DF-5
References
"China's Ballistic Missile Programs Technologies, Strategies, Goals" by John W
ilson Lewis and Hua Di, International Security, Fall 1992 [vol. 17 no. 2]


Specifications
Contractor Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology - CALT
Operator Second Artillery Corps
Basing Luoning
Wuzhai
Xuanhua
Tongdao

Configuration Three Stages
Length [meters] 32.6
Diameter [meters] 3.35
Mass [kilograms] 183,000
Propellant Storable liquid
Guidance Inertial
First Flight 1971
IOC 1981
Deployment Silo
Range (km) 12,000 - 15,000
Re-entry Vehicle Mass (kg) 3,000 - 3,200
Warhead Yield 2 MT
CEP  500 - 3,500 meters
Launch Preparation Time 30-60 minutes


------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--



The Chinese flight tested a vehicle with ICBM characteristics to a reduced ran
ge in September 1971. The earliest possible IOC for an ICBM based on this vehi
cle was projected by US intelligence in 1972 as being late 1974, but more like
ly a year or two later.

Development problems evidently precluded initial deployment of the DF-5 as an
operational ICBM, but the space-launch version referred to by the Chinese as t
he FB-1 (Fengbao-Tempest) - was used as the booster for a series of five satel
lite shots that began in July 1975 and concluded in December 1976. The rocket
uses four first-stage gimballed engines and one second-stage engine, all of wh
ich burn N2O4/UDMH. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in
the western Soviet Union and the United States.

The absence of any space shots between January 1978 and September 1981 may wel
l have related to DF-5 testing as China prepared for the long range testing of
 its experimental ICBM. Four partial range tests were reported in 1979: 7 Janu
ary, 15 July, 21 August, and 4 September, and there might have been one in Oct
ober. The final test shot was fired in February 1980.

By 1980 China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the C
ultural Revolution and had some spectacular successes in its strategic weapons
 program. Preparation for full-range tests base exercises at the Shuangchengzi
 site and ship exercises in the Yellow Sea began in March 1980. Finally, on 18
 and 21 May, two long-range shots were made into the Pacific Ocean, where it w
as recovered by a naval task force. There seems to be agreement that the first
 shot was a success, traveling approximately 6,000 miles from the launch site
to an area bounded by the Gilbert Islands, the Solomons, Fiji, and the New Heb
rides, with splash-down occurring at 0230 Greenwich mean time. The second shot
 may well have been a failure, coming down perhaps 800 miles off course.

When the DF-5 was first tested in September 1971, it had a range of 10,000 to
12,000 kms which allowed it to threaten the western portions of the United Sta
tes. Beginning in 1983 the Chinese inaugurated the improved DF-5A, with an inc
reased of over 13,000 km and a more accurate guidance system. The DF-5A upgrad
e increased the throw-weight of the system from 3,000 kg to 3,200 kg.

As with the DF-4, initially the DF-5 was stored in a horizontal position in tu
nnels under high mountains, and are launched immediately outside the mouth of
the tunnel. The missiles must be moved into the open and fueled prior to firin
g, an operational mode dubbed chu men fang pao (shooting a firecracker outside
 the front door), with the fueling operation apparently requiring about two ho
urs. The initial deployment of a pair of DF-5s in silos in Central China was c
ompleted in 1981. That portion of the DF-5A force that is deployed in silos co
uld be maintained in a ready-to-fire status. In order to enhance the survivabi
lity of these missiles, China has constructed a large number of decoy silos wh
ich consist of shallow holes excavations with headworks that resemble operatio
nal silos.

For many years almost all sources credited China as having only four DF-5s dep
loyed in silos, including the authoritative 1992 treatement by John Wilson Lew
is and Hua Di, which asserted that as of 1992 only four DF-5 missiles on alert
. However, more recent estimates suggest that some 8-11 were deployed as of 19
95, and that at least 13 missiles were deployed at the end of 1997. According
to the National Air Intelligence Center, as of 1998 the deployed DF-5 force co
nsisted of "fewer than 25" missiles. As of early 1999 the total deployed DF-5
force was generally estimated at about 20 missiles. By mid-2000 some sources s
uggested that the total force was as many as 24 deployed missiles ["Inside The
 Ring" By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough Washington Times July 28, 2000].

Although it is widely reported that the 5-megaton nuclear warheads for the DF-
5/CSS-4 nuclear missiles are not "mated" to the missiles, but rather stored ne
arby, some sources suggest that US intelligence does not have a high confidenc
e understanding of this question ["Inside The Ring" By Bill Gertz and Rowan Sc
arborough Washington Times July 28, 2000]. Although it might be assumed that t
he DF-5 deployment complex would include a nuclear weapons storage area, it is
 not evident that technical intelligence could identify signatures to determin
e the precise whereabouts of such a small number of nuclear weapons.

In April 2001 it was reported that China had moved some its 24 DF-5 missiles.
The movement of the ICBMs from missile fields in central China was reportedly
detected by a US imagery intelligence satellite in early April 2001, although
it was not clear why the missiles were being moved.

As of mid-2002 China was replacing the CSS-4 Mod 1 ICBMs with longer range CSS
-4 Mod 2s. The replacement of all the approximately 20 CSS-4 Mod 1s was expect
ed to be completed by mid-decade.

China’s ballistic missile modernization began before it assessed that the Uni
ted States would deploy a missile defense, but China likely will take measures
 to improve its ability to defeat the defense system in order to preserve its
strategic deterrent. The measures likely will include improved penetration pac
kages for its ICBMs, an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs, and perhaps
development of a multiple warhead system for an ICBM, most likely for the CSS-
4.

R&D on multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as
 1970. On 20 September 1981 China launched three scientific satellites into sp
ace orbit from a single booster, and many in the West mistakenly regarded this
 as indicating that China might possess the technology to develop multiple, in
dependently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). But the launch tested neither
 a MRV nor a MIRV, and indeed one of the three satellites was merely attached
to the tail-deck of the second stage.

The current force of DF-5A missiles is deployed with single warhead, but in No
vember 1983 China inaugurated a DF-5 modification program to arm these ICBMs w
ith MIRVed warheads. Technical difficulties, however, have stalled the program
. The DF-5A, able to strike targets in the continental United States (CONUS),
was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no evidence that
they have been deployed. Some sources claim that at least four DF-5As have alr
eady been MIRVed, though it is generally asserted that while MIRVing may occur
 within the next few years no DF-5s have yet been fitted with MIRVed warheads.


Based on the DF-5A throwweight and warhead shroud the missile could be equippe
d with a six reentry vehicles with each RV weighing 600 kgs (the size of the s
ingle warhead on the DF-21). The DF-5A second stage apparently has four vernie
r engines which reportedly fire for 190 seconds after the main missile engine
cuts off. Thus the DF-5A could direct a warhead bus over a fairly large arc co
vering an array of aim points. But the exact status of this program cannot be
confirmed based on open sources.
------------------------------------------------