課程名稱︰個體經濟學
課程性質︰經濟系必修
課程教師︰黃貞穎
開課系所︰經濟系
考試時間︰06/22/2006
是否需發放獎勵金：是，謝謝！
（如未明確表示，則不予發放）
試題 :
1.Consider the signaling model. Suppose we have two types of workers, able and
unable. The able workers have a marginal product of 2 and the unable workers
have a marginal product of 1. Suppose a half of the workers are able and
another half of them are unable. The price of output is assumed to be 1 and
both the labor and the output markets are competitive. Hence firms will bid up
to worker's vaule of the marginal product.
Suppose that workers can attain education to signal their types. Let "e1" be
the amount of education attained by the unable workers and "e2" the amount
attained by the able workers. Education levels are measured by years and hence
have to be weakly greater than zero. Suppose the total cost of education for
the able workers is 2"e2", and the total cost of education for the unable
workers is 4"e1". A worker's utility is simply the wage he gets minus his
total cost of education. The reservation utility of all workers is 0.
(a)(10%) Explain, in your own words, the phenomenon of adverse selection.
(b)(10%) When signaling is not possible so firms cannot tell whether a
worker is able or unable, what is the competitive equilibrium wage of workers?
Is the competitive equilibrium efficient? Explain it.
(c)(10%) Now suppose signaling is possible, argue that if firms can tell able
workers from unable workers, then in any separating equilibriun, "e1"=0.
(d)(10%) Continue from above, determine the range of "e2" that able worker can
possibly choose in equilibrium.
(e)(10%) Continue from above, comparing (b) to (c) and (d), does the singaling
possibility improve efficiency? Explain it.
(f)(10%) Now suppost the reservation utility of all workers is 1.6. Will the
signaling possibility improve efficiency? Explain.
2.The Groves-Clarke mechanism can be used to decide whether a public graden
will be built. Suppose there are three persons, A, B, and C in the society.
The total construction cost of the garden is 300 dollars. The gross value of
persons A, B and C for the graden is 50, 50, and 250 dollars respectively. As
in the class, we assume that A, B and C all have quasi-linear utilities.
(a)(10%) Describe, in your own words, the Groves-Clarke mechanism.
(b)(10%) Explain, in your own words, why truth-telling is an equilibriunm
when the Groves-Clarke mechanism is used.
(c)(10%) Find a way to allocate the total construction cost of 300 dollars to
person A, B and C so that both the public good and the private good are
allocated efficiently. Explain.
(d)(10%) Discuss the possible drawbacks of the Groves-Clarke mechanism.
3.(20%) State, in your own words, the first theorem of Welfare Economics and
Walras' law.
(Explain competitive equilibrium and Parato efficient before state the first
theorem of Welfare Economics. )
--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 61.229.52.65