課程名稱︰財政學
課程性質︰經濟系選修
課程教師︰李顯峰
開課學院：社會科學院
開課系所︰經濟系
考試日期（年月日）︰2013.11.05
考試時限（分鐘）：150分鐘
是否需發放獎勵金：是
（如未明確表示，則不予發放）
試題 :
Public Finance 財政學 MidTerm Exam 期中考試題 李顯峰 2013.11.05
Note注意: 須附推理說明計算過程，若只列出正確答案，不予計分。試題計有5題，試
題紙計2頁。若干數字答案可能不為整數。
1.(15%)Does the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Ecomonics imply a minimal
government? Does the government have to intervene directly in markets in order
to move the economy to the welfare-maximizing point in a Edgeworth Box Model?
If society determines that the current distribution of resources is unfair,
does it need to interfere with market prices and impair efficiency?
2.(20%)Assume that the demand curve for milk is given by Q^D = 100 - 2P, where
P is unit price and Q is the quantity demanded per year. Please answer:
(1)With the connivance of some politicians, the dairy farmers are able to form
and maintain a cartel. What is the cartel price, and how many units of milk are
purchased? [Hint: the marginal revenue curve MR is given by MR = 50 - Q. The
marginal cost curve of the cartel is given by MC = 20 + Q/4.]
(2)What are the economic rents associated with the cartel?
(3)Suppose that in order to maintain the cartel, the dairy farmers simply give
lump-sum campaign contributions tp the relevant politicians. What is the
maximum contribution they would be willing to make? What is the deadweight loss
of the cartel?
(4)Suppose that instead of lump-sum contributions to politicians, the dairy
farmers hire lobbyists and lawyers to make their case in Parliament. How does
this change your estimate of hte deadweight loss associated with this rent-
seeking activity?
3.(25%)請問：(1)次佳理論(theory of the second best)是否修訂柏瑞圖效率境界
(Pareto optimality)的經濟一般均衡條件？(10%)
(2)若全社會只有一家公營事業及一家民營事業，分別都只生產一項商品。若公營事業
採取獨占定價方式(monopoly pricing)，並且政府對民營事業課徵定額稅(a unit tax)，
另公營事業及民營事業的邊際成本都成正斜率形狀(遞增)，且二家事業的產品互為替代品
(substitutes)，請依據次佳理論繪圖說明社會福利水準將提高或降低？(15%)
4.(20%)Suppose that two firms emit a certain pollutant. The marginal cost of
reducing pollution for each firm is as follows: MC_1 = 300 e_1 and
MC_2 = 100 e_2 , where e_1 and e_2 are the amount (in tons) of emissions
reduced by the first and second firms, respecttively. Assume that in the
absence of government intervention, Firm 1 generates 100 units of emissions
and Firm 2 generates 80 units of emissions.
(1)Suppose regulators decide to reduce total pollution by 40 units. In order
to be cose effective, how much should each firm cut its pollution?
(2)What emissions fee should be impose to achieve the cost-effective outcome?
How much would each firm pay in taxes?
(3)Suppose that instead of an emissions fee, the regulatory agency introduces
a tradable permit system and issues 140 permits, each of which allows the
emission of one ton of pollution. Firm 1 uses its political influence to
convince the regulatory agency to issue 100 permits to itself and only 40
permits to Firm 2. How many, if any, permits are traded between the firms?
What is the minimum amount of money that must be paid (total) for these
permits? By how many tons does each firm end up reducing its pollution?
5.(20%)In a democratic society, which criteria should be satisfied by
"ethically acceptable" (倫理上可接受的) for a collective decision-making rule?
According to Arrow's analysis, is it possible or impossible generally that a
democratic society is welfare function exist or not? Why?
(2)How to improve or enhance Arrow's analysis to find a consistent
decision-making? For example, with median voter theorem or else.
完 卷
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