[資訊] 伊朗趕著造核武，而川普阻止不了

[kwei (光影)]

Iran Is Rushing to Build a Nuclear Weapon — and Trump Can’t Stop It
伊朗趕著造核武，而川普阻止不了

The White House strategy of “maximum pressure” is backfiring in the most
dangerous way possible.
白宮的“極限施壓”策略將導致最危險的反效果。

原文 (New York Times) : https://tinyurl.com/yxl2xxr7
譯文 (國關國政外交學人): https://m.sohu.com/a/325555079_618422

John J. Mearsheimer
芝加哥大學政治學教授

President Trump says he wants to make sure Iran never acquires nuclear
weapons. His policy, however, is having the opposite effect: It is giving
Tehran a powerful incentive to go nuclear, while at the same time making it
increasingly difficult for the United States to prevent that. On Monday the
official Iranian news agency announced that the country had breached the
limits for enriched uranium imposed on it by the 2015 international
agreements.

美國總統川普曾一度表示，希望確保伊朗永不擁核。然而，其對伊政策卻產生了截然相反
的效果：步步緊逼，使得德黑蘭方面再度激活了發展核武器的雄心，同時，也使得美國越
來越難以掌控伊核局面的發展。當地時間7月1日，伊朗方面宣佈，自身的低濃縮鈾庫存已
經超過了2015年達成的《限制伊朗發展核武器國際協議》所規定的上限。

Indeed, American policy toward Iran over the past year makes it clear that
Iranian leaders were foolish not to develop a nuclear deterrent in the early
2000s.

事實上，美國過去一年的對伊政策表明，伊朗領導人在本世紀初沒有發展核威懾力量是十
分愚蠢的行為。

Although there has not yet been a significant military clash, the United
States has effectively declared war on Iran. Its wide-ranging sanctions
campaign is strangling Iran’s economy, in the hope of gaining sufficient
leverage to force Tehran to permanently dismantle its capacity to reprocess
plutonium and enrich uranium, the main pathways to the bomb.

雙方雖然還沒有發生重大的軍事衝突，但實際上，美國已經向伊朗宣戰。其廣泛的制裁行
動一定程度上扼殺和阻礙了伊朗經濟的發展，美國希望通過對伊制裁獲取足夠的地區影響
力，並迫使德黑蘭方面永久喪失其鈈和濃縮鈾的生產和復工能力，眾所周知，鈈和濃縮鈾
是製造核彈的必不可少的材料。

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has also declared that Iran must fundamentally
alter its foreign policy in ways that suit the interests of America and its
Middle East allies. By imposing what it calls “maximum pressure,” the Trump
administration is threatening Iran’s survival as a sovereign state.

美國國務卿邁克·彭佩奧（Mike Pompeo）也宣稱，伊朗必須從根本上改變其外交政策，
使之符合美國及其中東盟友的利益。 實際上,通過所謂的"極限施壓"，川普政府正在威脅
伊朗作為一個主權國家的生存需求。

There is no evidence that Iran is likely to capitulate to American demands.
If anything, the historical record demonstrates that great powers can inflict
enormous punishment on their adversaries — with blockades, sanctions, sieges
and bombing campaigns — and yet the pain rarely causes target states to
surrender.

沒有任何的直接證據表明，伊朗方面可能會屈服於來自美國的要求。歷史的經驗告訴我們
，大國可以通過封鎖、制裁、圍攻和轟炸等行動對對手實施巨大的懲罰，但這種“痛苦療
法”很少會迫使目標國家行為體完全屈服。

American sanctions killed well over 100,000 Iraqi civilians in the 1990s, but
Saddam Hussein remained defiant. Nationalism is a powerful force that
invariably causes the people being pummeled to hang together, instead of
rising up to demand that their leaders surrender to the enemy.

在上世紀90年代，美國的行動曾使得超過10萬名的伊拉克平民喪命，但薩達姆 · 侯賽因
仍然保持了挑釁的姿態。民族主義是一股強大的力量，它總是會導致被打擊的人民萬眾一
心，同仇敵愾，而不是舉手投降。

States are also reluctant to capitulate to coercive pressure because it may
tempt stronger powers to escalate their demands. If “maximum pressure”
 works once, Mr. Trump and other American hawks might conclude it would work
again. Tehran has no interest in showing that it can be browbeaten.

各國家行為體往往也不願意屈服於脅迫式壓力，因為這可能會誘使更多和更強大的大國行
為體將無理的要求升級或是擴容，從而不斷降低自身的對外下限。如果“極限施壓”收到
了預期的效果，川普和其他美國鷹派人士可能會得出結論，它將會再度發揮作用。所以，
德黑蘭方面一再宣稱，無意也絕不會理睬美式恫嚇。

In fact, Iran has already shown that it will not sit by while its people die
and its society is wrecked. The Iranians are likely to launch more covert
attacks against tankers and oil facilities in the Persian Gulf and employ
proxies to attack American troops and installations. We can also expect them
to launch sophisticated cyberattacks against the United States and its allies.

事實上，伊朗方面已經表明，自己不會坐以待斃，袖手旁觀，眼睜睜地看著自己的人民和
社會遭到死亡威脅和秩序破壞。其可能會對波斯灣的油輪和石油設施發動更多的秘密攻擊
，僱傭代理人攻擊美國軍隊及其設施。同時還可以預判，他們對美國及其盟友發動複雜的
網絡攻擊亦是勢在必行。

President Trump, in response, is likely to retaliate and further escalate the
pressure on Iran. The aim will be to “re-establish deterrence” with Iran
and force it to capitulate. But these measures will have the opposite result,
as the two sides are now locked in a classic escalatory spiral. Iran will
double down, which almost certainly means it will move to build its own
nuclear arsenal.

作為回應，川普總統可能會採取一系列報復手段並進一步加大對伊制裁。這樣做的目的是
"重建對伊朗的威懾力"，迫使其屈服。但這些措施將會產生相反的結果，因為現在的形勢
是，雙方都陷入到了一個典型的衝突升級螺旋中。幾乎可以肯定的是，伊朗方面將提高擁
核行動的倍速，直到最終建立自己的核武庫。

The Iranians had good reason to acquire nuclear weapons long before the
present crisis, and there is substantial evidence they were doing just that
in the early 2000s. The case for going nuclear is much more compelling today.
After all, Iran now faces an existential threat from the United States, and a
nuclear arsenal will go a long way toward eliminating it.

其實早在此次危機之前，伊朗人就有很好的理由擁核了，而且有大量的證據顯示，他們自
21世紀初就著手這樣做了。如今，發展核能核武的理由更加令自眾信服。畢竟，伊朗現在
面臨著來自美國的生存威脅，核武庫的建立將有助於極大的消除這一威脅。

Nuclear weapons are considered the ultimate deterrent for good reason:
Adversaries are unlikely to threaten the existence of a nuclear-armed state,
especially one with a  deterrent that can survive a first-strike attack,
because that is the one circumstance in which a state is likely to use its
nuclear weapons. It is hard to imagine, for example, Israel or the United
States attacking Iran — even with conventional weapons — if Iran had the
bomb, simply because there is some chance that escalation might lead to
nuclear use. Moreover, if its survival was at stake, Iran could credibly
threaten to use a few nuclear weapons to completely shut down the flow of oil
in the Persian Gulf.

有充分的理由表明，核武器是終極的威懾力量：敵對方不太可能對一個擁核的國家行為體
存在威脅，特別是一個能夠經受住第一次核打擊並開展第二次核打擊的國家行為體，因為
這將是國家間可能大規模使用核武的唯一情況。例如，很難想像，如果伊朗方面擁有了核
彈，美國或以色列會對伊朗發動軍事攻擊——即使僅僅是使用常規武器——也可能會迫使
對方因為局勢升級而選擇使用核武器。此外，如果伊朗的生存受到威脅，其完全可以有令
人信服的理由,威脅使用核武器來切斷波斯灣的石油輸送。

It might seem hard to imagine Iran using nuclear weapons first in a crisis,
but history tells us that desperate states are sometimes willing to pursue
exceedingly risky strategies — the Japanese decision to attack a far more
powerful United States in 1941 and the Egyptian decision to strike mighty
Israel in 1973 are the classic cases. The Trump administration would surely
be aware of the dangers of provoking a nuclear-armed Iran. In short, nuclear
weapons would profoundly alter Iran’s strategic situation for the better.

也許很難想像，伊朗會在危機局面中率先使用核武器打擊對方，但歷史的經驗告訴我們，
絕望的國家行為體有時會採取極端危險的戰略賭搏---日本在1941年決定攻擊美國，埃及
在1973年決定打擊以色列，這些就是典型的例子。川普政府肯定會意識到，激怒一個擁核
伊朗的危險性。簡而言之，核武器將深刻地改變伊朗的戰略形勢與地區局勢，使之向好方
向發展。

Of course, the last thing Washington, Tel Aviv and Riyadh want is for Iran to
acquire the bomb. But it is hard to see how to avoid that outcome. The United
States is certainly not going to invade and occupy Iran — forever — to
ensure that it does not go nuclear. Hard-liners will instead advocate bombing
Iran’s nuclear facilities, but the Iranians will go to great lengths to make
them invulnerable to aerial attacks. Air power can delay a determined Iranian
effort to get the bomb by a few years at most. It is also hard to imagine the
United States bombing Iran year after year to prevent it from acquiring the
bomb.

當然，華盛頓、特拉維夫和利雅得方面最不希望看到的就是伊朗擁核。但他們又很難想到
如何避免這種結果。似乎可以肯定的是，美國不會為確保伊朗的無核化而選擇入侵併永久
佔領伊朗。鷹派或許會主張轟炸伊朗的核設施，但伊朗人會不遺餘力地使其免受空襲。來
自空中的打擊力量最多可以將伊朗擁核的決心推遲幾年。同時，我們也很難想像，美國年
復一年轟炸伊朗的場景。

Furthermore, Mr. Trump’s policy has backed the United States into a corner,
leaving no clear diplomatic offramp in sight. For obvious reasons, Iranian
leaders do not trust Mr. Trump, and they surely recognize he might eventually
walk away from any deal they strike with him. If Mr. Trump tries to lower
tensions by easing the sanctions, which Tehran insists he must do before it
will even agree to talk, he will be savaged at home by the Iran hawks, who
are an important part of his political base. Israel, Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf States will be equally critical.

此外，川普先生的對外政策已經把美國逼到了牆角，沒有留下明確的外交出口。顯而易見
的是，伊朗領導人並不信任川普，他們肯定早就已經認識到，美國最終會放棄與伊朗達成
的任何協議。如果川普試圖通過制裁鬆綁來緩和緊張局勢（基於德黑蘭對立場的一再堅持
，在其同意與美國談判之前,川普必須這樣做）那麼，他將在美國國內遭到對伊鷹派人士
的猛烈抨擊，要知道，這些人是川普國內和國際政治基礎威權的重要組成部分。在他們的
概念裡,以色列、沙特阿拉伯和海灣國家同等重要。

One might argue that Iran can wait out the Trump presidency, hoping that a
Democrat wins the November 2020 election. After all, virtually all the
Democratic candidates are committed to returning the United States to the
nuclear deal.

有人可能會說，伊朗可以等到川普的總統任期結束後再做打算，並寄希望於民主黨人贏得
2020年11月的美國大選。畢竟，幾乎所有的民主黨候選人都承諾讓美國重返伊朗核協議。

The election, however, is well over a year away, and Iran cannot know whether
Mr. Trump will be defeated. Even if he is, Tehran cannot be sure the new
president will deliver on that promise, not only because one can never be
certain about the future intentions of foreign leaders, but also because
American-Iranian relations are likely to become even more poisonous between
now and the election. No sensible Iranian leader is going to wage his country
’s survival on who gets elected president of the United States.

然而，距離大選還有一年多，伊朗方面尚不確定川普是否會被擊敗。同時，德黑蘭也無法
確定新總統是否會兌現這一承諾,這不僅是因為人們永遠無法確定外國領導人未來的意圖
，還因為的是，從現在到大選之前的這段時間，美伊關係可能會變得更加惡劣。任何明智
的領導人都不會依靠誰當選美國總統來維護自己國家的生存權利。

It makes much more sense for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons rather than
gamble on the possibility that America’s Iran policy will radically shift
once again. Surely many Iranian policymakers — and especially the
hard-liners among them — now recognize that if they had acquired a
survivable nuclear arsenal in the early 2000s, the Trump administration would
not be threatening their survival today.

擁核比賭博更接近真理。對伊朗來說，核武器比分析判斷美國對伊的政策是否再次徹底改
變更具現實意義。可以肯定的是，許多伊朗的政策制定者——尤其是其中的對美強硬派—
—現在已經認識到，如果他們在本世紀初就獲得了常備核武庫，川普政府今天就不會威脅
到他們的生存了。

The one slim chance for heading off a nuclear-armed Iran is a radical
reversal of American policy. Mr. Trump would have to begin by parting company
with the hard-line advisers who helped lead him astray. Ultimately, he would
have to return the United States to the 2015 agreement, ease sanctions and
appoint an experienced and fair-minded representative to negotiate a new
deal. He would also have to endure the storm of protests that would come from
his own party, influential donors, and allies like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

目前來看，阻止伊朗擁核的一個渺茫機會是美國對伊政策的徹底逆轉。川普先生必須首先
與助力他誤入歧途的強硬派顧問分道揚鑣。此舉最終也將使他不得不讓美國重返2015年的
協議；放鬆制裁；並任命一位經驗豐富、公正的代表來通過談判，促成一項新的協議。他
還將不得不忍受來自自己政黨、有影響力的捐助者以及以色列和沙特阿拉伯等盟友的抗議
風暴。

Regrettably, Mr. Trump is more likely to escalate the pressure on Iran to
salvage a flawed policy rather than accept the political costs of a course
correction — a blunder that will drive Iran to join the nuclear club.

遺憾的是，川普更有可能加大對伊朗的制裁和施壓，妄想以此挽救先前存在缺陷的對伊政
策，而不是接受修正路線所帶來的政治代價——這個失誤或將迫使伊朗最終加入世界核俱
樂部。

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