[資訊] 美國精英如何才能符合期待

[kwei (光影)]

美國精英如何才能符合期待
How Do America’s Elites Stack Up?
原文：The American Interest https://tinyurl.com/t3b5kec
譯文：法意讀書 (刊載於察網)
http://www.cwzg.cn/theory/202003/55557.html
作者：Seth D. Kaplan

【法意導言】約翰霍普金斯大學保羅·H·尼采高級國際研究學院（SAIS）的教授講師塞
斯·D·卡普蘭（Seth D. Kaplan）於2019年10月30日在《國家利益》（The American
Interest）雜誌上發表了《美國的精英們如何才能符合期待》一文。他引述了伊本·赫勒
敦、阿諾德·湯因比、托克維爾等學者對於社會運轉及精英群體的見解，指出了無論何種
社會，具有創造力的精英對於社會興衰都至關重要。同時，精英需要深深植根於社會，瞭
解民眾的需求，以免對即將到來的挑戰毫無準備。卡普蘭指出，當前美國精英與民眾已經
產生了脫節，精英雖然表示出對於社會的關注，但在實際行為中卻與民眾劃出界線，而精
英與民眾的脫節會使精英群體失去創造力，同時失去應對當前危機的能力。即使部分學者
相信美國能夠避免其他文化經受的挫折，但卡普蘭認為，精英們需要放棄認為自己站在歷
史正確的一邊的自大想法，美國當前更需要他們擁有謙卑感、紮根於社會，且樂意做出自
我犧牲。

The American elite has many worries—maintaining geopolitical stability,
reducing inequality, ending discrimination, and the like. But what if the
greatest threat to the United States is not these things, but rather elites
themselves—in particular their unwillingness to accept responsibility as
stewards of society and their disengagement from the rest of the population?
This “pulling away” by elites compromises the country’s ability to address
the various challenges it faces. Compounding this threat, American elites’
 hubristic confidence that they are on “the right side of history” limits
what they might otherwise learn from the rise and fall of other societies.

美國的精英們有許多擔憂——維持地緣政治穩定、減少不平等、結束歧視等等。但如果對
美國最大的威脅不是這些東西，而是精英們自己——特別是在於他們對社會管理者的責任
的逃避以及與其他群體的脫離——那又會怎麼樣？精英們的這種“抽離”削弱了美國應對
它正在面臨的各種挑戰的能力。而在此之上，美國精英們還自大地相信自己站在“歷史的
正確的一邊”，這限制了他們原本能從其他社會的興衰中學習到的東西。

The great Arab historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun studied the “science of
society” (‘ilm al-‘umran), emphasizing the importance of asabiyyah—social
cohesion or group solidarity—as crucial to understanding the rise and fall
of any state. The British historian Arnold Toynbee, who examined 26 world
civilizations in his 12-volume A Study of History, saw civilizational decay
as resulting from the deterioration of the creative minority—composed of
elite leaders—that drives progress. The elite degenerates, growing prideful
and dominant even as it loses the ability to innovate and address societal
challenges. Instead of leading with a confident sense of virtue and purpose,
it turns parasitic and “succumbs to the sickness of ‘proletarianization.’”
 Others have theorized that countries weaken due to a decline in civic virtue
(Edward Gibbon), cultural dynamism (Oswald Spengler), familism (Carle
Zimmerman), productive forces (Karl Marx), and political institutions (Samuel
Huntington).

偉大的阿拉伯歷史學家和社會學家伊本·赫勒敦研究了“社會的科學”，強調了
asabiyyah（本文譯為凝聚力）——即社會凝聚力或群體凝聚力——對於理解任何國家的
興衰的重要性。英國歷史學家阿諾德·湯因比在其12卷的《歷史研究》中考察了26種世界
文明，他認為文明的衰落源於有創造力的少數群體的墮落，這一由精英領袖組成的群體推
動著進步。精英們墮落了，他們變得驕傲自大，失去了創新和應對社會挑戰的能力。他們
不是以對自己的道德和目標的自信來領導，他們成為了依附者，並“屈服於‘無產階級化
’的病態”。其他人則將國家的衰敗總結為發生在公民道德（愛德華·吉本）、文化活力
（奧斯瓦爾德·斯賓格勒）、家庭主義（卡爾·齊默爾曼）、生產力（卡爾·馬克思）和
政治機構（塞繆爾·亨廷頓）中的墮落。

Though these scholars emphasize different things, for the most part they
consistently point to the importance of elites and social cohesion for the
success of any polity—and see these two as being connected. Elites—groups
with outsized power and influence over the major institutions in any society—
were historically comprised of at most 2 percent of any people. Depending on
how broadly one defines the term, “elites” comprise anywhere from 10
percent to 20 percent of the American population today.

儘管這些學者強調的東西不同，但他們在很大程度上都持續地指出了精英和社會凝聚力對
於任何一個政體的成功的重要性，並且認為這兩者是相互聯繫的。歷史上，在某一社會中
對主要機構擁有巨大的權力和影響力的精英群體最多佔所有人數的百分之二。根據人們對
“精英”的定義範圍的不同，“精英”在當今美國人口中所佔比例在百分之十到百分之二
十之間。

If a society is to prosper, elites must not only creatively address critical
challenges, they must also avoid becoming disconnected from society and
acting in ways that undermine its dynamism and loyalty. Although correctly
anticipating and responding to challenges the U.S. faces may seem to depend
on rational decision-making by merit-based actors, history shows that this is
incorrect: Deep ties to society are necessary for the right intelligence, a
tradition of self-sacrifice is necessary to inspire collective action, and
longstanding habits of virtue are necessary to ensure the societal response
is energetic.

如果一個社會要繁榮，精英們不僅必須創造性地應對嚴峻的挑戰，還必須避免與社會脫節
，也避免以破壞社群活力和忠誠的方式行事。儘管正確預測和應對美國面臨的挑戰似乎取
決於擇優者的理性決策，但歷史表明這是不正確的：與社會的深厚聯繫是獲得正確的智慧
的必要條件，自我犧牲的傳統是激勵集體行動的必要條件，而長期的美德習慣對於確保社
會反應充滿活力而言是必要的。


The Science of Society
社會的科學

Comparative analyses of how underlying societal and institutional dynamics
shape the destiny of countries across centuries are far less popular today
than in the past. This is partly due to specialization, the dominance of
economics, the rise of gender and other identity studies, and a clear
preference for quantitative models. There is a broad intellectual consensus
in academia and officialdom that policy choices (which can be rationally
deduced) and leadership (which should be selected on merit) matter more than
anything else. According to this consensus, as societies evolve in only one,
ever more positive, direction, the study of their broader dynamics, norms,
and cycles is not vital. This is unfortunate. As the U.S. experiences an
unprecedented decline in social cohesion, it is precisely such knowledge that
is increasingly important.

相比過去，如今，對社會和制度性動力如何塑造國家跨世紀命運的比較分析遠沒有那麼熱
門。其部分原因在於專業化、經濟學的主導地位、性別和其他身份研究的興起，以及對數
據模型的明顯偏好。學術界和官僚界的共識認為，（可以合理推斷的）政策選擇和（應該
擇優的）領導階層比其他任何事情都重要。根據這一共識，隨著社會只朝著某一個愈發積
極的方向發展，對其更廣泛的動力、規範和週期的研究並不重要。這是不幸的。美國社會
凝聚力空前地下降，而正是這類知識正在變得越來越重要。

Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah, completed in 1378, is one of the earliest
treatises on the science of human social organization. His goal was to
ascertain the underlying causes and effects of historical change and the
probability that events from history happened as reported. As Charles Issawi
and Oliver Leaman describe in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ibn
Khaldun proposed that society is an organism that obeys its own inner laws.
These laws can be discovered by applying human reason to data either culled
from historical records or obtained by direct observation. . . . These laws
are explicable sociologically, and are not a mere reflection of biological
impulses or physical factors. To be sure, facts such as climate and food are
important, but . . . purely social factors as cohesion, occupation and wealth
[have greater influence].

伊本·赫勒敦的《歷史緒論》於1378年完成，是最早的人類社會組織的論著之一。他的目
標是查明歷史變化的根本原因和影響，以及歷史事件確實如同記述的那樣發生的可能性。
正如查爾斯·伊薩維和奧利弗·萊曼在《勞特利奇哲學百科全書》中所描述的那樣，伊本
·赫勒敦提出：“社會是一個遵循自身內在規律的有機體。這些規律可以通過將人類的理
性運用到從歷史記錄中挑選的或通過直接觀察得到的數據來發現……這些規律在社會學上
是可以解釋的，而不僅僅是生物衝動或物理因素的反映。當然，氣候和食物等因素很重要
，但是……純粹的社會因素，如凝聚力、職業和財富的影響更大。”

Groups with greater asabiyyah (loosely translated as social cohesion or group
solidarity) are more likely to defeat those with less even if they are
comparatively smaller, poorer, and less technologically advanced. This
asabiyyah is built from a combination of kinship ties, common religion that
builds a shared orientation, and economic gains from trade, pillage, or
conquest. The legitimacy of leaders—and the institutions that support
authority—are products of the three. But Ibn Khaldun noted that asabiyyah
declines with success. It is eroded either by the indolence that development
and luxury bring or by the social divisions that necessarily result from the
concentration of wealth and the development of hierarchy in society.
(Hierarchy becomes necessary to manage a larger, more sophisticated entity.)

擁有更多的凝聚力（原意大致為社會凝聚力或群體凝聚力）的群體更有可能擊敗那些擁有
更少的凝聚力的群體，即使前者相對更小、更窮、技術上更落後。這種凝聚力是由血緣關
係、建立了一個共同方向的共同宗教以及來自貿易、掠奪或征服的經濟收益的結合而帶來
的。領導者的合法性——以及支持權威的機構——都是這三者的產物。但伊本·赫勒敦指
出，凝聚力會隨著成功衰落。它要麼被發展和奢侈帶來的懶惰所侵蝕，要麼被財富集中和
等級制度發展必然導致的社會分化所侵蝕。（層級結構對於管理更大、更複雜的實體來說
至關重要。）

In the West, building off the work of Greco-Roman authors, the comparative
history of societies emerged as an important field of study in the 18th
century. The Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, for example, tried to
accomplish something similar to Ibn Khaldun in his book The New Science,
published in 1725. In it, he espoused a cyclical pattern of human history,
with each society passing through three recurring ages: the divine, the
heroic, and the human. The initial leadership of elite patriarchs that “
united wisdom, priesthood, and kinship” evolves into a competitive and crude
egalitarianism.

在西方，基於希臘羅馬作家的成果，社會比較史成為了18世紀裡一個重要的研究領域。例
如，意大利哲學家詹巴蒂斯塔·維科試圖在1725年出版的《新科學》一書中完成類似於伊
本·赫勒敦所做的事情。在書中，他支持人類歷史是循環的這一觀點，認為每個社會都經
歷了三個反覆出現的時代：神聖時代、英雄時代和人類時代。精英家長們最初的領導整合
了“智慧、神職和血緣”，後來演變成了一種競爭性的、粗暴的平等主義。

For Vico, each age has distinct attributes that affect everything from the
nature of government to the civil order to language. As societies develop,
they create new structures and constraints that shape culture. Primitivism
grows into idealism and then rationalism, but the latter fails to reach the
perfection it seeks. Instead, it yields cynicism, “barbarism,” and “civil
disease,” which corrupt the body politic from within. Responding to
Descartes, Vico warned that too much emphasis on individualism and the
rational development of distinct ideas undermines the tenets of religion—
tenets that are essential to holding society together. In this last stage of
rationalism, the people, “like so many beasts, have fallen into the custom
of each man thinking only of his own private interests and have reached the
extreme delicacy, or better of pride, in which like wild animals they bristle
and lash out at the slightest displeasure.”

對維科來說，每個時代都有不同的屬性，影響著從政府性質到公民秩序再到語言的一切。
隨著社會的發展，他們創造了塑造文化的新的結構和約束。原始主義發展為理想主義，然
後是理性主義，但後者未能達到它所追求的完美。相反，它會產生從內部腐蝕政治的憤世
嫉俗、“野蠻”和“公共性問題”。維柯在回應笛卡爾時警告說，過分強調個人主義和不
同思想的理性發展，破壞了宗教信條的原則，而這些原則對於維繫社會團結至關重要。在
最後理性主義的階段，人們“像野獸一樣，習慣於每個人都只考慮自己的私利，顯得極端
脆弱，或者好一點的情況裡，習慣於只考慮個人榮譽，在這種情況下，他們像野獸一樣，
對一點點不快就怒氣衝衝。”

Montesquieu, Voltaire, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Alexis de Tocqueville, Max
Weber, and Oswald Spengler were among the many other scholars who studied the
comparative history of societies. Tocqueville, for example, analyzed the
nature of American political and civil society—and contrasted it with France
—to understand why democracy had succeeded in America but failed in so many
other places. Adam Smith analyzed the nature of the market society in
crafting The Wealth of Nations; he is best understood not as an economist
but, in the words of Encyclopaedia Britannica, as “a social philosopher
whose economic writings constitute only the capstone to an overarching view
of political and social evolution.” Indeed, he saw his most famous work as a
study of “the general principles of law and government, and of the different
revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society.
” Weber emphasized both the importance of sociocultural dynamics—and the
influence of Protestantism in particular—to understanding the rise of the
West and the importance of elite behavior in understanding how any particular
country would evolve.

研究社會比較史的眾多學者中，有孟德斯鳩、伏爾泰、亞當·斯密、卡爾·馬克思、亞歷
克西斯·德·托克維爾、馬克斯·韋伯和奧斯瓦爾德·斯賓格勒等等。例如，托克維爾分
析了美國政治和公民社會的性質，並將其與法國進行了對比，以理解為什麼民主在美國取
得了成功，卻在其他許多地方都失敗了。亞當·斯密在撰寫《國富論》時分析了市場社會
的本質；他最適合的身份不是經濟學家，而是，用《大英百科全書》的話來說，“一位社
會哲學家，他的經濟著作就構成了政治和社會發展的統領觀點的基調”。事實上，他認為
自己最著名的作品是對“法律和政府的一般原則，以及它們在不同時代和社會時期所經歷
的不同革命”的研究。韋伯強調了社會文化動力——尤其是新教的影響——對於理解西方
的重要性，以及精英行為對於理解任何一個特定國家的演變中的重要性。

Emile Durkheim helped establish the field of modern sociology as a science of
“social facts”—phenomena that structure individual behavior and seemingly
autonomous or even chaotic decisions within a larger pattern. Although he was
not specifically interested in the broad arc of how societies rise and fall,
Durkheim’s work concerned what holds society together and how it might break
down. He differentiated between mechanical solidarity arising from similar
values, work, and life experiences in traditional societies and organic
solidarity arising through interdependence and complex social interactions in
dense modern settings. The latter brings more freedom, but secularism, the
division of labor, and individualism risk producing anomie and
disintegration. Rapid change in the values and standards a society professes
produces a disconnect with what is achievable in reality, yielding
alienation, purposelessness, and, eventually, “derangement” from the “the
malady of the infinite” (desire that cannot be fulfilled) and a rise in
suicide. Nationalism that bound people together through common purpose and
solidarity—reducing moral isolation in the process—was essential to counter
these dangers, especially in highly individualistic modern societies.

埃米爾·杜爾凱姆幫助將現代社會學領域建立為一門有關“社會事實”——指在一個更大
的模式中構建個人行為和看似自主以至混亂的決策的現象——的科學。儘管他對社會興衰
的大起大落並不特別感興趣，但杜爾凱姆的作品關注的是，什麼使社會團結在一起，以及
社會可能會如何崩潰。他區分了傳統社會中由類似的價值觀、工作和生活經驗產生的機械
團結和在密集的現代環境中由相互依存和複雜的社會互動產生的有機團結。後者帶來更多
的自由，但也帶來了現世主義、勞動分工和可能產生失范和解體的個人主義風險。社會所
宣稱的價值觀和標準迅速變化，產生了與現實中可以實現的東西的脫節，產生了異化、無
目的性，並最終產生了“無限的病態”（無法實現的慾望）中的“精神錯亂”以及自殺情
況的增多。民族主義通過共同的目標和凝聚力將人們聯結在一起，並在這一過程中減少了
道德的孤立，這對於應對這些危險至關重要，尤其是在高度個人主義的現代社會。

In the years since World War I, Toynbee’s magisterial series (published
1934-61), which defined his career, is arguably the most ambitious and
important development for understanding the dynamics of societies over time.
He focused on how cultures or civilizations arise from primitive societies as
a response to difficult challenges, then grow and decay. Like Ibn Khaldun,
Toynbee believed that the proper study of history required more than
examining a particular series of events from one place or time period; one
must look for patterns that repeat across societies and time. In contrast to
Ibn Khaldun (and many of his predecessors), however, he did not believe that
societies inevitably die. On the contrary, civilizations could adapt in ways
that allow them to achieve ever greater growth.

自從第一次世界大戰以來，湯因比藉以定義其職業生涯的權威系列叢書（出版於
1934-1961年），可以說是理解社會隨時間變化的最雄心勃勃也是最重要的進展。他專注
於研究文化或文明是如何從原始社會中產生以應對困難的挑戰、發展壯大、以至衰敗的。
與伊本·哈勒敦一樣，湯因比認為，對歷史的正確研究所需要的不僅僅是考察一個地方或
某個時間段的一系列特定事件；還必須尋找在不同社會和不同時間裡反覆出現的模式。然
而，與伊本·哈勒敦（和許多他之前的學者）相比，他並不認為社會必然會死亡。相反，
文明可以以某種方式獲得適應，並實現更大的發展。

Toynbee observed “Creative Minorities” playing crucial roles at every stage
of a society’s rise and fall. Initially their very presence makes the rise
possible. When confronted by a series of difficulties, members of a creative
minority respond in ways that solve the problem, yielding a progressive and
cumulative development of the civilization’s capacity, values, institutions,
and techniques. But this creative minority does not dominate. On the
contrary, it inspires and is freely imitated and followed, ensuring an
essential unity and preventing major social cleavages.

湯因比觀察到，“創造性的少數群體”在社會興衰的每個階段都扮演著至關重要的角色。
最初，它們的存在使社會的興起成為可能。當遇到一系列困難時，少數有創造力的人會作
出反應以解決問題，從而使文明的承受力、價值觀、制度和技術得到逐步和累積的發展。
但這一創造性的少數群體並不佔主導地位。相反，他們會啟發思考，而社會其他人都可以
自由地模仿和遵循，這確保了重要的團結性，也防止了嚴重的社會分裂。

Decay is not caused by an external assault or a decline in technology. In
Toynbee’s formulation in A Study of History, “. . . the nature of the
breakdowns of civilizations can be summed up in three points: a failure of
creative power in the minority, an answering withdrawal of mimesis on the
part of the majority, and a consequent loss of social unity in the society as
a whole.” In this latter stage, the “Creative Minority degenerates into a
mere Dominant Minority which attempts to retain by force a position which it
has ceased to merit.” Its mores decay and it declines into “truancy” and “
promiscuity,” becoming self-serving rather than self-sacrificing. It
worships the great achievements of its “former self,” becoming overly
prideful in the process, and unable to effectively address the next set of
challenges that a society faces. The decay may occur over centuries before
dissolution finally ensues.

衰敗並不是由外部的攻擊或科技水平的下降引起的。湯因比在《歷史研究》中的表述是，
“……文明崩潰的本質可以歸納為三點：少數群體的創造力的失敗，多數群體對於少數群
體的模仿反饋的消退，以及它帶來的社會整體的團結的消失”。在後一階段，“有創造力
的少數派變為佔優勢地位的少數派，他們試圖強行保留他們已經不再值得擁有的地位”。
他們的道德敗壞，並逐漸淪落至“卸責”和“淫亂”，他們服務於自我而不是犧牲自我。
他們崇拜“先前自我”的巨大成就，並在這過程中變得過分驕傲，無法有效應對社會面臨
的下一輪挑戰。這種衰敗可能在解體最終發生的幾個世紀前就已經開始進行了。

A number of late 20th-century comparative political scientists, including
Samuel Huntington, Seymour Martin Lipset, Charles Tilly, Barrington Moore,
and Ernest Gellner, explored the importance of social dynamics to political
outcomes in their work and have thus some overlap with social analyses.
Huntington, for example, looked at political development and decay in
writings such as Political Order in Changing Societies (published 1968). He
was particularly interested in the “conflict between mobilization and
institutionalization.” Where political structures are weak, mass political
participation can break the elite consensus that holds society together and
undermine the political institutions that they use to govern society—risking
instability, corruption, decline, or even collapse. Moreover, rapid change
challenges existing values and behaviors, often breeding corruption in the
process. He thus critiques the general “underlying commitment to the theory
of progress” in academia that leads to a belief that societies only progress
in one direction. “Little or no provision is made for their reversibility. .
. . National disintegration is a phenomenon as much as national integration.”

20世紀晚期的一些比較政治學家，包括塞繆爾·亨廷頓、西摩·馬丁·利普塞特、查爾斯
·蒂利、巴林頓·摩爾和歐內斯特·蓋爾納，在他們的工作中探討了社會動力對政治成果
的重要性，並因此與社會分析有了一些重疊。例如，亨廷頓在《變化中的社會的政治秩序
》（1968年出版）等著作中探討了政治的發展和衰落。他對“流動性和制度化之間的衝突
”特別感興趣。在政治結構薄弱的地方，大規模的政治參與可能會打破將社會團結在一起
的精英們的共識，破壞他們用來治理社會的政治機構——帶來不穩定、腐敗、衰落甚至崩
潰的風險。此外，快速的變化挑戰著現有的價值觀和行為，並往往在過程中滋生了腐敗。
因此，他批評學術界普遍存在的“對進步理論的隱含的認可”，這種認可導致人們相信社
會只能朝著一個方向發展。“人們為相反的可能留下了很少或根本不存在的餘地……民族
分裂與民族融合一樣，也都是（值得研究的）一種現象。”

More recently, Jared Diamond examined why societies fail in Collapse: How
Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005). He argues that societies end when
they fail to adequately respond to their greatest challenges, which he
considers to be climate change, hostile neighbors, a worsening environment,
and the breakdown of trade. Elites need to make the right decisions at
critical junctures, and this depends on being actively engaged with and not
insulated from the general population. A lack of knowledge, affinity, or
interest can preclude effective action. Long-term planning and a willingness
to rethink core values are essential to responding in time.

最近，賈裡德·戴蒙德在《崩潰：社會如何選擇成敗興亡》（2005）中研究了社會為什麼
會崩潰。他指出，當無法充分應對其面臨的最大的挑戰時，社會就結束了，而他認為這些
挑戰就是氣候變化、敵對鄰國、不斷惡化的環境和貿易的崩潰。精英們需要在關鍵時刻做
出正確的決定，而這取決於他們是否積極參與到普通群眾中去，而不是與普通民眾隔絕。
知識、親和力或興趣的缺乏會妨礙他們採取有效的行動。長期規劃和願意重新思考核心價
值觀對於及時作出反應至關重要。


The Importance of Elites
精英的重要性

Despite examining significantly different epochs and geographies, similar
themes appear among observers like Vico, Toynbee, and Diamond. In particular,
they believe elites play a crucial role in determining the development of a
given society. Not only must they be creative and able to think long term
when facing critical challenges, they must remain deeply embedded in their
populations in order to understand needs, act in ways that retain loyalty,
and build capacity to inspire action when needed. Elites that become too
enamored of their past successes or detached from their populations are more
likely to be unprepared for the challenges their societies face, act in ways
that alienate others, and be compelled to use force to extend their writ.
Taking a disproportionate share of the spoils from trade, war, and other
forms of wealth creation can yield this detachment.

儘管他們考察的是明顯不同的時代和地理，但類似的主題出現在如維科、湯因比和戴蒙德
這樣的觀察家的研究中。特別是，他們認為精英在決定一個特定社會的發展方面起著至關
重要的作用。精英不僅必須有創造力，在面臨重大挑戰時能夠進行長遠思考，而且必須深
深植根於民眾之中，以便瞭解民眾需求，以維持民眾忠誠的方式行事，並擁有在需要時激
發行動的能力。那些過於迷戀自己過去的成功或脫離民眾的精英們，更有可能對社會所面
臨的挑戰毫無準備，採取會使他人疏遠的行動，並被迫使用武力來延展他們的命令。從貿
易、戰爭和其他形式的財富創造中分得不成比例的戰利品，就會帶來這種疏離。

Elite behavior thus both sets the tone for society as a whole and determines
the nature of the relationships that define that society—and thus has
enormous influence on how cohesive it is. And social cohesion—asabiyyah,
unity, or some form of social or elite consensus—is critical for collective
action, creativity, and aspirations. On the other hand, social divisions are
a common source of societal decay. These divisions could stem from too much
individualism, materialism, and elites’ focus on private interests. Social
disintegration is the greatest risk; this could result from some sort of
cleavage among elites or between elites and the population, an increase in
the corruption of institutions or morals, or a growing disaggregation of the
population.

因此，精英行為既為整個社會定下基調，也決定了界定社會的關係的性質，從而對社會的
凝聚力產生巨大影響。社會凝聚力——asabiyyah，團結，或某種形式的社會性的或精英
的共識——對集體行動、創造力和信念至關重要。另一方面，社會分化是社會衰退的常見
根源。這種分化可能源於太多的個人主義、唯物主義和精英們對私人利益的關注。最大的
風險是社會解體；這可能是由於精英之間或精英與民眾之間的某種分裂、機構中或道德上
的腐敗的加劇或是民眾的日益分裂。

Only elites—Toynbee’s “creative minority”—are able to shepherd a society
through the series of challenges that it will inevitably face. Such
challenges can catalyze the creative development of new technologies and
institutions that spur the advancement of the society and, in time, increase
its power and influence. As Toynbee notes, “Man achieves civilization, not
as a result of superior biological endowment or geographical environment, but
as a response to a challenge in a situation of special difficulty which
rouses him to make a hitherto unprecedented effort.”

只有精英——也就是湯因比的“有創造力的少數群體”——才能帶領社會度過不可避免的
一系列挑戰。這些挑戰可以促進新技術和新制度的創造性發展，從而推動社會進步，並最
終提高其力量和影響力。正如湯因比所指出的，“人類實現文明，不是由於優越的生物稟
賦或地理環境，而是在一種特殊困難的情況下應對挑戰的結果，這種特殊困難激發了他作
出迄今為止前所未有的努力。”

But these tests can also spell the demise of a society if not handled well.
In such cases, the result will be more due to elite failings—in a process
akin to suicide or murder (using Toynbee’s metaphor)—than from what any
outsider does.

但如果這些挑戰沒有被妥善處理，它也可能意味著一個社會的滅亡。在這種情況下，這個
結果將更多地歸咎於精英的錯誤——在類似於自殺或謀殺的過程中（用湯因比的比喻）—
—而不是來自任何其他人的所作所為。

Meeting challenges of “special difficulty”—which can be physical (swamps,
rising sea waters, environmental change), social (internal divisions, growing
mobilization), economic (decline of trade), military (hostile neighbor), or
institutional (need for reform)—requires some spiritual dynamic that goes
well beyond just rational decision-making and engenders broad, sometimes
fervent, action across society.

應對“特殊困難”的挑戰——這些困難可以是物理上的（沼澤地、上升的海水、環境變化
）、社會上的（內部分裂、不斷增長的流動性）、經濟上的（貿易的衰退）、軍事上的（
敵對的鄰居），或者體制上的（改革的需要）——需要某種精神動力，這種精神動力遠遠
超出理性決策的範疇，並在全社會產生廣泛的、有時甚至是狂熱的行動。

As such, many scholars identify religion as being crucial to helping
communities jell, cultivating elite virtue, promoting vigorous values among
the population, and inspiring heroic acts. But they also warn that as
societies evolve, faith’s influence typically diminishes, contributing to a
society’s decline. Rationalism and materialism come to the fore, weakening
the common affinities that bound elites to their populations and the values
and beliefs that fueled the society’s rise to prominence. The risk of social
maladies and disintegration grows.

因此，許多學者認為宗教對於幫助社區凝聚、培養精英美德、在民眾中提倡有活力的價值
觀和激勵英雄行為至關重要。但他們也警告說，隨著社會的發展，信仰的影響通常會減弱
，從而帶來社會的衰落。理性主義和唯物主義走到台前，削弱了聯繫著精英與民眾之間的
共同親和力，也削弱了推動社會崛起的價值觀和信仰。社會產生弊病和分裂的風險越來越
大。

表1總結了負責任的管理國家的精英和不負責任的未能管理國家的精英之間的區別。它們
當然是理想的類型。大多數社會都會有各種各樣的因素，或者介於這兩個極端之間。

表1：精英的比較
         / 負責任的精英                        / 不負責任的精英
社會聯系 / 接地氣                              / 疏離
決策制定 / 同樣在意非理性的目標（如榮譽、忠誠）/ 基於理性主義和物質主義
道德     / 合乎規範、自我犧牲、合乎道德、質樸  / 自我中心、腐敗、雜亂
組織     / 即使地位得到提升也會踐行平等主義    / 努力使自己與大眾區分開
成果     / 分享                                / 集中於精英
凝聚力   / 將其視為最高價值                    / 通常以某種破壞它的方式行事
教育目標 / 培養人才、傳授知識                  / 為了自己發展助力
物質追求 / 節制                                / 放縱
宗教組織 / 認識其重要性、尊敬                  / 認可其工具性，但施加義務


Elites in American Society
精英主義的美國社會

Who are the American elite? The term “elite” can be contentious. For our
purposes it includes the senior echelon of professionals in government,
academia, business, media, entertainment, and the nonprofit world, all of
whom work to produce and manipulate information. Debates about “the one
percent” in politics and social movements such as Occupy Wall Street focus
mostly on the disproportionate amount of wealth and power elites have.
Protestors are concerned primarily about fairness and inequality. But some of
the elite may not be particularly wealthy, and there is little consideration
of how elites’ advantages bring greater obligations to society and how
contemporary elites are failing to fulfill them. There is more concern for
whether elites signal their support for particular causes than for whether
they personally enmesh themselves within society and act in ways that
contribute to its strength.

哪些人是美國精英？“精英”這個詞引發爭議。就我們的目的而言，它包政府、學術界、
商界、媒體、娛樂界和非營利組織的高級專業人員，他們都致力於生產和操控信息。政治
和社會運動（如佔領華爾街運動）中關於“百分之一”的爭論主要集中在精英們擁有的不
成比例的財富和權力上。抗議者主要關心的是公平和不平等。但一些精英階層可能並不特
別富有，而且人們很少考慮精英階層的優勢如何要求他們對社會履行更大的義務，以及當
代精英階層如何未能履行這些義務。人們更關心的是，精英們是否展現出了對特定的事業
的支持，而不是他們是否使自己切身融入社會，並以會增強社會力量的方式行事。

The values and standards of those driving such debates—which, ironically,
include many who are arguably part of the elite or at least the
semi-privileged class just below—have so changed that even admitting society
has a set of elites that might play a constructive role stewarding the
country forward is considered a taboo subject. Elites are rarely considered
to be an essential pillar—a public good—of society, with outsized
obligations, as scholars such as Ibn Khaldun, Toynbee, and Weber argue.

推動此類辯論的人——具有諷刺意味的是，這些人中許多算得上是精英階層或至少是其下
的半特權階層——的價值觀和標準已經發生了巨大的變化，甚至，承認社會中存在一批可
能在治理國家中發揮建設性的作用的精英已經被視為一個禁忌。精英很少被認為是社會的
重要支柱——一種公共性的利益——並承擔著巨大的義務，正如伊本·哈勒敦、湯因比和
韋伯等學者所認為的那樣。

It is difficult to discuss the subject in non-pejorative terms given the
prevailing egalitarian ideology. Some elite theory scholars argue that this
ideology is more an illusion than anything else, preventing a more serious
discussion of a crucial topic and contributing to our current political and
even social problems. As G. Lowell Field and John Higley argue in Elitism, “
A general failure to consider the complementarity of elitist and liberal
principles has been at the heart of a serious doctrinal degeneration within
liberalism.” And, as Peter Berger writes in The Public Interest, “The
paradox of modernization is that egalitarian regimes become progressively
less feasible [as countries develop], while egalitarian ideologies are
rampant.” The latter forces elites to create a “smokescreen of egalitarian
rhetoric.” But this makes them less secure in their positions, and thus less
able to be an effective steward of society.

鑑於普遍存在的平等主義意識形態，很難用非貶義的措辭討論這個問題。一些精英理論學
者認為，這種意識形態比其他任何東西都更像是一種幻覺，它阻止了對關鍵話題的更嚴肅
討論以及對當前政治乃至社會問題的解決。正如G.Lowell Field和John Higley在《精英
主義》（Elitism）中所說的那樣，“沒有考慮精英主義和自由主義原則的互補性，是自
由主義內部嚴重的教義退化的根源。”正如彼得·伯格在《公共利益》（The Public
Interest）中所寫的，“現代化的悖論是，隨著國家的發展，平均主義政權變得越來越不
可行，但平均主義意識形態卻盛行。”後者迫使精英們製造“平均主義言論的煙幕”。但
這使他們在其位置上更不穩定，因此更難成為一個有效的社會管理者。

Elites habitually highlight their willingness to “check their privilege”
 and help the marginalized, while purposely eschewing the responsibilities
that their privilege ought to bring. As Anand Giridharadas argues, “American
elites generally seek to maintain the system . . . our winners-take-all
economy, which siphons the gains from progress upward” even while working
hard to alleviate suffering and improve lives—what he calls “fake change.”
 They may give money or promote good causes but rarely act on a personal
level in a way that strengthens society. They, for example, rarely move to
third-tier cities, compromise their career prospects, or put their children
in underperforming urban schools. On the contrary, as Richard Reeves writes,
elites hoard opportunity for themselves, creating a class system encompassing
differences in wealth, education, security, family structure, and health that
functions “more ruthlessly than the British one.” They rarely support
policies that would constrain their choices or limit their gains (for
example, restrictions on trade, business monopolies, and tax avoidance). And
while they may act (relatively) virtuously in their personal life, they
regularly attack as a negative sign of privilege any attempt to promote the
virtuous traditional values and mores that were once accepted as essential to
personal success in the broader society (for example, get married before you
have children and then stay married; work hard, don’t be idle; be a patriot;
save and invest for the future).

精英們習慣性地強調他們願意“檢查自己的特權”並且幫助被邊緣化的人，但他們故意迴
避特權帶來的責任。正如阿南德·吉里哈拉達斯所說，美國精英們在努力減輕痛苦和改善
生活的同時，“通常尋求維持這一體系……從進步中攫取利益的贏者通吃的經濟”——他
稱之為“虛假的改變”。他們可能會給予錢財或推進好的事業，但很少在個人層面上採取
增強社會力量的行動。例如，他們很少搬到三線城市，或是犧牲他們的職業前景，或是把
孩子送進表現不佳的公立學校。另一方面，正如理查德·里夫斯所寫，精英們為自己積累
機會，創造了一個包含財富、教育、安全、家庭結構差異的“比英國更冷酷的”的階級體
系。他們很少支持限制他們的選擇或限制他們的收益的政策（例如，限制貿易、商業壟斷
和避稅行為的政策）。儘管他們在個人生活中（相對而言）可能表現得比較正直，但是作
為特權的負面體現，他們經常攻擊任何試圖宣揚合乎道德的、傳統的價值觀和習俗的行為
，而這些價值觀和習俗曾被認為是在更廣泛的社會中取得個人成功的必要條件（例如，先
結婚再生小孩，不要離婚；努力工作，不要無所事事；做一個愛國者；為未來儲蓄和投資
）。

American elites are also separated from their less-mobile neighbors. As
Christopher Lasch writes, “There has always been a privileged class, even in
America, but it has never been so dangerously isolated from its surroundings”
 as it is now. Whereas elites were once tied to a given place, where they
settled for several generations, and understood that wealth carries various
obligations, such allegiances are much attenuated today. The new elites are “
far more cosmopolitan,” following the “siren call of opportunity wherever
it leads.” Success is now closely associated with mobility, promoting the
best and the brightest of non-elites into the ruling class and ending what
was once the country’s democratic ideal of “rough equality of condition.”

美國的精英也與他們不那麼活躍的同伴分離。正如克里斯托弗·拉什所寫，“即使在美國
，也一直有一個特權階層，但它從未像現在這樣危險地與周圍環境隔絕”。儘管精英們曾
經被束縛在某個特定的、他們已定居了幾代人的地方，並且明白財富承載著各種義務，但
如今這種忠誠卻大大削弱了。新的精英是“更加國際化的”，跟隨著“機遇的誘惑，無論
它引領到哪裡”。現在，成功與流動性密切相關，最優秀和最聰明的非精英人群被推動著
進入統治階級，而曾經的國家民主理想“境遇的大致平等”正在被終結。

As such, elites no longer have a desire to gain the esteem that once came
from fulfilling the obligations of their positions. The growing divergence of
skills and experience between them and everyone else mean, as Paul Collier
argues, that they gain greater esteem (and deeper meaning) from their work
and thus feel greater allegiance to their career, colleagues, and social
group than they do to their locale. “This helps explain why social elites so
often actively disparage their own country—they are esteem-seeking.” They
are signaling that their national identity is no longer salient, that their
loyalties and obligations have shifted. The result is that they are, as Lasch
argues, “less interested in leadership than in escaping from the common lot.
”

因此，精英們不再渴望曾經從履行其職位義務中獲得的尊重。正如保羅·科利爾所說，他
們與其他人之間技能和經驗的日益分化意味著，他們從工作中獲得了更大的尊重（和更深
層的意義），因此他們對自己的職業、同事和社會群體比對自己的地理所屬更忠誠。“這
有助於解釋為什麼社會精英們經常積極貶低他們自己的國家——他們在尋求尊重。”他們
在暗示他們的國家身份不再顯著，他們的忠誠和義務已經轉移。結果是，正如拉什所說，
他們“相比追求領導地位，對逃避普羅大眾更感興趣。”

This cosmopolitism undermines any sense of loyalty to and need to invest in a
particular place. The need to signal you are a good neighbor has triumphed
over the need to act as one. All of this, as a reader of Rod Dreher’s blog
wrote, “represents a terrible lowering-of-sights—from the idea that
economic elites should actively help people practically unable to help
themselves to the idea that they should passively chat about (‘raise
awareness’) the plight of middle-class people somewhat lacking in
self-belief.”

這種世界主義破壞了對某一特定地方的忠誠感和投資的需求。相比以行動塑造一個好鄰居
的形象，表示你是個好鄰居更加重要。正如羅德·德雷爾的博客中一位讀者所寫的那樣，
所有這一切“代表著一種可怕的視野的狹隘——人們的觀點從認為經濟精英應該積極幫助
那些實際上無法自救的人，轉變為了認為精英應該消極地談論（‘引起關注’）有些缺乏
自信的中產階級的困境”。

The United States today shows striking parallels with the latter stages of
societal evolution as articulated by scientists of society. There is growing
secularization, social disintegration, and anomie. There is a marked rise in
“barbarism” and a concomitant decline in the norms and values that were
once thought essential to ensuring the vigor of society, suggesting that
society is inflicted with the “civil disease” Vico warned of.
Individualism, materialism, and “private interests” triumph over
self-sacrifice, thriftiness, communitarianism, faith, and the public
interest. Elites are increasingly psychologically and financially detached
from the general population, making choices that benefit themselves at the
expense of everyone else, and stirring resentment and backlash.

今天的美國，與社會科學家們所闡述的社會進化的後期階段有驚人的相似之處。世俗化、
社會分裂和失范越來越嚴重。“野蠻的”現象極為顯著地增多，而一度被認為對確保社會
活力至關重要的準則和價值觀卻在減少，這表明社會正遭受維科所警告的“公共性問題”
。個人主義、唯物主義和“私人利益”戰勝了自我犧牲、節儉、社群主義、信仰和公共利
益。精英們在心理上和經濟上越來越脫離普通民眾，做出有利於自己卻犧牲他人的選擇，
激起了怨恨和抵制。


Recovering a Responsible Elite
重建負責任的精英

As Max Weber argued, mass democracy always yields elite rule in large,
complex societies. Mass democracy centralizes power, grows to rely on
executive bureaucratic “machines” of government, and encourages the
emergence of charismatic leaders who can generate mass appeal. These, in
turn, concentrate influence in “ruling minorities” while strengthening the
state. It is thus not surprising that the United States is ruled by such an
elite. Given this reality, how might the United States produce better, more
responsible elites?

正如馬克斯·韋伯所說，在龐大複雜的社會中，大眾民主總是產生精英統治。大眾民主集
中了權力，逐漸依賴政府的行政官僚“機器”，並鼓勵能夠擁有大眾吸引力的魅力領袖的
出現。反過來，這些在加強國家實力的同時，使影響力集中在“少數統治群體”手中。因
此，美國被這樣的精英群體統治並不奇怪。鑑於這一現實，美國如何才能培養出更好、更
負責任的精英？

The most obvious catalyst would be a national challenge that brought people
together, prompted elite commitment to the country, yielded a rethink of
values, and inspired a new patriotism. The threat from a rising China could
potentially accomplish this if it were utilized by the right leader. A highly
charismatic politician who built a coalition government and rallied people
around a transformative agenda that emphasized self-sacrifice for the common
good would hold the best chance, but even if such a coalition introduced many
changes, it would likely be difficult to sustain the necessary energy over
the long term unless the threat was ongoing and severe (as in Israel). Even
9/11 did not modify behavior for any length of time, and the threat was
highly palpable.

最顯而易見的催化劑是一場全國性質的威脅，它將人們聚集在一起，促使精英們對國家作
出承諾，產生對價值觀的重新思考，並激發新的愛國主義精神。如果正確的領導人能夠利
用崛起中的中國這一威脅，它有可能實現這一目標。如果一個極具魅力的政治家建立了聯
合政府，並圍繞著一個強調為共同利益而自我犧牲的改革議程召集人們，他將擁有最大的
機會，但即使這樣的聯合政府帶來了許多變化，它也很難長期保持必要的活力，除非威脅
的持續時間很長且非常嚴重（比如在以色列）。即使是高度切身可感的9/11事件也沒能帶
來任何行為的改變。

Although it is sometimes disparaged or misused, nationalism remains an
essential tool here. It strengthens social bonds and develops the generosity,
honesty, concern for the common good, respect for others, and other
constructive social norms essential to the functioning of a modern society.
Similarly, a revival of faith and traditional mores could contribute to
building the sense of responsibility for others among elites as well as
restoring their commitment to the virtues with which society once flourished—
including family, thrift, and civic engagement. As Tocqueville noted, only
religion can reach into the “habits of the heart” as well as the “whole
range of ideas that shape habits of mind.”

儘管有時被貶損或濫用，但民族主義仍然是此時一個重要的工具。它加強了社會紐帶，產
生了慷慨、誠實、關心共同利益、尊重他人以及其他對現代社會的運作至關重要的建設性
社會準則。同樣，信仰和傳統習俗的復興有助於在精英中建立對他人的責任感，並重建他
們曾經使社會繁榮的合乎道德的承諾，包括家庭、節儉和公民參與。正如托克維爾所指出
的，只有宗教才能觸及“心靈的習慣”以及“塑造心靈習慣的各種思想”。

Technological advance and globalization threaten to aggravate the problems
outlined above—and make reform more difficult. However, there are three
important ways elite behavior could be shaped in a positive direction,
rebuilding social sources of national strength in the process.

技術進步和全球化有可能加劇上述問題，使改革更加困難。然而，在這一過程中，有三種
重要的方式可以使精英行為朝著積極的方向發展，重建國家力量的社會根源。

As a start, the institutions that select and groom elites need to prepare
them for stewardship, as Weber argued. The overemphasis on merit and
achievement (and wealth) has reduced the importance of character and virtue
among elites, undermining the values and norms that once predominated across
society, with a clear impact on everything from the political arena to the
financial markets to the dating scene. This requires transforming how young
adults are trained and evaluated. Schools should bolster civic education and
character-building programs (for example, the Boy Scouts, at least in its
original form), and evaluate students on moral behavior as well as through
test scores.

首先，正如韋伯提出的，選拔和培養精英的機構需要讓他們做好管理國家的準備。過分強
調功績（和財富）降低了精英階層中品格和美德的重要性，破壞了曾經在全社會佔主導地
位的價值觀和規範，對包含政治舞台、金融市場、約會現場在內的一切都產生了明顯的影
響。這需要改變年輕人接受培訓和評估的方式。學校應該加強公民教育和品格建設項目（
例如，童子軍，至少參考其最初的形式），並同時通過道德行為和考試成績來評估學生的
能力。

Universities and graduate schools should prioritize personal character in
applicants. Essay questions today probe for volunteerism and a commitment to
helping society, but schools interpret these as another form of achievement.
Curriculum should encourage cooperating with stakeholders, responding to the
public good, and being invested in a particular place instead of pursuing
individual ambition alone. For example, MBA students are often taught that
profitmaking is the primary—or only—objective of a business in the United
States; in other countries (such as Germany, Japan), education, culture, and
government policy make the needs of employees, the location of operation, and
the broader society just as important. (American politicians who bully
companies, such as President Trump, have a point, even if their method is
crude and comes late in the game.) Student and business leaders need a
renewed focus on the moral sentiments—what we owe others—that Adam Smith
saw as the essential underpinning to capitalism.

大學和研究生院應該優先考慮申請者的個人品格。現今，論文題探討志願服務和幫助社會
的承諾，但學校將其解釋為了另一種形式的成就。課程應該鼓勵學生與利益相關者合作，
回應公共利益，投資於特定的地方，而不是僅僅追求個人抱負。例如，MBA學生經常被教
導說，盈利是美國企業的首要——或者唯一的——目標；在其他國家（如德國、日本），
教育、文化和政府政策使學生認為員工的需求、經營的地點和更廣泛的社會同樣重要。（
壓榨公司的美國政客，比如特朗普總統，在某種程度上是有道理的，雖然他們的方法很粗
糙，而且是在後程才出現的。）學生和商界領袖需要重新關注我們應給予他人的道德情感
，亞當·斯密認為它是資本主義的根本支柱。

How do we better understand our duties to others? A national service program
would give elites experiential knowledge and greater connectivity with other
Americans. Higher incentives for living, working, and opening social capital
building organizations in less well-off neighborhoods might encourage more
people not just to signal their concern but actually to make a personal
sacrifice for the benefit of the country. Encouraging elite undergraduate and
graduate schools to instill a code of conduct and to mandate or at least
strongly encourage service in an impoverished area, similar to Teach for
America, would help change values. Instead of just promoting semesters
abroad, they could also promote semesters of service at home. Tuition could
even be reduced or forgiven for commitments to serve in a rural or inner
urban city job for a minimum of five years.

我們如何更好地理解自己對他人的責任？一個全國性的服務項目將給精英們提供經驗知識
，並加強與其他美國人的聯繫。在不太富裕的社區，對生活、工作和開放社會資本的建設
組織採取更高的激勵措施，可能會鼓勵更多的人不僅表達他們的關切，而且在實際上為國
家利益作出個人犧牲。鼓勵精英大學和研究生院逐漸建立一套行為準則，強制或至少大力
鼓勵在貧困地區提供服務，將有助於改變價值觀，就像“為美國而教”一樣。學校不僅可
以推廣在國外的學期教學，還可以推廣在國內的服務型學期教學。如果承諾在農村或城中
村工作至少五年，甚至可以減少或免去學費。

This service initiative points to a second way to shape elite behavior.
Government, elite grooming institutions, the media, and so forth should make
a much more concerted effort to embed elites in local communities. This would
make them more knowledgeable, more responsible, and better incentivized to
address the challenges that the country and its common people face. (Warren
Buffet’s success may have more to do with his humble lifestyle and local
embeddedness than is generally appreciated.) The closer the social ties, the
more personal the information, relationship, and sense of obligation, the
greater the noblesse oblige. Today, elite compassion is often depersonalized—
there is more of it for abstract victims and distant people than there is for
those up the road. This requires creative thinking to prevent the upper crust
of society from gaining disproportionately from the financialization and
globalization of the economy and then living protected from the churn and
dislocation these factors cause. It also requires creating the mechanisms and
incentives to ensure that different classes either live in the same broad
areas or intermix on more than a perfunctory level.

這種服務倡議指出了塑造精英行為的第二種方式。政府、精英培訓機構、媒體等應該更加
協調一致地努力使精英融入當地社區。這將使他們更有知識，更有責任感，也更有動力應
對國家和人民面臨的挑戰。（沃倫·巴菲特的成功與其擁有謙遜的生活方式和深深紮根於
本土社群的關係可能比人們普遍認識到的更緊密。）社會關係越密切，信息、關係和責任
感越個人化，精英階層的義務就越大。今天，精英的同情心往往是去個人化的，他們對抽
象的受害者和遠方的人的同情，比對那些路邊的人的同情要更多。這就需要創造性的思考
，以防止社會上層從經濟的金融化和全球化中獲得不成比例的收益，然後使他們的生活免
受其造成的動盪和混亂的影響。這還要求建立各種機制和激勵，以確保不同階層要麼生活
在同一個廣闊的領域，要麼有更深層次的融合。

On the policy side, a much more concerted effort should be undertaken to
limit the ability of people to gain from stashing their wealth overseas,
avoiding American taxes, enriching themselves off the backs of their
employees, or living only off of the dividends of one’s forebears.
Incentives could be introduced to encourage investment in the country,
especially in impoverished regions (something the latest tax reform attempts).

在政策方面，應該採取更加一致的努力，限制人們從海外囤積財富、逃避美國稅收、通過
剝削僱員來致富或只靠先輩的紅利生活的能力。我們可以採取激勵措施鼓勵對國家的投資
，特別是對貧困地區的投資（這是最近的稅制改革正在嘗試的）。

The media might highlight more individuals—especially among the elites—who
returned to their communities after school, took up leadership posts in
underserved communities, sacrificed potentially profitable careers for a
commitment to working locally, and took on obligations to others (spouse,
neighbor, town, church) at a personal cost to themselves. This would inspire
others to do the same. (This strategy has been effective for highlighting
personal sacrifices made for the environment.) For example, current Senator
Cory Booker got his hands dirty by investing eight years in turning around
one of the country’s most troubled cities—Newark, New Jersey.

媒體可能會更多地強調那些個人——特別是在精英中——他們在完成學業返回社區，或在
服務缺乏的社區擔任領導職務，或為在當地工作而犧牲有收益的職業，或為了履行對其他
人（配偶、鄰居、城鎮、教會）的義務而犧牲自己。這將激勵其他人也這樣做。（這一策
略有效地突出了個人為整體環境做出的犧牲。）例如，現任參議員科裡·布克親力親為，
花費八年時間扭轉了新澤西州紐瓦克市的情況——它是美國麻煩最多的城市之一。

Of course, the more elites reflect the racial and gender balance in the
country, the easier it will be to embed them—and the greater legitimacy
elites will have across all groups. A renewed emphasis on elites does not
simply mean accepting the racial and gender inequalities that once excluded
large parts of the country from such positions. Indeed, the strongest elite
groups are open to new infusions of talent, stand upon societies with ample
social mobility, and work to spread the best of civilization to all parts of
their country. They are not afraid of competition; they gain from it. The key
is to make entry into the elite class more accessible while not diluting the
professional ethos and sense of responsibility that long defined it.

當然，精英階層越能反映國家的種族和性別平衡，就越容易使其融入社會——精英階層在
所有群體中的合法性也就越高。重新強調精英並不意味著接受曾經將大部分人口排除在精
英地位之外的種族和性別不平等。事實上，最強大的精英群體對新的人才注入抱持開放態
度，基於社會流動性充裕的社會，努力將最好的文明傳播到全國各地。他們不怕競爭，他
們從競爭中獲益。關鍵在於，要使進入精英階層的途徑更加容易，同時不要沖淡長期以來
定義精英階層的道德思想和責任感。

Lastly, the country’s social, economic, and political leaders, as well as
elite-shaping institutions, need to instill a much greater sense of humility
towards the fragility of society. Cultivating humility requires greater
awareness of the history of other great civilizations and the likelihood that
social decay will repeat itself. Although there are widespread concerns about
America’s position in the world, the environment, inequality, and the
dangers from artificial intelligence, there is little concern about social
disintegration, the decline in constructive social mores, and the growing
physical and psychological separation of elites from the rest of the
population. A change of heart requires major changes to education—especially
of elites.

最後，國家的社會、經濟和政治領導人，以及塑造精英的機構，需要傳遞更多的對社會脆
弱性的謙卑感。培養謙卑感需要對其他偉大文明的歷史有更大的認識，也需要認識到社會
的衰敗有可能重演。儘管人們普遍擔心美國在世界上的地位、環境問題、不平等以及人工
智能帶來的危險，但對於社會解體、建設性社會風氣下降以及精英與其他人群在物理上和
心理上的日益分離，卻很少有人擔心。改變心態需要對教育進行重大改革——特別是對精
英的教育。

More knowledge about the rise and fall of other societies and civilizations—
and the lessons that can be learned from them—should be a part of every high
school and college curriculum. Toynbee’s observations should be studied
alongside the historical events he was describing. More material on social
decay (for example, the negative outcomes from family breakup and the
weakening of communal ties) should also become a part of the curriculum in
schools—especially in journalism schools, economics programs, and public
policy programs.

更多關於其他社會和文明興衰的知識以及可以從中吸取的教訓，應該成為每一個高中和大
學課程的一部分。湯因比的觀察應該和他所描述的歷史事件一起被研究。關於社會衰敗的
更多材料（例如，家庭破裂和社區關係削弱帶來的負面結果）也應成為學校課程的一部分
——特別是在新聞學校、經濟課程和公共政策課程中。


Self-Sacrifice and the Common Good
自我犧牲與公共利益

The idea that society could somehow decay or fail from internal flaws seems
hard for the majority of American elites—leaders, scholars, and policymakers
—to fathom. Instead, they unconsciously hold, as Huntington argued, an “
underlying commitment to the theory of progress”—a Whig interpretation of
history. As former President Obama liked to say (quoting Martin Luther King,
Jr., who had paraphrased Theodore Parker), “The arc of the moral universe is
long, but it bends toward justice.” Obama employed this quote to support a
progressive determinism that makes many elites believe the United States is
immune to the challenges that every other major civilization in history has
faced in some form. There is little reflection on the downsides the current
trajectory might bring.

對於大多數美國精英——領導人、學者和政策制定者——來說，認為社會可能因內部缺陷
而衰退或失敗的想法似乎難以理解。相反，正如亨廷頓所說，他們無意識地持有“對進步
理論的隱含的認可”——對歷史的輝格黨式解釋。正如前總統奧巴馬喜歡說的那樣（引用
了馬丁·路德·金的話，而馬丁複述了西奧多·帕克的話），“道德宇宙的弧線很長，但
它向正義彎曲”。奧巴馬引用這句話來支持一種進步的決定論，這種決定論使許多精英相
信，美國不會經歷歷史上其他主要文明以某種形式面臨的挑戰。目前的軌跡可能帶來的負
面影響幾乎沒有反映出來。

But elites are not without feelings. Most want to believe that they are doing
good, that they are contributing in some way to their societies. The problem
is how the culture currently frames this contribution. What is valued is not
what is needed.

但精英們並非沒有感情。大多數人希望相信他們確實在做好事，希望相信他們在某種程度
上正在為他們的社會做出貢獻。問題在於文化當前如何定義貢獻。被認為有價值的東西不
是我們需要的。

Wealth and power used to be understood as bringing responsibility and
obligations—often to a particular place and group—that were developed on a
personal level and requiring a personal response. Elites today who search for
greater meaning in their lives will find that the best way to achieve this is
in service to and communion with others to whom one is tied through a web of
intimate bonds and interdependence. Embedding oneself into a community—a
community that needs stewardship and that involves diverse classes,
professions, and political persuasions—requires many sacrifices, even
discomforts. It also promises a greater personal transformation than any
quest for self-fulfillment. Only when elites are invested in the concerns of
the rest of the population, humble about the “right side of history”
 narrative, and open to stewarding their privilege rather than “checking”
 it will they be able to strengthen American society.

我們曾經認為，財富和權力要求在個人層面上發展起來的、需要個人的回應的責任和義務
——而這種責任和義務通常屬於某個特定的地方和群體。今天，那些在生活中尋求更大意
義的精英們會發現，實現這一目標的最佳方式是通過一個緊密聯繫和相互依存的網絡來服
務他人和與他人交流。使自己融入到一個需要管理的、涉及不同階層、職業和政治信仰的
社區，需要付出很多犧牲，甚至會帶來不安。它也承諾了比任何自我實現的追求都更大的
個人轉變。只有當精英們投入到對其他民眾的關注中，謙虛地對待“歷史的正確一面”的
敘述，開放地管理而不是“檢查”他們的特權的時候，他們才能增強美國社會的力量。

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論述謬誤：1 轉移議題 change of subject、2 偷換概念 concept swap、3 虛假目標
strawman argument、4 人身攻擊 ad hominem、5 感性辯護 appeal to emotion、
6 關聯替代因果 correlation as causation、7 不當類比 false analogy、8 不當引申
slippery slope、9 同義反覆 circular reasoning、10 無知辯護 argument from
ignorance、11 引用權威 appeal to authority、12 黨同伐異 appeal to faction 

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