Re: 中途島﹕淵田的騙人﹐南雲的無罪

[roxinnccu (觸身球專家)]

※ 引述《cobrachen (mustang)》之銘言：
: ※ 引述《tomasvon (lvye)》之銘言：
: : 笑﹐大陸這邊的人都已經根據本世紀出版的日本機動部隊
: : 作戰記錄英文版在踢爆淵田的牛皮了﹐台灣這邊還抱著被
: : 淵田給蒙了的普蘭奇那本上世紀80年代那本書當寶﹐還信
: : 口開河大陸這邊隻知道美軍的情報優勢? 大陸上世紀關於
: : 中途島出書不下10本﹐淵田和普蘭奇的書都在80年代就翻
: : 譯出版﹐不過這些書統統都被淵田給蒙了^_^
: : P.S.以上都是我友DDG的論述﹐他有閒錢和那個勁頭去買日本
: : 機動部隊作戰記錄英文版來讀﹐我可沒有:P
: 講了半天根本就是拾人牙慧之外，連書名是啥都不知道，還要亂引別人當背書。
: 我今天問過DDG，這個所謂的英文版就是我提過的Shattered Sword，在網路上
: 的評價很高，被認為是當大家覺得中途島已經不會有新的分析和資料出來的時候，
: 兩位作者居然有如此的成績。


說真的我還真不知道有這本書
有一陣子沒關心這些太平洋戰史的研究了（又是模型軍事學派的缺點）
t老大提到，那也很好，上亞馬遜訂書去

不過感謝萬能的網路，總是找的到書評的
我們來看看這本書大概講了什麼
（p.s，小弟前一篇文大概就是『市面上目前對中途島戰役的解釋』之大全，那這本書
       當然是要翻一些案，才有他賣的價值，的確跟一般人理解的有所不同）

ok開始了
首先，我引用三流網文時習慣附連結
http://mcsmith.blogs.com/general/2006/09/shattered_sword.html

又，小弟全民英檢中高級居然複試倒在寫作那一部份，
如有理解錯誤，請先進們指正，

In his 1951 book on the battle, Fuchida painted the picture, up to now the
accepted version of the Japanese side - of an essentially flawless IJN
carrier strike force that was literally moments away from destroying the
outnumbered and outgunned U.S. carriers when the errors of its commanders
came home to roost and it was destroyed by U.S. dive bombers that
miraculously found the ships at precisely the right moment,
with flight decks loaded with fully fueled and armed aircraft.
It's a great story, but like many great stories,
it turns out that's all thatit is.

The truth was quite different and far more complex,
-----
大意翻譯：淵田美津雄畫虎爛，
SBD臨空時一二航戰並不是滿甲板的滿油滿彈戰機而且正在準備起飛打擊老美
實情沒那麼簡單而且也複雜的多
（小r按：這裡打了那個告訴華特勞得他把炸彈扔進飛機群中的某SBD飛官一個巴掌）


and as the authors point out at the beginning, just about the only thing
miraculous about the battle was that the U.S. carriers achieved as much
as they did given how badly two of the three carriers managed their strikes
that morning.  (Put it this way - the U.S. carriers had nine attack squadrons
between them.  Holding one in reserve, they launched eight against the
Japanese carriers that morning.  The three torpedo squadrons had virtually
no chance of scoring any hits due to bad planes and bad torpedoes, leaving
five dive bomber squadrons.  Two never saw the enemy, leaving three.
Two of those also took a bad heading and only by the sheerest luck did
they find the carriers, by running across an escorting ship and following it.
Only one single squadron out of eight did what it was supposed to do.  A better illustration of how it's more important to be lucky than
smart would be hard to find).

以上這段陳述了美軍有多狗運，其成果與他們實際的戰術表現相比有多『奇蹟』
（也是這篇三流網文作者認為，原書作者認定在本戰役中唯一的奇蹟）
蓋對南雲發動攻擊的八個中隊，扣掉因為魚雷跟飛機太爛本質上不可能成攻的三
個魚雷機中隊，再扣掉兩個根本沒看到敵人的中隊，事實上幹事的只有三個中隊
然而其中的兩個中隊又僅僅是因為狗運才找到日艦，換言之八個中隊出去只有一個
中隊完全作到了他們該作的事
（r按：諷刺的是，那是打薩拉托加號上面調到約克鎮號的中隊，暈........）

（中間略過一段...）


Because the latter is really what this book is about.  Eschewing the
traditional analysis of IJN carrier operations based on the assumption
that they were the same as U.S., the authors have reconstructed how
Japanese carriers fought, and discovered in the process of computer
analysis of hangar space and elevator cycles (surprisingly, a hell of
a lot depending on the inadequate number of bomb carts in the hangars -
 a good illustration of the old saw that for the want of a nail the
kingdom was lost) in conjunction with Japanese carrier operation
doctrine (much of which apparently was not available in English until
the 1990's) that （緊接後文）
以上大致是在說， 之前對日本航艦作業的描述只是依照猜測他們會跟美國人一樣
阿這兩位作者翻了原始教範加上用電腦模擬機庫空間等等來還原日軍的航艦作業流程
於是發現.....

Fuchida's story that the carriers were ready to launch at the time the U.S.
dive bombers appeared simply wasn't true.

於是發現淵田在虎爛

Their planes were still in the hangar decks, and not on the flight deck,
and were at least 45 minutes away from being ready to launch.

攻擊機群不是在甲板上（r按：咦？那個說甲板上有很多飛機的是哪個開SBD的混蛋？）
而是在機庫甲板上（r：喔，頭上多了一層薄甲板），而且最少要45分鐘以後才能起飛
幹老美

The carriers were constantly landing and lauching their fighter cover, and
could not even begin arranging aircraft on deck and warming them up for a
strike until the U.S. air attacks stopped.
因為小日本當時被老美的空襲煩的要死，正在用力的起飛以及換防CAP，
沒辦法搞空襲準備

This then provides the real reason why the sacrifices of Torpedo 8 and
Torpedo 6 mattered - it wasn't that they pulled the fighter cover down
so that the dive bombers could get through, as the popular view has it.
Torpedo 8 attacked an hour before the SBDs even got there, a fact that
has been conveniently overlooked, and Torpedo 3 actually attacked the
Hiryu after the dive bombers did

這才是魚8跟魚6真正的貢獻--把小日本煩死--而非把屏衛零戰引到低空讓SBD闖空
（r按：不過SBD沒碰到任何屏衛零戰是事實不是？），蓋事實上印地安人在SBD群到達前
一小時就去送死了，而魚3事實上是在SBD攻擊後才開搞

(didn't do much good - two of the Japanese carriers were actually faster
than the American torpedoes - although the effect on Japanese flight
operations of constantly having to run away from the torpedo planes to
maximize their fighters' ability to shoot them down is an important theme
in the morning's battle).

為啥是送死？因為有兩條鬼子航艦事實上比美帝魚雷快
（r：雖然早就知道了，但還是很想說：碼的，這啥鳥魚雷）

It was that they kept the carriers from even beginning to prepare to launch
a strike against the U.S. task forces.

是這些送死魚雷機讓日本人無法安排空襲
（r曰：一小時不夠用就對了）

When the dive bombers got there Nagumo was nowhere near being ready to launch,
總之淵田是在畫孟加拉虎爛

and the attack planes, while fueled, were not on the flight deck,
where their explosions would have been largely vented into the air.

而且在機庫甲板上的滿油彈戰機反而比在甲板上被炸造成更大的損害
（r：喔，所以還是那些滿油彈戰機被炸搞出來的把戲）

They were stuffed  in the two levels of hangar deck cheek by jowl,
where the  explosions would cause far more damage.  For example,
the Kaga was essentially blown apart from the flight deck to her
original battleship main deck some 50 feet below over half her length
 (the book includes an artist's rendering of this horrific sight,
  which no other book has ever noted).
例如，加賀號的結構，打飛行甲板到它原本戰巡設計本體的甲板被炸飛掉了一大塊
這本新書獨家、獨步全球的畫出了那可怖場景的現場示意圖

And the Akagi was burned out as a result of a single bomb hit by Dick Best
(describing him as a "deadeye" was another terrific piece of wordsmithing.
I heard Best in 1992 at the same Nimitz symposium and he was crystal clear
on what he saw.  He reminded people that he remembered that day very well
- due to a lung injury he sustained in that afternoon's attack,
he never flew in combat again.)

迪克貝斯特的炸彈則讓赤城號燒個痛快，貝老大清楚的記著那一天

（再刪一部份）

The same painstaking analysis debunks other parts of the accepted tale.
For example, that the Tone's scout aircraft was late actually didn't affect
anything - if it had launched on time, it would still have missed the U.S.
carriers - they were on another plane's search leg,
脫奶號的偵察機有沒遲起飛根本無關緊要，因為美帝航母不在那架飛機預定搜索的範圍內
---在另外一架飛機的責任區內。

and even if it had sighted the U.S. carriers much sooner, it wouldn't have
done Nagumo any good.  He could not attack until the attacks from Midway
and the U.S. carrier planes stopped, and - more importantly - unless he
could attack the U.S. carriers before they launched the fatal strike,
it really didn't matter.

而且即便可以早點看到老美航母，南雲也不能在沒收回中途島打擊機隊跟老美航母的蒼蠅
停止嗡嗡嗡之前發動攻擊，而且除非南雲可以在老美航母打擊群起飛之前
就先炸到老美航母，不然就沒啥差別
（r按：這點，如果原書是這樣寫，則似乎應該有所保留，蓋老美即便在南雲機群到達前
       起飛，首先南雲的船就空了，怎會沒差別？再者，起飛跟可以如史實般打擊是兩
       回事，把老美飛行員想成跟一二航戰一樣未免托大）

For this reason, the real flaw was - well, first of all, not launching
an adequate search and launching it in time to locate any naval targets
early enough to hit them before they could launch, but specifically that
a Japanese search aircraft did apparently overfly the U.S. fleet in time
to have allowed Nagumo to hit them before they launched.  For some reason
 - the authors claim sloppy search procedures - it just didn't see them,
 although the pilot and observer had a wonderful morning traipsing through
the cloud cover before returning to their cruiser.

所以真正的問題是小日本的偵察機隊無能，數量不夠，也沒即時給南雲任何海上目標
的資訊，而且很詭異的即便真的有那麼一架即時的飛過老美航母頭上也沒看到
（r按，這部分跟以前提供的事實與觀點一致，日本偵察機的確比較早的就發現美艦
       但是很後面才報告有條航母跟著）

The book also explains that, contrary to the accepted wisdom, the Japanese
carrier fleet was hardly the crack unit that is portrayed.  Although well-
trained, it was exhausted from six months of war, and needed time to repair
and refit.  Incredibly, it was also short on aircraft - the carriers sailed
with approximately 80% of the aircraft complement, due in part to the
shortage of carrier planes.  Not shortage as Americans understood it,
meaning that there were competing demands for the thousands of
planes rolling out of the plants, but shortages as in the Japanese aircraft
industry wasn't making them anymore - only a few dozen replacement carrier
bombers were made in all of 1942 as the plants retooled to make different
planes.

此外，作者陳述當時的一二航戰，雖然訓練精良但是已經因為過去六個月的征戰沒力了
因為飛機工廠的問題（改去生產別的飛機），連艦爆的數量都不夠，整體來說只有應備機
的80趴機數，這點物資充裕的老美無法想像
(r按：大概是補充機不夠吧，對中途島發動空襲的數量很正常阿，跟珍珠港一樣
      至於是不是沒力的問題，山口多聞手下的表現可以說明一點事）

Another interesting point is the conditions under which Nagumo had to make
his decision on the tiny bridge of the Akagi.  Unlike the American carriers,
which had separate bridges for the captain and the flag in their relatively
spacious islands, the Japanese crammed one to two dozen people into one tiny
(about 12 x 15) bridge, with the admiral and his staff shoulder to shoulder
on one side, and the captain, his staff, and various enlisted on the other.
Under these cramped conditions, with no privacy, it would have been unlikely
that anyone would have offered Nagumo a frank disagreement in front of that
crowd.  Plus the fact that that ship was under continuous air attack all
morning, including an almost direct hit by B-26 (not its bomb - the entire
plane nearly took the island out as it crashed).
No other book has ever remarked on these conditions

作者認為赤城號的小艦橋也影響南雲的決策。南雲的staff得跟青木的手下擠在一起，
而這種環境使作者認為南雲將得不到任何不同的意見，此外包含一架差點直接往赤城
號艦橋撞上去的B-26在內，赤城號整個早上都在被老美搞。
沒有別的書提到這個環境條件

r曰：這部分我以為是作者過太爽。去日本搭地鐵看看就知道日本人早就習慣一伙子人
     擠在一個小地方，恁爸我小學就跟著我留學東大的舅舅搭過東京地鐵，那個左右
     轉頭都看到穿著西裝褲的屁股在你眼前5公分的場景真是令人難忘。

     而且不管擠不擠，日本人基本上不會頂撞上司。
     又，出主意的是S3源田實。

     我看別的書不提到這個是有原因的

The authors also put new light on the events after the bombing of Akagi, Kaga,
 and Soryu.  Conventional wisdom is that Nagumo was in shock, and the admiral
commanding the remaining carrier, Yamaguchi Tamon charged to the attack,
leaving Nagumo behind.  In fact, Yamaguchi trailed behind Nagumo, who was
acting aggressively to engage the Americans in a surface battle
 (his expertise was, after all, in torpedo engagements using destroyers).
此外作者也點出：一般認為南雲被搞了三條航艦之後意志消沈，
山口多聞不管它逕自發動攻擊。
但事實上，當時南雲正在積極的想發動傳統的海戰（這才是他的專長）

r按：這點跟之前顯露的事實並沒有很大差距不是嗎？南雲的確有這樣做
     心態描述上的差別而已

Surprisingly, it was the Japanese that was using carriers to bring
about a surface action - Nagumo allowed the Hiryu to unnecessarily sacrifice
itself by charging the U.S. fleet, when she could, and should, have pounded
the Yorktown and then turned for home, preserving at least one of the IJN's
precious and irreplacable flight decks.  Instead, Nagumo ordered the three
(soon to be four) burning carriers scuttled - something the records were
later redacted to delete references to - to free up the torpedo tubes on
the escorting destroyers for a night engagement.  Nagumo's action were bold
and correct - if Spruance had blundered by continuing to close the distance
with the Japanese fleet that night - as Yamaguchi did that afternoon,
costing him his carrier, and as some historians claim Spruance should
have done - Nagumo would have had the night surface engagement the Japanese
Navy had trained for.  That they were unmatched in their night-fighting skills
 was to be shown a couple of months later at Guadalcanal.

這段怪怪的
不過大意大概是南雲允許了飛龍號去單挑美國航母，反而讓飛龍號作了沒必要的犧牲
不過南雲下令鑿沈3（很快變成4）條航母，集中水雷戰隊準備夜戰史普勞的動作是勇敢而
且正確的---如果史普勞繼續往西追擊的話（如一些美國歷史學家建議），因為美軍在夜
戰方面半點不如日本人，瓜島海戰的結果說明一切

If Spruance kept his distance, his planes would finish off the burned out
wrecks the next day (as they did two days later with the cruiser Mikuma
which was accompanying its crippled sister Mogami).
Akagi and Hiryu probably were not fatally damaged and could have been
towed back to Japan - but not under the American air attacks that were
sure to come.

不過史實上史普勞往東跑了
所以三隈號完蛋了，也許沒有嚴重受傷的赤城號跟飛龍號也拖不回去了
（亦即：南雲的水雷戰隊計畫在美軍站著遠遠的放飛機打的狀況下無法實現）

A few other points.  First of all, it turns out that a Japanese invasion of
Midway would probably have failed due to Japan's lack of a good amphibious
assault capability.  For that matter, Japan could never have seriously
threatened an invasion of Hawaii for the same reason, plus that it would have
been numerically overwhelmed by the U.S. military on the islands, and it
could never have achieved the sort of air superiority that such an invasion
required - as events turned out, it really couldn't do so over Midway either.

又，作者指出因為日本欠缺兩棲作戰能力，可能根本無法威脅中途島守軍
，更不用提夏威夷，甚至會被數量上占優勢的美國陸軍守軍踢回海裡去，在夏威夷
上空也無法達成空優，而且因為史實上發生的事，在中途島上空也不可能拿到空優

（r按，如果不是本文作者對原書作者的轉述有誤，這裡的說法我就覺得有待商榷
  有點結果論的感覺。  對陸軍作戰的方面可能是，但對空優爭奪的方面...？？
  夏威夷大概是太大塊了，但中途島如果一切照日本計畫進行，真拿不下來嗎？）

 Its carriers were a raiding force, not an occupying one, and they had
nowhere near the strength or logistical capabilities to stand offshore
and support landings in the same way that the U.S. carriers later did off
of, say, Okinawa in 1945.

日本的航艦是攻擊兵力，不是可以搞佔領的，沒有任何合理的能力支援海外登陸作戰
以及發動如同沖繩戰役那種規模的登陸戰
（r按，感想如上面那一段，老覺得這作者忘了面臨頭上有飛機掃的地面攻勢感覺如何
 ........這兩位作者是美國人嗎？是的話就不意外了）

 More importantly, however, the authors put a whole new light on Nimitz'
decision to commit the three carriers he had to the battle.
They were not actually defending Midway at all - they were there to seek out
and destroy the Japanese carriers.  Had they been unable to do so, he would
simply have recalled the surviving ones and let the Japanese have the island
 (if they could take it).  For a nation with little (soon to be virtually none
 due to U.S. submarine warfare) merchant capability, Midway would
have been a tremendous problem to keep supplied, and would have essentially
been a convenient place for U.S. air power and submarines from Hawaii to
destroy Japanese planes and supplies.  The Japanese would have been forced
to convoy massive supplies all the way from Japan to what would quickly
become a beleagered garrison well within range of U.S. planes from Hawaii,
and Nimitz could sink their convoys and raid their airstrip at his leisure
until he decided to retake the island.  Viewed in this light, losing Midway
was in fact no net loss to the Americans - it would have provided an
exceedingly efficient way to destroy Japan's already limited war material.
With three carriers and an unsinkable air base, Nimitz was spoiling for a
fight with the Japanese fleet.   He could afford to lose the base and even
his forces.  The Japanese, on the other hand, could not.  Why?  Because of
the nature of the war the Japanese had gotten into.

這段，總之就是在陳述尼米茲的心機重。作者認為尼米茲根本不是在防禦中途島，
而是在找機會幹掉日本航母（r按：我想，山本五十六真正的目的也不是拿下中途島）
如果用手上三條航艦幹到這件事那很好，幹不到，那就生還者招一招回夏威夷去等著用
潛艇加飛機打日本維持中途島佔領的補給線即可。
換言之：尼米茲可以承受扔掉中途島跟艦隊的損失，日本不能。為什麼？因為最後一句。

(r按，這個令人看的頭痛。挖咧合著尼米茲往中途島上面砸的援軍蓋的防線，作者是都
     不打算考慮，還是認為尼老大準備隨便的把這個島犧牲掉？再沒登陸能力，這個島
     在重炮跟飛機的夾擊下又能撐多久？還是作者根本認為尼老大是打算送這些守軍
     去死？因為我沒看到他有計畫要把中途島守軍也在大局不利時落回珍珠港去耶。
     如果尼米茲原先計畫是這樣的話，則中途島根本不該加以防禦。派飛機上去以其為
     基地協助航母作戰得了，頂多派派機場守衛的兵力，挖坑道埋沙包的幹嘛？還讓約
     翰福特上去呢！不怕這些人萬一海戰不利一傢伙全落入日本人手裡？要撤退有撤那
     麼快嗎？說實在這不像一個美國人會有的算盤........

     亦即，當然很有可能這交戰雙方都意不在中途島，但是按照史實上尼米茲對中途島
     的經營，實在也不像他丟不丟這個島都無所謂，隨時準備放棄的樣子，真要這樣的
     話，在上面的地面部隊兵力應該越少越好，夠作機場警衛足矣，沒必要又陸戰隊又
     特戰部隊還放魚雷艇的的擺，即便原來就有，如果計畫是如此也該先撤一點走了。

     而且，1942/6尼米茲真的有本錢連艦隊都丟掉嗎？50年後看當然是沒差，
     換到1942/6去看，可能會嚴重不少吧.......................................）



下面的個人認為就不是太相關了
反正t兄想提的上面大概都提過了
至於以上這些會不會根本的顛覆史實呢，大家討論討論


小弟自己的感想是，（根據以上簡介作者的轉述的話）
日本海軍在中途島的失敗原因，其實還是跟之前認定的差不多

1.偵查不力
  相較於美軍航艦甚至直接編了一個VS中隊（艦載偵察機中隊）
  日軍在此役中只依靠了利根級重巡的偵察機
  雖然利根級那個空出來的後甲板就是來幹這個事的，但那些掛浮桶的東西跟SBD比....
  （p.s，SBD者，三個字母分別代表『偵查/斥堠』-『轟炸』-『道格拉斯』也.....
          這是那年代到越戰前一段時間內美國海軍機的命名方式 ）

  等到日軍終於正經的看這件事時，手下卻已經沒有好的飛行員了
  下場就是1944/6的火雞節


2.艦載機攻擊波在整備時被美軍炸了個痛快
  本書只是告訴英語系的讀者，被炸個痛快的時間沒有那麼戲劇化
  也許有命運的60、50分鐘，但絕對沒有所謂『命運的5分鐘』

  會造成這一點的原因跟前面那個原因脫不了關係
  但這本書，以及SIG先進提到的是以往對日軍航艦操作的誤解
  之前的英語出版品都是以美軍的方式去理解日本的操作，
  亦即，要起飛攻擊波時全部攻擊波機隊都會在艦尾排排站
  但日軍則習慣放在機庫裡，要起飛才快速的用升降機運上甲板去

  當然如前所述，美軍攻擊機飛行員的證詞如是
  不止SBD的飛官，
  印地安人的手下唯一回來那個也說他飛過飛行甲板的時候看見一大堆飛機
  以及週邊的支援裝具，然後他就被打下來了
  搭配兩波的攻擊時間來看，則最起碼日軍在這一小時多的時間內都是滿甲板的飛機
  當然，照本書的說法的話，那應該都是屏衛的零戰在換防幹嘛的

  跟這個議題有關的就是山口多聞那個率先出擊的建議
  t兄說這是莽夫行為，說淵田的說法是在為他『塑造形像』
  well，我不知道原書中有沒這麼寫
  但我沒這個感覺
  SIG先進提供的那個中文討論區有人認為作為二航戰的指揮官，山口的建議問題不大
  但也有人稱：即便依照山口多聞的建議，且山口的艦爆還真的能
              在美機到達之前先離艦
  .....日軍甚至可能敗的更慘
  其中一個原因是因為：那些艦爆會在沒戰鬥機掩護的狀況下出擊
  然後依照史實上有戰鬥機掩護的飛龍號反擊戰果去三下五除二，認定戰果不會更好

  well，首先史實上第一波艦爆的零戰屏衛只剩下重松大尉等4架
  （因為之前想偷雞幹老美返航機被打傷兩架先回家了，一開始就只有這六架）
  面對CV-5的12架CAP，外帶後來TF-16支援的幾架，差不多等於沒有
  但史實上18架艦爆的戰果是那樣

  第二波艦攻的魚雷攻勢亦然
  美軍CAP照樣有，艦攻的兵力還更單薄，結果......

  總之，把當時的日本海航跟美國同行想成一樣的水準是不大正確的


3.美軍大大的走狗運

  要問我的話這才是關鍵，沒有美軍的狗運的話，以上日軍的問題都不再會是問題
  設想一下，如果沒點狗運，真正能發動有意義進攻的美軍就只剩一個SBD中隊
  那在當下不管日本鬼被魚雷機煩的多厲害，就頂多能掛掉一條日本航艦
  而不管剩下三條還要多久才可以發動攻勢，總之會比TF-16/17的機群回去再掛彈要快
  然後.....搞不好滿船的整備中飛機被炸的就會變成美國那一方
  以當時日本海航與美國同行的水準差距，幾乎可以確定美軍是全滅的局
  當下戰損就會由史實上的美0日4變成美3日1



: 過去因為資料的關係，大家都被淵田的輸給誤導，我引DDG給我的話：
: [12:09] DDG-Pickett Charge: 怎么說呢
: [12:09] DDG-Pickett Charge: 對于一些基本情況
: [12:09] DDG-Pickett Charge: 當然不會推翻
: [12:10] DDG-Pickett Charge: 但是關于南云和山口的評价
: [12:10] DDG-Pickett Charge: 主要是戰役的复盤
: 所以，過去的書和資料有誤解被誤導，你也是包括在內，只不過今天DDG先拿到SS，
: 看過內容之後，讓你來爆料？不是你自己看的，也不是你自己去找的，你憑哪點
: 認為別人看的舊又缺？在這本書出來之前，你們那些中譯本或者是自己寫的東西有沒有
: 問題你自己心知肚明，但是也不敢講。DDG看了也沒一副你這種樣子。
: 你憑哪點說人家看的不夠？講德國空軍的時候你看書了？

--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc)
◆ From: 218.166.145.165
※ 編輯: roxinnccu       來自: 218.166.145.165      (04/07 08:00)
※ 編輯: roxinnccu       來自: 218.166.152.105      (04/08 10:19)
推 wymwym:我覺得米尼茲确實不是想守中途島，而是想誘日本的航母出來.
→ wymwym:能打掉就打掉，打不掉就當是實戰中鍛煉。
→ wymwym:美國的工業力使它能夠輸得起，但日本的工業力使它輸不起。
→ wymwym:日本仔航母沉了精英死了就泄了，美國佬航母沉了可以再造，
→ wymwym:艦上的人，如你所說，相對于日本仔來說也算不上精英了。
→ wymwym:至于為什么中途島上還是不停地蓋防御。我想一來可能美國佬
→ wymwym:本來就抱著守得住就守的態度，二來如果不是投些資源在上面
→ wymwym:日本仔也不會那么無聊來攻吧。
推 roxinnccu:中途島的加強防禦是在確定日本人要來才開始的喔～～～
→ roxinnccu:在那之前，就真的只是各種東西的『中途站』而已。
※ 編輯: roxinnccu       來自: 218.166.159.222      (04/08 19:38)
推 wymwym:我覺得一來美國佬也沒有多大的把握，艦隊一旦不行了還真是
→ wymwym:要靠那些設施守一下的，消耗一下日本仔的能量也好。
→ wymwym:二來肥雞也要像個肥雞模樣才能引狼來叨的吧，如果一點也不
→ wymwym:重視的樣子，日本仔怎么可能會認為攻打這個地方美國佬會全
→ wymwym:力來救呢？
推 roxinnccu:小問題：日本如果連艦隊打仗都不好好偵查，對個小島？
→ roxinnccu:此外，日本的作戰目的其實也不是為了那個島
→ roxinnccu:山本整個1942年都在想辦法找美軍艦隊決戰.....