噓 cangming: XDD 滯美中國人現在發這種文章不覺得十分可笑嗎 02/08 09:31
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How America Ends
美國如何終結? 人口結構變化觸發民主危機
A tectonic demographic shift is under way. Can the country hold together?
目前美國的人口結構轉變正在發生。美國人民能否共渡難關？
原文：The Atlantic https://tinyurl.com/v9tk5ea
作者： Yoni Appelbaum
譯文：法意
http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/F4JDVVC70514C2L0.html
[法意導言]美國總統大選在即，兩黨將進入新一輪的競爭。極具個人特色的川普總統上台
以來，美國社會已經見證許多前所未有的變革。川普主義以強勢的姿態為全世界帶來影響
。川普或共和黨是否能夠成功連任，這一問題決定著美國民主的走向。本文從美國社會人
口結構的轉變入手，結合美國兩黨政治角逐的史實，分析川普主義的利弊以及目前共和黨
所面臨的政治形勢，且指出美國中右翼力量對政治的選擇才是促進美國民主社會向前發展
的關鍵。本文為2019年12月發表在《大西洋月刊》（The Atlantic）上的專欄文章。作者
約尼·阿佩爾鮑姆（Yoni Appelbaum）是美國社會和文化歷史學家，今為《大西洋月刊》
的專欄作者，曾於哈佛大學教授歷史與文學。
Democracy depends on the consent of the losers. For most of the 20th century,
parties and candidates in the United States have competed in elections with
the understanding that electoral defeats are neither permanent nor
intolerable. The losers could accept the result, adjust their ideas and
coalitions, and move on to fight in the next election. Ideas and policies
would be contested, sometimes viciously, but however heated the rhetoric got,
defeat was not generally equated with political annihilation. The stakes
could feel high, but rarely existential. In recent years, however, beginning
before the election of Donald Trump and accelerating since, that has changed.
民主取決於敗者的妥協。二十世紀，美國政黨和總統候選人們清楚地知道，選舉失敗既不
是永恆的也不是不可容忍的。輸家承認失敗，調整計畫、重組聯盟，然後走向下一場選舉
。思想和政見會遭到反駁，也會遭遇惡毒的攻擊。但無論辯論有多激烈，失敗也並不總是
意味著政治上的毀滅。但是，近些年來，自唐納德·川普（Donald Trump）上台後，這樣
的情況已經改變了。
“Our radical Democrat opponents are driven by hatred, prejudice, and rage,”
Trump told the crowd at his reelection kickoff event in Orlando in June. “
They want to destroy you and they want to destroy our country as we know it.”
This is the core of the president’s pitch to his supporters: He is all that
stands between them and the abyss.
“那些激進的民主黨人被仇恨、偏見和憤怒教唆。”川普在6月於奧蘭多舉行的連任競選
活動中對群眾說，“他們想摧毀你們，他們想摧毀我們的國家。”這是川普向支持者宣傳
的核心觀點：他是阻止他們走向深淵的人。
In October, with the specter of impeachment looming, he fumed on Twitter, “
What is taking place is not an impeachment, it is a COUP, intended to take
away the Power of the People, their VOTE, their Freedoms, their Second
Amendment, Religion, Military, Border Wall, and their God-given rights as a
Citizen of The United States of America!” For good measure, he also quoted a
supporter’s dark prediction that impeachment “will cause a Civil War like
fracture in this Nation from which our Country will never heal.”
今年十月，川普面臨彈劾危機，他生氣地在推特上發言：“這不是一次彈劾，這是一場政
變，這些人想奪走人民的權力、選舉權、自由，破壞憲法第二修正案，他們想奪走人們的
宗教自由、圍牆、以及成為美利堅合眾國公民的神聖權利。”他還引用了一個支持者的陰
謀預言，稱彈劾“會導致美國內戰，國家將因此產生不可癒合的裂痕。”
Trump’s apocalyptic rhetoric matches the tenor of the times. The body
politic is more fractious than at any time in recent memory. Over the past 25
years, both red and blue areas have become more deeply hued, with Democrats
clustering in cities and suburbs and Republicans filling in rural areas and
exurbs. In Congress, where the two caucuses once overlapped ideologically,
the dividing aisle has turned into a chasm.
川普的這段話反映了時代的困境。民主政體比歷史上任何時候都要脆弱。過去二十五年裡
，紅藍派之間的對抗加劇，民主黨人主要聚集在城市和城郊，共和黨人者則佔據農村和周
邊郊區。國會裡，兩黨過去曾在意識形態上達成一致，如今業已被巨大鴻溝所隔絕。
As partisans have drifted apart geographically and ideologically, they’ve
become more hostile toward each other. In 1960, less than 5 percent of
Democrats and Republicans said they’d be unhappy if their children married
someone from the other party; today, 35 percent of Republicans and 45 percent
of Democrats would be, according to a recent Public Religion Research
Institute/Atlantic poll—far higher than the percentages that object to
marriages crossing the boundaries of race and religion. As hostility rises,
Americans’ trust in political institutions, and in one another, is
declining. A study released by the Pew Research Center in July found that
only about half of respondents believed their fellow citizens would accept
election results no matter who won. At the fringes, distrust has become
centrifugal: Right-wing activists in Texas and left-wing activists in
California have revived talk of secession.
隨著政客們在地理上與意識形態上逐漸分離，他們對彼此的敵意也與日俱增。1960年，不
到5%的民主黨人或共和黨人會因自己的子女與他黨人結婚而感到不快；如今，根據一項調
查，35%共和黨人及45%民主黨人會因此事生氣，這個數字甚至遠超對跨宗族和宗教結婚抱
有不滿的人。兩黨對抗的增加也導致美國民眾對政治制度的信任度下降。皮尤研究中心（
Pew Research Center）於七月公佈一份研究，稱只有一半受訪者認為人們並不排斥由兩
黨中的誰擔任總統。在一些邊緣選區，人們的不信任逐漸顯現：德克薩斯州的右翼分子和
加利福尼亞州的左翼分子又開始主張州獨立。
Recent research by political scientists at Vanderbilt University and other
institutions has found both Republicans and Democrats distressingly willing
to dehumanize members of the opposite party. “Partisans are willing to
explicitly state that members of the opposing party are like animals, that
they lack essential human traits,” the researchers found. The president
encourages and exploits such fears. This is a dangerous line to cross. As the
researchers write, “Dehumanization may loosen the moral restraints that
would normally prevent us from harming another human being.”
范德比爾特大學和其他機構的政治學家最近研究發現，“政客都稱對方黨派像動物一樣，
缺乏人性。”總統卻鼓勵甚至推動這樣的狀況發展。這是十分危險的，研究者說到，“這
容易導致道德約束力的下降，而道德約束是阻止人們傷害他人的防線。”
Outright political violence remains considerably rarer than in other periods
of partisan divide, including the late 1960s. But overheated rhetoric has
helped radicalize some individuals. Cesar Sayoc, who was arrested for
targeting multiple prominent Democrats with pipe bombs, was an avid Fox News
watcher; in court filings, his lawyers said he took inspiration from Trump’s
white-supremacist rhetoric. “It is impossible,” they wrote, “to separate
the political climate and [Sayoc’s] mental illness.” James Hodgkinson, who
shot at Republican lawmakers (and badly wounded Representative Steve Scalise)
at a baseball practice, was a member of the Facebook groups Terminate the
Republican Party and The Road to Hell Is Paved With Republicans. In other
instances, political protests have turned violent, most notably in
Charlottesville, Virginia, where a Unite the Right rally led to the murder of
a young woman. In Portland, Oregon, and elsewhere, the left-wing “antifa”
movement has clashed with police. The violence of extremist groups provides
ammunition to ideologues seeking to stoke fear of the other side.
如今，徹底的政治暴動仍比政黨分裂時期（包括二十世紀六十年代晚期）要少得多。但過
激的言論氛圍也使得某些人變得偏激。塞薩爾·薩約克因為用炸彈瞄準多個知名民主黨人
而被捕，他是個熱衷於福克斯新聞（Fox News）的人。在法庭文件中，他的律師表示，薩
約克從川普充滿白人至上意味的言論中獲得了行動的靈感。律師稱：“政治氣氛和（薩約
克的）精神疾病有密切關係。”此外，在某些地區，政治抗議已經轉變為政治暴力。在弗
吉尼亞州的夏洛茨維爾地區，那裡舉辦的一場“團結右翼”集會導致一名年輕婦女被謀殺
。這些極端主義團體的暴力行為讓他們的反對者有更多攻擊的話柄。
What has caused such rancor? The stresses of a globalizing, postindustrial
economy. Growing economic inequality. The hyperbolizing force of social
media. Geographic sorting. The demagogic provocations of the president
himself. As in Murder on the Orient Express, every suspect has had a hand in
the crime.
這些仇恨從何而來？是全球化、後工業時代經濟所帶來的壓力、經濟上的不平等、社交媒
體的渲染、地理上的分裂、以及總統本人的煽動。正如《東方快車謀殺案》中的情節那樣
，每一位嫌疑人都參與到犯罪中。
But the biggest driver might be demographic change. The United States is
undergoing a transition perhaps no rich and stable democracy has ever
experienced: Its historically dominant group is on its way to becoming a
political minority—and its minority groups are asserting their co-equal
rights and interests. If there are precedents for such a transition, they lie
here in the United States, where white Englishmen initially predominated, and
the boundaries of the dominant group have been under negotiation ever since.
Yet those precedents are hardly comforting. Many of these renegotiations
sparked political conflict or open violence, and few were as profound as the
one now under way.
但最大的推動力可能是人口變化。美國正在經歷一場發達穩定的民主國家從未經歷過的轉
變：歷史上佔主導的團體日益成為政治上的少數派，而曾經的少數派團體如今能夠捍衛自
己的平等權和利益。如果要尋找這種轉變的先例，可能要回溯美國歷史。當時，英國白人
最初佔據主導地位，而後主流團體不斷被重新定義。但這些先例最終都演變為政治暴力，
很少能如今日一樣影響深遠。
Within the living memory of most Americans, a majority of the country’s
residents were white Christians. That is no longer the case, and voters are
not insensate to the change—nearly a third of conservatives say they face “
a lot” of discrimination for their beliefs, as do more than half of white
evangelicals. But more epochal than the change that has already happened is
the change that is yet to come: Sometime in the next quarter century or so,
depending on immigration rates and the vagaries of ethnic and racial
identification, nonwhites will become a majority in the U.S. For some
Americans, that change will be cause for celebration; for others, it may pass
unnoticed. But the transition is already producing a sharp political
backlash, exploited and exacerbated by the president. In 2016, white
working-class voters who said that discrimination against whites is a serious
problem, or who said they felt like strangers in their own country, were
almost twice as likely to vote for Trump as those who did not. Two-thirds of
Trump voters agreed that “the 2016 election represented the last chance to
stop America’s decline.” In Trump, they’d found a defender.
許多美國人印象中，國家居民大多數是白人基督徒。但如今情況已不如昨，人們對這樣的
變化也並不敏感。將近三分之一的保守黨認為他們的信仰遭遇“許多”歧視，二分之一的
福音派教眾也有此感。但是，與已經發生的變化相比，尚未發生的變化更具有劃時代的意
義：在下一個二十五年，根據移民率以及民族和種族認同的變化，非白人將成為美國的多
數。對某些美國人而言，這是可喜的變化；而對另一些人來說，則不值得關注。但這樣的
轉變已經引起政治上的強烈反應，而總統則對此加以助推和利用。2016年，白人工人階級
選民認為，對白人的階級歧視是個嚴重的問題，這讓他們在最熟悉的國度反而成為陌生人
。這些人投票給川普的可能性是其他白人群體的兩倍之多。三分之二的川普支持者認為，
“2016年選舉是阻止美國衰退的最後機會”。他們認為川普是那個對的人。
In 2002, the political scientist Ruy Teixeira and the journalist John Judis
published a book, The Emerging Democratic Majority, which argued that
demographic changes—the browning of America, along with the movement of more
women, professionals, and young people into the Democratic fold—would soon
usher in a “new progressive era” that would relegate Republicans to
permanent minority political status. The book argued, somewhat triumphally,
that the new emerging majority was inexorable and inevitable. After Barack
Obama’s reelection, in 2012, Teixeira doubled down on the argument in The
Atlantic, writing, “The Democratic majority could be here to stay.” Two
years later, after the Democrats got thumped in the 2014 midterms, Judis
partially recanted, saying that the emerging Democratic majority had turned
out to be a mirage and that growing support for the GOP among the white
working class would give the Republicans a long-term advantage. The 2016
election seemed to confirm this.
2002年，政治科學家魯·特謝拉（Ruy Teixeira）和記者約翰·朱迪斯（John Judis）出
版書籍《新興的民主多數派》（The Emerging Democratic Majority）。書中談及，人口
變化是美國的褐變。更多女性、專業人士以及年輕人將加入民主黨，很快將迎來“新的發
展時代”，而共和黨將成為永久的政治少數派。此外，該書認為，新興的民主多數派是不
可阻擋的。2012年巴拉克·歐巴馬（Barack Obama）連任後，特謝拉在《大西洋月刊》發
表文章稱，“民主多數派將成為主流。”兩年後，民主黨在2014年中期選舉中受挫，朱迪
斯似乎有點退縮，稱新興民主多數派可能只是海市蜃樓，白人工人階級對共和黨的支持會
讓共和黨人長期佔據優勢。2016年選舉結果似乎證實了這一點。
But now many conservatives, surveying demographic trends, have concluded that
Teixeira wasn’t wrong—merely premature. They can see the GOP’s sinking
fortunes among younger voters, and feel the culture turning against them,
condemning them today for views that were commonplace only yesterday. They
are losing faith that they can win elections in the future. With this come
dark possibilities.
但許多保守派在調查人口變化趨勢時發現，特謝拉說的話沒錯，只是當時時機未熟。他們
可以看到共和黨在年輕選民中的頹勢，並感受到新的文化與他們背道而馳，並指責他們仍
然停留在過去。他們正在失去能夠在未來贏得選舉的信心，隨之而來的是暗淡無望。
The Republican Party has treated Trump’s tenure more as an interregnum than
a revival, a brief respite that can be used to slow its decline. Instead of
simply contesting elections, the GOP has redoubled its efforts to narrow the
electorate and raise the odds that it can win legislative majorities with a
minority of votes. In the first five years after conservative justices on the
Supreme Court gutted a key provision of the Voting Rights Act in 2013, 39
percent of the counties that the law had previously restrained reduced their
number of polling places. And while gerrymandering is a bipartisan sin, over
the past decade Republicans have indulged in it more heavily. In Wisconsin
last year, Democrats won 53 percent of the votes cast in state legislative
races, but just 36 percent of the seats. In Pennsylvania, Republicans tried
to impeach the state Supreme Court justices who had struck down a GOP attempt
to gerrymander congressional districts in that state. The Trump White House
has tried to suppress counts of immigrants for the 2020 census, to reduce
their voting power. All political parties maneuver for advantage, but only a
party that has concluded it cannot win the votes of large swaths of the
public will seek to deter them from casting those votes at all.
共和黨人將川普的當選視為一種過渡性的統治而非復興，這種短暫的喘息可以減緩國家的
衰退。共和黨人不只是簡單的參與選舉，他們努力縮小選民的範圍，提高以少數選票獲得
選舉勝利的可能。最高院的保守派法官於2013年將《選舉法》的關鍵條文無效化後，五年
裡39%的縣減少了投票站的數量（此前法律限制這樣的行為）。此外，儘管嫁禍對方是兩
黨都常用的手段，但過去十年裡共和黨人顯然更耽於此道。在威斯康星州，去年民主黨人
贏得州選舉53%的選票，卻只佔了36%的議會席位。賓夕法尼亞洲，共和黨人試圖彈劾州法
院的法官，因為這個法官阻止了共和黨人在國會選區賄賂選舉的企圖。川普和他的內閣試
圖壓縮2020年人口普查時移民的人數，削弱移民的選舉權。任何政黨都會追逐自身利益，
但只有認為自己無法在選舉中獲勝的政黨才會設法阻止選民投票。
The history of the United States is rich with examples of once-dominant
groups adjusting to the rise of formerly marginalized populations—sometimes
gracefully, more often bitterly, and occasionally violently. Partisan
coalitions in the United States are constantly reshuffling, realigning along
new axes. Once-rigid boundaries of faith, ethnicity, and class often prove
malleable. Issues gain salience or fade into irrelevance; yesterday’s rivals
become tomorrow’s allies.
一度佔優的群體不得不適應新生代，這在美國歷史上很常見。這個適應過程可能是體面的
，也可能是痛苦的，甚至是通過暴力實現的。美國政黨不斷改革，沿著新的宗旨不斷自我
調整。從前嚴守的信仰、倫理和階級邊界如今不斷被重塑。同一事物時而重要時而次要，
昔日的敵人成為明天的盟友。
But sometimes, that process of realignment breaks down. Instead of reaching
out and inviting new allies into its coalition, the political right hardens,
turning against the democratic processes it fears will subsume it. A
conservatism defined by ideas can hold its own against progressivism, winning
converts to its principles and evolving with each generation. A conservatism
defined by identity reduces the complex calculus of politics to a simple
arithmetic question—and at some point, the numbers no longer add up.
有時候，自我調整會被打斷。這時候，政黨非但不會迎接新盟友加入，甚至反對民主進程
。思想上的保守主義可以接納進步主義，並更新自身的規則，實現代際的發展。而身份上
的保守主義則只能將複雜的政治演算化為簡單的算術問題。
Trump has led his party to this dead end, and it may well cost him his chance
for reelection, presuming he is not removed through impeachment. But the
president’s defeat would likely only deepen the despair that fueled his
rise, confirming his supporters’ fear that the demographic tide has turned
against them. That fear is the single greatest threat facing American
democracy, the force that is already battering down precedents, leveling
norms, and demolishing guardrails. When a group that has traditionally
exercised power comes to believe that its eclipse is inevitable, and that the
destruction of all it holds dear will follow, it will fight to preserve what
it has—whatever the cost.
川普和他的政黨如今走進了死胡同，這可能導致他連任失敗（假設他沒有被彈劾）。但總
統的失敗只會加劇選民的絕望心態，讓支持者更加恐懼人口轉變會帶來不利影響。這樣的
恐懼是目前美國民主的最大威脅，美國民主正在違背先例，抬高社會標準，破壞“護欄”
。當曾經掌權的團體意識到自己將不可避免地被取代，手中的一切將要被摧毀，他們會付
出一切代價捍衛自己的權益。
Adam Przeworski, a political scientist who has studied struggling democracies
in Eastern Europe and Latin America, has argued that to survive, democratic
institutions “must give all the relevant political forces a chance to win
from time to time in the competition of interests and values.” But, he adds,
they also have to do something else, of equal importance: “They must make
even losing under democracy more attractive than a future under
non-democratic outcomes.” That conservatives—despite currently holding the
White House, the Senate, and many state governments—are losing faith in
their ability to win elections in the future bodes ill for the smooth
functioning of American democracy. That they believe these electoral losses
would lead to their destruction is even more worrying.
政治學家亞當·普熱沃斯基（Adam Przeworski）研究東歐以及拉美地區的民主實踐。他
認為民主制度如希望長久存在，“必須讓所有政治力量能夠在利益和價值的競爭中角逐掌
權的機會”。除此之外，民主制度也應當追求平等。“他們要讓失敗的民主看起來也比不
民主的未來更具有吸引力。”儘管保守派如今掌控著白宮，參議院和許多州政府的席位，
他們也在懷疑自己是否能贏得選舉。這預示著美國民主目前面臨的跌宕。保守派甚至認為
選舉失敗將帶來黨派的毀滅，這是更令人擔憂的。
We should be careful about overstating the dangers. It is not 1860 again in
the United States—it is not even 1850. But numerous examples from American
history—most notably the antebellum South—offer a cautionary tale about how
quickly a robust democracy can weaken when a large section of the population
becomes convinced that it cannot continue to win elections, and also that it
cannot afford to lose them.
我們要警惕是否誇大了事情的危險性。1860或1850年的狀況不會再重現，但美國歷史上有
諸多例子（其中最著名的是南北戰爭）警示我們，當佔主流的團體認為自己無法贏得選舉
且無法承受失敗的後果時，繁榮民主社會的蕭條只在頃刻之間。
The collapse of the mainstream Republican Party in the face of Trumpism is at
once a product of highly particular circumstances and a disturbing echo of
other events. In his recent study of the emergence of democracy in Western
Europe, the political scientist Daniel Ziblatt zeroes in on a decisive factor
distinguishing the states that achieved democratic stability from those that
fell prey to authoritarian impulses: The key variable was not the strength or
character of the political left, or of the forces pushing for greater
democratization, so much as the viability of the center-right. A strong
center-right party could wall off more extreme right-wing movements, shutting
out the radicals who attacked the political system itself.
面對川普主義，佔主流的共和黨的垮台既是現時美國社會狀況的產物，也有著過往事件殘
留的影響。政治學家丹尼爾·茲布拉特（Daniel Ziblatt）在他近來對西歐民主興起的研
究中討論了區分政治穩定的民主政體和威權國家的決定性因素：關鍵變量並不是左翼的權
力或人格，或者促進民主化的動力，而是中右翼的力量。一個強大的中右翼政黨可以阻止
激進的右翼運動，同時也將攻擊政體的激進分子攔在門外。
The left is by no means immune to authoritarian impulses; some of the worst
excesses of the 20th century were carried out by totalitarian left-wing
regimes. But right-wing parties are typically composed of people who have
enjoyed power and status within a society. They might include
disproportionate numbers of leaders—business magnates, military officers,
judges, governors—upon whose loyalty and support the government depends. If
groups that traditionally have enjoyed privileged positions see a future for
themselves in a more democratic society, Ziblatt finds, they will accede to
it. But if “conservative forces believe that electoral politics will
permanently exclude them from government, they are more likely to reject
democracy outright.”
左翼力量很容易淪為威權主義的工具。二十世紀那些最糟糕的運動都來自於極權左翼勢力
。但極右翼黨派是由掌握權力和社會地位的人組成的。他們中可能有商業領袖、軍官、法
官和政府官員，這些都是政府賴以生存的社會力量的代表。如果這些享受特權的群體在民
主社會中看到自己的未來發展機會，他們會支持這樣的社會發展。但“如果保守力量認為
選舉政治會奪走他們在政府的位置，那他們很可能會強烈抵制民主。”
Ziblatt points to Germany in the 1930s, the most catastrophic collapse of a
democracy in the 20th century, as evidence that the fate of democracy lies in
the hands of conservatives. Where the center-right flourishes, it can defend
the interests of its adherents, starving more radical movements of support.
In Germany, where center-right parties faltered, “not their strength, but
rather their weakness” became the driving force behind democracy’s collapse.
茲布拉特指出，20世紀30年代德國呈現出一個民主國家最災難性的崩潰——民主的命運掌
握在保守派手中。在那裡，中右翼蓬勃發展，捍衛其追隨者的利益，餓死更激進的運動。
在中右翼政黨搖搖欲墜的德國，“不是他們的強項，而是他們的弱點”成為民主崩潰的動
力。
Of course, the most catastrophic collapse of a democracy in the 19th century
took place right here in the United States, sparked by the anxieties of white
voters who feared the decline of their own power within a diversifying nation.
當然，19世紀最災難性的民主崩潰發生在美國，這是由白人選民的焦慮引發的，他們擔心
自己的權力在多元化的國家中下降。
The slaveholding South exercised disproportionate political power in the
early republic. America’s first dozen presidents—excepting only those named
Adams—were slaveholders. Twelve of the first 16 secretaries of state came
from slave states. The South initially dominated Congress as well, buoyed by
its ability to count three-fifths of the enslaved persons held as property
for the purposes of apportionment.
在早期的共和政體中，奴隸制南方掌控著不成比例的政治權力。美國的頭十幾位總統——
除了那些叫亞當斯的總統——是奴隸主。在最初的16位國務卿中，有12位來自奴隸國。南
方起初也是國會的主要成員，但它有能力將五分之三的被奴役者作為財產分配。
Politics in the early republic was factious and fractious, dominated by
crosscutting interests. But as Northern states formally abandoned slavery,
and then embraced westward expansion, tensions rose between the states that
exalted free labor and the ones whose fortunes were directly tied to slave
labor, bringing sectional conflict to the fore. By the mid-19th century,
demographics were clearly on the side of the free states, where the
population was rapidly expanding. Immigrants surged across the Atlantic,
finding jobs in Northern factories and settling on midwestern farms. By the
outbreak of the Civil War, the foreign-born would form 19 percent of the
population of the Northern states, but just 4 percent of the Southern
population.
在早期的共和國，政治是專橫的，而且是由交叉的利益支配。但當北方各州正式放棄奴隸
制，然後接受向西擴張時，那些崇尚自由勞動的州和那些命運與奴隸勞動直接相關的州之
間的緊張關係加劇，從而導致了地區衝突。到了19世紀中葉，人口統計顯然站在自由國家
一邊，那裡的人口正在迅速膨脹。移民湧過大西洋，在北方工廠找到工作，在中西部農場
定居。到內戰爆發時，外國出生的人佔北方各州人口的19%，但只佔南方人口的4%。
The new dynamic was first felt in the House of Representatives, the most
democratic institution of American government—and the Southern response was
a concerted effort to remove the topic of slavery from debate. In 1836,
Southern congressmen and their allies imposed a gag rule on the House,
barring consideration of petitions that so much as mentioned slavery, which
would stand for nine years. As the historian Joanne Freeman shows in her
recent book, The Field of Blood: Violence in Congress and the Road to Civil
War, slave-state representatives in Washington also turned to bullying,
brandishing weapons, challenging those who dared disparage the peculiar
institution to duels, or simply attacking them on the House floor with fists
or canes. In 1845, an antislavery speech delivered by Ohio’s Joshua Giddings
so upset Louisiana’s John Dawson that he cocked his pistol and announced
that he intended to kill his fellow congressman. In a scene more Sergio Leone
than Frank Capra, other representatives—at least four of them with guns of
their own—rushed to either side, in a tense standoff. By the late 1850s, the
threat of violence was so pervasive that members regularly entered the House
armed.
新的動力首先出現在眾議院這個美國政府最民主的機構，而南方的反應卻是一致地拒絕辯
論奴隸制的話題。1836年，南方國會議員及其盟友對眾議院實施了一項禁言規則，禁止審
議像提到奴隸制那樣嚴重的請願，這持續了九年。正如歷史學家喬安妮·弗裡曼在最近的
著作《血的領域：國會和南北戰爭之路中的暴力》中所展示的那樣，華盛頓的奴隸州代表
也轉向欺凌，揮舞武器，挑戰那些敢於貶低這一特殊制度的人，或者乾脆用拳頭或手杖在
眾議院地板上攻擊他們。1845年，俄亥俄州的喬舒亞·吉丁斯發表了一次反奴隸制的演講
，使路易斯安那州的約翰·道森心煩意亂，他舉起手槍，宣佈他打算殺死他的議員同胞。
在更像西部片而非勵志片的場景中，代表們---其中至少有四人拿著自己的槍---在一場緊
張的對峙中衝向雙方。19世紀50年代末，暴力威脅非常普遍，以至於議員們經常武裝進入
眾議院。
As Southern politicians perceived that demographic trends were starting to
favor the North, they began to regard popular democracy itself as a threat. “
The North has acquired a decided ascendancy over every department of this
Government,” warned South Carolina’s Senator John C. Calhoun in 1850, a “
despotic” situation, in which the interests of the South were bound to be
sacrificed, “however oppressive the effects may be.” With the House tipping
against them, Southern politicians focused on the Senate, insisting that the
admission of any free states be balanced by new slave states, to preserve
their control of the chamber. They looked to the Supreme Court—which by the
1850s had a five-justice majority from slaveholding states—to safeguard
their power. And, fatefully, they struck back at the power of Northerners to
set the rules of their own communities, launching a frontal assault on states
’ rights.
隨著南方政客們意識到人口趨勢開始偏向北方，他們開始將民眾民主本身視為一種威脅。
“北方在本屆政府的每一個部門都取得了決定性的優勢，”南卡羅來納州參議員約翰·C
·卡爾霍恩在1850年警告說，這是一種“專制”的局面，南方的利益必然會被犧牲，“無
論其影響如何具有壓迫性”。他們指望最高法院——到19世紀50年代，最高法院擁有五個
來自奴隸國的司法多數——來維護他們的權力。而且，決定性地，他們還擊北方人制定自
己社區規則的權力，對各州的權利發動正面攻擊。
But the South and its conciliating allies overreached. A center-right
consensus, drawing Southern plantation owners together with Northern
businessmen, had long kept the Union intact. As demographics turned against
the South, though, its politicians began to abandon hope of convincing their
Northern neighbors of the moral justice of their position, or of the
pragmatic case for compromise. Instead of reposing faith in electoral
democracy to protect their way of life, they used the coercive power of the
federal government to compel the North to support the institution of slavery,
insisting that anyone providing sanctuary to slaves, even in free states, be
punished: The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 required Northern law-enforcement
officials to arrest those who escaped from Southern plantations, and imposed
penalties on citizens who gave them shelter.
但南方及其盟友卻做得過頭了。長期以來，中右派的共識吸引了南方農場主和北方商人，
使聯盟保持了完整。然而，隨著人口的變化對南方不利，南方的政治家們開始放棄說服北
方鄰國相信其立場的道德正當性，甚至放棄找一個務實的理由妥協。他們不再相信用民主
選舉來保護自己的生活方式，而是利用聯邦政府的強制力來迫使北方支持奴隸制制度，堅
持任何為奴隸提供庇護所的人，即使在自由州也要受到懲罰：1850年的《逃亡奴隸法》要
求北方執法官員逮捕從南方種植園逃走的人，並對給他們提供庇護的公民實施懲罰。
The persecution complex of the South succeeded where decades of abolitionist
activism had failed, producing the very hostility to slavery that Southerners
feared. The sight of armed marshals ripping apart families and marching their
neighbors back to slavery roused many Northerners from their moral torpor.
The push-and-pull of democratic politics had produced setbacks for the South
over the previous decades, but the South’s abandonment of electoral
democracy in favor of countermajoritarian politics would prove catastrophic
to its cause.
在數十年廢奴主義運動失敗之後，南方反而產生迫害情結，南方人所擔心的對奴隸制的敵
意產生了。看到武裝部隊拆散家庭，讓鄰居們重返奴隸制的景象，使許多北方人從他們的
道德堡壘中驚醒。民主政治的推拉在過去幾十年中給南方帶來了挫折，但南方放棄選舉民
主而支持反霸權政治將對它造成災難性的影響。
Today, a republican party that appeals primarily to white Christian voters is
fighting a losing battle. The Electoral College, Supreme Court, and Senate
may delay defeat for a time, but they cannot postpone it forever.
如今，吸引白人基督徒選民的共和黨正在打一場不能贏的仗。共和黨在選舉團、聯邦最高
法院、參議院中的優勢可能會讓失敗來得慢一些，但這終究無法避免。
The GOP’s efforts to cling to power by coercion instead of persuasion have
illuminated the perils of defining a political party in a pluralistic
democracy around a common heritage, rather than around values or ideals.
Consider Trump’s push to slow the pace of immigration, which has backfired
spectacularly, turning public opinion against his restrictionist stance.
Before Trump announced his presidential bid, in 2015, less than a quarter of
Americans thought legal immigration should be increased; today, more than a
third feel that way. Whatever the merits of Trump’s particular immigration
proposals, he has made them less likely to be enacted.
共和黨選擇通過強迫而不是說服的方式來繼續掌權，這反映出在多元民主社會中，通過共
同遺產（common heritage）而不是通過價值和理想來定義一個政治黨派極其危險。川普
阻止移民的舉動引起美國民眾的巨大反響，他的限制主義態度不為公眾所接受。2015年，
彼時川普還沒有宣佈競選，不到四分之一的美國人認為合法移民的比例應當提高；而如今
，超過三分之一的人支持增加合法移民。無論川普的移民提案如何有利，他都難以將其實
現。
For a populist, Trump is remarkably unpopular. But no one should take comfort
from that fact. The more he radicalizes his opponents against his agenda, the
more he gives his own supporters to fear. The excesses of the left bind his
supporters more tightly to him, even as the excesses of the right make it
harder for the Republican Party to command majority support, validating the
fear that the party is passing into eclipse, in a vicious cycle.
對於民粹主義者而言，川普並不受歡迎。但人們不該因此而竊喜。他越激起對手對他行為
的反對，就會帶給自己的支持者越多的恐懼。左派的肆意妄為讓川普的支持者更加向川普
靠攏，正如右派的某些行為讓共和黨難以獲得多數人支持，這也正是共和黨恐懼在惡性循
環中走向毀滅的原因。
The right, and the country, can come back from this. Our history is rife with
influential groups that, after discarding their commitment to democratic
principles in an attempt to retain their grasp on power, lost their fight and
then discovered they could thrive in the political order they had so feared.
The Federalists passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, criminalizing criticism
of their administration; Redemption-era Democrats stripped black voters of
the franchise; and Progressive Republicans wrested municipal governance away
from immigrant voters. Each rejected popular democracy out of fear that it
would lose at the polls, and terror at what might then result. And in each
case democracy eventually prevailed, without tragic effect on the losers. The
American system works more often than it doesn’t.
右派和整個國家還有挽救的餘地。美國歷史上，許多有影響力的團體為贏得選舉而放棄了
對民主的承諾，最終導致失敗。然而，他們認識到自己可以在所懼怕的政治體系中發展繁
榮。聯邦黨人通過了《外籍人員和懲治暴亂法案》（The Alien and Sedition Acts），
將批評政府的行為犯罪化；救贖時代的民主黨人剝奪了黑人選民的選舉權；進步共和黨人
將城市管理的權利從移民選民手中奪走。人們抗拒普遍民主制，害怕他們因此在選舉中失
利以及由此帶來的後果。然而在每一種情況下，民主最終都會佔上風，不會對輸家產生悲
劇性的影響。美國制度通常運作地不錯。
The years around the First World War offer another example. A flood of
immigrants, particularly from Eastern and Southern Europe, left many white
Protestants feeling threatened. In rapid succession, the nation instituted
Prohibition, in part to regulate the social habits of these new populations;
staged the Palmer Raids, which rounded up thousands of political radicals and
deported hundreds; saw the revival of the Ku Klux Klan as a national
organization with millions of members, including tens of thousands who
marched openly through Washington, D.C.; and passed new immigration laws,
slamming shut the doors to the United States.
一戰時期，情況卻又不盡相同。大量移民從東歐、南歐遷入，導致白人清教徒感覺到威脅
。美國連續頒布數部禁止令，主要是為了規範這些新人口的社會行為：策劃了Palmer
Raids案，將數千名政治激進分子集中起來，並驅逐了數百人；見證三K黨作為一個擁有數
百萬成員的全國性組織的復興，包括數萬人公開遊行穿過華盛頓特區；通過了新的移民法
，關上了美國的大門。
Under President Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic Party was at the forefront of
this nativist backlash. Four years after Wilson left office, the party faced
a battle between Wilson’s son-in-law and Al Smith—a New York Catholic of
Irish, German, and Italian extraction who opposed Prohibition and denounced
lynching—for the presidential nomination. The convention deadlocked for more
than 100 ballots, ultimately settling on an obscure nominee. But in the next
nominating fight, four years after that, Smith prevailed, shouldering aside
the nativist forces within the party. He brought together newly enfranchised
women and the ethnic voters of growing industrial cities. The Democrats lost
the presidential race in 1928—but won the next five, in one of the most
dominant runs in American political history. The most effective way to
protect the things they cherished, Democratic politicians belatedly
discovered, wasn’t by locking immigrants out of the party, but by inviting
them in.
在伍德羅·威爾遜總統領導下，民主黨正處於這種本土主義衝突的最前沿。威爾遜總統卸
任總統四年後，威爾遜的女婿以及艾爾·史密斯為爭奪總統席位而鬥爭。史密斯是有愛爾
蘭、德國和意大利血統的紐約天主教徒，他公開反對禁酒並譴責私刑，以爭取總統提名。
四年之後，史密斯取得了勝利，壓制了黨內本土主義者的勢力。他召集了新興的婦女和發
展中工業城市的族裔選民。民主黨人在1928年總統大選中落敗，但在接下來的五次總統競
選都贏得勝利，其中包括美國歷史上民主黨選舉優勢最大的一次。在這過程中，民主黨人
意識到，最有效保衛自己的辦法並非禁止移民，而是邀請移民進入美國。
Whether the American political system today can endure without fracturing
further, Daniel Ziblatt’s research suggests, may depend on the choices the
center-right now makes. If the center-right decides to accept some electoral
defeats and then seeks to gain adherents via argumentation and attraction—
and, crucially, eschews making racial heritage its organizing principle—then
the GOP can remain vibrant. Its fissures will heal and its prospects will
improve, as did those of the Democratic Party in the 1920s, after Wilson.
Democracy will be maintained. But if the center-right, surveying demographic
upheaval and finding the prospect of electoral losses intolerable, casts its
lot with Trumpism and a far right rooted in ethno-nationalism, then it is
doomed to an ever smaller proportion of voters, and risks revisiting the
ugliest chapters of our history.
齊布拉特的研究表明，美國現有的政治制度是否能夠持續，可能取決於中右翼的抉擇。如
果中右翼決定接受暫時的選舉失敗，而後通過政治辯論增加吸引力以獲取民眾支持，避免
將所謂的共同遺產當作自己的立黨原則，則共和黨仍能保持生機。黨內的裂縫能夠被修補
，且共和黨的前景將能得到改善，正如1920年後威爾遜所領導的民主黨那樣。美國的民主
將得以存續。但如果中右翼意識到人口變化帶來的動盪以及無法接受其面臨選舉失敗，並
轉向川普主義和根植於民族國家主義的極右翼，則支持共和黨的選民將會越來越少，且美
國歷史又將重現至暗時刻。
Two documents produced after Mitt Romney’s loss in 2012 and before Trump’s
election in 2016 lay out the stakes and the choice. After Romney’s stinging
defeat in the presidential election, the Republican National Committee
decided that if it held to its course, it was destined for political exile.
It issued a report calling on the GOP to do more to win over “Hispanic[s],
Asian and Pacific Islanders, African Americans, Indian Americans, Native
Americans, women, and youth[s].” There was an edge of panic in that
recommendation; those groups accounted for nearly three-quarters of the
ballots cast in 2012. “Unless the RNC gets serious about tackling this
problem, we will lose future elections,” the report warned. “The data
demonstrates this.”
2012年米特·羅姆尼敗選以後，至2016川普當選美國總統之前，有兩份文件揭示了中右翼
的賭注與選擇。羅姆尼敗選後，共和黨國家委員會認為，如果他們繼續堅持，則最終將面
臨政治驅逐。委員會公佈一份報告，呼籲共和黨投入更多精力贏得“西班牙裔、亞太島民
，非裔美國人，印第安裔美國人，美洲原住民，婦女和青年”的支持。這些團體佔2012年
投票總數的近四分之三。報告警示全黨，“除非共和黨國家委員會能夠認真解決這個問題
，否則我們將在未來的選舉中失敗。數據顯示了這樣的結果。”
But it wasn’t just the pragmatists within the GOP who felt this panic. In
the most influential declaration of right-wing support for Trumpism, the
conservative writer Michael Anton declared in the Claremont Review of Books
that “2016 is the Flight 93 election: charge the cockpit or you die.” His
cry of despair offered a bleak echo of the RNC’s demographic analysis. “If
you haven’t noticed, our side has been losing consistently since 1988,” he
wrote, averring that “the deck is stacked overwhelmingly against us.” He
blamed “the ceaseless importation of Third World foreigners,” which had
placed Democrats “on the cusp of a permanent victory that will forever
obviate [their] need to pretend to respect democratic and constitutional
niceties.”
但感受到這種恐慌的不僅僅是共和黨內部的實用主義者。在最有影響力的右翼支持川普主
義的宣言中，保守派作家邁克爾·安東在“克萊爾蒙特書評”中宣稱，“2016年是93號航
班(註：911遭到劫機的四架飛機之一)大選：衝進駕駛艙和恐怖分子戰鬥，否則你就得死
。”他的絕望之聲為共和黨全國委員會的人口分析提供了淒涼的回應。他寫道：“如果你
沒有注意到的話，我們一方自1988年以來就一直在輸，”他說，“甲板上的人壓倒性地反
對我們，”他指責“不斷輸入第三世界的外國人”，這讓民主黨人“處於永久勝利的邊緣
，（他們）永遠不需要假裝尊重民主和憲法的細節”。
The Republican Party faced a choice between these two competing visions in
the last presidential election. The post-2012 report defined the GOP
ideologically, urging its leaders to reach out to new groups, emphasize the
values they had in common, and rebuild the party into an organization capable
of winning a majority of the votes in a presidential race. Anton’s essay, by
contrast, defined the party as the defender of “a people, a civilization”
threatened by America’s growing diversity. The GOP’s efforts to broaden
its coalition, he thundered, were an abject surrender. If it lost the next
election, conservatives would be subjected to “vindictive persecution
against resistance and dissent.”
在上屆總統選舉中，共和黨在這兩個相互競爭的願景之間面臨著選擇。2012年後的報告從
思想上定義了共和黨，敦促其領導人接觸新的團體，強調他們的共同價值觀，並將該黨重
建為能夠在總統競選中贏得多數選票的組織。相反，安東的文章將該黨定義為“一個民族
，一個文明”的捍衛者，受到美國日益增長的多樣性的威脅。他大聲疾呼道，共和黨擴大
聯盟的努力是一種卑鄙的投降。如果輸掉下一次選舉，保守派將遭受“針對抵抗和異見的
報復性迫害”。
Anton and some 63 million other Americans charged the cockpit. The
standard-bearers of the Republican Party were vanquished by a candidate who
had never spent a day in public office, and who oozed disdain for democratic
processes. Instead of reaching out to a diversifying electorate, Donald Trump
doubled down on core Republican constituencies, promising to protect them
from a culture and a polity that, he said, were turning against them.
安東和其他約6300萬美國人衝進駕駛艙。一位從未在公職上度過一天並且對民主進程不屑
一顧的候選人擊敗了共和黨的旗手。唐納德·川普沒有與多元化的選民接觸，而是加倍關
注共和黨的核心選區，承諾保護他們免受其反對的文化和政體的侵害。
When Trump’s presidency comes to its end, the Republican Party will confront
the same choice it faced before his rise, only even more urgently. In 2013,
the party’s leaders saw the path that lay before them clearly, and urged
Republicans to reach out to voters of diverse backgrounds whose own values
matched the “ideals, philosophy and principles” of the GOP. Trumpism
deprioritizes conservative ideas and principles in favor of ethno-nationalism.
當川普任期屆滿，共和黨將面臨同樣抉擇，但這一次的情況則更為嚴峻。2013年，共和黨
的領導人已經清楚看到未來的發展，因此極力敦促共和黨人接觸更多背景多樣化的，價值
追求契合共和黨“理想，哲學和原則”理念的選民。然而，川普主義掘棄了保守主義，轉
向民族國家主義。
The conservative strands of America’s political heritage—a bias in favor of
continuity, a love for traditions and institutions, a healthy skepticism of
sharp departures—provide the nation with a requisite ballast. America is at
once a land of continual change and a nation of strong continuities. Each new
wave of immigration to the United States has altered its culture, but the
immigrants themselves have embraced and thus conserved many of its core
traditions. To the enormous frustration of their clergy, Jews and Catholics
and Muslims arriving on these shores became a little bit congregationalist,
shifting power from the pulpits to the pews. Peasants and laborers became
more entrepreneurial. Many new arrivals became more egalitarian. And all
became more American.
美國政治遺產中的保守派崇尚延續性，熱衷傳統和制度，對於新鮮事物懷有合理的懷疑，
他們為國家提供了必要的支持。美國既是不斷變化的國家，同時也是有強大延續性的一方
土地。每一次移民潮都改變了美國文化，但移民自己也適應美國文化並且保存了某些核心
的傳統。每個人都正日益融入美國文化之中。
By accepting these immigrants, and inviting them to subscribe to the country’
s founding ideals, American elites avoided displacement. The country’s
dominant culture has continually redefined itself, enlarging its boundaries
to retain a majority of a changing population. When the United States came
into being, most Americans were white, Protestant, and English. But the
ineradicable difference between a Welshman and a Scot soon became all but
undetectable. Whiteness itself proved elastic, first excluding Jews and
Italians and Irish, and then stretching to encompass them. Established
Churches gave way to a variety of Protestant sects, and the proliferation of
other faiths made “Christian” a coherent category; that broadened, too,
into the Judeo-Christian tradition. If America’s white Christian majority is
gone, then some new majority is already emerging to take its place—some new,
more capacious way of understanding what it is to belong to the American
mainstream.
接收移民並且邀請他們共同建設國家，美國精英因此得以保存自己的位置。國家主流文化
不斷重新自我定義，擴大自身邊界以接納不斷變化的人口。美國成立之時，多數美國人口
是由從英國來的白人清教徒組成的。儘管威爾士和蘇格蘭的文化之間有著巨大的鴻溝，在
美國這些差別則變得微不足道。白人群體證明自身有彈性的，首先排除猶太人、意大利人
和愛爾蘭人，然後再將他們融入。老牌教會讓位給了各種新教教派，其他信仰的擴散使“
基督教”成為一個連續的光譜；這也擴大了猶太教-基督教的傳統。如果美國白人基督徒
多數派失去主導地位，那一些新的主流群體就會興起並取代多數派的位置——這是通過更
新穎的、廣泛的方式理解美國主流文化的意義。
So strong is the attraction of the American idea that it infects even our
dissidents. The suffragists at Seneca Falls, Martin Luther King Jr. on the
steps of the Lincoln Memorial, and Harvey Milk in front of San Francisco’s
city hall all quoted the Declaration of Independence. The United States
possesses a strong radical tradition, but its most successful social
movements have generally adopted the language of conservatism, framing their
calls for change as an expression of America’s founding ideals rather than
as a rejection of them.
美國理念的吸引力是如此強大，以至於它甚至感染了我們的異見人士。塞內卡瀑布、林肯
紀念堂台階上的馬丁·路德·金和舊金山市政廳前的哈維·米爾克都引用了《獨立宣言》
。美國有著強大的激進傳統，但其最成功的社會運動通常採用保守主義的語言，將他們的
變革呼籲作為美國建國理想的表達，而不是拒絕這些理想。
Even today, large numbers of conservatives retain the courage of their
convictions, believing they can win new adherents to their cause. They have
not despaired of prevailing at the polls and they are not prepared to abandon
moral suasion in favor of coercion; they are fighting to recover their party
from a president whose success was built on convincing voters that the
country is slipping away from them.
時至今日，保守派仍對自己充滿信心，認為可以贏得下一次選舉。他們並沒有對民意測驗
的結果感到沮喪，也沒有準備放棄道德勸說而訴諸脅迫，而是採取強力手段；他們正在努
力從一位總統手中重建政黨。
The stakes in this battle on the right are much higher than the next
election. If Republican voters can’t be convinced that democratic elections
will continue to offer them a viable path to victory, that they can thrive
within a diversifying nation, and that even in defeat their basic rights will
be protected, then Trumpism will extend long after Trump leaves office—and
our democracy will suffer for it.
右翼面臨的這一次選舉賭注比下一次總統大選高得多。如果共和黨的選民不相信民主選舉
可以給予他們更加穩定的生活，保證他們在多樣化國家中獲得更多利益，即使共和黨敗選
也不會威脅人們的權利，則川普主義將在川普卸任後的時間裡仍然有日益增長的影響力，
而我們的民主社會將因此品嚐苦果。
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論述謬誤：1 轉移議題 change of subject、2 偷換概念 concept swap、3 虛假目標
strawman argument、4 人身攻擊 ad hominem、5 感性辯護 appeal to emotion、
6 關聯替代因果 correlation as causation、7 不當類比 false analogy、8 不當引申
slippery slope、9 同義反覆 circular reasoning、10 無知辯護 argument from
ignorance、11 引用權威 appeal to authority、12 黨同伐異 appeal to faction
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