[編譯] 經濟學人：中國的第二次長征

[pursuistmi (common people)]

China's reforms

The second Long March
Dec 11th 2008
From The Economist print edition

China has been transformed by the changes ushered in by Deng Xiaoping 30
years ago. But the biggest step has yet to be dared

中國因為鄧小平三十年前發動的改變而轉變了。但沒人敢發動更進一步的改變。

“ENGELS never flew on an aeroplane; Stalin never wore Dacron.” Thus China’
s late leader, Deng Xiaoping, to a meeting 30 years ago that is now
officially seen as the starting-point of his economic and political reforms.
Deng’s words meant Maoist dogma was out and pragmatism was in. A
dramatically transformed China is now commemorating the anniversary. But even
as officials trot out a litany of achievements they attribute to the country’
s “reform and opening” policy—200m fewer citizens living in poverty, a 6%
share of global GDP compared with 1.8% in 1978, a nearly 70% increase in
grain production—the world’s financial crisis weighs heavily on their
minds, and their leaders are struggling with unfinished business.

恩格司沒坐過飛機，史達林沒穿過戴克龍，鄧小平三十年前在某場會議如是說。現在，
這個會議已被視為中國經濟和政治改革的起點。鄧小平的話意為著毛主席主義淘汰，
務實主義正夯。積極改變的中國現在正紀念著三十年的改變。但即便豐功偉業羅列若
江河─包含兩億拖貧，佔全球GDP的6％（1978年時為1.8％），穀類生產量成長近七成
等等─世界金融危機的重擔仍然壓得他們有些緊張，他們的領導人正在努力解套，擺平
危機。


Vice-President Xi Jinping, heir-apparent to President Hu Jintao, is said to
have been appointed chief organiser of the celebration programme. It includes
concerts, exhibitions and endless speeches celebrating the “turning point”
 in China’s history when Deng gained the upper hand over the Maoists. His
victory was evident at two meetings held in November and December 1978. The
first was a month-long “work conference” of the Communist Party’s Central
Committee, probably the liveliest gathering of its kind ever held (it was
here, according to some Western scholars, that Deng mentioned Dacron). A more
scripted and formal plenum followed it.

習近平，胡錦濤的接班人，據說已被指派為三十年紀念大典的主要規劃人。這次大典包括
演奏會，展覽，以及無數的演講，歡慶中國的轉捩點。鄧小平對毛派的勝利可由兩次
1978年的會議中看出。第一個會議是十一月，接近一個月長的共產黨中央委員會的
「工作會議」：這次或許是同類型會議裡頭最活潑的一次（根據一些西方學者說法，
鄧小平就是此時講到戴克龍的）。第二個會議則在十二月，是比較形式化的大會。

Next year the country will mark its 60th birthday as a people’s republic (in
Confucian tradition, 60th birthdays are particularly significant). Reform and
opening has thus taken up half of China’s communist life. But officials are
being careful to manage expectations of further change. Deng once suggested
that direct elections to national leadership posts could be held by 2050. No
one mentions that now. On the economic side huge challenges loom, among them
an ageing population and a blighted environment, both of which could drag
down growth.

明年，中華人民共和國則要歡慶60大壽（儒家文化裡，60歲是大事）。改革開放已經讓
中國的共產主義消彌大半，但各級官員仍在努力控管改變的速度。鄧小平曾經建議
國家領導人直選可能可以在2050年舉行。現在沒有人談這個了。經濟方面，中國
面臨巨大挑戰，且其中也包括了老齡化人口和環境的破壞，兩者都可能會拖垮成長。

Deng, who died in 1997, is often described as the chief architect of reform,
as if the sweeping changes of the past 30 years were mapped out by him. He
himself more accurately described his approach as “crossing a river by
feeling the stones”. The ultimate objective has never been clear. Since 1992
it has been to set up a “socialist market economy”, but officials struggle
to explain how this differs from a real one. Deng announced that year that
the party’s “basic line” (party-speak for reform and opening under
one-party rule) would not change for 100 years. This implies a lot more
stone-groping.

鄧小平於1997年辭世。他常被形容是改革的主要操盤手，好似三十年的改變都是他
起草鋪陳的。鄧小平則形容自己的方法是摸石過河。改革的最終目標一直不明確。
自從1992年，改革的目的號稱是建立「社會主義市場經濟」，但官員們不太能解釋
這個市場經濟與實際市場經濟的差異在何處。鄧小平那年宣布共產黨的基本路線
（共產黨依據一黨專政概念對改革開放的說法）一百年不變。這似乎意味著要摸的
石頭更多。

Party leaders revel in this obscurity. It gives them flexibility in
policymaking and makes it easier for them to forge compromises between
factions. One of the most important political changes in China over the past
30 years has been a move away from the vicious factional strife of the Maoist
era, a tendency that persisted well into the 1980s and fuelled the
pro-democracy upheaval of 1989. In 2002, for the first time in China’s
communist history, power was smoothly transferred from one set of leaders to
another without killings or purgings. The new leaders express the same
commitment to reform, but have a more left-wing agenda.

共產黨領導對這不明確的狀態挺滿意的。這意味著他們有更多制訂政策的空間，並且
讓他們更輕鬆地模糊黨派間的爭議。三十年來最重要的政治改革，就是邁出脫離以
鬥爭為主的毛時代：這鬥爭心態在1980年間也於波蕩漾，甚至形成了追求民主進程的
1989天安門事變。200年，中國共產黨有史以來第一遭，國家權力從一群領導人手中
和平轉移到另外一群人手中，且沒有腥風血雨。新領袖則表示對改革同樣的承諾，
只是多了些左派內容。

Papering over some of the party’s history has helped them too, damping
public demands for political change. The history of the reform programme
itself has been sanitised and simplified in order to minimise public
questioning of leaders’ motives and actions. No mention is made, for
example, of a vital part of the background to the party meetings, Democracy
Wall—a 200-metre-long brick structure in front of a bus depot west of
Tiananmen Square. For a remarkable four months in the winter of 1978-79,
until Deng decided to shut it down and jail some of its activists, citizens
plastered the wall with posters calling for freedom and democracy. The area
is now a plaza flanked by shopping malls.

撰寫共產黨史也有效的讓大眾對於政治改革的需求降低了些。改革計畫的歷史本身
不斷在被淨化和簡化以降低大眾對領導人動機和行為的質疑。例如，民主之牆（一座
兩百公尺長的磚造建築，位於天安門廣場西側）這個伴隨了共產黨1978年會議的重要
社會事件，就鮮少被提及。1978到1979之間四個月的寒冬裡，民主之牆被人民貼滿
海報，要求自由和民主，直到鄧小平決定制止這些行動並且把一些人士關起來才做罷。
這個區域現在是個大廣場，有許多購物商店。

Party officials, preferring their heroes to be larger than life, have
massaged history to imply that the meetings 30 years ago were a clarion call
for reform and opening. They were not. The dismantling of the Maoist edifice
after the Chairman’s death in 1976 began more by stealth. A shift of
emphasis towards rebuilding the economy was already under way long before the
meetings began. Political rapprochement with the West—a key part of the “
opening”—began several years before Mao’s death, driven by a shared
dislike of the Soviet Union.

共產黨官員誇大他們的英雄，把歷史美化成為三十年前因兩場會議而掀起了改革開放。
歷史不是這樣。毛派的瓦解是1976年毛澤東去世後靜悄悄地發生的。早在1978年開會
以前，重建經濟的步驟已經開始。與西方的政治互動（改革開放的重要步驟），早在
毛去世七年之前就已經開始，且讓蘇聯十分不爽。

The rule of prudence
智慧之道

The word “opening” did not even appear in the communiqué issued on
December 22nd 1978, at the end of the two meetings. “Reform” was mentioned
only once. A draft policy document on agriculture adopted by the leaders and
promulgated the next year specifically rejected the idea, now considered a
hallmark of China’s rural reforms, of contracting out rural land to peasants
to farm by themselves. By contrast, Mao’s disastrous “people’s communes”
 were praised. Deng’s reformist victory was suffused with compromise, a
pattern that persists to this day.

「開放」這詞甚至並沒有在1978年12月22號的公報中出現。改革只有提出一次。一份
重領袖共擬的農業政策草稿中甚至排斥了改革的想法，排斥了將農地租給農家作為自耕
地的作法。比較之下，毛澤東的人民公社概念反而被強調了。鄧小平的改革勝利在妥協
下被消音，而這個模式在今天仍然持續著。

Some in the Chinese media now talk of a “Beijing consensus” as an
alternative philosophy to the “Washington consensus” of liberal economics
that lately seems so discredited. China’s state-run news agency, Xinhua,
recently said the Beijing consensus meant “prudence in market reforms”.
Deng was certainly prudent. He knew the importance of giving the Maoists some
face, even as he consolidated his grip on power and allowed experiments to be
carried out with precisely the kinds of changes the Maoists disliked. Rural
reforms began in late 1978 in the central province of Anhui even as the party
was holding its meetings in Beijing. Peasants in one commune there secretly
started parcelling out land, expecting death for it, but soon gained backing
from a provincial leader and Deng ally, Wan Li. Others gradually followed
suit. By the time communes were formally dismantled in 1984, most had long
disappeared in all but name.

一些中國媒體現在唱著「北京共識」作為「華盛頓共識」的自由派經濟主義的對應邏輯。
中國的國營媒體新華社最近說，北京共識意味著「「有智慧的市場改革」。鄧小平當然
智慧。他知道給毛派面子的道理，就算是他正在逐漸掌握權力，並且能夠讓毛派不愛的
實驗性質的計畫運作下去。農村改革於1978年在安徽實行，此時共產黨正在北京開會。
平民在當地悄悄地分出土地，心底有準備會遭遇不測。但農民的行為馬上獲得省級領導
、鄧小平派的萬里支持。其他人也就逐漸跟進。當人民公社正式於1984年瓦解時，
多數公社老早就不見了。


Prudently, too, the government itself avoids pushing the idea of a “Beijing
consensus” as an alternative to Western capitalism. It is fearful of
accusations that it harbours plans to challenge American power and change the
world order. It was actually an American, Joshua Cooper Ramo, who helped the
phrase gain currency in 2004 with the publication of an enthusiastic pamphlet
for the Foreign Policy Centre, a British think-tank. “What is happening in
China at the moment”, Mr Ramo wrote, “is not only a model for China, but
has begun to remake the whole landscape of international development,
economics, society and, by extension, politics.”

政府也有智慧地避免把「北京共識」這個概念作為西方資本主義的替代方案。北京政府
不希望讓一些關於北京意圖挑戰美國權力以及改變世界秩序的指控出現。北京共識這個
概念就是一位美國人RAMO推廣出去的。他的平台是一個英國智庫。「中國現在正在發生
的事情不只是中國的模型，而是逐漸重塑國際發展的整體地貌，經濟、社會，以及這些
的延伸，政治。」

For at least the first half of the reform period, few were so confident. Today
’s soaring city skylines are mainly the product of rapid growth in the past
15 years. And much of that growth is a product of hard-nosed liberal
economics rather than any magic Chinese touch. Two of the most far-reaching
reforms of the past 30 years—the dismantling of tens of thousands of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the privatisation of urban housing—did
not take off until the late 1990s. In the case of enterprise closures,
massive suffering (and not a little protest) was involved as millions were
left unemployed.

至少在改革的前半期，很少人有把握會成功。今天中國城市春筍般冒出的天際線主要是
建立在最近15年的迅速成長。這些成長主要是靠著自由經濟的拉拔，而非出自中國魔術
之首。過去三十年來，兩個影響最大的改革─數以千計的國營事業以及城市房產自由化─
要一直到1990年代才開始。至於企業倒閉問題，有數以百萬計的人在沒有任何抗爭
的情況下就這麼失業了。

Pro-democracy unrest in the late 1980s played a far bigger role in turning
China capitalist than either officials, or admirers of China’s supposed
gradualist approach, suggest. The protests in China were ruthlessly crushed,
but they—and the collapse of communism elsewhere—triggered fierce debate
among Chinese leaders about the direction of reform. Some argued that a
planned economy and tight social control were essential to the regime’s
survival. Others said the tumult had been fuelled by precisely these
strategies. Deng, at long last, decided Maoism should be dealt a decisive
blow. He emerged from retirement in 1992 to put a stop to the bickering and
set China on a decisive path towards a market economy. The boom was
instantaneous.

1980年代末期的民主訴求，比起任何官員或對中國漸進主義的粉絲都還要來得有效。
這些訴求被無情地震壓了，但這些訴求─以及蘇俄的瓦解─一同燃起了對於中國未來
改革的方向的激烈辯論。一些強調要走計畫經濟以及抓緊社會控制等面向，確保政權
生存。另一些人則說這些民主訴求就是被這些政策給激起的。鄧小平終於決定，毛派
思想要被徹底擊潰。他1992年自退休狀態復出，結束紛爭，並把中國導向市場經濟路線
前進。經濟起飛成為瞬間的事情。

In 1978 Deng showed no such clarity of thought. He astutely read the
tea-leaves of public opinion but had no grand vision. The 1980s were consumed
by leadership struggles. Bao Tong, a former member of the party’s Central
Committee who was jailed for sympathising with the protesters in 1989, says
Deng’s original plan for the meetings 30 years ago was no more than to
produce a consensus on the need to focus on the economy, then in tatters
after the ravages of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the
Cultural Revolution from 1966 until Mao’s death. Reform and opening was not
even on his agenda.

1978年時，鄧小平還沒有完整概念。他撿閱片片的輿論之言，但沒有願景。1980年代
充斥著領導班子的鬥爭。鮑彤（共產黨中委會的前任成員，曾因為同情1989年學運
而被監禁）提到，鄧小平於三十年前會議時的計畫不過是產生出著重經濟的共識。
當時的中國經濟在1950年代的大躍進以及1966年掀起的文化大革命其間，落魄非常。
改革與開放等並不在鄧小平的計畫之中。

But the meetings did not proceed as expected. Deng, who was away on a foreign
tour for the first few days, came back to find that discussions had been
taken over by festering political grievances aired by leaders who had
suffered under Mao. Delegates demanded the rehabilitation of purged
colleagues and a re-evaluation of protests in Tiananmen Square in 1976, a few
months before Mao’s death, which had been declared “counter-revolutionary”
. For ordinary Chinese, it was the Beijing party committee’s decision, while
the work conference was under way, to declare the Tiananmen protests “
entirely revolutionary” that signalled the biggest change that year—not
anything Deng or his allies said about the economy.

但1978年的會議並沒有達成預期效果。工作會議起初的幾天，鄧小平出訪外國，返回時
發現討論的內容竟是一些曾被毛派惡整的人的自吹自憐。代表們要求平反被肅清的同事，
以及重新評估1976年天安門廣場的抗議事件。這次抗議就在毛澤東死去前幾個月爆發，
隨後被打成反革命。對一般中國人來說，北京共產黨委員會主動宣布天安門抗議為
「革命性」才是當年最大的改變，而非鄧小平或他的盟友對經濟發表的看法。

Voices from below
來自基層的聲音

The party likes to gloss over this. June 4th next year will be the 20th
anniversary of the crushing of Tiananmen’s more famous protests, in 1989, in
which thousands may have died. As they celebrate reform’s 30th birthday,
officials do not want to suggest that any re-evaluation of the 1989 unrest
may one day be possible. Not that they are likely to face much pressure to do
so. The bloodshed is a distant memory now.

共產黨對這件事一直遮遮掩掩。明年六月四日將會是1989年天安門事件的二十週年
紀念。正當中華人民共和在慶祝30歲時，官員們並不想要提起重新評估1989年學運
事件的可能性。並非他們可能會面對巨大壓力要求這麼做。事件已經逐漸陌生成為
回憶了。

But public opinion continues to shape the progress of China’s reforms.
Liberal Chinese economists complain that the country still falls well short
of what they would call a market economy. The currency is not fully
convertible, so capital flows in and out of the country are controlled. So
too, still, are some prices, including those of electricity, fuel and water.
In January the government imposed new controls on some food prices. It lifted
them again this month. Non-state-owned enterprises are now producing
two-thirds of China’s manufacturing output, but SOEs dominate key sectors
such as banking, telecoms, energy and the media. Between 2001 and 2006 the
number of SOEs fell from 370,000 to 120,000, but this still left assets worth
$1.3 trillion in state control. There is much more work to do.

但輿論不斷在推動中國改革的進度。自由派中國經濟學家抱怨，中國仍然不是他們所謂
的市場經濟。貨幣不能徹底兌換，資金流動被空管。一些如電力、油氣、和水價，都被
控制。這個月這些經濟學家又再次提起這個議題。非官方營運的企業現在包辦了中國
生產總額的2/3,但國營企業掌握了關鍵性的行業，如銀行、通訊、能源、和媒體。
2001到2006之間，國營企業的數自從37萬掉到12萬，但仍然有相當於1.3兆美金的
資產為國有。市場經濟化仍有一段路要走。

But the present set of leaders headed by President Hu and the prime minister,
Wen Jiabao, worry more than their predecessors did about public reaction to
painful restructuring. They have reason to be cautious. In the late 1990s
around 30m workers were laid off as a result of SOE reform. China Labour
Bulletin, an NGO based in Hong Kong, said in a September report that millions
of these workers were left barely able to support their families, thanks to
widespread corruption and a lack of clear policy guidelines. Messrs Hu and
Wen, with their signature slogans of building a “harmonious society” and “
putting people first”, want to give the impression that theirs is a more
caring kind of capitalism. A change of tack, they feel, is necessary to avert
a public backlash.

但是，現在胡錦濤和溫家寶率領的領導班子反而比前人更擔心痛苦重建的社會觀感。
他們有理由小心謹慎。1990年代，將近三千萬工人因為國營企業改組而被迫下崗。
中國勞工通訊（香港營運的無政府組織）說，這些勞工中將近有百萬計無法養活他們
的家庭，且是拜氾濫的貪污和不明確的政策規條所致。胡錦濤和溫家寶希望建立一種
更溫馨的資本主義，強調和諧社會和人民優先等。改變手段才可能避免社會的反動力。

Brakes began to be applied in 2004 after Larry Lang, a Hong Kong-based
scholar and popular TV commentator in China, drew attention to
asset-stripping during management buy-outs of SOEs, then a common form of
privatisation. This struck a chord with many Chinese, who felt that factory
bosses (officials, in effect) were getting fabulously rich as a result of
such buy-outs, while workers were getting next to nothing. Officials
responded by suspending the practice. Two years later, to stop him riling the
public even more, they cancelled Mr Lang’s TV show.

2004年，多種煞車開始啟動。郎咸平，一位香港學者和知名電視評論人，喚醒注意
當時普遍私有化模式的問題，特別是國營企業賣出時的淘空行為。關注這個問題挺合
許多中國人的脾胃，他們感覺到工廠老闆（國營事業的政府官員）竟然不可思議地
富有，且全是因為販賣國營事業，而工人卻毫無獲益。政府官員的對策就是停止販賣。
兩年之後，為了讓郎咸平閉嘴，政府乾脆勒令郎咸平的電視節目停止播出。

Cao Siyuan, an economist who helped draft China’s first bankruptcy law in
the 1980s and now runs a bankruptcy consultancy, says the privatisation of
larger SOEs has now all but ceased. Talk in the 1980s of encouraging private
involvement in all competitive industries, he says, has been abandoned in
favour of giving SOEs privileged positions in sectors the government regards
as strategic (a term liberally interpreted). Mr Cao expects about 3,000
firms, most of them SOEs, to go through formal bankruptcy proceedings this
year compared with 3,200 last year. The numbers that qualify for bankruptcy
are ten times higher and rising, he says, but local officials are blocking
SOEs from applying in order to preserve government reputations.

曹思源（1980年代曾幫中國政府撰寫中國第一份破產法，現在經營破產諮詢事務所）
說道，大型國有企業已經停止私有化了。1980年代鼓勵私人介入所有具有競爭力的
產業的說法，現在已經全面被拋棄，取代的則是給予國有企業在產業中的特權位置，
也就是政府認為具有關鍵意義的位置。曹思源預測，將有三千間左右的企業，其中
多數為國營企業，將於今年宣告破產（去年為3200間）。符合破產條件的企業數量是
這個數字的十倍，並且正在增加中，他說。但地方政府官員正在阻擋國營事業宣告
破產，以保護政府名聲。


The lagging land
遲滯的土地

China was highly praised around the world for dismantling the communes and
for the big increase in agricultural output that followed (although raising
prices paid to peasants for their grain helped, too). But the rural power
structure has changed little since commune days. Land remains collectively
owned, even though it is leased out to individual households to farm. This
system has shut farmers out from the boom that cities have enjoyed as a
result of the rapid emergence in the past few years of a free market in
property.

中國解散公社以增加農業產出的舉動曾被世界稱讚（提高付給農民的穀價也有幫助）。
但公社之後的農業區權力結構並沒有多大改變。土地仍然共有，即便土地能夠出租
給個體戶自耕。這個共有系統阻止農民享受城市區等級的成長，阻止地產自由市場化
進入農村區。

In October President Hu chaired a Central Committee plenum that was clearly
intended to echo the one held 30 years ago. But it proved an anticlimax. Mr
Hu and his colleagues remain fearful that any big change in the land system
will unleash an avalanche of peasants on cities already struggling with
meagre social provision. Although turning peasants into city-dwellers is
crucial to maintain the fast growth of the past 30 years (nearly 10% a year
on average since 1978), the government wants to keep a firm grip on the
process. Migrants are allowed into big cities on sufferance. During the
outbreak of SARS in 2003 Beijing was all but emptied of them. Many left in
August during the Olympic games, as officials put indirect pressure on them
to stay away.

十月，胡錦濤主持了中央黨代表大會，明顯是希望與三十年前的大會相呼應。但這
證明是製造了反高潮。胡景濤與他的同事仍然懼怕任何劇烈的土地政策改變會引發
大規模平民潮，淹沒已經無法分配微薄社會福利的城市區。雖然把農民轉為城市居民
是維持過去三十年來快速成長的重要關鍵，但政府希望能夠掌握成長過程。移民仍然
可以移入大型城市。在2003年SARS爆發時，北京把移民將近趕光。奧運後，政府
則對留下的許多人施加非直接的壓力，要他們離開城市。


Like Deng and like Jiang Zemin who succeeded him, Mr Hu has paid little more
than lip service to the idea of political reform. He repeats Deng’s
disingenuous line that without democracy there can be no socialism or
socialist modernisation. But some Chinese scholars have pointed out that even
communist Vietnam—whose leaders eye with envy the success of China’s
economic reforms—has done better on the political side. In an article
published in May by an official journal, Reform Internal Reference, Gao
Shangquan, a prominent Chinese economist, said that Vietnam had “fewer
ideological obstacles than we have”—fewer arguments, he said, over what
constitutes socialism and capitalism. In another article in June he noted
that only last year a petition signed by 170 people (many of them former
senior officials) had accused the party of leading China towards a “
capitalist restoration”.

如鄧小平以及江澤民，胡錦濤僅對政治改革打些高空。他重複鄧小平的說詞，即沒有
民主，就沒有社會主義和社會主義現代化。但許多中國學者指出，就算是共產越南
（他們的領導人對中國經濟改革十分羨慕）都在政治改革方面作得比中國好。
在《改革內參》（一份官方雜誌）發表的一篇文章中，中國知名經濟學家高尚全表示，
越南「比起我們，有比較少的意識型態障礙」─更少關於社會主義和資本主義內涵的
論辯。在另一篇六月份的文章中他指出，就在去年，一份有170人簽署的請願書就指控
共產黨帶領中國朝向「資本主義回魂」的路子。

Mr Hu certainly has no plans to weaken the party’s influence, much less to
allow opposition to organise. The authorities have detained or questioned
several signatories to an unusually bold call for political liberalisation
issued by around 300 intellectuals on December 10th to mark the 60th
anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights. And Mr Hu has
devoted considerable effort (and the party considerable funds) to rebuilding
the party’s grassroots organisation, which was dealt a body-blow by the
closure of state-owned enterprises and the rapid growth of the private
sector. Party officials have sent thousands of teams to persuade private
firms to allow the establishment of trade unions (which in China are
controlled by the party) as well as party cells.

胡錦濤顯然不會計畫減弱共產黨的影響力，更不會容許反對派組織起來。政府已經
針對十月十號發佈的一份政治自由化的呼籲文章，監禁與審問幾名知識份子。該份聲明
有近三百名知識份子簽署，發佈時間是世界人權宣言公布的六十週年。胡景濤投入了
顯著的力量（以及可觀的共產黨資金）來重建共產黨草根組織。這些組織在國營產業
被迫關門以及私有部門茁壯階段時遭受致命打擊。政府官員派遣數以千計的小組，
說服私有企業設立貿易工會（共產黨掌握）以及共產黨小型駐點。

Their efforts have met some resistance, not least from foreign-invested
enterprises. Wal-Mart, an American retail chain with around 100 superstores
in China, was especially stubborn. Repeated meetings were arranged by party
officials with Wal-Mart representatives in the eastern city of Nanjing in
2006 after the firm’s (reluctant) decision to allow a union branch. The
officials, on instructions from the trade-union chief, Wang Zhaoguo, demanded
a party cell too. Only six party members could be found in a workforce of
more than 400, and those six did not feel a cell within Wal-Mart was needed.
But the company succumbed, and others have followed. By the end of 2006,
party cells had been established in more than two-thirds of larger non-state
enterprises.

政府的努力也面臨了阻礙，且甚至來自於外國企業。美國連鎖店WALMART特別頑固。
2006年，就當WALMART不情願地同意設立貿易工會部門後，中國政府不斷安排黨部
官員與WALMART代表在南京談判。這些官員被告知要也要求設立共產黨小型駐點。
在四百人裡頭，只有六名共產黨成員，而這六個共產黨成員並不覺得需要在WALMART內部
設立小型駐點。但WALMART妥協了，同時其他企業也就照辦。2006年底，共產黨小型駐點
已經在超過2/3的非國營企業中設立。

Early this year, some official newspapers published calls for a new round of
“thought liberation”. Some Chinese scholars openly appealed for a new phase
of reform focusing more on politics. But crises intervened—upheaval in Tibet
in March, an earthquake in May that killed tens of thousands—and so, too,
did the deadening impact of the Olympic games, during which the authorities
tried to suppress any hint of dissent. Now Chinese officials fret about the
possibility of growing unrest as the economy suffers the impact of the global
crisis. Democrats must wait.

今年初，一些官方媒體呼籲進行新一回合的「思想解放」。一些中國學者公開要求
新一階段的政治改革。但西藏暴動和四川地震，當然還有北京奧運，阻礙了任何進程。
政府官員在這些危機中不斷壓制任何一絲的不滿。現在，中國政府對於經濟危機
所興起的不安與不滿開始恐懼。民主派的又得等了。

http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12758848&fsrc=nwlgafree

                      煩請注意附上原稿來源

--

--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 60.245.64.237
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 219.81.84.61         (12/15 21:10)
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 219.81.84.61         (12/15 21:11)
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 219.81.84.61         (12/15 21:20)
推 WanTaWin:推認真翻譯~~
推 MonkeyDFang:有編譯真是太好了!!我花了很多時間看還看的亂七八糟的
推 hunmir:PUSH!!
推 Vicky1016:大推 不過有一些錯字 胡"錦"濤的"錦"寫錯蠻多次
推 Vicky1016:另外提到大陸國企有1.3兆的資產 沒有註明貨幣單位為何
→ Vicky1016:Harmonious Society應是和諧社會 不是更溫馨地資本主義
我是用更溫馨的資本主義是對譯"a more caring kind of society"，不知適不適當
推 bluewzy:重建應該被修改為改革吧，中間那個是改革三十年，不是建國
重建是對譯restructuring，改革在文中對應應該是reform，不知道這樣通不通
→ pursuistmi:感謝vicky和bluewzy
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 140.123.43.211       (12/16 09:59)
推 undusted:我佩服的是已經泥菩薩過江的美國倒是對別人穩定與否挺關
→ undusted:心的
※ 編輯: pursuistmi      來自: 140.123.43.211       (12/16 17:42)
→ pursuistmi:除非內戰分裂，不然美國這麼大國家的基本盤就是大國
→ pursuistmi:除非美國瓦解，不然再怎麼落魄都有本錢衝回來
→ pursuistmi:又更何況中國也有可能會是經濟發展的伙伴，沒理由喪志