課程名稱︰個體經濟學
課程性質︰財金系必修
課程教師︰吳玉瑩
開課學院：管理學院
開課系所︰財金系
考試日期（年月日）︰101/01/09
考試時限（分鐘）：180分鐘
是否需發放獎勵金：
（如未明確表示，則不予發放）
試題 :
Q1 and Q2 are required. And please pick 3 questions from Q3 to Q6. Note that
there WON'T be extra score even if you aswer all the qusetions.
1. (25%)Nobita and Ginambi one day discover a stream taht flows wine
instead of water in the deep mountain. They decide to bottle the
wine and sell it. Because of Doraemon's help, the marginal cost of
bottling wine and the fixed cost to bottle are both zero. The market
demand for bottled wine is given as:
P = 90 - 0.25Q
where Q is the total quantity of bottled wine produced and P is the market
price of bottled wine.
a. (5%)What is the economically efficient price and quantity of bottled wine?
b. (5%)If Nobita and Giambi collude with one another and produce the profit-
maximizing monopoly quantity of bottled wine, how much bottled wine
will they produce and charge for?
c. (5%)Suppose that Nobita and Giambi decide not to cooperate and act as
Cournot duopolists, what are the reaction functions for Nobita and
Giambi? What are the output and price level of Nobita's bottled wine
when the long run equilibrium is reached? (Suppose the math is not
a problem for him...)
d. (10%)Suppose that after Nobita and Giambi have arrived at their long run
equilibrium as Cournot duopolists, another individual, Suneo, disco-
vers the streams. Suneo, who sell no wine before its time, decides to
bottle wine as well. There are now three Cournot firms producing at
once. In the long run, what level of output will Nobita produce?
2. (15%) Sheryl operates a ceramics factory in Yingge and sell her products
to retailers around the country. Sheryl sells the ceramics for $50
each, a price the firm considers given. Sheryl's production function
is given by the expression:
Q = 600L - 5L^2
where Q = number of figurines per day, and L = number of skilled
workers per day.
a. (5%)Write an expression for the firm's marginal revenue product.
b. (5%)Sheryl currently pays $1500 per day for each of its skilled workers.
How many skilled workers shouled the firm employ?
c. (5%)Sheryl's workers are highly skilled artisans with a great deal of job
mobility. The firm's managers fear that they must increase the workers'
total compensation to $2,000 per day to remain competitive. What impa-
ct would the wage increase have upon the firm's employment?
3. (20%)Xialmi and HTC are in a local market competing for the sale of new
smartphone. Each firm must decide if they will offer a warranty or
not. The pay-offs of each firm's strategy is a function of their
competitor as well. The pay-off matrix is presented below.
HTC
Offer warranty No Warranty
_____________________________________
| -5 -10 |
Offer Warranty | -5 0 |
Xiaomi |_____________________________________|
| 10 0 |
No Warranty | -10 0 |
|_____________________________________|
a. (5%)Does either player have a dominant straegy? If yes, what is the
strategy?
b. (5%)Does the game have any Nash equilibrium? If yes, what's that?
c. (5%)Should the players use a mixed strategy?
d. (5%)Is there any possible to change this outcome?
4. (20%) A certain firm can hire two types of workers: Group H workers who
have high productivity and Group L workers with low productivity.
Group H workers will add $27,500 to the firm's revenues per year,
while Group L workers will increase the firm's revenues by $15,000
per year. The firm's managers expect workers to be employed for eight
years. The differences in the workers' productivity levels are
reflected in their costs of education per year. Each year of education
costs an H worker $12,500, while each year costs a L worker $25,000.
Answer the following questions according to the scenario mentioned
above.
a. (5%) Under competitive conditions, how much would H and L workers earn?
b. (5%) Assuming that the firm is unable to distinguish H from L workers and
that it is equally likely that a worker is of either type, what pay
scale will the firm offer?
c. (10%)Suppose that the firm decides to use education as a market signaling
device to distinguish H workers from L workers. What education
requirement could the firm set to let H workers be educated but L
workers not?
5. (20%)Assume that the owners of a firm know that the firm's profits will
depend upon two parameters: (1) how hard the managers work, and (2)
the state of the economy. For simplicity, assume that the managers can
exert either High or Low level of effort and that the economy can be
either favorable or unfavorable. The profits under various situations
are represented by the matrix below.
____________________________________________________________________
| | Favorable Economy | Unfavorable Economy |
|___________________|_______________________|_______________________|
| High effort level | 700,000 | 400,000 |
|___________________|_______________________|_______________________|
| Low effort level | 400,000 | 200,000 |
|___________________|_______________________|_______________________|
The firm considers there to be an equal probability of either state of
the economy. The manager considers the cost of effort to be C =55,000x
, where x=1 for HIGH effort and 0 for LOW effort. The firm is consider-
ing the pay scheme described below. Evaluate each alternative in terms
of their incentive effects for the manager and their effect on the
firm's profitability.
a. (5%) a flat salary of $30,000 that is not tied to the firm's performance.
b. (5%) a bonus of 0 if profit equals 200,000 or 400,000 and a bonus of
120,000 if profit equals 700,000.
c. (5%) a bonus determined by the formula: B= 0.20(PROFIT-300,000)
d. (5%) a bonus determined by the formula: B= 0.24(PROFIT-300,000)
6. (20%)"Plutocrat" is a monopoly in oil refinement in the local market. The
demand for Plutocrat's oil is : P = 65 - q. The relevant marginal
revenue function is: MR(q) = 65 - 2q. Plutocrat's marginal cost
function is: MC(q) = 8. In the refinement of oil,, Plutocrat emits
pollution that has the marginal external cost function: MEC(q)=2
a. (5%) What level of output will Plutocrat select to maximize profits? How
much do consumers pay for plutocrat's refined oil?
b. (5%) What is the marginal social cost of Plutocrat's profit maximizing
output?
c. (5%) Is this level of output efficient? Should more or less oil be refined
to reach the optimum output level?
d. (5%) Should the local government charge Plutocrat a pollution fee for each
unit of oil she refines? In what way can the social otipmal output
level be reached?
End
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> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- <
作者: d3osef (阿嘉) 看板: NTU-Exam
標題: [試題] 101-1 吳玉瑩 個體經濟學 (中文版)
時間: Sun Jan 27 16:02:06 2013
課程名稱︰個體經濟學
課程性質︰必修
課程教師︰吳玉瑩
開課學院：管理學院
開課系所︰財務金融學系
考試日期（年月日）︰102/01/09
考試時限（分鐘）：180
是否需發放獎勵金：是
（如未明確表示，則不予發放）
試題 :
第一及第二題必答，第三題至第六題中選3題作答，多做不加分。
1.(25%)大雄和胖虎在深山中發現一條流著紅酒的河流，於是決定將紅酒中的河流裝瓶出售。
裝瓶與運送的工具皆由哆啦A夢提供，因此裝瓶的邊際成本以及瓶子等用具的固定成本皆
為零。市場對此瓶裝紅酒的需求為 P=90-0.25Q， Q為瓶裝酒數量，P則為價格。
a.請問具經濟效率的紅酒瓶數與價格應為何? (5%)
b.若大雄與胖虎合作生產獨佔數量，請問紅酒瓶數與價格各將為何? (5%)
c.若大雄與胖虎翻臉，各自以Cournot 競爭方式生產裝瓶紅酒，請問大雄與胖虎的反應函
數各為何?大雄生產瓶裝酒數量與價格為何? (5%)
d.倘若大雄與與胖虎達到長期Cournot 均衡後，小夫也發現了這條河流，並決定自行加入
戰局。現成為三廠商進行Cournot競爭，請問大雄當生產多少瓶裝酒?價格當為何?(10%)
2.(15%) Sheryl在鶯歌經營陶瓷廠並將其產品銷售給全國零售商。 Sheryl的陶瓷每個售價
為$50，此對Sheryl而言為市場給定之價格。假設 Sheryl陶瓷廠的生產函數為
Q=600L-5L^2，其中Q為數量，L為每天的技術勞工數。
a.該陶瓷廠的邊際生產收入(MRP)為何? (5%)
b.若Sheryl給技術勞工的日薪為$1500，請問其最適勞動雇用量為何? (5%)
c.由於Sheryl陶瓷廠的技術勞工技藝高超，為預防其他廠挖角，故Sheryl的經理認為日薪
當調整為$2000方可保持其工廠的競爭力。請問此條新策略對其勞動雇用量之影響為何?
(5%)
3.(20%) 小米與 HTC 在同一市場中進行銷售競爭。兩公司皆考慮是否提供保固，其是否
提供保固的報酬皆受到競爭對手的決策之影響，校表列出兩公司之報酬:
HTC
提供保固 不提供保固
提供保固 (-5,-5) (10,-10)
小米
不提供保固 (-10,10) (0,0)
a.請問兩公司是否有其優勢策略? 若有，該策略為何?(5%)
b.此賽局是否有奈許均衡?若有，該均衡為何? (5%)
c.小米與HTC是否會採混合策略?若有，該策略為何? (5%)
d.是否有可能改變上述均衡? (5%)
4.(20%) 某公司可雇用兩類勞動者:高生產力者可為公司每年增加$27.500的收益，低生產
力者則可為公司每年增加$15,000的收益。公司經理預期若雇用一個員工，其將在公司
工作8年。而兩類勞動者的生產力差異亦反映在其受教育的成本上，高生產力者每年
受教育之成本為 $12,50；低生產力者每年受教育之成本則為$25,000元。請依上述
情景回答下列問題。
a.(5%) 在完全競爭的條件下，H和L兩類勞動者可賺取之金額各為何?
b.(5%) 假設公司無法分辨H與L勞動者，且某勞動者屬於H或L之機率相同。請問廠商會提
供的薪資水準為何?
c.(10%)假設廠商決定以受教育作為區分高低生產力勞動者之方式，請問廠商當設定勞動
者受幾年教育以使H勞動者願意受教育，但L勞動者不願意?
5.(20%) 一公司的獲利狀況受其經理人的努力程度以及景氣好壞之影響。為簡化討論，
假設經理人的努力程度可分為高與低兩種，而景氣則為好與壞兩類，廠商在各不同組合
下的獲利狀況如下表所示:
景氣好 景氣差
High effort level 700,000 400,000
Low effort level 400,000 200,000
倘若景氣好壞的機率相同，而經理人的努力成本為 C=55,000x ，其中若經理人採取高
的努力程度，則x=1，若採取低的努力程度，則x=0。公司有以下四種薪資給付機制，
試計算在不同給薪方式下，經理人的努力程度為何? 公司的預期獲利為何?
a.(5%) 固定給付$30,000，與公司表現無關
b.(5%) 無底薪，若公司獲利金額為 200,000 或 400,000，則紅利為0
但若獲利為700,000，則紅利為120,000
c.(5%) 無底薪，紅利公式為B=0.2(PROFIT-300,000)
d.(5%) 無底薪，紅利公式為B=0.2.4(PROFIT-300,000)
6.(20%)「富豪」是一家獨佔煉油廠，市場需求為P=65-q，邊際收益為MR(q)=65-2q
邊際成本為MC(q)=8。但在煉油過程中，「富豪」釋出的汙染所造成的邊際外部成本為
MEC(q)=2
a.(5%) 請問「富豪」最大化利潤的產出水準為何?消費者每單位支付價格為何?
b.(5%) 在「富豪」利潤最大的產量下，邊際社會成本為何?
c.(5%) 「富豪」決定的產量是否達效率水準? 若非，則「富豪」當增加或降低產量?
d.(5%) 政府是否應該對「富豪」所生產之各單位油徵收污染費用? 用什麼方式可達社會
最適產量?
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