Re: 轉：美國《國家利益》期間評中國南海聲索合理性

[ianwoo (langHe)]

Twin2 以下轉文的英文原稿，找了一下，原英文鏈接：

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-beijings-south-china-sea-moves-make-sense-now-14643

順便把英文原文貼在這里
注：若存在版權問題，請版本刪除該貼，我會開一貼為 Twin2 給出本文鏈接。謝謝


China’s military activities on its ocean frontier have given rise to a fear
 that it’s seeking to expand its power at the expense of others now that it
 has a more powerful navy. The essence of this idea is that China’s activit
ies are expansionist and more aggressive compared with twenty or thirty year
s ago because it has a new urge for more territory or because it wants to th
row its new-found weight around in maritime areas to rewrite regional order.


Another interpretation is possible, more in conformity with the facts, and l
ess sinister.


China’s ocean frontier has, for the most part, never been settled in the fi
ve centuries since the idea of maritime borders under international law was
first articulated in 1609.

China’s primary motivation in recent South China Sea military activities, t
hen, is to defend what it sees as its island territories which neighboring c
ountries have attempted to usurp.

Regional order (the balance of economic and military power between Japan and
 China and between the mainland and Taiwan) has already been rewritten by Ch
ina’s peaceful rise and any additional gains accruing from the control of i
ts claimed small island territories in the South China Sea would be marginal
. For China, the main game on its maritime frontier is successful unificatio
n with Taiwan, which sits at the northern end of the South China Sea. Though
 China has come to describe the dispute in the Spratly Islands as a “core i
nterest” because it involves sovereign territory, that is hardly new and is
 only a statement of the obvious. The more important characterization drivin
g Chinese policy for decades has remained, as one Chinese government adviser
 observed in 1996, that the Spratly dispute is “small in scale and local in
 nature.”

Beginning in the mid-1800s, colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, the
United States, Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, Portugal, Russia and Japan s
uccessively became involved in carving out spheres of influence or de facto
sovereignty (“concessions” of some kind) over enclaves of Chinese land ter
ritory in such a way that the country, weak in naval power, didn’t place an
y priority on asserting or protecting a maritime frontier.

It wasn’t until an 1887 treaty with France delimiting a sea border with the
French protectorate of Tonkin that China began to take any action to
demarcate and defend an ocean frontier. That came just two years after China
had been forced by Japan to cede the island of Taiwan and associated small
islands to Japanese sovereignty. And it was only with the defeat of Japan in
1945 that China again was in a position to demarcate and defend its maritime
frontier, including around Taiwan, free from foreign military threat,
invasion or occupation.


The opportunity was short-lived b

ecause the country again fell into civil wa
r, which resulted in an enduring stalemate about the country’s ocean fronti
er. In 1949, the Communist victory was incomplete. The rival government, the
 Republic of China (ROC) was able to establish itself on Taiwan and the main
land government was forced into a protracted and still unfinished series of
island wars and political contests to mark out a maritime frontier.

Beginning with Canada in 1970, major Western powers still recognizing the RO
C began to shift their diplomatic recognition from it to the People’s Repub
lic of China (PRC). This has the inevitable effect under international law o
f preserving to a unitary China (led by the only recognized government) all
territorial rights of the ROC prior to 1949. Of special significance, these
include the ROC claim to the Spratly Islands, manifested in 1946 through phy
sical occupation of the island of Taiping (Itu Aba). The ROC and the PRC mai
ntain nearly identical territorial claims in the South China Sea.

China’s current claims on its ocean frontier comprise three main elements:
claim to territorial sovereignty over Taiwan and other ROC-controlled island
s, claim to territorial sovereignty over a large number of other small islan
ds in the South China Sea (Paracel and Spratly islands) or East China Sea (S
enkaku Islands), and claims to maritime resource jurisdictions (not sovereig
nty) that might flow to China if its claims to the land territories were rec
ognized by adjacent states.

With the exception of the claim to the Senkaku Islands, the territorial clai
ms of China haven’t changed since before 1949. It was the ROC that in 1970
first claimed the Senkaku Islands and the PRC was forced to follow suit sinc
e both governments were at that time competing to be seen as defending the s
overeignty of “one China."

The extent and character of China’s sovereignty claims aren’t unusual and
in broad terms conform to the practice of other states with only one clear s
et of exceptions: China appears to claim sovereignty over submerged reefs th
at wouldn’t normally qualify as land territory.

It’s regularly asserted by some scholars, media commentators and other anal
ysts that China claims sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea. B
ut that is based on a misunderstanding of the so-called nine-dashed line tha
t China has repeatedly included in maps of the South China since 1947. In De
cember 2014, in a study of China’s potential ocean frontier in the South Ch
ina Sea, the U.S. Department of State observed correctly that China has neve
r clarified the jurisdictional intent of the U-shaped line.

Thus, the current maritime territorial disputes predate the rise of China’s
power and increase in its naval capability. Any assumption that China has
somehow expanded its maritime claims because it now feels more powerful is
not borne out by the facts. One of many things that have changed about the
disputes is China’s willingness to act robustly, as most states would, to
defend pre-existing sovereignty claims that have been in place for at least
66 years.


※ 引述《ianwoo (langHe)》之銘言：
: 近些年來，隨著中國和南海周邊國家在南海部分海域主權歸屬問題上產生的分歧，不少
: 域外國家也想摻和進南海，將南海區域的和平環境攪亂，從而給中國“添堵”。而他們
: 摻和南海問題的理由是幫助南海各國間“平衡”，在領土主權的爭議中不讓中國占據上
: 風，并不時制造輿論稱中國是南海地區和平的威脅者。然而國外也有明眼人，美國《國
: 家利益》雜志網站12月16日發表文章《為什么中國的南海行動符合常理》，就對南海的
: 歷史和現狀進行了闡述，表明了中國南海主權的合理性。
: 文章稱，近些年來，中國加強了在南海方面的軍事部署，也增加了在南海區域的軍事活
: 動，而這一切都是為了擊碎中國在南海的島嶼領土被周邊國家篡奪的企圖。對于中國來
: 說，南沙島嶼的主權是“核心利益”，因為這涉及到了領土主權。這一提法并不是最近
: 才出現的，中國幾十年來一直如此強調這一點。
: 文章稱，從19世紀中期開始，不少殖民國家如英國、美國、比利時、意大利、法國、德
: 國、葡萄牙、俄羅斯和日本先后對中國陸地領土進行了侵蝕，當時的中國主要精力只能
: 放在陸地領土之上，而且當時中國海軍力量薄弱，沒有任何辦法優先維護或保護海上邊
: 界。直到1887年，中國才開始采取行動來捍衛海洋邊境并將臺灣設為省，然而僅僅數年
: ，日本便迫使中國簽訂《馬關條約》占據了臺灣島及其附屬各島嶼、澎湖列島。直到19
: 45年，日本戰敗后，中國才又有機會來劃分和捍衛自己的海上邊境從而擺脫外國的軍事
: 威脅、入侵和控制。
: 然而隨著中國內戰，國民黨敗退臺灣，中國被迫長時間無法完成統一。而在1970年代開
: 始，西方大國開始承認現在中華人民共和國的地位，毫無疑問現在的中國應當繼承1949
: 年以前中國的權利，包括當時中華民國聲明所有的南沙群島。現在，中國聲明主權的海
: 洋邊境包括三個主要元素：臺灣及其附屬島嶼、位于東海的釣魚島和位于南海的西沙、
: 南沙群島。
: 文章稱，此前有一些學者、媒體評論員和其他分析師經常聲稱中國對整個南海都進行了
: 主權聲索，這是一個誤解。早在1947年中國就已經提出了“九段線”。因此，當前有不
: 少假設認為當前的海上領土爭端源于中國力量的崛起和中國海軍實力的提升，這其實是
: 并不符合實際的，中國對南海明確的主權聲索已經存在了至少66年。
: 美媒的報道對南海的歷史和現狀的分析比較符合事實，其實早在漢武帝時期起，中國就
: 開始較大規模地利用南海，宋代以來中國海事發達、南沙群島進入中國版圖。明清時期
: 經營的層次更深，中國漁民甚至在中業島等一些島上建房建水井而它國所無。2015年10
: 月28日報道的英美海軍航海舊記錄證明，清代和民國前期，只有中國漁民遍布南海各島
: 礁，并在有的島上常年居住。而中國的九段線在很長一段時間內也被國際社會所認可。
: 而近些年來，一些周邊國家企圖通過一些小動作來破壞我國南海主權領土完整，而一些
: 不懷好意的域外國家看到了機會便如同蒼蠅逐臭般一窩蜂對這些“搗亂國家”聲援和實
: 際援助，有些國家甚至“不顧吃相”，親自上陣在南海挑釁，這些行為與他們口中所稱
: “和平、平等”等大道理背道而馳，頗為滑稽。作為中國來說，一些跳梁小丑的卑劣演
: 出我們不必太過在意，發展自己在南海地區的實力，建設好南海才是重中之重。（范辰
: 言）
: ==============================
: 上文轉自 http://pit.ifeng.com/a/20151221/46765684_0.shtml
: 有興趣的朋友，可按上述鏈接查看原文。

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※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/CrossStrait/M.1450705218.A.278.html
→ Chynagirl: 洋文不看，吃屁。
→ ianwoo: 下面的引文是中文；Twin2 要求提供原文的
→ godwind7: 看完原文了，內容只是重申了中國在1947
→ godwind7: 所畫的九段線，在南海議題上中國只是在
→ godwind7: 自己的主權，簡單來說就是先畫先贏XD
→ godwind7: 原文也沒有說中國對南海的行動是合理
→ godwind7: 只不過是把中國說法的來龍去脈描述一下
→ godwind7: 感覺上比較像是歷史回顧吧
→ twin2: 這篇文章試著去解釋為何中國會有這些海權
→ twin2: 主張，其實算寫的不錯的中國立場分析文，
→ twin2: 但裡面也提到中國把一般不具資格當土地主
→ twin2: 權的暗礁當主權地去擴展海岸線，為什麼中
→ twin2: 文翻譯文就偏偏鬼隱了這段?而且中文翻譯末
→ twin2: 端的加油添醋有夠噁心，好好一篇分析文被
→ twin2: 搞成宣傳文，不愧是土共