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Disaster in the Desert：Why Trump’s Middle East Plan Can’t Work, Foreign
Affairs
沙漠中的災難：川普的中東計畫為何行不通
原文：Foreign Affairs https://tinyurl.com/y63ahars
作者：Martin Indyk
譯文：法意讀書 http://www.cwzg.cn/theory/202001/54128.html
譯者：黃致韜 (北大法治研究中心)
【法意導言：中東地區是美國地緣政治上的核心利益所在，川普上任之後，美國的中東政
策發生了很大調整。如何評價這一轉變？曾擔任美國主管近東事務助理國務卿的馬丁·印
迪克（Martin Indyk）在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）2019年10/11月刊上發表了《
沙漠裡的災難：為什麼川普的中東政策行不通》（Disaster in the Desert：Why Trump
’s Middle East Plan Can’t Work），嚴厲地批評了川普的中東政策。長期以來，美國
在中東的政治對手是尋求區域霸權的伊朗，美國最重要的政治盟友是以色列和沙特阿拉伯
。為了遏制伊朗，季辛吉推動建立的中東秩序，並取得了巨大的成效，其關鍵是調和以色
列與阿拉伯鄰國的矛盾，一致針對、遏制伊朗。但是在建立反伊朗同盟方面，川普試圖以
給予以色列和沙特阿拉伯更大的自由政策空間為代價，讓兩者完全承擔遏制伊朗的責任，
而美國以極小的代價全身而退。作者認為，這是不切實際的美好幻想。作者認為，事實證
明，在中東各派勢力錯綜複雜的情況下，給予盟友更大的政策空間將會導致同盟的內鬥，
進而削弱同盟，瓦解遏制伊朗的力量。在美國直接制裁伊朗方面，川普表面上採取了極其
嚴厲的制裁，但是背後卻沒有足夠的軍事決心，其出爾反爾的性格也同時削弱了制裁的效
果和盟友的信心。這導致伊朗反擊，重新開始核計畫。作者認為，這一切是川普不瞭解中
東極其複雜的現實，同時又剛愎自用造成的，美國的政策應該盡快回到原有的軌道。】
In July 2019, Jason Greenblatt, then U.S. President Donald Trump’s envoy for
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, attended a routine quarterly UN Security
Council meeting about the Middle East. Providing an update on the Trump
administration’s thinking about the peace process, he pointedly told the
surprised audience that the United States no longer respected the “fiction”
of an international consensus on the Israeli-Palestinian issue.
2019年7月，美國總統川普的巴以談判特使傑森·格林布拉特（Jason Greenblatt），參
加了聯合國安理會關於中東問題的例行季度會議。在提供川普政府對和平進程的最新想法
時，他尖銳地告訴驚訝的聽眾，美國不再尊重在巴以問題上達成“虛構”的國際共識。
Greenblatt went out of his way to attack not some extreme or obscure measure
but UN Security Council Resolution 242, the foundation of half a century of
Arab-Israeli negotiations and of every agreement Israel has achieved within
them, including the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. He railed against
its ambiguous wording, which has shielded Israel for decades against Arab
demands for a full withdrawal from occupied territory, as “tired rhetoric
designed to prevent progress and bypass direct negotiations” and claimed
that it had hurt rather than helped the chances for real peace in the region.
格林布拉特特意攻擊的不是一些極端或模糊的措施，而是聯合國安理會第242號決議，這
是半個世紀以來阿以談判的基礎，也是以色列在談判中達成的每一項協議的基礎，包括與
埃及和約旦的和平條約。他譴責其含糊不清的措辭，雖然這種措辭幾十年來一直保護以色
列不受阿拉伯要求其從佔領土全面撤軍的影響，他稱其為“旨在阻止進展和繞過直接談判
的陳詞濫調”，並聲稱這傷害了而不是幫助了該地區實現真正和平的機會。
The indignation was calculated. Guided by his boss Jared Kushner, the
president’s son-in-law and senior adviser on the Middle East, Greenblatt was
trying to change the conversation, to “start a new, realistic discussion”
of the subject. UN resolutions, international law, global consensus—all
that was irrelevant. From now on, Washington would no longer advocate a
two-state solution to the conflict, with independent Jewish and Palestinian
states living alongside each other in peace and security.
這種憤慨是計算好的。在他老闆，總統的女婿和中東高級顧問，賈裡德·庫什納（Jared
Kushner）的指導下，格林布拉特嘗試改變對話，在該領域“開展新的、現實的討論”。
聯合國決議、國際法、國際共識——這一切都與此無關。從此以後，華盛頓將不再主張以
兩國方案解決衝突，讓獨立的猶太和巴勒斯坦國家在和平與安全中共存。
Greenblatt's presentation was part of a broader campaign by the Trump
administration to break with the past and create a new Middle Eastern order.
To please a president who likes simple, cost-free answers, the
administration's strategists appear to have come up with a clever plan. The
United States can continue to withdraw from the region but face no adverse
consequences for doing so, because Israel and Saudi Arabia will pick up the
slack. Washington will subcontract the job of containing Iran, the principal
source of regional instability, to Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Levant and
the Persian Gulf, respectively. And the two countries' common interest in
countering Iran will improve their bilateral relationship, on which Israel
can build a tacit alliance with the Sunni Arab world. The proxies get broad
leeway to execute Washington's mandate at will, and their patron gets a new,
Trumpian order on the cheap. Unfortunately, this vision is a fantasy.
格林布拉特的演講是川普政府打破過去、創建中東新秩序的更廣泛運動的一部分。為了取
悅一位喜歡簡單、免費答案的總統，政府的戰略家們似乎想出了一個聰明的計畫。美國可
以繼續從該地區撤軍，但不會因此而面臨不利後果，因為以色列和沙特阿拉伯將會彌補這
一不足。華盛頓將把遏制伊朗這個地區不穩定的主要來源的任務分別分包給黎凡特和波斯
灣地區的以色列和沙特阿拉伯。兩國在對抗伊朗問題上的共同利益將改善雙邊關係，在此
基礎上，以色列可以與遜尼派阿拉伯世界建立默契的聯盟。代理人獲得了廣泛的迴旋餘地
，可以隨心所欲地執行華盛頓的命令，而他們的贊助人則以低廉的代價獲得一個新的、川
普式的秩序。不幸的是，這種願景只是一種幻想。
In the mid-1970s, even as the United States retrenched after its defeat in
Vietnam, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger successfully laid the
foundations for a new, U.S.-led Middle Eastern order. His main tool was
active diplomacy to reconcile Israel and its Arab neighbors. In many
respects, his efforts and those that followed were strikingly successful,
producing peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and
Jordan, as well as an interim agreement with the Palestinians.
在20世紀70年代中期，即使美國在越南戰敗後緊縮開支，美國國務卿亨利·季辛吉（
Henry Kissinger）還是成功地為美國領導的中東新秩序奠定了基礎。他的主要工具是積
極的外交手段來調和以色列及其阿拉伯鄰國。在許多方面，他和繼任者的努力取得了驚人
的成功，在以色列和埃及之間以及以色列和約旦之間達成了和平條約，並與巴勒斯坦人達
成了臨時協議。
Progress stalled during the twenty-first century, however, as the second
intifada dashed hopes for Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation, the Iraq war
empowered a revolutionary Iran, and the Arab Spring destabilized the region
and triggered the rise of the Islamic State, or ISIS.
然而，21世紀的進展停滯不前，因為第二次起義粉碎了以色列-巴勒斯坦和解的希望，伊
拉克戰爭增強了伊朗的革命力量，阿拉伯之春破壞了該地區的穩定，並引發了伊斯蘭國，
ISIS，的崛起。
Whoever won the presidency in 2016, therefore, would have faced a bleak
diplomatic landscape in the Middle East. Any recent administration would have
responded to this situation by going back to basics and painstakingly trying
to reconstruct the order Kissinger built, since it has, on balance, served
U.S. interests well. Instead, the Trump administration decided to blow up
what was left.
因此，無論是誰在2016年贏得總統大選，都會面臨中東慘淡的外交前景。任何最近的政府
都會對這種情況作出回應，回到基礎上，努力重建季辛吉建立的秩序，因為總的來說，它
很好地服務於美國的利益。相反的是，川普政府決定炸掉剩下的東西。
This is not reckless mayhem or mere domestic politics, goes the official
line, but creative destruction--demolition necessary to clear the ground for
a grand new diplomatic structure opening soon. The brochures look great; they
always do. But it is just another illusion.
官方的說法是，這不是魯莽的混亂或純粹的國內政治，而是創造性的破壞——為一個即將
開放的新外交結構掃清道路所必需的破壞。小冊子看起來很棒；他們總是這樣。但這只是
另一個幻覺。
The Trump administration likes to see itself as clear-eyed and tough-minded,
a confronter of the hard truths others refuse to acknowledge. In fact, it
understands so little about how the Middle East actually works that its
bungling efforts have been a failure across the board. As so often in the
past, the cynical locals are manipulating a clueless outsider, advancing
their personal agendas at the naive Americans' expense.
川普政府喜歡把自己視為目光清晰、意志堅強的人，是別人拒絕承認的嚴酷事實的對抗者
。事實上，它對中東實際上是如何運作的瞭解如此之少，以至於其拙劣的努力已經全面失
敗。和過去一樣，自私自利的當地人操縱著一個無知的局外人，以天真的美國人為代價推
進他們的個人議程。川普政府的中東政策不可能創造一個新的、更穩定的地區秩序。但他
們肯定會在繼續摧毀舊的、冒著失去一切的風險方面做得很好。這完全符合川普廢除自由
國際秩序、支持叢林法則的整體運動。
O JERUSALEM
耶路撒冷
Each aspect of the Trump administration's supposed new strategic triangle is
misconceived, starting with Iran, a hostile would-be regional hegemon with a
well-advanced nuclear program that Washington has been trying to contain for
decades. In 2015, U.S. and European diplomats made a major breakthrough by
negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a classic
multilateral arms control agreement that finally brought Iran's nuclear
program under extensive international supervision. By the time Trump entered
office, the agreement was functioning well in practice, and its inspections
provided a high degree of confidence that Iran was not actively pursuing a
nuclear weapons program.
川普政府所謂的新戰略三角的每一個方面都是錯誤的，從伊朗開始，一個希望掌握區域霸
權的敵對國家，擁有華盛頓幾十年來一直試圖遏制的先進核計畫。2015年，美國和歐洲外
交官通過談判達成《聯合全面行動計畫》(JCPOA)取得了重大突破，這是一項經典的多邊
軍控協議，最終將伊朗核計畫置於廣泛的國際監督之下。川普就職時，該協議在實踐中運
行良好，其視察為伊朗沒有積極推行核武器計畫提供了高度信心。
The deal was hardly perfect. Its terms enabled Iran to resume parts of its
nuclear program after ten years, it did not deal adequately with Iran's
ballistic missile program, and it did not address Iran's aggressive efforts
at regional destabilization. Still, the agreement took the nuclear file off
the table and set a pattern for how to resolve contentious disputes. So the
obvious next step for any incoming administration would have been to build on
the JCPOA and tackle the other issues on the docket. Instead, in May 2018,
overruling then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense
James Mattis and blatantly lying about Iran's compliance, Trump shredded the
agreement.
這筆交易並不完美。它的條款使伊朗能夠在十年後恢復部分核計畫，它沒有充分處理伊朗
的彈道導彈計畫，也沒有解決伊朗破壞地區穩定的侵略性。儘管如此，該協議並未提及核
檔案，並為如何解決有爭議的爭端設定了模式。因此，對於任何即將上任的政府來說，顯
而易見的下一步就是在JCPOA的基礎上再接再厲，解決議事日程上的其他問題。相反，
2018年5月，川普否決了當時的國務卿雷克斯·蒂勒森（Rex Tillerson）和國防部長詹姆
斯·馬蒂斯（James Mattis），並公然對伊朗的遵守情況撒謊，粉碎了該協議。
This was partly due to Trump's personal obsession with Barack Obama. Anything
his predecessor had done had to be undone, and the Iran deal was Obama's
signature accomplishment. But there was more to it than pique. In a speech
soon after the U.S. withdrawal from the deal, Trump's new secretary of state,
Mike Pompeo, unveiled the administration's "maximum pressure" campaign of
reimposed sanctions to cut off Iran's oil exports, an effort that was
designed to prevent the country from having "carte blanche to dominate the
Middle East." Pompeo issued a list of demands that together amounted to
Iranian capitulation： no uranium enrichment, ever; no interference with the
International Atomic Energy Agency's inspections, anywhere; no development of
nuclear-capable missiles; no support for Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Shiite militias, the Taliban, or Yemen's Houthis; no
Iranian-commanded forces in any part of Syria; and no threatening behavior
toward Israel, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates. In case there was
any doubt, Pompeo was explicit： there would be no renegotiation of the JCPOA.
部分原因是川普個人對巴拉克·歐巴馬的著迷。他的前任所做的一切都必須撤銷，而伊朗
協議是歐巴馬的標誌性成就。但這不僅僅是賭氣。在美國退出協議後不久的一次講話中，
川普的新任國務卿邁克·龐培奧(Mike Pompeo)公佈了政府重新實施制裁以切斷伊朗石油
出口的“最大壓力”行動，此舉旨在防止該國“全權控制中東”。龐培奧發佈了一份總計
相當於讓伊朗投降的要求清單：永遠不要濃縮鈾；任何地方都不干涉國際原子能機構的視
察；禁止發展有核能力的導彈；禁止支持哈馬斯、真主黨、巴勒斯坦伊斯蘭聖戰組織、伊
拉克什葉派民兵、塔利班或也門的胡塞組織；敘利亞任何地方都禁止有伊朗指揮的部隊；
也禁止對以色列、沙特阿拉伯或阿拉伯聯合酋長國的威脅行為。以防任何疑問，龐培奧明
確：不會對JCPOA重新談判。
These moves were not coordinated with U.S. allies and partners. The appeals
of the other signatories to the JCPOA--China, Russia, the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and the Eu--were ignored, and they were even threatened with
U.S. sanctions if they dared to buy Iranian oil, in contradiction to the
agreement they had signed.
這些舉措沒有與美國盟友和合作夥伴協調一致。《聯合行動綱領》的其他簽署國——中國
、俄羅斯、英國、法國、德國和歐盟——的呼籲被忽視，他們甚至受到美國製裁的威脅，
如果他們膽敢購買伊朗石油，這與他們簽署的協議背道而馳。
Meanwhile, the president was determined to withdraw U.S. forces from the
region even more quickly than his predecessor had. The administration
dramatically increased its demands on Iran, in other words, at precisely the
same time that it was reducing its ability and will to deter Tehran's
nefarious activity in the region. The gap between rhetoric and reality was
best expressed by Pompeo, who, one month after Trump made clear that he was
determined to remove every remaining U.S. soldier from Syria, declared that
the United States intended to "expel every last Iranian boot" from the
country.
與此同時，總統決心比他的前任更快地從該地區撤出美國軍隊。換句話說，政府大幅增加
了對伊朗的要求，與此同時，它正在削弱遏制德黑蘭在該地區邪惡活動的能力和意願。言
辭和現實之間的差距最能體現在龐培奧身上。一個月後，川普明確表示，他決心將所有剩
餘的美國士兵撤出敘利亞，並宣佈美國打算“將伊朗的最後一隻靴子驅逐出境”。
The chasm between intentions and capabilities would not be a problem, the
Trump team insisted, because most of the burden of containing Iran would be
borne by Washington's two powerful regional partners, Israel and Saudi
Arabia. There was a superficial logic to this approach, since Israel is now
the strongest power in the region and Saudi Arabia is rich and influential.
But it cannot stand up to scrutiny.
川普團隊堅持認為，意圖和能力之間的差距不成問題，因為遏制伊朗的大部分負擔將由華
盛頓的兩個強大的地區夥伴——以色列和沙特阿拉伯——承擔。這種方法有一個膚淺的邏
輯，因為以色列現在是該地區最強大的力量，沙特阿拉伯富有且有影響力。但它經不起仔
細審查。
Israel has formidable military capabilities and a common interest with Sunni
Arab states in countering Iran, but the United States cannot depend on the
Jewish state to promote its interests in the Arab world. Israel's unresolved
conflict with the Palestinians has placed a ceiling on its ability to
cooperate publicly with its neighbors. Arab states are often willing to make
common cause with Israel under the table; Saudi Arabia has been doing so
since the 1960s. But an open association with the Jewish state would allow
Iran to pummel them for their apostasy and generate domestic dissent.
以色列擁有強大的軍事實力，在打擊伊朗方面與遜尼派阿拉伯國家有著共同的利益，但美
國不能依靠這個猶太國家來促進它在阿拉伯世界的利益。以色列與巴勒斯坦之間懸而未決
的衝突已經限制了它與鄰國公開合作的能力。阿拉伯國家常常願意與以色列私下達成共識
;自上世紀60年代以來，沙特阿拉伯一直在這樣做。但與這個猶太國家建立一個開放的聯
盟，將使伊朗能夠因他們的叛教行為而對他們進行打擊，並在國內製造異議。
In February of this year, for example, Trump and Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu attempted to organize an anti-Iran conference in Poland.
Netanyahu tweeted that it was "an open meeting with representatives of
leading Arab countries, that are sitting down together with Israel in order
to advance the common interest of combating Iran." Yet the Arab foreign
ministers refused to appear on the same panel with him in the conference's
general forum. The best the Israeli leader could do was post an illicitly
filmed video on YouTube of the foreign ministers of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia,
and the United Arab Emirates discussing Israel. (The video was quickly taken
down.) As for the United States' European allies, they mostly sent low-level
representatives, whose fate there was to be publicly chastised by U.S. Vice
President Mike Pence for attempting to discourage Iran from breaking out of
the nuclear agreement.
例如，今年2月，川普和以色列總理本傑明·納坦雅胡(Benjamin Netanyahu)試圖在波蘭
組織一次反伊朗會議。納坦雅胡在推特上說，這是“與阿拉伯主要國家代表的公開會議，
這些國家與以色列坐在一起，以推進打擊伊朗的共同利益。”然而，阿拉伯外交部長拒絕
與他一起出席大會的一般性論壇。這位以色列領導人能做的最好的事就是在YouTube上發
佈一段非正常拍攝的巴林、沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯聯合酋長國外交部長討論以色列的視頻。
(視頻很快就被刪除了。）至於美國的歐洲盟友，它們大多派出低級別的代表，他們在那
裡的命運就是受到美國副總統邁克·彭斯的公開譴責，因為它們試圖阻止伊朗違反核協議
。
In Syria, meanwhile, Israel can't achieve its objective of evicting the
Iranian presence, which includes Iranian-backed militias with some 40,000
troops, without outside help. But with the United States heading for the
exits there, Israel has had no choice but to seek Russia's assistance, given
its military presence and its influence on the Assad regime. Repeated visits
by Netanyahu to Moscow, however, have gained only Russian President Vladimir
Putin's qualified acquiescence in Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets. The
Israeli prime minister had hoped to use U.S. pressure and promises of
sanctions relief to persuade Russia to press Iran to leave Syria, but that
plan didn't pan out either. This past June, Netanyahu invited the top U.S.
and Russian national security advisers to Jerusalem to discuss joint action
against Tehran. There, the Russian poured cold water on the plan, explaining
publicly that Russia and Iran were cooperating on counterterrorism issues,
that Iran's interests in Syria needed to be acknowledged, and that Israeli
airstrikes on Iranian assets in Syria were "undesirable."
與此同時，在敘利亞，沒有外界的幫助，以色列無法實現驅逐伊朗軍隊的目標，其中包括
由伊朗支持的約4萬人的民兵。但是，鑑於美國的軍事力量準備撤退，以色列別無選擇，
只能尋求俄羅斯的援助，因為俄羅斯的軍事存在和它對阿薩德政權的影響。然而，納坦雅
胡對莫斯科的多次訪問只獲得了俄羅斯總統普京對以色列空襲伊朗目標的有條件默許。以
色列總理曾希望利用美國的壓力和減輕制裁的承諾來說服俄羅斯迫使伊朗離開敘利亞，但
這個計畫也沒有成功。今年6月，納坦雅胡邀請美國和俄羅斯最高國家安全顧問前往耶路
撒冷，討論針對德黑蘭的聯合行動。在那裡，俄羅斯對該計畫潑冷水，公開解釋說，俄羅
斯和伊朗正在反恐問題上進行合作，伊朗在敘利亞的利益需要得到承認，以色列對伊朗在
敘利亞資產的空襲是“不可取的”。
Netanyahu was so alarmed by Trump's surprise announcement that he would
withdraw residual U.S. troops from eastern Syria, where they were helping
prevent Iran from establishing a land bridge from Iraq to Lebanon, that he
had to plead with the White House to delay the withdrawal. But this stopgap
measure has done nothing to remove Iran's Syrian strongholds, and hundreds of
Israeli strikes on Iranian positions have only increased the risk that the
conflict will spread to Iraq and Lebanon and escalate to a full-scale war
between Israel and Hezbollah.
川普出人意料地宣佈，他將從敘利亞東部撤出剩餘的美國軍隊，這讓納坦雅胡非常震驚。
在那裡，美國軍隊正在幫助阻止伊朗修建從伊拉克到黎巴嫩的陸橋，他不得不請求白宮推
遲撤軍。但這一權宜之計無助於拆除伊朗在敘利亞的據點，以色列對伊朗陣地的數百次襲
擊只會增加衝突蔓延到伊拉克和黎巴嫩並升級為以色列和真主黨之間全面戰爭的風險。
Israel's border with Syria had been quiet for almost four decades after
Kissinger negotiated the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement in 1974. The
agreement included a carefully negotiated side deal between the United States
and Syria that committed the Assad regime to preventing terrorists from
operating against Israel from the Syrian side of the Golan Heights. The
disengagement agreement was based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, with
its explicit prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force, which made
clear that the Golan Heights was Syrian sovereign territory. Nevertheless,
that UN resolution, which Greenblatt was so keen to disparage before the UN
Security Council, allowed Israel to retain possession of the Golan Heights
until a final peace agreement was reached. That is why Israel never annexed
the territory, even though it considers it strategically crucial, maintains
settlements there, and even has established vineyards and a robust tourism
industry in the area. (Instead of claiming sovereignty, in a controversial
decision in 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin extended Israeli law to the
Golan, for which Israel was condemned by the UN Security Council, with the
United States voting in favor.)
季辛吉於1974年談判達成以色列-敘利亞脫離接觸協議（Israeli-Syrian disengagement
agreement）後，以色列與敘利亞的邊界平靜了近40年。該協議包括美國和敘利亞之間經
過認真談判達成的一項附帶協議，該協議承諾阿薩德政權將防止恐怖分子從戈蘭高地的敘
利亞一側對以色列採取行動。脫離接觸協定以聯合國安全理事會第242號決議為基礎，明
確禁止以武力獲取領土，這表明戈蘭高地是敘利亞的主權領土。然而，這份格林布拉特如
此熱衷於在聯合國安理會上貶低的聯合國決議，允許以色列保留戈蘭高地的所有權，直到
達成最終和平協議。這就是為什麼以色列從未吞併該領土，儘管它認為它具有戰略重要性
，在那裡維持定居點，甚至在該地區建立了葡萄園和強大的旅遊業。(1981年，以色列總
理梅納赫姆·貝京（Menachem Begin）沒有聲稱擁有主權，而是將以色列法律延伸到戈蘭
高低，以色列因此受到聯合國安理會的譴責，當時美國投了贊成票。)
Israel and Syria managed to keep their deal going for generations, even
upholding it as the latter descended into civil war and anarchy. When
Netanyahu asked for Russia's help in keeping Iranian-backed militias out of
the Golan Heights in July 2018, he explicitly invoked the disengagement
agreement, as did Putin in his press conference with Trump at their ill-fated
Helsinki summit that same month. But that was all before Netanyahu sought
Trump's help in his latest reelection bid. In what Trump subsequently
referred to as a "quickie" briefing, he was asked on Netanyahu's behalf by
Kushner and David Friedman, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, to recognize
Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights (without even informing Pompeo,
who happened to be visiting Israel at the time).
以色列和敘利亞設法讓他們的協議延續了幾代人的時間，甚至在後者陷入內戰和無政府狀
態時也堅持了下來。當納坦雅胡在2018年7月請求俄羅斯幫助阻止伊朗支持的民兵進入戈
蘭高地時，他明確援引了脫離接觸協議，同一個月，普京於赫爾辛基峰會上，在與川普舉
行的新聞發佈會中也是如此。但這一切都發生在納坦雅胡尋求川普在最近一次連任競選中
的幫助之前。在川普後來稱之為“快嗖嗖”的簡報會上，庫什納和美國駐以色列大使戴維
·弗裡德曼(David Friedman)代表納坦雅胡要求他承認以色列對戈蘭高地的主權(甚至沒
有通知龐培奧，龐培奧當時碰巧正在訪問以色列)。
Trump was quick to agree. "I went, 'bing!'--it was done," he later told the
Republican Jewish Coalition at its annual meeting in Las Vegas. And so in
March of this year, he issued a presidential proclamation declaring that the
Golan Heights was part of Israel. Trump boasted that he had done something no
other president was willing to do. He was clearly unaware that no previous
Israeli government had been willing to do it either, knowing that it would
violate a core principle of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and not
wanting to reap the whirlwind.
川普很快同意了。“我去了，‘bing！’——就搞定了！”他後來在拉斯維加斯的年度會
議上告訴共和黨猶太聯盟（Republican Jewish Coalition）。因此，今年3月，他發佈了
一項總統公告，宣佈戈蘭高地是以色列的一部分。川普誇口說，他做了其他總統都不願意
做的事情。他顯然不知道以色列前政府也不願意這樣做，因為他知道這違反了聯合國安理
會第242號決議的核心原則，也不想自食其果。
The cheap political gambit wasn't even successful. Netanyahu couldn't secure
a majority in national elections two weeks later and was forced to take part
in another campaign in the fall, in which he came up short again. But Trump's
snap decision will have lasting implications, undermining the disengagement
agreement, giving Putin justification for his illegal annexation of Crimea,
and reinforcing U.S. and Israeli diplomatic isolation. The result is a Tehran
now free to establish its militias' presence on the Syrian side of the
border--with the blessing of Damascus, unconstrained by the antiterrorism
commitment that Hafez al-Assad made to Kissinger all those decades ago. Sure
enough, by July of this year, Israel was finding it necessary to bomb
Hezbollah positions in the Golan Heights, left with violence as its only tool
to prevent Iran from making mischief there.
廉價的政治策略甚至沒有成功。兩週後，納坦雅胡無法在全國選舉中獲得多數席位，被迫
在秋季參加另一場競選，但他再次落選。但川普的倉促決定將產生持久影響，破壞脫離接
觸協議，為普京非法吞併克里米亞提供理由，並強化美國和以色列的外交孤立。其結果是
，在大馬士革的支持下，德黑蘭現在可以自由地在邊境的敘利亞一側建立民兵組織，不受
幾十年前哈菲扎爾·阿薩德（Hafezal Assad）對季辛吉的反恐承諾的約束。果然，到今
年7月，以色列發現有必要轟炸戈蘭高地的真主黨陣地，讓暴力成為阻止伊朗在那裡製造
事端的唯一工具。
SAUDI STYLE
沙特方式
Saudi Arabia has proved to be an even weaker reed for the United States to
lean on. Riyadh has never before sought to lead the Arab world in war and
peace. Recognizing their country's limitations as a rich yet vulnerable state
with a fragile domestic consensus, Saudi rulers have preferred to play a
quiet, supporting role in the American-led order. Egypt, Iraq, and Syria were
always the key players in Arab politics. But with Iraq battered, Syria in
chaos, and a stagnant Egypt being whipsawed by revolution and
counterrevolution, the way was clear for an ambitious, headstrong, and
ruthless young Saudi prince to stake his country's claim to Arab leadership.
Coming to power in 2015, at the age of 29, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman,
known as MBS, first consolidated his control over the kingdom's military and
security apparatus and then launched an ambitious economic development
program at home and aggressive interventions abroad, including a brutal
campaign to suppress Iranian-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.
沙特阿拉伯證實是美國盟友中更弱的蘆葦。利雅得以前從未試圖在戰爭與和平中領導阿拉
伯世界。沙特統治者認識到自己國家作為一個富裕但脆弱的國家的侷限性，國內共識脆弱
，他們更願意在美國領導的秩序中扮演一個安靜的配角。埃及、伊拉克和敘利亞一直是阿
拉伯政治中的關鍵角色。但是，隨著伊拉克遭受重創，敘利亞陷入混亂，停滯不前的埃及
被革命和反革命重創，一位雄心勃勃、任性而無情的年輕沙特王子可以用自己的國家對阿
拉伯領導地位的要求作為賭注。2015年掌權時，29歲的王儲穆罕默德·本·薩爾曼
(Mohammed bin Salman)首先鞏固了對王國軍事和安全機構的控制，然後在國內發起了雄
心勃勃的經濟發展計畫，並在國外進行了侵略性干預，包括鎮壓也門伊朗支持的胡塞武裝
叛軍的野蠻運動。
Newly exposed to Middle Eastern diplomacy on taking office, Trump jumped at
the short-term benefits Saudi Arabia promised to deliver in both security and
economics (a $350 billion arms deal that never materialized and the promise
of huge investments in the United States). The young Saudi scion soon
developed a bromance with his American counterpart, Kushner, which led to
Trump's first trip abroad, to an Arab and Islamic summit in Riyadh in 2017.
This gathering was supposed to facilitate greater cooperation on countering
violent extremism across the region; its sole tangible result was Trump's
greenlighting of an Emirati-Saudi decision to blockade neighboring Qatar, a
crucial U.S. partner in the Gulf because it hosts Al Udeid Air Base, the
largest U.S. military facility in the Middle East.
川普就職時剛剛接觸到中東外交，他欣然接受沙特阿拉伯承諾在安全和經濟方面提供的短
期利益(一筆3500億美元的從未兌現的武器交易，以及在美國進行巨額投資的承諾)。這位
年輕的沙特後裔很快與他的美國副本，庫什納，建立了友好關係，這致使川普首次出訪，
並於2017年在利雅得參加阿拉伯和伊斯蘭峰會。這次會面本應促進整個地區在打擊暴力極
端主義方面的更大合作；其唯一切實的結果是川普給阿聯酋和沙特封鎖鄰國卡塔爾的決定
開了綠燈。卡塔爾是美國在海灣地區的重要夥伴，因為它擁有美國在中東最大的軍事設施
——烏代德空軍基地（Al Udeid Air Base）。
Instead of focusing on Iran, the Saudis had duped Trump into taking sides in
a local ideological contest, against another American friend to boot. The
result was to split the Gulf Cooperation Council, further undermining its
already limited ability to counter Iran in the Gulf, while driving Qatar into
Iran's arms, since it had no other way of maintaining access to the world
except by utilizing Iranian airspace, something which the Iranians were only
too happy to provide. This fiasco has bedeviled the administration ever
since, with the Saudis blocking all attempts at patching up the rift.
沙特沒有把注意力集中在伊朗，而是欺騙川普，讓他在當地的意識形態競賽中站在一邊，
反對另一個美國朋友。其結果是分裂了海灣合作委員會（Gulf Cooperation Council），
進一步削弱了其在海灣地區對抗伊朗的本已有限的能力，同時將卡塔爾推入伊朗的懷抱，
因為除了利用伊朗領空之外，卡塔爾別無其他途徑保持與世界的聯繫，而伊朗人非常樂意
提供這一點。自那以後，這一慘敗一直困擾著政府，沙特阻止了所有修補裂痕的嘗試。
MBS's war in Yemen has also created the worst humanitarian crisis in the
world. Saudi Arabia's atrocities against Yemeni civilians, carried out with
U.S.-supplied aircraft using U.S. ordnance, have brought global outrage. The
damage to the United States' reputation has been so great that a bipartisan
congressional consensus tried to suspend arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Trump
brushed aside the challenge, but only by invoking executive powers, which
further infuriated Congress and has jeopardized the sustainability of one of
the pillars of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.
薩爾曼在也門的戰爭也造成了世界上最嚴重的人道主義危機。沙特阿拉伯對也門平民的暴
行，是用美國提供的飛機使用美國武器實施的，已經引起了全球的憤慨。對美國聲譽的損
害如此之大，以至於兩黨國會一致試圖暫停向沙特阿拉伯出售武器。川普對這一挑戰置之
不理，只是援引行政權力，這進一步激怒了國會，並危及了美沙關係支柱之一的可持續性
。
MBS's determination to seek a military solution in Yemen has met its match in
the Houthis, whose dependence on Iran has grown with their ambitions to rule
the country. Tehran is now supplying them with ballistic missiles and armed
drones for use against Saudi targets, including civilian airports and oil
facilities. (Hence initial suspicions of Houthi involvement in a September
attack that took out almost half of Saudi Arabia's oil production capacity.
Although the disruption was short lived, Saudi Arabia's once stalwart
reliability as the world's largest oil exporter has been put in doubt by the
unintended consequences of its Trumpen-couraged adventurism.)
薩爾曼在也門尋求軍事解決方案的決心在胡塞得到了回應，胡塞對伊朗的依賴隨著他們統
治國家的野心而增長。德黑蘭現在向他們提供彈道導彈和武裝無人機，用於打擊沙特的目
標，包括民用機場和石油設施。(因此最初懷疑胡塞武裝參與了9月份的襲擊，這次襲擊奪
走了沙特阿拉伯近一半的石油生產能力。儘管中斷的時間很短，但沙特阿拉伯一度作為世
界最大石油出口國的堅定可靠性受到川普鼓勵冒險主義的意外後果的質疑。)
The outrages continued to pile up when MBS apparently ordered the murder of
the Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials in the Saudi consulate
in Istanbul in 2018. Trump and Netanyahu did their best to shield their Saudi
partner from international condemnation, and Trump even restricted
congressional access to intelligence about the murder, sowing further
divisions in Washington. With Riyadh so dependent on Washington and MBS
momentarily vulnerable to intrafamily rivalries, the White House could have
used the crisis to insist that MBS take responsibility for the murder and
rein in his foreign exploits. But Trump didn't even try, allowing the
efficacy of Saudi leadership of the anti-Iran coalition to be further
undermined.
2018年，當薩爾曼顯然下令沙特駐伊斯坦布爾領事館的沙特官員謀殺沙特持不同政見者賈
邁勒·卡舒吉（Jamal Khashoggi）時，暴行繼續升級。川普和納坦雅胡盡最大努力保護
他們的沙特夥伴免受國際譴責，川普甚至限制國會獲取關於這起謀殺的情報，在華盛頓製
造進一步的分歧。由於利雅得如此依賴華盛頓，而且薩爾曼一度受到家庭內部競爭的影響
，白宮本可以利用這場危機堅持讓薩爾曼對這起謀殺負責，並控制他的對外行為。但川普
甚至沒有嘗試，讓沙特反伊朗聯盟領導的效力進一步削弱。
Nor has Saudi Arabia helped much on the peace process. Experienced hands
could have told Trump that the Saudis would never get out ahead of the
Palestinians. But Trump had given responsibility for the peace process to
Kushner, who was impressed by MBS's refreshingly open attitude to Israel and
disdain for the Palestinians and uninterested in the lessons of past
failures. In 2017, MBS promised Kushner that he could deliver the Palestinian
leader Mahmoud Abbas to the negotiating table on Trump's terms. He summoned
Abbas to Riyadh and told him to accept Kushner's ideas in exchange for $10
billion in Saudi funding. Instead, Abbas refused and promptly leaked the
details of the exchange, causing a furor in the Arab world.
沙特阿拉伯對和平進程也沒有多大幫助。有經驗的人可以告訴川普，沙特永遠不會領先於
巴勒斯坦人。但川普將和平進程的責任交給庫什納，庫什納對薩爾曼以色列的開放態度和
對巴勒斯坦人的蔑視印象深刻，他對過去失敗的教訓也不感興趣。2017年，薩爾曼向庫什
納承諾，他可以按照川普的條件將巴勒斯坦領導人馬哈茂德·阿巴斯（Mahmoud Abbas）
送上談判桌。他把阿巴斯叫到利雅得，告訴他接受庫什納的想法，以換取沙特100億美元
的資助。相反，阿巴斯拒絕並迅速洩露了交易細節，在阿拉伯世界引起了軒然大波。
MBS also promised Kushner that Saudi Arabia would acquiesce in Trump's
recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and reassured him that any
negative reaction on the Arab street would die down in a couple of months.
That was enough for Trump to dismiss all objections and announce his decision
at the end of 2017 to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and to move the
U.S. embassy there.
薩爾曼還向庫什納承諾，沙特阿拉伯將默認川普承認耶路撒冷為以色列首都，並向他保證
，阿拉伯街上的任何負面反應將在幾個月後平息。這足以讓川普駁回所有反對意見，並在
2017年底宣佈他決定承認耶路撒冷為以色列首都，並將美國大使館遷到那裡。
MBS was right about the reaction in the Arab street; it was hardly
noticeable. But he had failed to warn Kushner of the other consequences. The
crown prince might not have cared about Jerusalem, but his father certainly
did. And while MBS may have been in day-to-day control of the kingdom's
affairs, final say still lay with King Salman. The al Aqsa mosque, in
Jerusalem, is Islam's third-holiest shrine; as custodian of the two others,
King Salman could not stay silent. He promptly condemned Trump's decision and
summoned the region's Arab leaders to a meeting the following April to
denounce it collectively. King Salman has repeatedly stated ever since that
Saudi Arabia will not support any settlement that does not provide for an
independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital--something
Trump refuses to endorse.
薩爾曼對阿拉伯街上的反應是正確的；這幾乎不引人注意。但他沒有警告庫什納其他後果
。王儲可能不在乎耶路撒冷，但他的父親當然在乎。雖然薩爾曼可能已經控制了王國的日
常事務，但最終決定權仍在薩爾曼國王手中。耶路撒冷的阿克薩清真寺（Aqsa mosque）
是伊斯蘭教的第三大聖地；作為另外兩個聖地的監護人，薩爾曼國王不能保持沉默。他立
即譴責川普的決定，並召集該地區的阿拉伯領導人於次年4月召開會議，集體譴責這一決
定。此後，薩爾曼國王一再聲明，沙特阿拉伯不會支持任何不建立以東耶路撒冷為首都的
獨立巴勒斯坦國的解決方案——川普拒絕認可這一點。
The Jerusalem decision and embassy move blew up Kushner's scheme to have
Saudi Arabia play a leading role in the peace process. It also drove the
Palestinians away from the negotiating table. In the wake of the decision,
they cut off all official contact with the Trump administration, with Abbas
condemning the forthcoming Trump peace plan as "a shameful bargain" that will
"go to hell." When Kushner unveiled the economic dimensions of Trump's peace
plan at a meeting in Bahrain this past June--designed to show the
Palestinians that they would benefit from peace--the Palestinians boycotted
the conference.
耶路撒冷的決定和大使館的舉動粉碎了庫什納讓沙特阿拉伯在和平進程中發揮主導作用的
計畫。它還把巴勒斯坦人趕出了談判桌。該決定做出後，他們切斷了與川普政府的所有官
方聯繫，阿巴斯譴責即將出台的川普和平計畫是“可恥的交易”，將“下地獄”。今年6
月，庫什納在巴林的一次會議上公佈了川普和平計畫的經濟層面——旨在向巴勒斯坦人展
示他們將從和平中受益——巴勒斯坦人抵制了這次會議。
Bullying was no more effective than bribing. Trump thought the Palestinians
were so weak that he could bludgeon them into submission by cutting off aid,
closing down the Palestine Liberation Organization's office in Washington and
the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, and attempting to eliminate the UN
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. Once again,
as anybody with experience in the region could have predicted, this didn't
work. Punishing the Palestinians only made them dig in their heels and rally
behind their (otherwise unpopular) leadership.
欺凌不比賄賂更有效。川普認為巴勒斯坦人太軟弱了，他可以切斷援助，關閉巴勒斯坦解
放組織在華盛頓的辦事處和美國駐耶路撒冷總領事館，並試圖取消聯合國近東巴勒斯坦難
民救濟和工程處（ UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East），迫使他們屈服。再一次，正如該地區任何有經驗的人都能預料到的那樣，
這並沒有奏效。懲罰巴勒斯坦人只會讓他們寸步不讓，團結在他們領導人身後。
Without the Saudis and the Palestinians, Kushner had little chance to secure
Egyptian or Jordanian support for the crucial part of the plan, the political
and security arrangements. King Abdullah of Jordan, in particular, became
increasingly alarmed by the prospect that he might have to choose between
Trump and the Palestinians if Kushner came forward with Trump's ideas. King
Abdullah's largely Palestinian population would be furious if he accepted the
plan, yet he feared alienating Trump and jeopardizing his billion-dollar
annual aid package if he rejected it. (The Palestinian Authority was already
finding alternatives to Trump's aid cuts, but those sources weren't available
to Jordan.) Nevertheless, when Kushner made his final ask this past summer,
the king refused--after which the launch of the full plan was once again
rescheduled for some "more appropriate" time. Recognizing that it had no
future, Greenblatt resigned.
若沒有沙特人和巴勒斯坦人的幫忙，庫什納幾乎沒有機會獲得埃及或約旦對該計畫關鍵部
分——政治和安全安排——的支持。尤其是約旦國王阿卜杜拉（King Abdullah）越來越
擔心，如果接受庫什納提出的想法，他可能不得不在川普和巴勒斯坦人之間做出選擇。阿
卜杜拉國王如果接受這個計畫，大部分巴勒斯坦人會非常憤怒，但他擔心如果拒絕這個計
畫，會疏遠川普，危及他的十億美元年度援助計畫。(巴勒斯坦權力機構已經在尋找川普
削減援助的替代方案，但約旦無法獲得這些資源。）然而，當庫什納去年夏天提出最後一
個要求時，國王拒絕了——此後，整個計畫的啟動再次被重新安排在“更合適”的時間。
意識到這沒有未來，格林布拉特辭職了。
Another Saudi-inspired initiative, the proposed Middle East Strategic
Alliance, also went nowhere. Riyadh assumed that Trump could pull the
neighboring Arab states into a coalition to counter Iran. Dubbed the "Arab
NATO," it had Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council coming together
under a U.S. security umbrella to enhance their cooperation and, as a White
House spokesperson put it, "serve as a bulwark against Iranian aggression."
Israel would be a silent partner. The project's internal contradictions
revealed themselves at the initial meeting in September 2017, and it quickly
stalled. Trump eventually appointed Anthony Zinni, a former commander of U.S.
Central Command, as a special envoy to move things forward. Given the
reluctance of the other Arab states to bait the Iranian bear, however, Zinni
was unable to make any headway, and he resigned in January. Three months
later, Egypt withdrew, and the initiative died.
沙特發起的另一項倡議——擬議中的中東戰略聯盟——也無濟於事。利雅得認為川普可以
把鄰近的阿拉伯國家拉進一個聯盟來對抗伊朗。它被稱為“阿拉伯北約”，讓埃及、約旦
和海灣合作委員會在美國的安全保護傘下走到一起，加強合作，正如白宮發言人所說，“
充當抵禦伊朗侵略的堡壘”。以色列將是一個沉默的夥伴。該項目的內部矛盾在2017年9
月的首次會議上暴露出來，並很快陷入停滯。川普最終任命美國中央司令部（ U.S.
Central Command）前指揮官安東尼·津尼（Anthony Zinni）為特使，推動事情向前發展
。然而，鑑於其他阿拉伯國家不願充當引誘伊朗的誘餌，津尼無法取得任何進展，他於1
月份辭職。三個月後，埃及退出，該倡議宣告失敗。
IRAN AMOK
伊朗失控
Just like its blundering on other fronts, the Trump administration's efforts
on Iran have produced few positive results. It seemed for a while that the
"maximum pressure" campaign was reducing Iran's funding of its proxies
abroad. Yet those operations have always been run on the cheap, and with some
belt-tightening, they have continued apace. Hezbollah is still trying to add
precision-guided missiles to its arsenal in Lebanon, Iranian-backed militias
in Syria are staying put, and the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad in Gaza have actually had their funding increased.
就像川普政府在其他方面的失誤一樣，川普政府在伊朗問題上的努力幾乎沒有產生積極的
結果。一段時間以來，“最大壓力”運動似乎正在減少伊朗對其海外代理人的資助。然而
，這些操作總是以低廉的價格運行，隨著一些緊縮政策的實施，它們繼續快速發展。真主
黨仍試圖在黎巴嫩的軍火庫中增加精確制導導彈，伊朗支持的敘利亞民兵仍留在原地，也
門的胡塞組織、哈馬斯和加沙的巴勒斯坦伊斯蘭聖戰組織實際上增加了資金。
Not content with the maximum, in April of this year, Trump dialed up the
pressure even further by designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
as a terrorist organization and denying waivers to China and India for the
purchase of Iranian oil. With its economy crashing and the Europeans failing
to provide adequate sanctions relief, Tehran decided enough was enough.
今年4月，川普不滿足於“最大限度”，他進一步加大壓力，將伊朗伊斯蘭革命衛隊
(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps)指定為恐怖組織，並拒絕給中國、印度購買伊朗
石油的豁免權。隨著經濟崩潰和歐洲人未能提供足夠的制裁救濟，德黑蘭忍無可忍。
Up to that point, the Iranians had been exercising what they termed
"strategic patience"--waiting for the 2020 U.S. presidential election,
toughing things out in the meantime, and keeping the Europeans onboard by
sticking to the nuclear agreement. Now, Iran decided to retaliate.
在那之前，伊朗人一直在行使他們所謂的“戰略耐心”——等待2020年美國總統大選，同
時解決問題，並通過堅持核協議讓歐洲人繼續在場。現在，伊朗決定報復。
First, it reduced its compliance with the JCPOA by expanding its stockpile of
low-enriched uranium. Then, it resumed higher levels of enrichment. And in
September, it restarted centrifuge development, shortening the breakout time
for nuclear weapons production. Since Trump was the first to walk away from
the accord, ripping up the painstakingly developed international legal
consensus that prevented Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, the United
States was in no position to say or do anything to stop it.
首先，它通過擴大低濃縮鈾庫存，減少了對JCPOA的遵守。然後，它恢復了更高水平的濃
縮。9月，它重啟離心機開發，縮短了核武器生產的突破時間。由於川普是第一個放棄該
協議的人，撕毀了阻止伊朗獲得核武器的煞費苦心的國際法律共識，美國沒有資格說或做
任何事情來阻止它。
Iran's moves are putting Trump in an increasingly tight corner. If he does
not persuade the Iranians to reverse course, he will come under pressure from
his hawkish advisers and Netanyahu to bomb their nuclear program, a dangerous
adventure. But the only way to persuade them is to grant Iran sanctions
relief, which Trump is clearly loath to do. The tension is also rising
because Iran is now striking at U.S. interests across the region： six oil
tankers hit by mysterious attacks just outside the Strait of Hormuz, an
Iranian missile attack on the Golan Heights, confrontations in Gaza provoked
by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Saudi oil fields struck by drones.
伊朗的舉動正讓川普陷入越來越緊張的境地。如果他不說服伊朗人改變路線，他將面臨來
自鷹派顧問和納坦雅胡的壓力，要求轟炸伊朗的核設施，這是一次危險的冒險。但是說服
他們的唯一方法是給予伊朗制裁減免，川普顯然不願意這樣做。緊張局勢也在加劇，因為
伊朗現在正在打擊美國在該地區的利益：六艘油輪在霍爾木茲海峽外遭到神秘襲擊，伊朗
對戈蘭高地發動導彈襲擊，巴勒斯坦伊斯蘭聖戰組織在加沙挑起對抗，沙特油田遭到無人
駕駛飛機襲擊。
In May, Trump responded by dispatching a carrier strike group and bombers to
the Gulf, but when it came to retaliating for the shooting down of a U.S.
drone, he blinked. The Iranians got the message： Trump likes to talk war,
but he doesn't like to wage it. They understood that he prefers making deals.
So they cleverly offered to start negotiations. Sensing another
made-for-television summit, Trump jumped at the offer and invited Iranian
President Hassan Rouhani to meet on the margins of the UN General Assembly in
September, saying of the Iranian problem, "We could solve it in 24 hours."
今年5月，川普做出回應，向海灣派遣了一個航母戰鬥群和轟炸機，但當談到對擊落一架
美國無人機的報復時，他眨了眨眼睛。伊朗人得到了這樣的信息：川普喜歡談論戰爭，但
他不喜歡發動戰爭。他們知道他更喜歡做交易。所以他們聰明地提出開始談判。川普察覺
到另一場可以上電視的峰會的到來，欣然接受了邀請，並邀請伊朗總統哈桑·魯哈尼（
Hassan Rouhani）在9月份的聯合國大會間隙會面，談到伊朗問題，他說：“我們可以在
24小時內解決。”
The about-face alarmed Trump's partners, especially Netanyahu, who spoke out
against it. The Saudis became more circumspect in responding to the September
drone attack on their oil fields. The Emiratis wasted no time in hedging
their bets, dispatching officials to Tehran to resume long-stalled maritime
security talks. For Trump's Middle Eastern partners, a meeting between the
impulsive and unpredictable U.S. president and the cool, professional Iranian
president was their worst nightmare.
這種轉變讓川普的合作夥伴感到震驚，尤其是納坦雅胡，他公開表示反對。沙特對9月份
無人駕駛飛機襲擊其油田的反應變得更加謹慎。阿聯酋沒有猶豫地對沖賭注，派出官員前
往德黑蘭恢復長期停滯的海上安全談判。對川普的中東合作夥伴來說，衝動且不可預測的
美國總統和冷靜、專業的伊朗總統之間的會面是他們最糟糕的噩夢。
Almost three years into his term, Trump has nothing to show for his efforts
to counter Iran or promote peace in the Middle East. Instead, his policies
have fueled the conflict between Iran and Israel, alienated the Palestinians,
supported an unending war and a humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and split the
Gulf Cooperation Council, possibly permanently.
川普任期將近三年，但他對抗伊朗或促進中東和平的努力沒有任何表現。相反，他的政策
加劇了伊朗和以色列之間的衝突，疏遠了巴勒斯坦人，支持也門無休止的戰爭和人道主義
危機，並分裂了海灣合作委員會，而且可能是永久性的。
There is another path the United States could take in the region, an approach
far more conducive to the interests of Washington and all its allies and
partners. It would require stepping up U.S. diplomacy and scaling back U.S.
objectives to what can plausibly be accomplished with the means available.
Contain Iran rather than try to roll back its gains or topple its regime.
Maintain the residual U.S. troop presence in Iraq and Syria. Get back to the
JCPOA and build on it to address other problematic Iranian behavior, using
measured sanctions relief as leverage. Resolve the dispute in the Gulf
Cooperation Council and engage all the relevant parties to try to end the
conflict in Yemen. Return to the pursuit of an equitable resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where prospects for a breakthrough may be low
but engagement is necessary to preserve the hope of a two-state solution down
the road. Treat Israel and Saudi Arabia as crucial regional partners but not
subcontractors free to do whatever they want. And instead of spurning
international consensus, try to shape it to align with U.S. interests.
美國在該地區還有另一條路可走，這條路更有利於華盛頓及其所有盟友和夥伴的利益。這
將需要加強美國外交，將美國的目標縮小到用現有手段似乎可以實現的程度。遏制伊朗，
而不是試圖收回其成果或推翻其政權。維持美國在伊拉克和敘利亞的剩餘駐軍。回到
JCPOA，並以此為基礎解決伊朗其他有問題的行為，利用適度的制裁減免作為槓桿。在海
灣合作委員會解決爭端，並與所有相關方接觸，努力結束也門的衝突。回到尋求公平解決
巴以衝突的道路上來，雖然在那裡突破的前景可能很渺茫，但為了保持兩國解決方案的希
望，接觸是必要的。將以色列和沙特阿拉伯視為至關重要的地區合作夥伴，而不是可以任
意妄為的分包商。與其摒棄國際共識，不如努力使其符合美國的利益。
This alternative path might eventually lead to a successful renovation of the
grand project Kissinger began half a century ago. But if the United States
continues to follow Trump's folly instead, it should not be surprised to find
itself alone in the desert, chasing a mirage.
這條替代道路可能最終導向季辛吉半個世紀前開始的宏偉工程的成功翻新。但是，如果美
國繼續延續川普的愚蠢，那麼發現自己獨自一人在沙漠中追逐海市蜃樓就不足為奇了。
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論述謬誤：1 轉移議題 change of subject、2 偷換概念 concept swap、3 虛假目標
strawman argument、4 人身攻擊 ad hominem、5 感性辯護 appeal to emotion、
6 關聯替代因果 correlation as causation、7 不當類比 false analogy、8 不當引申
slippery slope、9 同義反覆 circular reasoning、10 無知辯護 argument from
ignorance、11 引用權威 appeal to authority、12 黨同伐異 appeal to faction
--
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