推 Davidking: 凱因斯曾經是我的偶像啊…… 02/09 13:48
→ vonannes: 凱因斯怎麼可能預測人心呢 經濟學的理性選擇對人類來說 02/10 00:42
→ vonannes: 就是個錯誤假設 02/10 00:42
→ kwei: 行為經濟學愈來愈受重視就是這個道理。 02/10 02:01
→ kwei: 討論這篇文章的廣播訪談： 02/11 08:25
凱因斯錯了，青年世代過超慘
苦勞網
https://www.coolloud.org.tw/node/93974
譯者 /張宗坤 政大勞工所碩士生
【編按】1930年，英國經濟學家凱因斯寫下〈我們後代的經濟前景〉，他預言資本主義在
發展100年後，將很有可能解決人類的經濟問題，帶領人們走向物質豐裕和閒暇的時代。
但正如本文作者指出，凱因斯的預言未曾實現，新世代的青年反而持續苦於工資停滯、生
態危機等資本主義制度造成的深層問題，而漸漸傾向於左翼社會主義。
原文標題"Keynes was wrong. Gen Z will have it worse."，刊載於《麻省理工科技評
論》（MIT Technology Review）。
網頁： https://tinyurl.com/sjjayxy
The founder of macroeconomics predicted that capitalism would last for
approximately 450 years. That’s the length of time between 1580, when Queen
Elizabeth invested Spanish gold stolen by Francis Drake, and 2030, the year
by which John Maynard Keynes assumed humanity would have solved the problem
of our needs and moved on to higher concerns.
宏觀經濟學的創始人凱因斯曾預測，資本主義大概可以存在450年左右。這個時間大概介
於1580和2030年間，也就是從伊莉莎白女皇投資了航海家德瑞克（Francis Drake）偷走
的西班牙黃金，直到凱因斯預言人類將能夠滿足我們自身的需求，並將視野投向更高層次
的年代。
It’s true that today the system seems on the edge of transformation, but not
in the way Keynes hoped. Gen Z’s fate was supposed to be to relax into a
life of leisure and creativity. Instead it is bracing for stagnant wages and
ecological crisis.
確實，資本主義這個系統看似正處在轉型的邊緣，但卻不是朝凱因斯所希望的方向轉變。
Z世代的命運，原本應該是能夠在休閒娛樂和創造力的生命得到放鬆，但如今卻必須為工
資停滯和生態危機做準備。
In a famous essay from the early 1930s called “Economic Possibilities for
Our Grandchildren,” Keynes imagined the world 100 years in the future. He
spotted phenomena like job automation (which he called “technological
unemployment”) coming, but those changes, he believed, augured progress:
progress toward a better society, progress toward collective liberation from
work. He was worried that the transition to this world without toil might be
psychologically difficult, and so he suggested that three-hour workdays could
serve as a transitional program, allowing us to put off the profound question
of what to do when there’s nothing left to do.
早在凱因斯1930年代早期的名篇，〈我們後代的經濟前景〉（Economic Possibilities
for Our Grandchildren）一文中，他就已預言了百年後的世界樣貌。凱因斯點出了某些
現象，如工作自動化（他稱之為「技術性失業」）的到來，但他相信這些轉變是進步的預
告：朝著更好的社會進步，朝著人類集體從工作中被解放出來的方向進步。因為擔心這個
不需辛勞工作就能得來的轉變，將會造成心理上的負擔，他建議可以把每天工作三小時當
作過渡方案，讓我們可以放下「沒別的事可做時該做什麼」的嚴重問題。
Well, we know the grandchildren in the title of Keynes’s essay: they’re the
kids and younger adults of today. The prime-age workforce of 2030 was born
between 1976 and 2005. And though the precise predictions he made about the
rate of economic growth and accumulation were strikingly accurate, what they
mean for this generation is very different from what he imagined.
我們其實認識凱因斯文章標題裡頭的「後代」是誰：他們就是今天的孩子和年輕人們。
2030年的成年勞動力，是在1976年到2005年間出生的。儘管他針對經濟成長率與經濟積累
做出的精確預測驚人地可靠，這些數值對於這個世代的意義，已遠不同於他所想像。
Instead of progress toward a labor-free utopia, America has experienced
disappearing jobs as a kind of economic climate change. Apocalyptic forecasts
loom while poor and working-class communities take the brunt of the early
impacts: wage stagnation, deregulated and unsafe workplaces, an epidemic of
opioid addiction. The increasingly profligate wealth on the other end of
society is no less disturbing.
與其說是朝向不需勞動的烏托邦的方向進步，美國反倒正體會到對工作的失望，猶如某種
經濟上的氣候變遷。預言中的災難不斷逼近，窮人與勞動階級首當其衝：工資停滯、工作
場所不受管制且變得危險，還有成癮物質像瘟疫地流行。社會另一端不斷成長、恣意揮霍
的財富，也同樣讓人感到不安。
What the hell happened? To figure out why Generation Z isn’t going to be
Generation EZ, we have to ask some fundamental questions about economics,
technology, and progress. After we assumed for a century that a better world
would appear on top of our accumulated stuff, the assumptions appear
unfounded. Things are getting worse.
到底發生了什麼鳥事？為了找出新世代（Z Generation）沒有變成輕鬆世代（EZ
Generation）的原因，我們必須質問一些關於經濟、科技與進步的根本問題。我們假設在
我們累積的成果之上將出現一個更好的社會，已經假設了一個世紀，但這個假設似乎沒有
根據。事情變得越來越糟。
//////
As recently as the first web boom two decades ago, it was still possible to
talk about technological development and economic expansion as being good for
everybody. Take Webvan, the early (and subsequently much derided) grocery
delivery startup. The company planned to combine the efficiencies of the
internet and other advances in information and logistics to provide
better-quality products at lower prices, delivered directly to consumers by
higher-paid and better-trained workers. It’s a univocal, Keynesian vision of
development: not only do all involved benefit individually as consumers,
employees, or capitalists, but society itself steps together up the mountain
toward the elimination of necessity and a higher plane of being.
二十年前最近一波的網路爆發，那時還大致可以說，技術發展與經濟擴張對大家都好。以
早期（後來更多是嘲諷的語氣）的雜貨新創電商Webvan為例，這家公司規劃結合網路及其
他資訊與物流科技的優勢，以更便宜的價格提供品質更好的商品，透過良好訓練的高薪員
工，直接送到消費者手中。這是個非常凱因斯式的發展觀點：這不只對所有個別參與其中
的消費者、受僱者和資本家有利，對整個社會來說，也是齊心協力解決需求，朝著更高層
次的生存方向高昇。
When Webvan went belly-up, analysts assumed it meant the core idea was
hopelessly wrong: it just doesn’t make sense to use human capacity to bring
individual people their supermarket orders. Harvard Business School professor
John Deighton, when asked about the future of the industry in 2001, said, “
Home-delivered groceries? Never.” Yet less than 20 years later I can have
one of the world’s few trillion-dollar companies (Amazon) deliver my order
via its grocery brand (Whole Foods) in an hour. And if that’s not fast
enough, there are various platform services (Instacart, Postmates, and
others) through which I can hire someone to go pick my order up and bring it
to me immediately. Buzzing clouds of freelance servants, always in motion.
Webvan倒閉時，分析家們認為這代表上述的核心理念無可救藥地錯了：透過人力滿足所有
的超市個人訂單，似乎是不可能的。哈佛經濟學院的教授John Deighton在被問到2001年
的未來經濟圖景時說道，「雜貨送到家？沒門的事。」然而，不到二十年內，我可以透過
世上少數數兆規模的公司（Amazon），藉由它們的雜貨品牌（Whole Foods），將我的訂
單在數小時內送達。如果我覺得這還不夠快，還有好幾間不同的平台服務商（Instacart
、Postmates或者其他公司），我可以透過它們麻煩某人幫我取件，再馬上帶來給我。一
群鬧哄哄的打工族僕人，隨時等候差遣。
For consumers, these services have made life more convenient. For owners,
stock prices and corporate profits have been cruising higher and higher for
decades. But as workers, we have suffered. Gone is the Webvan vision of
highly trained, highly paid, upwardly mobile, stock-holding delivery drivers.
Amazon’s treatment of its workers at all levels is so intensely exploitative
that former employees have created their own form of writing: the “
report-back,” an essay that exposes the particular, common hardships of
working at the firm. It’s one part worker’s inquiry, one part trauma diary.
對消費者來說，這些服務讓生活變得更便利。對老闆來說，股票價格和公司利潤在過去數
十年內穩定增長。但作為勞工，他們卻吃足了苦頭。類似Webvan這樣，希望送貨員能高度
熟練、領高薪、向上移動，甚至可以持股的看法，已經一去不復返。在任何程度上，
Amazon高壓地剝削著所有層級的員工，導致某些前員工甚至開始形成了獨特的寫作文類：
「回饋報告」（report-back），這些文章揭露了公司工作上常見的特定困難。這些文章
既反映工人們的疑惑，也是某種療傷日記。
Here’s how one warehouse employee described the workflow:
以下是某位倉庫員工描述的工作流程：
“The AI is your boss, your boss’s boss, and your boss’s boss’s boss: it
sets the target productivity rates, the shift quotas, and the division of
labor on the floor ... Ultimately what this means to you is that you’ll
rarely work with the same people twice, you’ll be isolated, put on random
tasks from shift to shift, slog for stowing or sorting or picking or packing
rates well exceeding your average—because your supervisor told you so, and
the program told him before that.”
「人工智慧是你的老闆，也是你老闆的老闆，還是你老闆的老闆的老闆：它決定了目標產
率、輪班份額，以及這一層樓的工作分工……這對你而言的最終意義是，你很少跟相同人共事兩次以上，你將被孤立，在這個班、
到那個班，被佈置隨機的任務，忙著堆放或是分類或者揀選或者包裝，頻率遠超出你平均
所能——因為你的主管要你這麼做，在這之前程式又要他對你這麼做。」
Rather than relieving workers from toil, improvements in technology grind out
their efficiencies by molding laborers into unreasonable shapes. Across
departments, Amazon workers report being forced by the circumstances of their
jobs to urinate in bottles and trash cans. Using layers of subcontracting
agreements, the largest firms insulate themselves from responsibility to and
for their lowest-wage workers. Recent investigations into Amazon’s last-mile
shipping reveal exhausted drivers whose required carelessness has,
predictably, been known to kill people. The company remains, as far as the
business community is concerned, exemplary.
比起將勞工從辛勞的工作中解放出來，技術的進步反倒將勞動者形塑成不合理的樣貌，摧
毀了他們的效率。Amazon不同部門的工人曾回報過，他們為工作環境所迫，不得不尿在瓶
子或是垃圾桶裡。透過採用一層層的外包合約，這間最大的公司免於為這些最低薪的工人
負起任何一點責任。近來針對Amazon最後一哩運程（last-mile shipping）的調查顯示，
精疲力竭的司機，很可能將因他們的粗心造成傷亡。然而就整個企業界而言，這間公司仍
是榜樣。
Everywhere, the idea of liberation from work seems like a dream. Workers
making parts for iPhones have been exposed to toxic chemicals; Taiwanese
manufacturing giant Foxconn is regularly under the microscope for poor labor
conditions. Instacart delivery workers went on strike to complain about
changes that led to fewer tips; two days later the company cut their bonuses
(Instacart says the two events are unrelated). Gig workers on the audio
platform Rev.com recently discovered an overnight pay cut that meant Rev now
takes 70 cents of every dollar a customer spends on getting audio
transcribed, and they get a mere 30.
不論在何處，自工作中解放出來的念頭，似乎就像一場夢。製作iPhone組件的工人暴露在
有毒化學物質之下，台灣的製造業龍頭富士康常常因為低劣的勞動條件而受到檢視。
Instacart的貨運員發起罷工，抨擊那些導致小費減少的改變，兩天後，公司砍掉了他們
的紅利獎金（Instacart表示這兩件事情毫無關係）。影音平台Rev.com的零工勞工，近來
發現過夜津貼被砍掉了，這代表Rev從消費者花掉用來取得影音拷貝檔案的每1美元中拿走
了70美分，而他們只能拿到30美分。
Young Americans are reaching prime working age in the Amazon economy, not the
Webvan one. According to the Economic Policy Institute, while worker
productivity increased 69.6% between 1979 and 2019, hourly pay has risen a
measly 11.6%. “The income, wages, and wealth generated over the last four
decades have failed to ‘trickle down’ to the vast majority largely because
policy choices made on behalf of those with the most income, wealth, and
power have exacerbated inequality,” the EPI says. The difference between
productivity and pay is an increase in exploitation: workers doing more and
getting less. That was not the plan.
年輕的美國人在Amazon經濟中達到工作年齡，而非Webvan的那個年代。根據經濟政策研究
所（Economic Policy Institute，EPI）的說法，在1979年到2019年，勞工生產力成長
69.6％的同時，每小時薪資僅少得可憐地成長了11.6％。EPI指出，「過去四十年來產生
的收入、工資和財富，顯然未能『涓滴』及於絕大多數人，主因是代表那些收入、工資和
財富最著者所作出的政策選擇，加劇了不平等。」生產力與薪資間的差距，代表剝削程度
的提升：工人做的越多但拿的越少。這不在規劃之中。
//////
Keynes and his policy vision fell out of fashion when the laissez-faire
fundamentalism championed by Milton Friedman carried Reagan and Thatcher into
global power. The old view of the future yielded to an era of deregulation
and privatization. This was the “End of History,” with the free market as
the proper—perhaps even inevitable—vehicle for human nature.
在傅利曼（Milton Friedman）倡導的自由放任基本教義派推動雷根和柴契爾掌握全球大
權之時，凱因斯和他的政策觀點落伍了。關於未來的舊觀點，讓位給去管制化和私有化的
紀元。這就是「歷史的終結」（the End of History）：自由市場就是人性的適當載體（
甚至可說是不可避免的載體）。
Here all pursue their individual interests, and together that adds up to the
best of all possible worlds—at least as long as the government stays out of
the way. We were taught as fact, for example, that rent--control policies
counterintuitively increase rents, that minimum-wage laws counterintuitively
hurt wages, that wealth from tax cuts trickles down to workers. (Attitudes on
rent control are more nuanced today, while minimum-wage increases have raised
incomes at the lowest end. The trickle--down theory has fared worst of all;
the rich pocket, rather than reinvest, their tax cuts.) Most people bought
the libertarian hype, and when the global financial crisis hit in 2008, many
were surprised to find out markets weren’t actually self--regulating the way
they had been told.
在此，所有人都追求自己的個人利益，至少在政府不干預的情況下，這些個人利益的加總
，將構成所有可能的世界中最好的結果。例如，以下的說法被說成是事實：控制租金的政
策反直覺地提高了租金，最低工資法反直覺地損害了工資，或者是由降稅而來的財富將涓
滴及於工人。（大眾對租金控制的態度在今日越來越微妙，與此同時，最低工資則不斷提
高了收入的最低標準。涓滴理論的說服力最糟：富人減稅後把錢收進口袋，而不是再次投
資）自由主義者的不實宣傳最多人買帳，當2008年全球金融海嘯襲來時，許多人驚訝地發
現，我們的市場其實並不如過去眾人所云地能夠自我管制。
The subsequent bailouts, however, made it difficult to argue that governments
could only ever get in the way of the economy’s proper functioning. And so
economists dusted off Keynes. Countries that enthusiastically followed his
advice and used public funds to stimulate demand came out of the recession
much better off than those that hesitated. China’s decision in 2008 to
inject stimulus spending worth more than 12% of GDP looks smart in
retrospect. In America, Democrats and Republicans alike run for office on the
promise of trillion--dollar spending proposals, not the bipartisan calls for
a balanced budget and a shrinking government that we used to hear. The
pendulum swung, and Keynes came back.
然而，接連金融海嘯而來的紓困計畫，讓人們難以論證政府只能夠干擾經濟的正常運行。
也因此，經濟學家捧起了蒙塵已久的凱因斯。興致昂昂地聽從凱因斯建議的國家，挹注公
共補助以刺激需求，比起那些猶豫不決的國家，更快更好地走出了蕭條。回頭來看，中國
於2008年投入總額超過GDP佔比12%以上的激勵性開支，是聰明的決定。在競選時，美國的
民主黨人與共和黨人都很類似地提出增加數兆美元開支的承諾，兩黨都沒有提到我們過去
常常聽到的預算平衡和縮小政府。風水輪流轉，凱因斯回來了。
Switching from Friedman to Keynes means more than tinkering with the economy’
s operating system, however. The two men had different ideas not just about
how capitalism functions, but about what it’s for. Friedman and his ilk saw
the market as maximizing individual man’s freedom to pursue his
self-interest and thus, since the pursuit of self-interest is simply human
nature, maximizing collective well-being. Capitalism was the means and the
end.
從傅利曼到凱因斯的轉變，不只代表著對經濟運作體系的修補而已。這兩人想法上的差距
，不只是關於資本主義如何運作，更關於資本主義是為誰運作。傅利曼之流視市場為最大
化個人追求私利的自由，既然追求私利純屬人性，公共利益得以最大化。資本主義既是手
段，也是結果。
Keynes, on the other hand, outstanding example of the English gentry that he
was, couldn’t countenance money-grubbing as the highest example of virtue.
There had to be something more. For Keynes the most dangerous kind of avarice
was not trying to make money, but holding it in your pockets for too long.
The only way to keep popular well-being high and employment up was to produce
and consume more and more—not because it’s in our nature, but because that’
s how the system works: it must grow to survive. But someday soon, he
predicted, the race will be over, and we can all stop pretending capitalism
isn’t a psychotic, Earth-destroying way to live.
另一方面，凱因斯作為英國紳士階層的傑出典範，他不能容許貪財成了最高尚的美德。一
定有別的什麼。對凱因斯而言，最危險的貪婪，並不是試著賺錢，而是把錢留在你的口袋
裡太久。促進公共福祉與就業的唯一方式，是製造、消費得越來越多，這不只因為這就是
我們的日常，也是因為這個系統是這樣運作的，它必須成長以求生。但他也預測，在不久
的未來，競爭將會結束，我們都不再需要假裝資本主義不是個精神錯亂、傷害地球的謀生
手段。
In “Grandchildren,” Keynes looked forward to the day when “we shall be
able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true value.” He
continued:
在〈前景〉一文中，凱因斯看向未來，當「我們能勇於以其真正的價值評價金錢動機」的
日子，他接著說道：
“The love of money as a possession—as distinguished from the love of money
as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life—will be recognised for
what it is, a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal,
semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the
specialists in mental disease.”
「將對於金錢的愛好作為一種佔有慾，與作為享受生活、應付現實的那種對金錢的愛好相
比，前者將被看作某種可憎的病態，是一種半是犯罪、半是病態的性格，人們不得不戰戰
兢兢地把它交給精神病專家去處理。」
Capitalism, to Keynes, does not justify itself. “There will be,” he wrote,
“ever larger and larger classes and groups of people from whom problems of
economic necessity have been practically removed.” But he never identified
the mechanism that would end the capitalist accumulation game. Even if we did
produce enough stuff to pass the finish line, how would we know? And who’s
going to make the rich share, or even just stop taking more? He knew that we
could keep growing along these lines for only so long, but he ruled out
revolution. Instead, he thought the owners would do the right thing.
對凱因斯而言，資本主義無法證明自身的正當性。他寫道，「將有越來越多階級、群體的
人們，得以實際解決經濟上的需要。」但他從未指認將會終結資本家積累遊戲的機制。即
使我們生產了足夠越過終點線的東西，我們又如何得知？又有誰來讓富人懂得分享，或只
是讓他們不再索討更多？他知道我們只能夠沿著這些軸線，發展這麼長的時間，但他排除
了革命的選項。相反的，他認為老闆們會做出正確的事情。
Not being Milton Friedman isn’t the same as being right about how the world
works. Keynes can be right about growth predictions and business cycles and
fiscal policy, but if he is wrong that capitalism will simply end of its own
accord, the foundational justification for his entire program crumbles. In
that case, all of society is strapped in riding shotgun on the semi-criminal,
semi-pathological drive to consume the future in advance, with no virtuous
end on the horizon.
對於世界如何運作的看法，傅利曼並不正確。不像他，凱因斯可能在預測成長、商業週期
和財經政策的方面是對的，但倘若他錯了，資本主義只是單純地自我了斷，他的整個計畫
的論證基礎就會因此崩潰。在這種狀況下，整個社會將陷入迫在眉睫、提前消滅未來的半
犯罪、半病態驅力的威脅之下，美好結局將不復存在眼前。
Oops.
哎呀。
//////
If the spectrum of traditional economics goes from Friedman to Keynes—from
capitalism as an end in itself to capitalism as a means to something beyond it
—then what we need now is a critique of what the two of them share, a
critique of economics itself. Most such critiques were locked in a trunk and
shoved under the bed in the late 1980s and early ’90s, but they are not gone.
如果傳統經濟學的光譜開始從傅利曼移向凱因斯，也就是從資本主義作為自身的終點，到
資本主義作為超越資本主義的手段，那麼，我們現在需要的正是對兩者兼有的問題，也就
是對經濟學自身的批判。這類批判多數都已在八〇年代晚期到九〇年代初期遭到深埋，但
它們並未消失。
The most famous and influential critic of economics remains Marx. Keynes didn
’t think highly of the man; in the British economist’s reflections on
visiting Soviet Russia in 1925 he declined to name him, instead making
pointed references to “avaricious” Jews. But the commie who is not to be
named had a different vision for the future of economic development.
其中對經濟學最有名、最有力的批評者，莫過於馬克思。凱因斯看不太起這個人，在他
1925年拜訪蘇維埃俄國時，他拒絕提到馬克思的名字，反倒是明確的談到「貪婪」的猶太
人。但這位沒被點名的共產黨人，對於未來的經濟發展有著非常不同的觀點。
Marx’s “immiseration thesis” is an idea that’s pretty easy to summarize:
Since capitalists make money from every hour of workers’ labor, they will
get increasingly rich over time, while workers won’t because they’re too
busy making money for capitalists. A rising tide lifts only big boats;
everyone else has to swim for it.
馬克思的「貧窮化命題」（immiseration thesis）很容易解釋：既然資本家從工人們每
一小時的勞動中賺錢，前者將隨著時間推移而漸漸富有，與此同時，工人卻非如此，因為
他們忙著為資本家賺錢。只有大船能在漲潮時浮起來，其他人只能游泳了。
If technology reduced the need for work, Marx figured, workers would simply
be made to work longer, harder, more efficiently, or on other things.
Technology would create a population of the desperate unemployed who could be
put to work making luxury goods, for which there would be an ever growing
market—though growing only in terms of money, not in terms of the number of
people wealthy enough to buy. Instead of the common good increasing, it’s
inequality, exploitation, and misery that accumulate. What workers have been
building this whole time is their own subordination, and they’ve been doing
a good job.
如果技術減低了對工作的需求，馬克思認為，工人只是被迫工作得更久、更累，更有效率
等等。技術將創造出一群絕望的失業人口，他們可以從事製造奢侈品的工作，為此將存在
著一個不斷增長的市場——儘管所謂的增長，只是以金錢來衡量，而非以富裕到可以買得
起奢侈品的人數計算。與其說這是公共利益的增加，不如說這是不平等、剝削和悲慘的堆
疊。工人在這整個期間造就的是他們自身的屈從地位，而且他們做得還很不錯。
After decades on the outs even among self-described Marxists, the
immiseration thesis is looking empirically strong—especially when compared
with Keynes’s vision of increasingly large groups of people graduating from
the burden of economic need into the paradise of full-time leisure, or with
Friedman’s belief that greater wealth at the top turns into greater wealth
for everyone.
儘管是在那些自稱的馬克思主義者之下，歷經數十年來的砥礪，貧困化命題看來得到強大
的實證支持，特別是和凱因斯或傅利曼的願景相比。凱因斯的願景是讓越來越多的人從經
濟需求的負擔中得到解脫，進入全職休閒的天堂，傅利曼的信念則是讓社會頂層的財富變
成所有人的財富。
And workers weren’t the only thing Marx saw getting used up: “All progress
in capitalistic agriculture is a progress in the art, not only of robbing the
labourer, but of robbing the soil,” he wrote. “All progress in increasing
the fertility of the soil for a given time, is a progress towards ruining the
lasting sources of that fertility.” Environmentalism was not a basic tenet
of Marx’s thought, but unlike the economists, he understood intuitively that
extractive production had natural limits. The only answer for this species on
this planet is to scrap the whole form of production, with its workers and
capitalists, its cities and rural areas, its big piles of stuff and
hollowed-out globe.
馬克思看到，工人並不是唯一被吃乾抹淨的對象：「資本主義下農業的進步是工藝的進步
，不只是對勞動者的劫掠，也是對土壤的劫掠，」他寫道，「所有在既定時間內提升土壤
肥力的進步，都是朝向長久肥沃的毀滅的進步。」環境保護不是馬克思思想的基本宗旨，
但不同於其他經濟學家，馬克思直覺地理解到，竭澤而漁式的生產有其自然的極限。對這
個星球上的所有物種而言，唯一的解決方案是廢除這整個生產方式，不再有工人與資本家
、城市與鄉村的分別，也不再有龐大的物品堆積及被掏空的地球。
//////
As we near 2030—the year that capitalism was meant to be over, the time when
we were meant to have advanced and elevated ourselves—the predictions are
not rosy. In October 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
concluded that global warming is likely to reach 1.5 °C between 2030 and
2052 if temperatures continue to increase at the current rate. In the event
we do hit that mark, experts predict a rise of between 26 and 77 centimeters
(10 and 30 inches) in sea level, a rapid increase in species extinctions,
hundreds of millions more people experiencing water and food shortages, and
sustained extreme weather the likes of which the modern human species has
never encountered. We have been stockpiling not just wealth, but disasters.
隨著我們越來越接近2030年，既是資本主義注定終結的那個年代，也是我們注定要自我進
步、提昇的那個時代，前景卻似乎越來越不樂觀。2018年的10月，跨政府氣候變遷小組（
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change，IPCC）總結道，倘若氣溫持續以現在的
幅度升高，在2030到2052年間全球暖化的程度很有可能達到攝氏1.5度。要是氣溫上升到
這個數字，專家預測海平面將會上升26到77公分（10到30吋），物種將會急劇滅絕，上億
人將面臨飲水和糧食短缺，極端氣候將持續發生，這些都是現代人類從未經歷過的。我們
不僅在積蓄不只是財富，還有災難。
One protest sign at the youth climate strike put it succinctly: “You’ll die
of old age. We’ll die of climate change.” Today’s kids never had the
chance to believe in a simple progress narrative. The young movement leader
Greta Thunberg took the eco--generational message to the United Nations
Climate Action Summit: “People are suffering, people are dying, entire
ecosystems are collapsing,” she chided. “We are in the beginning of a mass
extinction and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal
economic growth. How dare you!”
青年氣候大遊行的其中一個抗議口號說得簡單明瞭：「你們是老死的！我們是氣死的！」
（You'll die of old age. We'll die of climate change.）今天的孩子從來沒有機會
相信簡單的進步敘事。青年運動領袖桑伯格（Greta Thunberg）在美國氣候行動峰會上，
傳達了關乎生態的跨世代訊息：「人們在受苦、人們在死去，整個生態系統已經瀕臨崩潰
，」她指責，「我們身處大規模滅絕的開端，但你們說的卻是錢錢錢，還有永續生態發展
的童話故事，你們竟敢！」
The younger cohort, the people around the world whom Thunberg represents,
have no choice but to establish new standards for social well-being—
standards beyond GDP growth. We need to get the carbon out of the atmosphere
and the plastics out of the ocean, keep the oil in the ground and the
undomesticated species we have left alive. Anything else is a catastrophic
failure. Young people seem up to the challenge, and even if the press has
occasionally overstated it, the affinity of millennials and Gen Z for
socialism is real. It’s more than a decade after the 2008 crash, and in the
United States we are in the longest economic expansion in history, yet poll
after poll shows left-wing politics enduring within the younger cohort. A
YouGov poll found that support for capitalism among Americans under 30 fell
from 39% to 30% between 2015 and 2018—14 percentage points below the average
and 26 points below the figure for seniors.
整個青年世代，那些桑柏格所象徵的整個世界的年輕人們，責無旁貸地建立了社會福祉的
新標準，這個標準遠不止包含GDP的成長。我們需要擺脫大氣裡的碳、海洋裡的塑膠，確
保石油只存在地下，沒被馴養的生物能好好活著。除此之外，都將是災難性的失敗。年輕
人們似乎決定迎接挑戰，儘管有時被媒體高估，但千禧世代和Z世代對社會主義的親近卻
是十分真實的。2008年金融海嘯以來已過了十多年，我們處在美國歷史上最長的經濟擴張
期間，然而，一次又一次的民意調查顯示，左翼政治在年輕一代之間，確實持續存在。一
項由英國民調公司YouGov進行的調查顯示，2015到2018年間在30歲以下的美國人中，支持
資本主義的比例由39％掉到了30％，這比平均值低了14％，也比成年人的比例低了26％。
The kids recognize that capitalism has been using up human and natural
resources rather than building a better society. Rather than a mere reaction
to the housing crash and global warming, we can see a deep, emergent
understanding. Much to everyone’s surprise, Keynes’s grandchildren have
become Marxists.
孩子們意識到，資本主義並沒有建立一個更好的社會，卻不過是榨乾了人類與自然的資源
。比起針對房產泡沫或全球暖化的直白反應，我們可以看到新生的深刻認識。出乎眾人意
料，凱因斯的後代竟成了馬克思主義者。
//////
When Keynes wrote that he looked forward to “the greatest change which has
ever occurred in the material environment of life for human beings in the
aggregate,” he meant us, now. And it looks as if he was right at least in
one sense. The fate of our species—and many other species, for that matter—
hangs in the balance.
當凱因斯寫說，他期待「在積累之中，人類生活的物質環境發生有史以來最大的變化」，
他說的是我們，是現在。那聽起至少在某個方面來說是對的。我們這個物種的命運，還有
其他涉及於這問題的物種的命運，都懸在天秤之上。
Though Keynes’ bottom line now seems fanciful, there are ways in which his
1930 prediction wasn’t totally off. Besides getting the growth rate more or
less right, Keynes thought we would be the generational cohort to end
capitalism. The system was not supposed to be sustainable for even 500 years.
At a certain level of technological development and capital accumulation,
capitalism becomes not merely exploitative or even genocidal (achievements
long registered); it becomes difficult to reconcile with humanity itself.
凱因斯的基本觀點，現在看來雖然純屬幻想，但他1930年的預言在有些方面也並非全錯。
除了多少導正了經濟成長率外，凱因斯還認為，我們將成為終結資本主義的一代人。資本
主義這個系統，甚至根本不該存在超過五百年。在一定的技術發展和資本積累之下，資本
主義不僅只是變得更加橫徵暴斂，甚至導向種族滅絕的結果（長期以來取得的成就），它
更加難以與人類本身取得和解。
Like football, where the increasing size and strength of the players has made
brain damage almost certain at the highest levels of the game, capitalist
production has become an objective hazard for the entirety of human society.
就像美式足球一樣，當球員的體型和力道不斷增強，在最高水準的比賽中，腦部的傷害幾
乎是注定發生的。資本主義生產已經成了整個人類社會的外在危害。
//////
One way or another, it’s a good bet that the workforce of 2030 is the last
true cohort that market capitalism gets. It’s hard to say what comes next,
but it has to happen pretty soon. The grandchildren he spoke of have been
here for a while now. Whether or not we manage to understand what it means in
advance, the new is here.
總之，2030年的勞動力絕對將是市場資本主義掌握的最後一個世代。很難說接下來會發生
些什麼，但它必然會很快發生。凱因斯所說的後代，已經存在這兒一段時間了。不論我們
是否力圖預先瞭解會有何變局，新生事物已在這兒了。
--
論述謬誤：1 轉移議題 change of subject、2 偷換概念 concept swap、3 虛假目標
strawman argument、4 人身攻擊 ad hominem、5 感性辯護 appeal to emotion、
6 關聯替代因果 correlation as causation、7 不當類比 false analogy、8 不當引申
slippery slope、9 同義反覆 circular reasoning、10 無知辯護 argument from
ignorance、11 引用權威 appeal to authority、12 黨同伐異 appeal to faction
--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 129.110.242.26 (美國)
※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/IA/M.1581196647.A.EFB.html