[資訊] 新全球影響力：與其他大國共享

[kwei (光影)]

The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers
新全球影響力：與其他大國共享
原文：Foreign Affairs https://tinyurl.com/utny5e8
譯文：觀察者
https://www.guancha.cn/GrahamAlison/2020_02_28_538851_s.shtml
作者：Graham Allison (哈佛大學甘迺迪政府學院教授)
譯者：楊晗軼

In the heady aftermath of the Cold War, American policymakers pronounced one
of the fundamental concepts of geopolitics obsolete. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice described a new world "in which great power is defined not
by spheres of influence or the strong imposing their will on the weak."
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that "the United States does not
recognize spheres of influence." Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed
that "the era of the Monroe Doctrine is over," ending almost two centuries of
the United States staking claim to its own sphere of influence in the Western
Hemisphere.

冷戰的勝利使美國決策者沖昏了頭腦，他們宣稱地緣政治的一個基本概念已經過時。2008
年前國務卿康朵麗莎‧萊斯描述了一個“不以勢力範圍定義強國”的新世界。2010年前國
務卿希拉里‧克林頓宣佈“美國不承認勢力範圍。”2013年，前國務卿約翰‧克里正式宣
告“門羅主義時代已經落幕”，為美國將西半球劃歸自身勢力範圍的將近兩百年畫上了句
號。

Such pronouncements were right in that something about geopolitics had
changed. But they were wrong about what exactly it was. U.S. policymakers had
ceased to recognize spheres of influence--the ability of other powers to
demand deference from other states in their own regions or exert predominant
control there--not because the concept had become obsolete. Rather, the
entire world had become a de facto American sphere. Spheres of influence had
given way to a sphere of influence. The strong still imposed their will on
the weak; the rest of the world was compelled to play largely by American
rules, or else face a steep price, from crippling sanctions to outright
regime change. Spheres of influence hadn't gone away; they had been collapsed
into one, by the overwhelming fact of U.S. hegemony.

這種說法有它正確的地方，因為地緣政治的某些方面發生了變化。但至於變化究竟在哪裡
，它卻弄錯了。美國決策者們不再承認勢力範圍——也就是大國要求得到所在地區其他國
家尊重或主導控制該地區的能力——不是因為這一概念已經過時。相反，整個世界實質上
都變成了美國的勢力範圍。原本的多個勢力範圍被單一的勢力範圍取代，但強者照樣能將
自身意志強加於弱者；世界其他國家被迫基本遵守美國制定的規則，否則它們將付出從嚴
酷的制裁到明目張膽的政權更迭等各種沉重代價。勢力範圍並沒有消失；它們只是在美國
霸權的壓倒性事實面前塌陷併合而為一了。

Now, however, that hegemony is fading, and Washington has awakened to what it
calls "a new era of great-power competition," with China and Russia
increasingly using their power to assert interests and values that often
conflict with those of the United States. But American policymakers and
analysts are still struggling to come to grips with what this new era means
for the U.S. role in the world. Going forward, that role will not only be
different; it will also be significantly diminished. While leaders will
continue announcing grand ambitions, diminished means will mean diminished
results.

然而今天美國霸權正在消退，華盛頓方面在其所謂的“大國競爭的新時代”面前警醒起來
，因為中國和俄羅斯越來越多地利用實力來主張它們與美國相衝突的利益和價值觀。但是
美國決策者和分析人士仍然沒有切實理解這個新時代對美國在世界上的角色意味著什麼。
展望未來，美國的角色不僅會發生變化，而且其重要性會大大降低。儘管美國領導人還將
繼續宣示宏偉的雄心，但隨著美國能使用的手段變少，最終取得的成效也會減弱。

Unipolarity is over, and with it the illusion that other nations would simply
take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order. For the United
States, that will require accepting the reality that there are spheres of
influence in the world today--and that not all of them are American spheres.

單極世界已經結束，美國必須放棄幻想，不要以為其他國家還會屈就於一個美國主導的國
際秩序並簡單地接受自己被分配到的地位。美國將需要接受一個現實，即當今世界上存在
多個勢力範圍，並非所有勢力範圍都屬於美國。


THE WORLD AS IT WAS
世界的本來面目

Before making pronouncements about the new rules of geopolitics, post-Cold
War U.S. secretaries of state should have looked back to the final months of
World War II, when U.S. policymakers were similarly resistant to accepting a
world in which spheres of influence remained a central feature of
geopolitics. Competing views on the issue lay at the core of a debate between
two top Soviet experts in the U.S. government.

在為地緣政治宣佈新規則之前，後冷戰時期的美國國務卿們本應當回顧第二次世界大戰的
最後幾個月，當時美國決策者同樣很牴觸一個仍以勢力範圍作為地緣政治核心特徵的世界
。在這個問題上，兩種針鋒相對的觀點構成了美國政府兩名蘇聯問題專家爭辯的核心。

On February 4, 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt met with Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta. At
Roosevelt's side was his translator and principal adviser on the Soviet
Union, Charles Bohlen. Just that morning, Bohlen had opened an urgent private
missive from his close colleague George Kennan in Moscow. Kennan correctly
forecast that the Soviet Union would attempt to maintain control of as much
of Europe as it could. The question was what the United States should do
about that. Kennan asked, "Why could we not make a decent and definitive
compromise with it--divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence--keep
ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?"

1945年2月4日，富蘭克林‧羅斯福總統在雅爾塔會見了蘇聯領導人約瑟夫‧史達林和英國
首相溫斯頓‧丘吉爾。陪同在羅斯福身邊的是俄語翻譯兼蘇聯問題首席顧問查爾斯‧博倫
。就在那天早上，博倫收到同事喬治‧凱南從莫斯科發來的緊急密信。凱南在信中正確地
預測，蘇聯會試圖儘可能維持對歐洲的大範圍控制。問題是美國應該拿出什麼對策。凱南
問道：“我們為什麼不能體面且決定性地與它妥協——坦誠地將歐洲劃分成美蘇各自的勢
力範圍——確保我們不進入俄羅斯的勢力範圍，也不讓俄國人闖入我們的地盤？”

Bohlen was appalled. "Utterly impossible," he erupted in response. "Foreign
policy of that kind cannot be made in a democracy." Reflecting on this moment
later, Bohlen explained: "The American people, who had fought a long, hard
war, deserved at least an attempt to work out a better world." Between 1945
and 1947, Bohlen worked alongside other leading figures in the Roosevelt and
then the Truman administration to realize their "one world" vision, in which
the allies who had fought together to defeat the Nazis would remain allied in
creating a new global order. But he ultimately resigned himself to the world
as it was--in short, Kennan had been right. "Instead of unity among the great
powers on the major issues of world reconstruction--both political and
economic--after the war, there is complete disunity between the Soviet Union
and the satellites on one side and the rest of the world on the other,"
Bohlen acknowledged in the summer of 1947 in a memo to Secretary of State
George Marshall. "There are, in short, two worlds instead of one."

博倫大吃一驚，他回覆道：“絕不可能，民主制度產生不了那樣的外交政策。”後來在反
思那天的情形時，他解釋說：“經過長期艱苦戰爭的美國人民至少應該嘗試建立一個更美
好的世界。”在1945年至1947年之間，博倫先後與羅斯福與杜魯門兩屆政府的要員合作，
力爭實現了“一個世界”的願景，即讓那些與美國並肩作戰擊敗納粹的盟國繼續共同建立
新的全球秩序。但他最終還是放棄了改造世界的想法，簡單地說，凱南是對的。1947年夏
天，博倫在給時任國務卿的喬治‧馬歇爾的備忘錄中承認了這一點：“戰後，在政治和經
濟重建方面等重大問題上，大國之間不但不團結，而且高度分化，一邊是蘇聯及其衛星國
，一邊是世界其他國家。簡而言之，世界不再是一個，而是兩個。”

When he finally came to share Kennan's diagnosis, Bohlen did not shrink from
the implications. His memo to Marshall concluded: Faced with this
disagreeable fact, however much we may deplore it, the United States in the
interest of its own well-being and security and those of the free non-Soviet
world must  draw [the non-Soviet world] closer together politically,
economically, financially, and, in the last analysis, militarily in order to
be in a position to deal effectively with the consolidated Soviet area.

即便博倫最終同意了凱南對形勢的判斷，他也沒有在可能產生的影響面前退縮。在給馬歇
爾的備忘錄中，他總結道：“面對這個令人不快的事實，無論我們多麼遺憾，美國為了維
護自身和自由世界的利益和安全，必須……在政治、經濟、金融以及軍事方面更加緊密地
團結（蘇聯勢力範圍以外的國家），以便有效地應對聯成一體的蘇聯勢力地區。”

This conviction became a pillar of the United States' strategy for the coming
decades, and it rested on the acceptance of spheres of influence. There would
be areas that would be subjected to Soviet domination, with often terrible
consequences, but the best course for the United States was to bolster those
powers on the periphery of this Soviet sphere while reinforcing the strength
and unity of its own sphere.

這種信念成為後來幾十年美國戰略的支柱，其基本前提是對於勢力範圍的接受。即承認某
些地區將由蘇聯主導，儘管產生的後果可能是不利的，但美國最好的辦法是強化自身勢力
範圍內部的實力和團結的同時，扶持處於蘇聯勢力範圍邊緣的國家。

For the four decades that followed, the United States and the Soviet Union
engaged in the great-power competition that we know as the Cold War. In the
Soviet sphere, the captive nations of Eastern Europe remained under the boot
of an "evil empire." American presidents faced repeated crises in which they
had to choose between sending troops into Soviet-dominated nations to support
freedom fighters seeking to exercise rights that the American creed declares
universal and standing by as those freedom fighters were slaughtered or
suppressed. Without exception, U.S. presidents chose to watch instead of
intervene: consider Dwight Eisenhower when Hungarians rose up in 1956 and
Lyndon Johnson during the Prague Spring of 1968 (or, after the Cold War,
George W. Bush when Russian troops attacked Georgia in 2008 and Barack Obama
when Russian special forces seized Crimea). Why? Each had internalized an
unacceptable yet undeniable truth: that, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan once
explained in a joint statement with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, "a
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."

在隨後的四十年裡，美國和蘇聯進行了我們稱之為冷戰的大國競爭。在蘇聯勢力範圍內，
東歐國家對雷根所說的“邪惡帝國”俯首帖耳。數任美國總統都經歷了危機，因為美國的
信條宣稱某些權利是普世性的，所以當受蘇聯主導的國家內部尋求行使這些權利的自由戰
士受到鎮壓時，美國得考慮派遣軍隊的選項。但歷任美國總統毫無例外均選擇了旁觀而不
是干預：比如艾森豪威爾面對1956年匈牙利十月事件；約翰遜面對1968年布拉格之春；包
括冷戰後2008年小布希對俄羅斯喬治亞戰爭；以及歐巴馬對俄羅斯特種部隊佔領克里米亞
的處理。為什麼？因為每次衝突都在不斷內化一個無法接受但不可否認的事實：即雷根和
戈巴契夫在聯合聲明中所說的，“絕不能打核戰爭，因為沒有人能夠從中取勝。”

This bit of Cold War history should serve as a reminder: a nation that is
simultaneously idealistic and realistic will always struggle to reconcile
rationales and rationalizations of purpose, on the one hand, with realities
of power, on the other. The result, in the foreign policy analyst Fareed
Zakaria's apt summary, has been "the rhetoric of transformation but the
reality of accommodation." Even at the height of U.S. power, accommodation
meant accepting the ugly fact of a Soviet sphere of influence.

這段冷戰史應當提醒我們：一個兼具理想主義和現實主義的國家，總是要努力在目的的依
據和合理性與實力現實之間取得平衡。外交政策分析人士法裡德‧扎卡里亞總結認為，這
樣的結果就是“嘴上喊著變革，行動卻是和解。”即使在美國實力鼎盛時期，和解仍然意
味著接受蘇聯勢力範圍這一令人不快的事實。


TECTONIC SHIFTS
結構性變化

After nearly half a century of competition, when the Cold War ended and the
Soviet Union disappeared, in 1991, the United States was left economically,
militarily, and geopolitically dominant. In the first two decades of the
post-Cold War era, U.S. defense spending exceeded the defense budgets of the
next ten nations combined (five of them U.S. treaty allies). Operationally,
that meant that, as Secretary of Defense James Mattis's 2018 National Defense
Strategy put it, the United States "enjoyed uncontested or dominant
superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces
when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted."
The United States and its allies could welcome new members into NATO,
applying to them its Article 5 security guarantee, without thinking about the
risks, since the alliance faced no real threat. In that world, strategy in
essence consisted of overwhelming challenges with resources.

1991年，在持續競爭將近半個世紀之後，冷戰結束了，蘇聯消失了，剩下一個在經濟、軍
事和地緣政治上處於主導地位的美國。在後冷戰時代的前二十年裡，美國的國防支出超過
了緊隨其後的十個國家（其中五個是跟美國簽訂防務條約的盟國）國防預算的總和。這意
味著，正如美國前國防部長詹姆斯‧馬蒂斯的《 2018年國防戰略》報告中所說，美國“
在各個作業領域都享有無可爭議的優勢或主導優勢。我們通常可以在需要時部署部隊，在
需要的地方組織部隊，並讓部隊按照我們的意願執行任務。”美國及其盟國可以歡迎新成
員加入北約，按第五條給予它們安全保證，而無需考慮風險，因為北約沒有真正的威脅。
在這樣一個世界裡，戰略的本質就是堆積大量資源去壓垮挑戰。

But that was then. The tectonic shift in the balance of power that occurred
in the first two decades of the twenty-first century was as dramatic as any
shift the United States has witnessed over an equivalent period in its 244
years. To paraphrase Vaclav Havel, then the president of Czechoslovakia, it
has happened so fast, we have not yet had time to be astonished. The U.S.
share of global GDP--nearly one-half in 1950--has gone from one-quarter in
1991 to one-seventh today. (Although GDP is not everything, it does form the
substructure of power in relations among nations.) And as the United States'
relative power has declined, the menu of feasible options for policymakers
has shrunk. Consider, for example, the U.S. response to China's Belt and Road
Initiative. With currency reserves of almost $3 trillion, China can invest
$1.3 trillion in infrastructure linking most of Eurasia to a China-centered
order. When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States
would increase its own investments in the Indo-Pacific in response, he was
able to come up with just $113 million in new investments.

然而，此一時彼一時，在21世紀前二十年中力量平衡發生結構性變化，與美國244年歷史
上任何同樣長時期內的變化一樣具有戲劇性。以捷克斯洛伐克前總統瓦茨拉夫‧哈維爾的
說法，變化來得如此之快，我們甚至沒有時間感到驚訝。美國GDP佔全球GDP的比重從1991
年的四分之一降至如今的七分之一，而這個比例1950年接近一半。（儘管GDP並不是全部
，但它確實構成了國際關係的權力亞結構。）而且隨著美國相對實力下降，可供決策者選
擇的菜單也在縮短。美國對中國“一帶一路”倡議的回應就是這樣一個例子。在將近3萬
億美元外匯儲備的支撐下，中國可以投資1.3萬億美元建設基礎設施，把亞歐大陸大部分
地區連接起來，置於以中國為中心的秩序之下。而當美國國務卿邁克‧蓬佩奧宣佈美國將
對印度洋-太平洋地區增加投資來回應中國的時候，他只拿得出1.13億美元的新投資。

China has, of course, been the chief beneficiary of this transformation. In
the past generation, its GDP has soared: from 20 percent of the U.S. level in
1991 to 120 percent today (measured by purchasing power parity, the metric
that both the CIA and the International Monetary Fund use to compare national
economies). Although China faces many internal challenges, there are more
reasons to expect this basic economic trend to continue than to bet that it
will stop soon. With four times as many citizens as the United States, and if
Chinese workers become as productive as Portuguese workers are today (that
is, around half as productive as Americans), China will see its GDP rise to
double that of the United States.

毫無疑問，中國是這一變化的主要受益者。在過去一代人的時間裡，中國GDP飛躍式增長
，它1991年只有美國水平的20%，今天已經是美國的120%（這是按購買力平價計算的GDP，
美國中情局和國際貨幣基金組織都採取這種統計方式來比較各國經濟）。儘管中國面臨許
多內部挑戰，但有更充足的理由認為這種基本經濟趨勢將持續下去，而不會很快停止。中
國公民人數是美國的四倍，如果中國工人的生產率達到葡萄牙工人今天的水平（即美國工
人生產率的一半左右），那麼中國的GDP規模將擴大到美國的兩倍。

In Asia, the economic balance of power has tilted especially dramatically in
China's favor. As the world's largest exporter and second-largest importer,
China is the top trading partner of every other major East Asian country,
including U.S. allies. (And as an aggressive practitioner of economic
statecraft, Beijing does not hesitate to use the leverage this provides,
squeezing countries such as the Philippines and South Korea when they resist
Chinese demands.) Globally, China is also rapidly becoming a peer competitor
of the United States in advanced technologies. Today, of the 20 largest
information technology companies, nine are Chinese. Four years ago, when
Google, the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI), the most
significant advanced technology, assessed its competition, Chinese companies
ranked alongside European companies. Now, that state of affairs is barely
visible in the rearview mirror: Chinese companies lead in many areas of
applied AI, including surveillance, facial and voice recognition, and
financial technology.

在亞洲，經濟力量平衡的天平尤其明顯地向中國傾斜。作為全球最大的出口國和第二大進
口國，中國是所有東亞主要國家的最大貿易夥伴，其中包括美國的盟友。（而且，作為經
濟治國的積極實踐者，中國毫不猶豫地對經濟實力提供的槓桿加以利用，在拒絕中國要求
的國家施加壓力。）在全球範圍內，中國也在迅速成為在先進技術領域與美國平分秋色的
競爭對手。今天，全球最大的20家信息技術公司，有9家是中國公司。四年前，當時全球
領先的人工智能技術公司谷歌對行業競爭情況進行評估，認為中國公司與歐洲公司處於不
相上下的水平。現在的情況早已發生變化，中國公司在人工智能許多應用領域處於領先地
位，包括監控、人臉和語音識別以及金融科技。

China's military spending and capabilities have surged, as well. A quarter
century ago, its defense budget was one-25th that of the United States; now,
it is one-third and on a path to parity. And whereas the U.S. defense budget
is spread across global commitments, many of them in Europe and the Middle
East, China's budget is focused on East Asia. Accordingly, in specific
military scenarios involving a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China
Sea, China may have already taken the lead. Short of actual war, the best
tests of relative military capabilities are war games. In 2019, Robert Work,
a former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, and David Ochmanek, one of the
Defense Department's key defense planners, offered a public summary of the
results from a series of classified recent war games. Their bottom line, in
Ochmanek's words: "When we fight Russia and China, 'blue' [the United States]
gets its ass handed to it." As The New York Times summarized, "In 18 of the
last 18 Pentagon war games involving China in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S.
lost."

中國的軍事開支和軍事能力也取得了長足進步。四分之一世紀以前，中國的國防預算是美
國的1/25；現在已達到三分之一，而且正朝著追平的方向發展。美國的國防預算分撥給了
它在全球各處的軍事承諾，其中許多分佈在歐洲和中東，而中國的軍事預算則集中花在東
亞地區。因此，在涉及台灣或南海衝突的特定軍事場景中，中國可能已經佔了優勢。在不
真的開戰的情況下，考驗軍事能力最好的辦法是通過戰爭遊戲進行推演。2019年，美國前
國防部副部長羅伯特‧沃克和國防部國防計畫主要制定者之一大衛‧奧赫曼尼克，公開歸
納了近期一系列機密戰爭遊戲的結果。最終的結果用奧赫曼尼克的話來說就是：“當我們
與俄羅斯和中國交戰時，‘藍軍’（美國）被揍得屁滾尿流。”《紐約時報》總結道，“
在五角大樓最近18場設定於台灣海峽與中國交手的戰爭遊戲中，美國18場全數告負。”

Russia is a different matter. Whatever President Vladimir Putin might want,
Russia will never again be his father's Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union
dissolved, the resulting Russian state was left with less than half the GDP
and half the population and saw its borders rolled back to the days before
Catherine the Great. Yet Russia remains a nuclear superpower with an arsenal
that is functionally equivalent to that of the United States; it has a
defense industry that produces weapons the world is eager to buy (as India
and Turkey have demonstrated in the past year); and it boasts military forces
that can fight and win--as they have demonstrated repeatedly in Chechnya,
Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. On a continent where most of the other nations
imagine that war has become obsolete, and maintain military forces more for
ceremonial than combat operations, military prowess may now be Russia's major
comparative advantage.

俄羅斯則是另一回事。不管普京總統有什麼想法，俄羅斯都永遠不會再成為他父輩的蘇聯
。蘇聯解體後，俄羅斯的GDP不足從前的一半，人口也少了一半，國土範圍縮小到凱薩琳
二世執政之前的大小。然而，俄羅斯仍然是一個核武器超級大國，其核武庫規模與美國相
當，其國防工業生產的武器是世界其他國家搶著買的“香餑餑”（去年印度和土耳其的軍
購已經提供了很好的案例）；其武裝力量善於作戰且能夠取勝——他們已經在車臣、喬治
亞、烏克蘭和敘利亞屢次證明了自己。歐洲其他大多數國家都以為戰爭已經過時，它們的
武裝力量更多是為了維持儀式感而不是真的去打仗，這樣一來傑出的軍事能力可能成了俄
羅斯主要的比較優勢。


BACK TO BASICS
回歸本質

The claim that spheres of influence had been consigned to the dustbin of
history assumed that other nations would simply take their assigned places in
a U.S.-led order. In retrospect, that assumption seems worse than naive. Yet
because many U.S. analysts and policymakers still cling to images of China
and Russia formed during this bygone era, their views about what the United
States should and should not do continues to reflect a world that has
vanished.

那種認為勢力範圍已被掃入歷史垃圾箱的說法有一個假設條件，即各國會簡單地接受美國
主導的秩序中自己被分配到的位置。如今看來，這種假設似乎過於天真了。然而，由於許
多美國分析人士和決策者，仍然死死抱住舊時代對中國和俄羅斯的印象不肯放手，因此在
美國應該怎麼做、不應該怎麼做的問題上，他們的看法是一個已經消失的世界的映射。

Over the course of centuries of geopolitical competition, policymakers and
theorists developed a set of core concepts to help clarify the complexities
of relations among states, including spheres of influence, balances of power,
and alliances. These concepts must be adapted to take account of specific
conditions in the twenty-first century. Yet they remain the sturdiest
building blocks available for understanding and constructing international
order.

在幾個世紀的地緣政治競爭過程中，決策者和理論家們為了闡釋國家之間關係的複雜性，
發展出一系列核心概念，包括勢力範圍、力量平衡和聯盟等。這些概念必須加以調整，才
能適應21世紀的具體形勢，但它們仍然是可用於理解和建構國際秩序最牢靠的基礎單元。

Where the equilibrium of forces between one state and another shifts to the
point where the first becomes predominant, the resulting new balance of power
casts a shadow that becomes, in effect, a "sphere of influence." That
specific term entered the vocabulary of diplomacy in the early nineteenth
century, but the concept is as old as international relations itself. (As
Thucydides noted, after the defeat of the Persians in the fifth century BC,
Sparta demanded that Athens not rebuild the walls around its city-state to
leave itself vulnerable.) Traditionally, great powers have demanded a degree
of deference from lesser powers on their borders and in adjacent seas, and
they have expected other great powers to respect that fact. Recent actions by
China and Russia in their respective neighborhoods are just the most recent
examples of that tradition.

當兩個國家之間的力量均勢變化到一定程度，使一個國家佔據主導地位時，新產生的力量
平衡就投下了一道陰影，它就是“勢力範圍”。19世紀初期這個術語才正式成為外交詞彙
，但這個概念其實與國際關係本身一樣古老。（正如修昔底德所注意到的，公元前五世紀
波斯人戰敗之後，斯巴達要求雅典不要在城邦周圍重建城牆，維持其脆弱狀態。）傳統上
，大國要求獲得周邊小國的順從，也期望其他大國尊重這一事實。中國和俄羅斯近期以來
在它們周邊地區的行動只是延續了這一傳統。

Spheres of influence also extend beyond geography. When the United States led
the world in the creation of the Internet, and the hardware and software that
empowered it, the United States enjoyed what Michael Hayden, a former
director of the National Security Agency, later called a "golden age of
electronic surveillance." Since most countries were unaware of the
surveillance capabilities revealed by the former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden, the United States had an unparalleled ability to exploit technology
to listen to, track, and even influence them. But post-Snowden, many states
are resisting the current U.S. campaign to prevent them from buying their 5G
wireless infrastructure from the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. As
the leader of a country currently considering the choice recently put it,
Washington is trying to persuade other countries not to buy Chinese hardware
because it will make it easier for China to spy and instead to buy American
hardware, which would make it easier for the United States to spy.

勢力範圍不一定侷限於地理範疇。美國國家安全局前局長邁克爾‧海登認為，當美國引領
世界創建互聯網以及為其提供支持的硬件軟件時，它享受了“電子監視的黃金時代”。在
美國國家安全局前承包商愛德華‧斯諾登揭秘之前，大多數國家都不知道美國的監控能力
，因此美國擁有利用技術來監聽、跟蹤甚至影響他國這一舉世無雙的能力。但在斯諾登曝
光“棱鏡門”之後，美國再阻撓其他國家採購中國通信巨頭華為的5G無線基礎設施，便遭
到了抵制。一名正在考慮如何選擇的國家領導人近期表示，華盛頓方面試圖說服其他國家
不要從中國購買硬件，因為這將便於中國從事間諜活動，美國希望別國購買美國的硬件，
這樣美國進行間諜活動便較為容易。


A REALISTIC RECKONING
現實的算計

From the perspective of American interests and values, the consequences of
increases in China's and Russia's power relative to that of the United States
are not good. As great powers, China and Russia can use their power to
suppress protesters' freedom in Hong Kong or block Ukrainian membership in
NATO. The South China Sea is likely to become more like the Caribbean than
the Mediterranean--that is, China's neighbors in Southeast Asia will be as
beholden to China as Latin Americans have been to their hemispheric hegemon.
Ukraine will have to get over the loss of Crimea as countries in Russia's
"near abroad" learn to be both more fearful of and more deferential to the
Kremlin.

從美國的利益和價值觀出發，中國和俄羅斯相對實力增強不利於美國。中俄作為大國，可
以利用實力對內壓制抗議，在外阻止烏克蘭加入北約。中國南海可能將變得更像加勒比海
而不是地中海，也就是說東南亞國家都要承蒙中國的恩典，就像拉丁美洲順服於西半球霸
主美國一樣。隨著俄羅斯周邊國家學會敬畏克里姆林宮，烏克蘭將不得不承認它失去了克
里米亞。

For many other nations and individuals around the world who have found
shelter under the American security umbrella and found inspiration in a
vision of an American-led international order that safeguards core liberties,
the consequences will be tragic. Recent events in Syria offer a preview of
what's to come. As the Arab Spring erupted in late 2010 and 2011, Obama
famously declared that Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad "must go." But Putin had
other ideas, and he was willing to act on them. He demonstrated that a nation
Obama had dismissed as a "regional power" could use its military forces to
defy the United States and help the Syrian leader consolidate his control.

這一現實對世界上許多國家和個人而言是悲劇性的，因為美國給它們提供了安全庇護傘，
其主導的保障核心自由的國際秩序願景提供了精神鼓舞。近期敘利亞發生的事件預示著未
來的情形。2010年、2011年阿拉伯之春爆發時，歐巴馬發表著名宣言稱，敘利亞領導人巴
沙爾‧阿薩德“必須下台”。對此普京有不同的想法，而且他願意付諸行動。他向世界證
明，一個被歐巴馬蔑視為“地區強國”的國家可以憑軍事力量違逆美國，並幫助敘利亞領
導人鞏固控制權。

This has been a horror for Syrians, and the millions of displaced people have
had a major impact on neighboring countries and Europe. But did Obama, or,
later, President Donald Trump, conclude that this outcome was so costly that
it would be better to send large numbers of U.S. troops to fight and perhaps
die in Syria? Can Americans sleep soundly in a world in which Putin and Assad
now smile when they ask visitors who is gone and who is still standing? U.S.
inaction speaks for itself.

數百萬敘利亞人流離失所，對周邊國家和歐洲產生了重大影響。但不論是歐巴馬還是後來
的川普，他們都不認為這是一種種高得無法承受的代價，所以都不願冒著美軍傷亡的風險
大規模派遣部隊前往敘利亞作戰。如今，普京和阿薩德可以微笑著讓來客看看誰倒下了誰
站立著，在這樣的世界里美國人是否睡得安穩？美國的無所作為已經說明了一切。

Sadly, Americans will come to accept such outcomes as good enough--at least
for the foreseeable future. Like Assad's atrocities, Russia's absorption of
Crimea and China's militarization of the South China Sea are now facts on the
ground that no one will contest militarily.

遺憾的是，至少在可預見的將來，美國人不得不接受這種結果。像阿薩德政權一樣，俄羅
斯收復克里米亞、中國控制南海現在均已是既成事實，沒人會以軍事手段與它們發生爭奪
。

Acknowledging that other powers have spheres of influence does not, of
course, mean that the United States can do nothing. It is a reflection of the
recent overmilitarization of U.S. foreign policy that restraint in the use of
military force is often equated with acquiescence. Washington has other ways
in which it can shape other countries' calculations of costs and benefits:
through the condemnation of unacceptable actions; the denial of legal status;
the imposition of economic sanctions on countries, companies, and
individuals; and support for local resisters. But such tools can rarely
decisively alter a decision another power has made when interests it sees as
vital are at stake. And it is worth remembering how often a refusal to
recognize and accept realities on the ground in the shadow of other powers
has led to major U.S. policy failures. From General Douglas MacArthur's rush
to the Chinese border during the Korean War (which triggered Chinese
intervention and a bloody, inconclusive war) to George W. Bush's insistence
that NATO offer membership to Georgia and Ukraine (which led to Georgian
overconfidence, ending in the country's partial dismemberment by Russia), a
stubborn disregard of brute facts has been counterproductive.

當然，承認其他大國的勢力範圍，並不意味著美國什麼都做不了。這只不過反映了美國最
近外交政策過度軍事化，克制使用武力往往等同於默許。事實上華盛頓還有其他方式可以
影響其他國家計算其利害得失：包括譴責不可接受的行動；剝奪法律地位；對國家、公司
和個人實施經濟制裁；以及支持當地抵抗者。但這些工具很少能決定性地改變另一個大國
在核心利益受威脅時所做出的決定。值得記住的是，在其他大國的陰影下，拒絕承認和接
受當地的現實常常導致美國的重大政策失敗。從道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟（Douglas
MacArthur）將軍在朝鮮戰爭期間匆忙前往中國邊境（這引發了中國的干預和一場血腥的
、沒有結果的戰爭），到小布希堅持讓喬治亞和烏克蘭加入北約（這導致喬治亞過度自信
，以該國被俄羅斯部分肢解而告終），頑固地無視殘酷現實反而適得其反。


THE MUSEUM OF RETIRED INTERESTS
過時的國家利益

When it comes to doing what it can, Washington should focus above all on its
alliances and partnerships. If China is destined to be "the biggest player in
the history of the world," as the longtime Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew
once claimed, the United States must work to assemble allied powers who
together will constitute a correlation of forces to which China will have to
adjust.

在做力所能及的事情時，華盛頓應該首先關注其聯盟和夥伴關係。如果中國注定成為“世
界歷史上最大的參與者”，“正如長期以來的新加坡領導人李光耀曾經聲稱的那樣，美國
必須努力將盟國力量聚集在一起，這些力量將構成中國必須調整的力量的關聯。

This logic is most evident in the economic arena. Before the Trump
administration ended U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
that trade agreement promised to bring together countries accounting for 40
percent of global GDP under a common set of rules on everything from tariffs
to state-owned enterprises to labor and environmental standards--providing a
counterweight to Chinese economic might that could have made Beijing a
rule-taker rather than a rule-maker. Thanks to the efforts of Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, the TPP is now a reality--but without the United States.
If American policymakers could find a way to allow strategic interests to
trump politics, the United States could rejoin the TPP. If that new TPP were
combined with the parallel trade agreement between the United States and the
European Union that was being negotiated at the end of the Obama
administration, nearly 70 percent of the world's GDP could be on one side of
the balance, versus China's approximately 20 percent on the other.

這種邏輯在經濟領域最為明顯。在川普政府退出跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP）之前，該
貿易協定本來要把佔全球GDP40%的國家聚集在一起，從關稅到國有企業再到勞工和環境標
準都採用一套通用規則，來制衡中國的經濟實力，使其成為規則的接受者而不是制定者。
在日本首相安倍晉三的努力下，TPP現在已成為現實，只不過沒有美國的參與。如果美國
決策者能夠設法讓戰略利益壓倒政治考量，那麼美國有可能重新加入TPP。如果美國重入
TPP，加上歐巴馬政府結束時正在談判的美歐貿易協定，則該陣營GDP總和佔世界近70%，
另一邊的中國約佔20%。

In the military arena, the same logic applies, but with more complexity.
Washington will need partners--but partners that bring more in assets than
they introduce in risks. Unfortunately, few of the United States' current
allies meet this standard. The U.S. alliance system should be subjected to a
zero-based analysis: every current ally and partner, from Pakistan, the
Philippines, and Thailand to Latvia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, should be
considered in terms of what it is doing to enhance U.S. security and
well-being, and with what risks and costs. Alliances are not forever.
Historically, when conditions have changed, particularly when a focal enemy
has disappeared or balances of power have shifted dramatically, so, too, have
other relationships among nations. Most Americans today have forgotten an era
in which NATO had a counterpart in Asia, SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization), and even an analogue in the Middle East, CENTO (the Central
Treaty Organization); both of those are now artifacts in the museum of
retired national interests. As Kennan noted, "There is more respect to be won
 by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the
most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives."

同樣的邏輯也適用於軍事領域，只不過更加複雜。美國需要夥伴，但必須是帶來好處大於
風險的夥伴。不幸的是，美國目前的盟友很少有達到這一標準的。美國應該用零基分析來
審視其同盟體系：從巴基斯坦、菲律賓、泰國，到拉脫維亞、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其，美國
應該考量每個盟友和夥伴，具體看待它們為美國帶來了哪些安全和福祉，造成了哪些風險
和成本。同盟不是永恆的。從歷史上看，當條件發生變化時，特別是當主要敵人消失或力
量平衡發生急劇變化時，國家之間的其他關係也將發生變化。今天，大多數美國人都忘記
了當年曾有個亞洲版的北約，即東南亞條約組織（SEATO），甚至中東也有個類似組織，
即中央條約組織（CENTO）。這兩個曾經代表美國國家利益的組織，現在俱已作古。正如
凱南所說：“比起頑固追求奢侈或無望的目標，堅決勇敢地放棄謬誤立場，反倒更值得尊
敬。”

To understand the risks entailed in the inheritance of current U.S.
alliances, consider two scenarios U.S. defense planners worry about today.
If, watching China's suppression of protests in Hong Kong, Taiwan should make
a dramatic move toward independence that leads China to react violently,
would the United States go to war with China to preserve Taiwan's status?
Should it? On the European front, if in response to an uprising of ethnic
Russian workers in Riga's shipyards, the Latvian government cracked down on
ethnic Russians and sparked Russia's annexation of a swath of Latvia--Crimea
2.0--would NATO launch an immediate military response, in accordance with its
Article 5 guarantee? Should it? If the answer to any of those questions is
not a straightforward yes--and it is not--then the time has come for an
alliance-focused version of the stress tests for banks used after the 2008
financial crisis.

要瞭解美國維持當前同盟關係的風險，就要考慮美國國防規劃者眼下擔心的兩種情況。如
果台灣戲劇性地宣佈獨立，導致中國採取武力行動，美國會不會、應不應該為了維持台灣
現狀而與中國交戰？在歐洲方面，如果拉脫維亞政府鎮壓裡加造船廠的俄羅斯族工人起義
，導致部分國土像克里米亞那樣被俄羅斯吞併，北約是否應該按照第五條所保證的那樣，
立即採取軍事對策？如果這些問題的答案不是簡單明了的“是”（事實上的確不是），那
麼美國就應該像2008年金融危機後的銀行系統那樣，對聯盟進行壓力測試了。

Such an approach is all the more important given the realities of nuclear
weapons in this new world. Both China and Russia have reliable second-strike
nuclear capabilities--that is, the ability to withstand an initial nuclear
attack and conduct a retaliatory strike that could destroy the United States.
Accordingly, not only is nuclear war not a viable option; even a conventional
war that could escalate to nuclear war risks catastrophe. Competition must
thus be tempered by caution, constraints, and careful calculations in risk
taking. For a nation that has accumulated a long list of entanglements with
nations that may have, or may imagine they have, a blank check from
Washington, this creates a big problem. The line between reassuring an ally
and emboldening its leadership to act recklessly is a fine one.

考慮到當今世界核武器的新現實，這一舉措顯得尤為重要。中國和俄羅斯都具備可靠的二
次核打擊能力，能夠抵抗最初的核攻擊並進行報復性打擊並摧毀美國。因此，核戰爭絕不
是可行的選擇；即使常規戰爭也可能升級為核戰爭，進而產生災難性後果。因此，大國之
間必須通過謹慎、約束和仔細算計風險來緩和競爭。美國與太多國家糾纏不清，而這些國
家往往覺得手裡握著張空白支票可以對美國予取予求，這帶來了一個大問題。如何既使盟
友安心，又避免鼓勵其領導人魯莽行事，把握這個限度非常微妙。

If the balance of military power in a conventional war over Taiwan or the
Baltics has shifted decisively in China's and Russia's favor, current U.S.
commitments are not sustainable. The gap between those commitments and the
United States' actual military capabilities is a classic case of overstretch.
What a zero-based assessment would mean for the current alliance system, and
for U.S. relations with each of more than 50 treaty allies and partners,
should emerge as a result of an analysis of the evidence. But it would likely
lead the United States to shed some allies, double down on others whose
assets are as important for U.S. security as U.S. assets are for them, and
radically revise the terms of each commitment to make obligations and
restraints as prominent as reassurances and guarantees.

如果在台灣或波羅的海打常規戰爭的勝算開始決定性地偏向中國和俄羅斯，那麼美國當前
的軍事承諾則是不可持續的。這些承諾與美國實際軍事能力之間的差距正是過度擴張的典
型案例。從零開始評估現有聯盟體系以及美國與50多個條約盟友和夥伴之間的關係，必須
嚴格遵循事實依據。其結果可能導致美國拋棄一些盟友，對那些持有關乎美國安全的重要
資產的盟友加倍重視，並徹底修訂每項承諾條款，將締約國義務和約束置於與美國安全保
證同等重要的地位。

This process would also enhance the credibility of the commitments that the
United States chose to renew. While the veterans of the Cold War rightly
claim that NATO has been the greatest alliance in the history of the world,
neither Trump nor Obama before him was convinced. Tellingly, American
military commanders doubted that the North Atlantic Council would authorize a
military response to the Russian annexation of Crimea or that the U.S.
government would be able to make a decision about how to respond before the
event was over. Rethinking the United States' commitments to its allies would
enhance American security and make these same pacts stronger.

這樣做有利於美國為修訂後的承諾提升可信度。冷戰老兵們宣稱北約是世界歷史上最偉大
的聯盟，儘管這種說法沒錯，但川普和歐巴馬對此都不買賬。在克里米亞問題上，美國軍
事指揮官顯然對北大西洋理事會批准對俄羅斯進行軍事回應，或美國政府能在事件結束前
拿出對策均不抱信心。美國重新思考對盟國的承諾將有助於增進美國的安全，使協定更加
牢固。


PRESENT AT THE (RE-)CREATION
重新創造的契機

Strategy is the purposeful alignment of means and ends. Among the many ways
in which a strategy fails, the two most common are mismatch--when the means
an actor can organize and sustain are insufficient to achieve the stated
ends--and vision blindness, when an actor is mesmerized by an ideal but
unachievable end. The United States' twenty-first-century wars in the Middle
East offer vivid examples of both.

手段和目的的有機結合便是戰略。戰略失敗分許多種，最常見的兩種一是不匹配（即行為
體能夠組織和維持的手段不足以實現既定目標），二是盲目（即行為體沉溺於理想化卻無
法實現的目標）。21世紀以來美國在中東地區戰爭便犯了以上兩種錯誤。

Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable
aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres
of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics. That acceptance
will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it
could also bring a wave of strategic creativity--an opportunity for nothing
less than a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual arsenal of U.S. national
security.

展望未來，美國決策者將不得不放棄夢想世界裡無法企及的願望，接受勢力範圍將仍是地
緣政治核心特徵這一事實。接受這一點難免經歷一個漫長、混亂和痛苦的過程，但它也可
能帶來新的戰略創造力，為美國國家安全理念的根本性反思提供了機會。

The basic view of the United States' role in the world held by most of
today's foreign-policy makers was imprinted in the quarter century that
followed the U.S. victory in the Cold War. That world is now gone. The
consequences are as profound as those that Americans confronted in the late
1940s. Accordingly, it is worth remembering how long it took individuals now
revered as "wise men" to understand the world they faced. Nearly five years
passed between Kennan's "Long Telegram," an early warning of Cold War
competition, and the policy paper NSC-68, which finally laid out a
comprehensive strategy. The confusion that reigns in the U.S. foreign policy
community today should thus not be a cause for alarm. If it took the great
strategists of the Cold War nearly five years to forge a basic approach, it
would be beyond hubris to expect this generation to do better.

美國外交政策制定者對該國全球角色的基本看法大都是在美國獲得冷戰勝利之後四分之一
個世紀裡形成的。現在，世界已經發生了徹底的變化，其程度堪比1940年代的巨變。要知
道，如今被人們尊為“智者”的人當年也花了很長時間來理解他們所面對的世界。從凱南
發出冷戰預警信號的長電報，到美國國家安全委員會頒布第68號文件提出全面冷戰戰略，
中間經過了近五年的時間。因此，我們不必對美國外交界當下的混亂情形感到驚慌。如果
偉大的冷戰戰略家們都花了近五年時間才制定出基本方案，指望當代人做得更好太過於倨
傲了。

--
論述謬誤：1 轉移議題 change of subject、2 偷換概念 concept swap、3 虛假目標
strawman argument、4 人身攻擊 ad hominem、5 感性辯護 appeal to emotion、
6 關聯替代因果 correlation as causation、7 不當類比 false analogy、8 不當引申
slippery slope、9 同義反覆 circular reasoning、10 無知辯護 argument from
ignorance、11 引用權威 appeal to authority、12 黨同伐異 appeal to faction 

--
※ 發信站: 批踢踢實業坊(ptt.cc), 來自: 129.110.242.26 (美國)
※ 文章網址: https://www.ptt.cc/bbs/IA/M.1583005231.A.68A.html
推 gimtama: I checked New York time, did not see news you maintai
→ gimtama: n.
NY Times: This Is How a War With China Could Begin
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/opinion/china-taiwan-war.html
※ 編輯: kwei (129.110.242.26 美國), 03/01/2020 06:08:59
→ KYALUCARD: 過度低估歐洲國家的軍事能力，事實上西歐中小型國家的
→ KYALUCARD: 軍事經驗可能是兩三百年來最好的時刻
推 gimtama: 這是社論吧
推 gimtama: that can be misleading, because the war games are muc
→ gimtama: h more limited than real life would be. For example,
→ gimtama:  the United States could interrupt China’s oil suppl
→ gimtama: ies from the gulf.
→ kwei: It appears that the author cited NY Times for the fact,
→ kwei: not for its opinion.