標題:The Making of George W. Obama
By Christian Brose
January/February 2009
The 2008 U.S. election was all about change. But that’s not what we’re
going to get on foreign policy, says the longtime speechwriter for
Condoleezza Rice. Instead of a radical departure from Bush, we’re likely to
end up with a lot more of the same. And that may be just what we need.
2008美國總統大選打得主題是改變。但長久來幫萊斯撰稿的寫手則認為外交政策不會
改變。新政府不會大幅悖離布希政策，反而非常可能會大致與布希政府相符。且這
或許正是我們需要的政策。
On December 1, Barack Obama, who won the U.S. presidency as the candidate of
“change,” announced his national security team: President George W. Bush’s
secretary of defense (Robert Gates), Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
special envoy for Middle East security (James Jones), and the doyenne of
Democratic centrism (Hillary Clinton). Some saw this as the political cover
Obama needs to lead U.S. foreign policy in an entirely different direction
after Bush. Perhaps. But I doubt it. My hunch, and my hope, is that Obama
will be a successful president, not because he’ll totally change the foreign
policy he’ll inherit from Bush, but because he’ll largely continue it.
十二月一號，歐巴馬以「改變」代言人之尊贏得總統大選後，宣布他的國安團隊為：
布希政府的國防部長蓋茲、國務卿萊斯的中東安全特使瓊斯上將、以及民主黨中間路線
的女悍將希拉蕊。一些人認為，這些步驟是歐巴馬的障眼法，為徹底脫離布希
的外交政策鋪路。我懷疑這個想法。我認為，以及我希望，歐巴馬會是個好總統，
並非因為他會徹底改變他所繼承的布希政策，而是因為他會大致跟著布希的政策走。
Until just a few weeks ago, I was a part of that foreign policy. As Rice’s
chief speechwriter and policy advisor, I traveled with her to 24 countries.
And I helped write (and rewrite) her remarks—a body of work I’d estimate to
be north of 150,000 carefully chosen words. For four years, I watched as a
foreign policy took shape that was quite different from that of Bush’s first
term. It was a pragmatic internationalism based on enduring national
interests and ideals for a country whose global leadership is still
indispensable, even as the world is becoming more multipolar.
一直到幾個禮拜以前，我都仍屬於布希外交政策制訂團隊裡，任職萊斯的主要寫手和
政策顧問，並且與她一同前往過24個國家。我也幫忙寫（以及修寫）她的談話─這個
工作大概是要用到大於15萬個精心選擇的詞彙。四年來，我看到一套與布希前四年的
外交政策頗為不同的政策成形。這套新的外交政策是以務實之國際主義穩固美國這
世界領袖國家的國家利益和國家理想；即便世界已然多極化，美國的領導地位仍然
不可替代。
Unfortunately, the election didn’t shed much light on what this inheritance
means for Obama. The campaign was a two-year referendum on the Bush
presidency in which Obama ran against a caricature of Bush’s first term and
John McCain ran desperately away from the whole thing. It was as if the past
four years never happened.
不幸地，總統大選並沒有辯論出這個外交政策遺產對於歐巴馬的意義。08年選戰成為
針對布希政府的兩年期公民投票，其中歐巴馬拼命攻擊醜化的第一任布希政府，而
馬坎則拼命與布希政府完全切割。兩方陣營好像把布希後四年的任期徹底遺忘了。
But because they did, Obama will inherit a foreign policy that is better than
many realize. Yes, there will be changes ahead—most likely, to energy and
climate change policy (thankfully), to the war in Iraq (winding it down), to
the war in Afghanistan (winding it up), and to the detention facility at Guant
ánamo Bay, Cuba (closing it, which some in the Bush administration tried to
do but couldn’t). But despite all that, Obama’s foreign policy likely won’
t depart radically from Bush’s.
但也因為雙方都不談後四年，歐巴馬能夠繼承一套比多數人想像中更好的外交政策。
的確，接下來會有若干改變─特別是能源和氣候變遷政策（感謝老天）、伊拉克戰爭
（降些熱度）、阿富汗戰爭（加些柴火）、以及古巴關塔那摩基地的監禁所（有些
布希政府人士也試圖把這個地方關掉，但關不掉）。但這些以外，歐巴馬的外交政策
不會與布希的有太大出入。
Take the three states Bush once labeled an “axis of evil”—Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea. After changing the regime in Baghdad, his administration in the
second term fully committed to changing the behavior of Pyongyang and Tehran.
As a result, Obama will receive the baton on a multilateral negotiation with
North Korea that has been and will be a frustrating marathon, but he will
likely pick up where Bush leaves off, simply because there are no practical
alternatives. On Iran, Obama will almost surely proceed with Bush’s policy
of sticks and carrots that seeks a diplomatic solution—a third option
between acquiescing to Iran’s behavior or attacking Iran to change it. To
have a better chance of success, this policy will need sharper sticks and
sweeter carrots, including the direct engagement Obama has advocated. And if
that fails, Obama will have to weigh his options—none of which, he has said,
he’s taking off the table.
以布希曾經提出的邪惡軸心三國（伊朗、伊拉克、何北韓）為例。改變巴格達政府後，
第二任布希政府積極投入改變平壤政府和德黑蘭政府的行為。結果是，歐巴馬能夠接過
北韓多方協商談判的指揮棒。北韓問題一向是且也會是令人沮喪的馬拉松折磨，但歐巴馬
應該會接著布希的進度繼續做下去，單純是因為沒有其他務實的替代方案存在。伊朗
問題方面，歐巴馬幾乎確定會跟著布希的蘿蔔棍棒手法進行，尋求外交解決途徑（即
除了姑息伊朗或攻擊伊朗以改變之的第三途徑）。為求更高的成功機率，這套政策需
要更尖的棍子和更甜的蘿蔔，其中包括歐巴馬提出的直接對談。而如果這套也失敗了
As for Iraq, Obama will inherit a war that Iraqis themselves are mostly
ending for him. The pace and size of the U.S. troop reduction may be hotly
debated, but few in Baghdad or Washington dispute that such a withdrawal is
now appropriate. This effort to end the war in Iraq will enable Obama to try
to save the war in Afghanistan, employing many of the lessons learned from
the surge strategy he opposed in Iraq.
伊拉克方面，歐巴馬會繼承的戰爭，多半會是由伊拉克人自己解決的。美軍遞減的速度和
數量或許會不斷經過激辯，但對巴格達或華盛頓來說，討論撤退細節已經是適當時機了。
結束伊拉克戰爭會讓歐巴馬有足夠力量挽回美軍在阿富汗的窘境，同時也能把歐巴馬
自己都反對的伊拉克「增兵」計畫移轉到阿富汗地區使用。
A challenge for Obama will be to knit the Iraq endgame into a broader
approach to the Middle East. But here, too, it likely won’t look all that
different from Bush’s: support for an independent Lebanon; attempts to
elicit responsible behavior from Syria; and security cooperation with Sunni
Arab regimes that may not love freedom, but definitely hate what Iran, and al
Qaeda, are doing to the region.
歐巴馬的挑戰會是如何在伊拉克收關，組織成更高層次的中東戰略。但可預見的結果
也大概不會和布希的相差多少：支持獨立黎巴嫩；引導序利亞做負責任的行為；與
遜尼派阿拉伯政體進行安全合作，這些政體或許不愛自由，但絕對討厭伊朗和蓋達組織
對中東地區推動的政策。
Another part of this strategy for Obama is continuing Bush’s engagement on
the Middle East peace process. A real insight of Bush’s first term had been
that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was more than a border dispute, as Bill
Clinton had framed it. Bush argued that peace required a successful
Palestinian state and economy. But the first-term policy amounted to telling
the Palestinians to put their house in order first, and then the United
States would talk about ending the Israeli occupation. Only in the second
term were both efforts pursued simultaneously. And because of it, Obama will
inherit a Middle East peace process finally proceeding on both tracks at
once: state-building and peacemaking.
另一部份的歐巴馬戰略會是持續布希政府推動的中東和平進程。布希第一任期間的真知
灼見，就是認定以巴紛爭並非如柯林頓所認為的疆界問題。布希認為，以巴和平必須
倚仗成功的巴勒斯坦國家和經濟。但第一任期中，布希僅告知巴勒斯坦人把自己的房舍
整頓好，就讓美國來談終結以色列佔領的問題。直到第二任，兩個問題才同步處理。
也因為如此，歐巴馬將會繼承一套終於是雙軌並進的中東和平進程政策：國家建立和
和平維繫。
Just as importantly, Obama will find a changing Middle East where freedom,
opportunity, and the longing for dignity are bubbling up in ways that no one
can control, Washington included. Something tells me that the leader of the
Democratic Party isn’t going to give up on supporting democracy, both in
terms of institutions and elections. Obama may rebrand Bush’s poorly named “
freedom agenda”—he may expand it, as some of his advisors suggest, into a “
dignity agenda”—but the basic approach will likely continue.
同樣重要地，歐巴馬會發現他接手後的中東，將會是自由、機會、和渴望尊嚴的地方，
且並非能由任何人所控制，甚至華盛頓也不能的地區。我不相信民主黨領導人會放棄
支持當地推動民主制度和民主選舉。歐巴馬或許會把布希政府命名的「自由章程」
給改個好一點的形式：歐巴馬可能依照他顧問的意見擴大章程的內容，成為「尊嚴章程」
，但本質將不會改變。
So, too, will there be little change on issues of global grand strategy. A
refrain from the campaign was rebuilding damaged ties with America’s allies.
But those ties have largely been rebuilt already—in Asia, Europe, and Latin
America. Obama can certainly improve these relations further, especially with
real action on climate change. But another challenge may be managing the
bubbles of overinflated expectations for his presidency that will soon begin
bursting in allied capitals.
同樣地，全球大戰略部分也不會有多大更動。大選中，歐巴馬外交政策主打的是修補
美國與其盟友之間的惡化關係。但對亞洲、歐洲、和拉丁美洲之間的關係老早就在修補
了。歐巴馬當然可以更進一步地改善這些關係，特別是投入實際行動來面對氣候變遷
問題。但另一個挑戰，將會是處理對於美國新政府泡沫式的過渡期待，且不久後就會在
各大首都相繼破滅。
Bush will also bequeath to Obama a realistic strategy for managing the rise
of great powers. By pushing China, India, Japan, Brazil, and others to be
responsible stakeholders in the international order, the Bush administration
showed that “the rise of the rest” need not be synonymous with America’s
decline. In fact, it might actually enhance U.S. influence. In Asia, the most
geopolitically dynamic part of the world, the United States now has better
relations with each major power than they do with one another. Every state
wants to hedge against the others, and the partner of choice is Washington.
Obama’s task will be to continue inducing these emerging powers to share a
greater burden of managing a new set of global challenges that no country,
including the United States, can manage alone.
布希也會交給歐巴馬一套務實的戰略來管理大國的興起。布希政府透過推動中國、印度、
日本、巴西、和其他新興國家成為負責任的國際秩序維護者，展示「新興國家興起」
並不一定等同於美國的衰退。反而，美國可以透過這個機會增加美國的影響力。
於現在地緣動態最為繁複的亞洲，美國已經與各個主要大國建立起比這些大國彼此之間
更好的友誼。每個國家都希望能夠站他國之上風，而他們選擇的戰略伙伴就是華盛頓
當局。歐巴馬的任務會是持續引導這些新興國家負擔管理新全球挑戰的任務，而此任務
是包括美國在內的所有國家無法單獨扛起的重擔。
The asterisk here is less a rising China (though the question is still open)
than a resurgent Russia. And with Russia, too, Obama will inherit a strategy
that he’s likely to continue, simply because it’s better than the
alternatives. It seeks neither to isolate Russia (which is impossible) nor to
give Russia the blank check it wants in its old imperial stomping grounds
(which is irresponsible). Rather, this policy seeks to balance cooperation
with Russia on many shared interests with competition when interests diverge.
Maybe this balance could have been struck better on issues such as Kosovo or
missile defense, but that doesn’t signal the need for a new policy, just a
recalibration of the current one. And if anything, the Georgia war showed
that, if the United States wants Russia to be a responsible stakeholder,
encouragement won’t be enough.
而重點不盡然是新興中國，反而是復活的俄國。而同樣地，歐巴馬也會繼承一套對俄國
的既定政策，因為這套政策已經是萬中之選。此政策不尋求孤立俄國（也不可能）或者
任俄國在其舊的帝國影響範圍內為所欲為（這也不負責任）。反而，這套政策希望能夠
尋找出與俄國在許多利益方面合作、與在許多歧異方面競爭的平衡點。或許這個
平衡點本能夠因為克索沃問題或者防禦飛彈系統問題而被發掘，但這也不意味著
美國需要一個新政策，而只是一個根據現行政策修正過的方案。且如果有區別的話，
喬治亞戰爭已經告訴我們，若美國希望俄國作為能夠成為一個負責任的大國，光靠
鼓勵是不夠的。
There will even likely be a great deal of continuity in the fight against al
Qaeda. There’s a consensus now that preemption is necessary to fight
terrorism; Obama himself has advocated for it. But in Bush’s second term,
the administration basically converged on a new mantra: “We can’t kill our
way to victory,” a key tenet of counterinsurgency strategy. The focus became
not just fighting terrorists but building conditions of security,
opportunity, and justice for the societies that terrorists seek to
radicalize. It was even accepted that the United States might have to
reconcile with some terrorists, as it did in Iraq and as some now support
doing in Afghanistan. Obama most likely—and correctly—will not refer to a “
war on terror” as the organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy, but that
doesn’t mean he won’t approach terrorism in much the same way.
或許歐巴馬政府對蓋達組織的政策會有更為顯著地延續性。目前共識認為，面對恐怖主義
時，先發制人是重要的。歐巴馬他自己也支持先發制人政策。但在布希的第二任時，
布希政府基本上改變了基調，成為一套新的方案：「勝利不是靠殺伐得來的，」此基調
成為反民兵的基本策略。焦點從與恐怖份子交戰轉移為建立起安全的條件、機會，以及
端正恐怖份子希望能夠極端化的社會正義。甚至美國政府還需要與若干恐怖份子妥協，
一如其於伊拉克和現在於阿富汗必須做的妥協一樣。歐巴馬多半會不把反恐戰爭訂為
美國外交政策的基礎原則，但這也不代表他不會以這種方式來處理恐怖主義問題。
Such a strategy depends, as the Bush administration eventually conceded, on
embracing nation-building as a national interest. There is now a consensus
that the United States is threatened as much by failing and poorly governed
states as strong, aggressive ones. Obama’s challenge will be to continue the
Bush administration’s effort to make nation-building a civilian-led effort—
to demilitarize U.S. foreign policy by trying to prevent states from failing
in the first place. This effort will require a transformation of U.S.
institutions of “soft power”—a goal that former Secretary of State Colin
Powell, then Rice, and most famously Gates made into a personal crusade.
Obama will inherit the start of it—an enlarged diplomatic corps, a
rudimentary civilian expeditionary force, and foreign assistance that has
been increased more than at any time since the Marshall Plan—and he looks
poised to carry the torch.
如此戰略倚仗的是以支持外國國家建設做為美國國家利益的基礎。這點布希政府也
逐漸認知並且相信為真。目前共識，是美國政府被許多亂而弱的國家威脅到了，同時
也被一些堅強而積極的國家給威脅到。歐巴馬的挑戰，會是持續布希政府所推動的
國家建設和以民眾為主的推動力量，藉由挽救紊亂的國家來把美國外交政策去軍事化。
這個方案需要轉化美國軟實力的各種機構─從包威爾、萊斯、到蓋茲等首長，皆視此
轉型作業為重點工作。歐巴馬則會繼承一些開頭作業，如擴大的外交部門，一組基礎的
民兵武力，以及大幅擴增的外援力量（為自馬歇爾計畫以來增幅最大的），且歐巴馬
就態勢來看已經準備好繼承這個方面的火炬。
The pragmatic internationalism that Bush will pass to Obama was largely
defined through changes made during the past four years. And for that reason,
there might be more continuity between the second term of Bush and the first
term of Obama than between the two terms of Bush himself. This foreign policy
is a valuable inheritance. And if Obama avoids spending his early years in
office pursuing change for the sake of change—simply trying to disassociate
himself from his predecessor, as Clinton and Bush too often did—he could
create the makings of a new bipartisan consensus on foreign policy.
布希的務實國際主義主要是過去四年建立的。也因此，布希的第二任和歐巴馬的第一任
將會有很多共通性和延續性，反而是布希的第一任和第二任之間的轉變比較大。
布希政府的外交政策是寶貴的資產。如果歐巴馬能夠避免把他任期的前一兩年浪費在
為追求改變而追求改變，單純要把他跟他的前任政府切割，一如克林頓和布希之前
曾經不費餘力地在做的，那麼歐巴馬就有可能製造新的兩黨共識基礎上的外交政策。
Obama might realize this, but the Democratic and Republican parties, I fear,
will not. They could each pretend as if Bush’s second-term foreign policy
never happened. At worst, Democrats could swagger righteously into power,
believing their predecessors were rubes who screwed everything up, and now is
the chance to do everything differently. For their part, Republicans could
tell themselves the comforting lie that they lost because Bush abandoned a
real conservative foreign policy—that his second term was all capitulation
to the striped-pants appeasers of the State Department.
歐巴馬或許知道這點，但民主黨和共和黨可能不會諒解。他們互相假裝布希的第二任
外交政策從沒發生過。最糟的是，民主黨能大剌剌地掌權，自以為他們的前任政府
都是把事情搞砸的鄉巴佬，而現在就是改變所有事情的重要關鍵點。對他們來說，
共和黨可以用謊言麻醉自己，讓他們自己相信他們的挫敗是因為布希放棄了真正的
保守派外交政策，相信布希的第二任充滿了對於國務院內姑息派的妥協。
One of my regrets about my work at the State Department is that we were
unable to convince the American people that Bush’s pragmatic
internationalism had within it the makings of a strong, sustainable global
leadership for the 21st century—and that, as such, it had the potential to
heal some of the fraught divisions over America’s role in the world that
have plagued the country since the end of the Cold War. My hope is that Obama
will not only continue this foreign policy, but strengthen it and expand
support for it among all Americans. Were he able to do that, it would truly
be a change I could believe in.
我對我國務院工作感到最遺憾的一件事，就是我們無法說服美國人民，布希政府的務實
國際主義內涵了建立起堅強而有韌性的21世紀領導者的元素，也因此這套外交政策
有潛力化解自冷戰結束後就不斷持續的、對於美國在世界上的角色的爭論。我希望
歐巴馬不僅會延續布希的外交政策，甚至還強化它，並擴大其在美國人民之間的支持
基礎。他若能做到這點，那他就真的完成了所謂我能相信的改變。
Christian Brose is a senior editor at Foreign Policy. He served as chief
speechwriter and policy advisor for U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
from 2005 to 2008, and as speechwriter for former U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell from 2004 to 2005.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4588&page=1
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※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 118.165.65.173 (01/26 02:39)
※ 編輯: pursuistmi 來自: 118.165.65.173 (01/26 02:40)