衛隊議會（Guardian Council）調查選舉不公的民怨
。他高呼Ahmadinejad是全伊朗人的總統，但又任他對那些未投票給他的，當成是足球流
氓。就選後和解來說，是個敗筆。
該政權將賭注放在基本教義派上。當激進的白宮還是全民公敵的時候，這張是王牌。但總
統Obama上台後，世界就變了，就像伊朗現在Twitter正流行的社會也變了。我猜
Ahmadinejad其的那匹世界變遷之馬，已經氣衰力竭了。
在變遷中的中東世界，新總統根據道德和正義來建立新的全球治理（global governance
）的宏偉呼籲，在這次的選舉鬧劇中灰飛湮滅，而伊朗會發現自己勢單力薄。
現在呢？只是歹戲拖棚吧。衛隊議會盡是Ahmadinejad的追隨者，我看不出重新計算能改
變什麼。
在目前國內和國際大規模的示威下，核心問題是Khamenei是否會把Ahmadinejad視為他的
負擔。若換做是Moussavi，他有個可靠的改革機制能夠讓政體延續下去，這對大部分伊朗
人來說是個可接受的妥協。
什葉派是個溫和的伊斯蘭分支。最高領導人可以找出反轉國家進程的方法。守衛伊斯蘭共
和的仲裁大任在他的肩上。現在他必須帶領神與人民到達一個不同，卻永續的平衡。
At the immense opposition demonstration earlier this week, I asked a young
woman her name. She said, “My name is Iran.”
A nation has stirred. Provoked, it has risen. “Silence equals protest,”
says one banner. The vast crowds move in a hush of indignation, anger
distilled to a wordless essence.
In greater numbers than ever before, Iranians had bought in to the sliver of
democracy offered by an autocratic system whose ultimate loyalty is to the
will of God rather than the will of the people. Almost 40 million voted. Now,
their votes flouted, many have crossed over from reluctant acquiescence to
the Islamic Republic into opposition. That’s a fundamental shift.
The Islamic Republic has lost legitimacy. It is fissured. It will not be the
same again. It has always played on the ambiguity of its nature, a theocracy
where people vote. For a whole new generation, there’s no longer room for
ambiguity.
Popular fury confronts the state’s monopoly over force. Who will flinch? I
think that depends above all on the leadership of Mir Hussein Moussavi, the
reformist of impeccable revolutionary credentials. If he bends, as the
legalistic former president Mohammad Khatami did in 1999 and 2003, it’s over.
Unlike the student-led protests of those years, a wide array of Iranians of
all ages and classes are in the streets. Shopkeepers and students march side
by side. Construction workers perched on scaffolding flash them the “V” for
victory sign.
Protest is broader, and accompanied by more visible splits in the ruling
elite than ever surfaced before. These divisions have thrust the supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, into the fray from his preferred perch.
The balance of forces has changed, which is not to say the outcome will be
different. But it could be.
The regime’s fundamental mistake was to insult the intelligence of Iranians.
A proud people, they do not take kindly to being treated as puppet-like fools.
There’s been some debate about whether correspondents, caught in an affluent
North Tehran bubble, might be underestimating President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’
s support.
I don’t doubt that his piety, patronage and populism secured him many
millions of votes. He personifies a defiant nationalism, symbolized by Iran’
s nuclear program. But a genuine victory with almost two-thirds of the vote
would not require the imposition of near-martial law to secure it.
In fact, there’s not much to debate. Kayhan, the conservative
pro-Ahmadinejad newspaper, had a headline on its Web site within an hour of
the vote’s close celebrating the incumbent’s victory with 65 percent of the
vote. The state news agency was not far behind. There was an absurd 98
percent correlation in voting patterns across diverse regions of the country.
Take the western province of Lorestan, a place of intense local loyalties. It
’s the state of the reformist cleric Mehdi Karroubi, one of four candidates
in the election. In his home town of Aligoodarz, Karroubi was attributed
14,512 votes to Ahmadinejad’s 39,640. Overall, Karroubi’s vote sunk to
300,000 — less than the spoiled ballots — from more than 5 million in 2005.
As rigging goes, this looks amateurish.
The Iranian regime is not amateurish. So the mess suggests scrambling to me,
an eleventh-hour decision that the surge in Moussavi’s support — the “
green wave” — was too massive to tolerate.
In retrospect, a statement four days before the vote from Yadollah Javani,
the head of the Revolutionary Guard political office, saying that if Moussavi
had a velvet revolution in mind, he would see it “quashed before it is born,
” assumes great significance.
Certainly, Khamenei, who had supported Ahmadinejad but appeared ready to live
with Moussavi, did not have a prepared script. He hailed a miraculous result,
but then asked the Guardian Council to investigate complaints about
irregularities. He hailed Ahmadinejad as president of all Iranians, but then
saw the president dismiss all who hadn’t voted for him as football
hooligans. As post-electoral conciliation goes, it was a bust.
The regime has gambled on radicalism. That proved a winning card when a
radical White House made an easy enemy. But the world has changed with
President Obama, just as Iran’s Twittering society has changed. I suspect
Ahmadinejad has ridden the stallion of world transformation to exhaustion.
In a changing Middle East, Iran could find itself isolated under a president
whose grandiose calls for a new global governance based on ethics and justice
fly in the face of this electoral farce.
What now? The regime is playing for time. The Guardian Council is stuffed
with Ahmadinejad loyalists. I can’t see its recount yielding any outcome
that changes things.
The core issue is whether, given the dimension of protests, internal and
international, Khamenei will come to view Ahmadinejad as a liability. In
Moussavi he has a credible vehicle for a reform of the regime that serves to
preserve it — an acceptable compromise to most Iranians.
Shiism is a malleable branch of Islam. The supreme leader can find the means
to reverse course. He is an arbiter beholden to the safeguarding of the
Islamic Republic. Arbitration now requires bringing God and the people into a
different, more sustainable balance.
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