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推 RIFF: 1.感謝劃重點 10/19 18:48
→ RIFF: 2.這種變革似因中國的挑戰而起 然我不看好企業社會化成果 10/19 18:49
Why rigged capitalism is damaging liberal democracy
為何受到操控的資本主義正在破壞自由民主
原文：FT.com
https://www.ft.com/content/5a8ab27e-d470-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77
譯文：觀察者
https://www.guancha.cn/MaDing-WoErFu/2019_10_12_520968.shtml
Martin Wolf
“While each of our individual companies serves its own corporate purpose,
we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stakeholders.”
“雖然我們每家公司都服務於自己的企業目標，但我們對公司的所有利益攸關方都有一個
基本的承諾”
With this sentence, the US Business Roundtable, which represents the chief
executives of 181 of the world’s largest companies, abandoned their
longstanding view that “corporations exist principally to serve their
shareholders”.
匯聚全球181家最大公司首席執行官的“美國商業圓桌會議”通過這句話宣示他們將放棄
“公司存在的價值在於為股東利益服務”的傳統觀念。
This is certainly a moment. But what does — and should — that moment mean?
The answer needs to start with acknowledgment of the fact that something has
gone very wrong. Over the past four decades, and especially in the US, the
most important country of all, we have observed an unholy trinity of slowing
productivity growth, soaring inequality and huge financial shocks.
這絕對是一個重大時刻。這個重大時刻到底意味著什麼呢？這個重大時刻應該意味著什麼
呢？要想尋得答案，我們必須首先意識到：一定是哪裡出了嚴重的問題。在過去40年裡，
尤其是在美國這個全世界最重要的國家，我們已經看到一個“危險三角”狀況的出現：生
產率增長放緩、貧富不均加劇以及嚴重金融震盪不斷爆發。
As Jason Furman of Harvard University and Peter Orszag of Lazard Frères
noted in a paper last year: “From 1948 to 1973, real median family income in
the US rose 3 per cent annually. At this rate…there was a 96 per cent chance
that a child would have a higher income than his or her parents. Since 1973,
the median family has seen its real income grow only 0.4 per cent annually…
As a result, 28 per cent of children have lower income than their parents did.
”
正如哈佛大學的傑森·福爾曼（Jason Furman）和拉扎德公司的彼得·奧斯扎格（Peter
Orszag）在去年共同撰寫的一篇論文中所指出的：“從1948年到1973年，美國家庭收入中
位數年均增長3%。在這個增長背景下，96%的美國孩子獲得了比其父母更高的收入。然而
從1973年開始，美國家庭實際收入中位數年均增長率僅為0.4%，這造成了28%的美國孩子
的收入比其父母要低”。
So why is the economy not delivering? The answer lies, in large part, with
the rise of rentier capitalism. In this case “rent” means rewards over and
above those required to induce the desired supply of goods, services, land or
labour. “Rentier capitalism” means an economy in which market and political
power allows privileged individuals and businesses to extract a great deal of
such rent from everybody else.
美國經濟的表現為何如此令人失望？答案很大程度上在於“收租資本主義”（rentier
capitalism）的興起。在這裡，“租”（rent）的意思是扣除必要的商品、服務、土地和
勞動力成本後所獲得的回報。而“收租資本主義”的存在意味著市場和政治力量允許經濟
體系中具備特權的公司或個人能夠從其他人那裡搾取大量的“租”。
That does not explain every disappointment. As Robert Gordon, professor of
social sciences at Northwestern University, argues, fundamental innovation
slowed after the mid-20th century. Technology has also created greater
reliance on graduates and raised their relative wages, explaining part of the
rise of inequality. But the share of the top 1 per cent of US earners in
pre-tax income jumped from 11 per cent in 1980 to 20 per cent in 2014. This
was not mainly the result of such skill-biased technological change.
然而，這並不能為所有令人失望的狀況提供解釋。正如美國西北大學社會學教授羅伯特·
戈登（Robert Gordon）所言：基礎性創新活動在20世紀中葉之後出現了放緩。科技還造
成了社會對大學畢業生的更深依賴，從而推高了他們的相對工資，這能夠為貧富不均加劇
提供部分解釋。稅前收入位居前1%的美國人的收入佔全部收入的比例已經從1980年的11%
上升到了2014年的20%，然而這並非技術變革所導致。
If one listens to the political debates in many countries, notably the US and
UK, one would conclude that the disappointment is mainly the fault of imports
from China or low-wage immigrants, or both. Foreigners are ideal scapegoats.
But the notion that rising inequality and slow productivity growth are due to
foreigners is simply false.
如果你去一些國家（比如美國和英國）聽一聽那裡的政治辯論，你會得出“中國進口商品
和低收入移民應該為此負責”的結論。外國人的確是理想的替罪羊。然而貧富不均加劇和
生產率增長放緩又該如何解釋呢？把這兩個問題的責任推給外國人顯然是不合適的。
Every western high-income country trades more with emerging and developing
countries today than it did four decades ago. Yet increases in inequality
have varied substantially. The outcome depended on how the institutions of
the market economy behaved and on domestic policy choices.
如今每一個西方高收入國家與新興發展中國家之間的貿易額都遠非40年前可比。然而西方
各國貧富不均的加劇程度卻存在著顯著差異，其結果取決於各國市場經濟制度的表現如何
以及各國在國內政策上做出怎樣的選擇。
Harvard economist Elhanan Helpman ends his overview of a huge academic
literature on the topic with the conclusion that “globalisation in the form
of foreign trade and offshoring has not been a large contributor to rising
inequality. Multiple studies of different events around the world point to
this conclusion.”
哈佛大學經濟學家埃爾哈南·海爾普曼（Elhanan Helpman）曾就這一課題的大量學術論
文寫過一篇綜述，他在結尾做出結論：“以對外貿易和外包生產為主要形式的全球化並不
是貧富不均日益加劇的主要原因，對全球許多案例的研究都得出了這一結論”。
The shift in the location of much manufacturing, principally to China, may
have lowered investment in high-income economies a little. But this effect
cannot have been powerful enough to reduce productivity growth significantly.
To the contrary, the shift in the global division of labour induced
high-income economies to specialise in skill-intensive sectors, where there
was more potential for fast productivity growth.
大量製造業轉移到國外（主要是中國）也許會略微降低高收入經濟體的投資水平，然而這
一效應不足以造成生產率增速的顯著下降。與之相反，全球勞動分工的變化會使高收入經
濟體更加專注於技術密集型產業，在這類產業裡生產率的增長潛力應該更大。
Donald Trump, a naive mercantilist, focuses, instead, on bilateral trade
imbalances as a cause of job losses. These deficits reflect bad trade deals,
the American president insists. It is true that the US has overall trade
deficits, while the EU has surpluses. But their trade policies are quite
similar. Trade policies do not explain bilateral balances. Bilateral
balances, in turn, do not explain overall balances. The latter are
macroeconomic phenomena. Both theory and evidence concur on this.
天真的重商主義者唐納德·川普認為雙邊貿易失衡是美國就業崗位流失的主要原因。這位
總統堅持認為，是糟糕的貿易協定造成了貿易逆差。的確，美國總體上存在貿易逆差而歐
盟存在貿易順差，然而兩者的貿易政策卻是非常相似的。因此貿易政策是無法為雙邊貿易
的平衡情況給出解釋的；更進一步來說，美國對某一貿易夥伴的雙邊貿易平衡情況也與美
國整體的貿易平衡情況無關，美國整體的貿易平衡情況屬於宏觀經濟範疇。貿易理論和貿
易實踐都為上面的論述提供了支持。
The economic impact of immigration has also been small, however big the
political and cultural “shock of the foreigner” may be. Research strongly
suggests that the effect of immigration on the real earnings of the native
population and on receiving countries’ fiscal position has been small and
frequently positive.
無論外國移民帶來的政治和文化衝擊有多麼強烈，其經濟影響其實卻小得多。研究結論告
訴我們，外國移民對移民接收國民眾的實際收入和該國財政狀況所產生的影響並不顯著，
而且其影響一般都是正面的。
Far more productive than this politically rewarding, but mistaken, focus on
the damage done by trade and migration is an examination of contemporary
rentier capitalism itself.
關注貿易和移民問題所帶來的損害雖然可以獲得政治上的回報，然而這樣做卻是錯誤的。
與之相比，更加有益的做法其實是對當代“收租資本主義”本身加以審視。
Finance plays a key role, with several dimensions. Liberalised finance tends
to metastasise, like a cancer. Thus, the financial sector’s ability to
create credit and money finances its own activities, incomes and (often
illusory) profits.
金融業在諸多領域扮演著關鍵角色，而自由化的金融業就像癌細胞一樣四處擴散。金融業
創造信貸和資金的能力為其自身的活動、收入和虛幻的利潤提供了資金來源。
A 2015 study by Stephen Cecchetti and Enisse Kharroubi for the Bank for
International Settlements said “the level of financial development is good
only up to a point, after which it becomes a drag on growth, and that a
fast-growing financial sector is detrimental to aggregate productivity growth
”. When the financial sector grows quickly, they argue, it hires talented
people. These then lend against property, because it generates collateral.
This is a diversion of talented human resources in unproductive, useless
directions.
史蒂芬·切凱蒂（Stephen Cecchetti）和艾尼賽·哈魯比（Enisse Kharroubi）在2015
年為國際清算銀行（BIS）撰寫的一份研究報告中指出：“金融行業在發展到某一水平之
前對生產率增長是有利的，超出那個水平之後便會成為生產率增長的拖累，快速發展的金
融業對總生產率增長是有害的”。當金融行業快速增長的時候，有才華的聰明人湧入了這
個行業，他們向外發放貸款，因為貸款都是有抵押的。有才華的人卻進入不事生產的行業
，這是一種對優質人力資源的錯配。
Again, excessive growth of credit almost always leads to crises, as Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff showed in This Time is Different. This is why no
modern government dares let the supposedly market-driven financial sector
operate unaided and unguided. But that in turn creates huge opportunities to
gain from irresponsibility: heads, they win; tails, the rest of us lose.
Further crises are guaranteed.
正如卡門·萊因哈特（Carmen Reinhart）和肯尼斯·羅格夫（Kenneth Rogoff）在他們
合寫的《這次不一樣》（This Time is Different）一書中所指出的，信貸的過度增長幾
乎總是會導致危機的爆發。這就是沒有任何一個現代政府敢於讓由市場驅動的金融產業在
毫無監管的情況下運轉的原因。在那樣一種不負責任的情形下，會出現巨大的獲利空間，
金融業者是注定的贏家，而危機也將進一步深化。
Finance also creates rising inequality. Thomas Philippon of the Stern School
of Business and Ariell Reshef of the Paris School of Economics showed that
the relative earnings of finance professionals exploded upwards in the 1980s
with the deregulation of finance. They estimated that “rents” — earnings
over and above those needed to attract people into the industry — accounted
for 30-50 per cent of the pay differential between finance professionals and
the rest of the private sector.
此外，金融業還助推了貧富不均的加劇。紐約大學斯特恩商學院的托馬斯·菲利蓬（
Thomas Philippon）和巴黎經濟學院的阿里爾·雷謝夫（Ariell Reshef）在文章中指出
，金融行業專業人士的相對收入在上世紀80年代出現了爆炸式增長，而正是那個時期金融
業被解除了管制。據二人推測，“租”（即超出金融業吸引人們進入該行業工作的基本收
入水平之外的超額收入）在金融行業專業人士和其他私營部門從業者的收入差距中佔
30%-50%的比例。
This explosion of financial activity since 1980 has not raised the growth of
productivity. If anything, it has lowered it, especially since the crisis.
The same is true of the explosion in pay of corporate management, yet another
form of rent extraction. As Deborah Hargreaves, founder of the High Pay
Centre, notes, in the UK the ratio of average chief executive pay to that of
average workers rose from 48 to one in 1998 to 129 to one in 2016. In the US,
the same ratio rose from 42 to one in 1980 to 347 to one in 2017.
自1980年以來金融活動的爆炸式增長並沒有提高生產率的增速。要說有什麼影響，金融活
動的這種爆炸式增長反而降低了生產率的增速，在危機爆發之後尤其如此。與此同時，公
司管理層的工資水平也出現了爆炸式增長，這可以看成是“抽租”（rent extraction）
的一種形式。研究機構“高收入中心”的創始人德博拉·哈格里弗斯（Deborah
Hargreaves）指出：在英國，CEO的平均收入與普通員工的平均收入之比已經從1998年的
48:1擴大至2016年的129:1。在美國，這個比值則從1980年的42:1擴大至2017年的347:1。
As the US essayist HL Mencken wrote: “For every complex problem, there is an
answer that is clear, simple and wrong.” Pay linked to the share price gave
management a huge incentive to raise that price, by manipulating earnings or
borrowing money to buy the shares. Neither adds value to the company. But
they can add a great deal of wealth to management. A related problem with
governance is conflicts of interest, notably over independence of auditors.
美國作家亨利·門肯（HL Mencken）曾寫道：“每一個複雜的問題都有一個清晰、簡明然
而卻錯誤的答案”。由於公司股價與公司高管個人收入掛鉤，他們在提高公司股價方面有
著強烈的動機，他們會通過操縱公司收入或借貸回購股票來達到這個目的。然而這兩種做
法對公司價值的提升毫無益處，只有管理層的錢包獲得了好處。此外，還有一個與監管有
關的問題會涉及利益衝突——審計部門的獨立性。
In sum, personal financial considerations permeate corporate decision-making.
As the independent economist Andrew Smithers argues in Productivity and the
Bonus Culture, this comes at the expense of corporate investment and so of
long-run productivity growth.
總之，管理層個人的利益算計已經對公司決策產生了重大影響。獨立經濟學家安德魯·史
密瑟斯（Andrew Smithers）在其《生產率與獎金文化》（Productivity and the Bonus
Culture）一書中指出，這一切“是以公司投資和長遠的生產率增長為代價的”。
A possibly still more fundamental issue is the decline of competition. Mr
Furman and Mr Orszag say there is evidence of increased market concentration
in the US, a lower rate of entry of new firms and a lower share of young
firms in the economy compared with three or four decades ago. Work by the
OECD and Oxford Martin School also notes widening gaps in productivity and
profit mark-ups between the leading businesses and the rest. This suggests
weakening competition and rising monopoly rent. Moreover, a great deal of the
increase in inequality arises from radically different rewards for workers
with similar skills in different firms: this, too, is a form of rent
extraction.
也許，一個更加基本的問題在於競爭程度的弱化。哈佛大學的傑森·福爾曼（Jason
Furman）和拉扎德公司的彼得·奧斯扎格（Peter Orszag）指出，有證據顯示，與30或40
年前相比，美國的市場集中度出現了上升，進入市場的新公司數量減少，而且新公司在經
濟體系中的比例也出現了下降。經合組織和牛津大學馬丁學院的研究也指出，領先型公司
與其他公司在生產率和利潤率方面的差距一直在擴大，這意味著競爭程度的弱化以及壟斷
性“租”的增加。此外，受到不同公司僱傭的具有相似技能的員工獲得的待遇不同，這在
很大程度上加劇了貧富不均的狀況，而且這也可以看成是“抽租”的一種形式。
A part of the explanation for weaker competition is “winner-takes-almost-all
” markets: superstar individuals and their companies earn monopoly rents,
because they can now serve global markets so cheaply. The network
externalities — benefits of using a network that others are using — and
zero marginal costs of platform monopolies (Facebook, Google, Amazon, Alibaba
and Tencent) are the dominant examples.
競爭程度弱化的一個原因在於“贏者通吃”市場的存在——那些明星企業家和他們的公司
可以獲得壟斷性的“租”，因為他們能夠以很低的成本向全球市場提供產品和服務。網絡
外部性（新經濟中的重要概念，是指連接到一個網絡的價值取決於已經連接到該網絡的其
他人的數量。通俗地說，就是每個用戶從使用某產品中得到的效用與用戶的總數量呈正相
關關係——觀察者網注）以及壟斷平台（臉書、谷歌等大公司提供的網絡平台）的零邊際
成本就是這方面的鮮明例證。
Another such natural force is the network externalities of agglomerations,
stressed by Paul Collier in The Future of Capitalism. Successful metropolitan
areas — London, New York, the Bay Area in California — generate powerful
feedback loops, attracting and rewarding talented people. This disadvantages
businesses and people trapped in left-behind towns. Agglomerations, too,
create rents, not just in property prices, but also in earnings.
保羅·科利爾（Paul Collier）在《資本主義的未來》（The Future of Capitalism）一
書中強調稱，城市群的網絡外部性（the network externalities of agglomerations）
是另一股自然生成的力量。倫敦、紐約和加州灣區等發展成功的都會區都能夠生成強大的
閉環反饋機制，從而吸引人才的加入。這讓落後地區的產業和人口陷入不利境地。城市群
也能夠創造“租”，這“租”不僅包括不動產的升值，還包括收入的增長。
Yet monopoly rent is not just the product of such natural — albeit worrying
— economic forces. It is also the result of policy. In the US, Yale
University law professor Robert Bork argued in the 1970s that “consumer
welfare” should be the sole objective of antitrust policy. As with
shareholder value maximisation, this oversimplified highly complex issues. In
this case, it led to complacency about monopoly power, provided prices stayed
low. Yet tall trees deprive saplings of the light they need to grow. So, too,
may giant companies.
壟斷性的“租”不僅是自然生成的、令人憂慮的經濟力量的產物，它還是政策的結果。在
美國，耶魯大學法學教授羅伯特·伯克（Robert Bork）上世紀70年代就提出：“消費者
利益”應該被確立為制定反壟斷政策的唯一目的。正如股東利益最大化問題一樣，這種觀
點也把高度複雜的問題看得過於簡單了。按照伯克教授的說法，只要商品價格維持在低位
，壟斷性的大公司便不會再覺得有何不妥，然而大樹還是會擋住小樹苗生長所需要的陽光
，那些大公司也會對剛成立的小企業產生同樣的影響。
Some might argue, complacently, that the “monopoly rent” we now see in
leading economies is largely a sign of the “creative destruction” lauded by
the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter. In fact, we are not seeing enough
creation, destruction or productivity growth to support that view
convincingly.
一些人也許會頗為得意地認為，我們在發達經濟體所看到的壟斷性的“租”不過是奧地利
經濟學家約瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）所讚頌的“創造性破壞”（creative
destruction）的一種表現而已。然而事實上，我們所看到的創造、破壞或生產率增長等
現象並不足以為上述觀點提供令人信服的論據。
A disreputable aspect of rent-seeking is radical tax avoidance. Corporations
(and so also shareholders) benefit from the public goods — security, legal
systems, infrastructure, educated workforces and sociopolitical stability —
provided by the world’s most powerful liberal democracies. Yet they are
also in a perfect position to exploit tax loopholes, especially those
companies whose location of production or innovation is difficult to
determine.
尋租（rent-seeking）的一個令人所不齒的地方在於嚴重的避稅行為。這個世界上最強大
的自由民主國家所提供的安全、法制、基礎設施、技能良好的勞動力和穩定的社會環境等
公共產品使得大公司及其股東們深受其益。然而那些公司還是很容易對稅收漏洞加以利用
，尤其是那些生產和研發地點難以確定的公司。
The biggest challenges within the corporate tax system are tax competition
and base erosion and profit shifting. We see the former in falling tax rates.
We see the latter in the location of intellectual property in tax havens, in
charging tax-deductible debt against profits accruing in higher-tax
jurisdictions and in rigging transfer prices within firms.
公司稅收制度的最大挑戰在於稅收競爭（指各地區通過競相降低有效稅率或實施有關稅收
優惠等途徑吸引其他地區財源流入本地區的政府自利行為——觀察者網注）、稅基侵蝕以
及利潤的轉移。我們已經在不斷降低的稅率中看到了稅收競爭；此外，我們還在避稅天堂
的知識產權申請、為應對在高稅率地區的利潤飈升而欠下可減稅的債務以及在公司內部操
縱轉移價格等現象中看到了稅基侵蝕和利潤轉移。
A 2015 study by the IMF calculated that base erosion and profit shifting
reduced long-run annual revenue in OECD countries by about $450bn (1 per cent
of gross domestic product) and in non-OECD countries by slightly over $200bn
(1.3 per cent of GDP). These are significant figures in the context of a tax
that raised an average of only 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2016 in OECD countries
and just 2 per cent in the US.
國際貨幣基金組織於2015年進行的一項研究顯示，稅基侵蝕和利潤轉移使經合組織國家的
長期測算年收入損失了4500億美元（佔其GDP的1%），使非經合組織國家的長期測算年收
入損失了2000億美元（佔其GDP的1.3%）。在2016年經合組織國家GDP增長率2.9%和美國
GDP增長率2%的大背景下，上面的數字可以說是頗為顯著的。
Brad Setser of the Council on Foreign Relations shows that US corporations
report seven times as much profit in small tax havens (Bermuda, the British
Caribbean, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore and Switzerland) as in
six big economies (China, France, Germany, India, Italy and Japan). This is
ludicrous. The tax reform under Mr Trump changed essentially nothing.
Needless to say, not only US corporations benefit from such loopholes.
美國對外關係委員會的布拉德·塞特瑟（Brad Setser）指出，根據美國公司的報告，這
些公司在7個避稅天堂（百慕大群島、英屬加勒比地區、愛爾蘭、盧森堡、荷蘭、新加坡
和瑞士）的利潤是他們在6個大型經濟體（中國、法國、德國、印度、意大利和日本）的
利潤的7倍。這是非常荒唐的。川普總統進行的稅務改革對這一狀況的改善幾乎沒有產生
任何作用。當然，從這一漏洞中獲利的可不僅是美國公司。
In such cases, rents are not merely being exploited. They are being created,
through lobbying for distorting and unfair tax loopholes and against needed
regulation of mergers, anti-competitive practices, financial misbehaviour,
the environment and labour markets. Corporate lobbying overwhelms the
interests of ordinary citizens. Indeed, some studies suggest that the wishes
of ordinary people count for next to nothing in policymaking.
在上述情況下，人們不僅在搾取“租”，他們還通過遊說活動製造扭曲和不公平的稅收漏
洞、反對針對合併、反壟斷、金融不端行為以及對環境和勞動力市場的必要監管在創造“
租”。公司的遊說活動擊敗了普通公民的利益。一些研究報告指出：普通民眾的意願對政
策制定者毫無影響力。
Not least, as some western economies have become more Latin American in their
distribution of incomes, their politics have also become more Latin American.
Some of the new populists are considering radical, but necessary, changes in
competition, regulatory and tax policies. But others rely on xenophobic dog
whistles while continuing to promote a capitalism rigged to favour a small
elite. Such activities could well end up with the death of liberal democracy
itself.
尤其需要指出的是，隨著一些西方經濟體在收入分配方面拉美化傾向日益明顯，他們的政
治也在變得拉美化。一些新的民粹主義者正在將競爭、監管和稅收政策領域的激進而必要
的變革納入考慮。與此同時，其他民粹主義者帶著排外的心理繼續推動有利於一小部分精
英階層的受到操縱的資本主義。此類行為可能導致自由民主制度本身的終結。
Members of the Business Roundtable and their peers have tough questions to
ask themselves. They are right: seeking to maximise shareholder value has
proved a doubtful guide to managing corporations. But that realisation is the
beginning, not the end. They need to ask themselves what this understanding
means for how they set their own pay and how they exploit — indeed actively
create — tax and regulatory loopholes.
美國商業圓桌會議”的成員及其夥伴們需要向自己提出一些嚴峻的問題。他們是對的，最
大化股東利益的行為在公司治理方面的確是值得懷疑的。然而他們在這方面意識的覺醒還
只是邁向問題解決的開始，而非終結。他們需要問自己，當他們為自己的工資制定標準時
，當他們利用乃至積極主動地創造稅收和監管漏洞時，上述意識的覺醒到底意味著什麼呢
？
They must, not least, consider their activities in the public arena. What are
they doing to ensure better laws governing the structure of the corporation,
a fair and effective tax system, a safety net for those afflicted by economic
forces beyond their control, a healthy local and global environment and a
democracy responsive to the wishes of a broad majority?
他們尤其需要考慮自己的行為在公共輿論中的影響。為了讓公司治理有一個更完善的法律
框架、為了公平高效的稅收制度的建立、為了讓那些受到失控的經濟力量影響的人們能夠
擁有一張安全網、為了享有一個良好的局部和全球環境、為了建立能夠回應大多數民眾需
求的民主制度，他們到底都做了什麼呢？
We need a dynamic capitalist economy that gives everybody a justified belief
that they can share in the benefits. What we increasingly seem to have
instead is an unstable rentier capitalism, weakened competition, feeble
productivity growth, high inequality and, not coincidentally, an increasingly
degraded democracy. Fixing this is a challenge for us all, but especially for
those who run the world’s most important businesses. The way our economic
and political systems work must change, or they will perish.
我們需要構建一個有活力的、每個人都能夠在其中獲得利益的資本主義經濟體系。然而我
們所看到的似乎是失穩的“收租資本主義”、弱化的競爭局面、乏力的生產率增長、日益
加劇的貧富分化以及退化的民主制度。解決上述問題對我們來說是一個巨大的挑戰，對那
些運營著全球最重要大公司的高管們來說更是如此。我們必須改革當下的政治經濟體系的
運行方式，否則這個體系將走向終結。
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