推 moslaa: 推。所以我現在要認真討論時，一定要看到原始資料 04/25 13:40
→ moslaa: 畢竟只要是人，都存在誤讀可能。 04/25 13:40
→ moslaa: 所以最好作法是，公示自己說法的依據資料 04/25 13:41
→ moslaa: 大家一同檢視。 04/25 13:41
※ 編輯: carsen (114.44.48.57 臺灣), 04/25/2024 14:05:34
→ helldog: 我承認我誤解作者的意思，但你指責我斷章取義，對我也不 04/25 16:39
→ helldog: 公平，我希望你能道歉；還有作者在P605頁犯的錯誤，德軍 04/25 16:40
你一堆斷章取義，沒有先把作者的論述好好說明，卻只顧著講你自己想講的。
舉另一個例子，作者以數千字篇幅，討論二戰德軍接受了納粹的種族主義，
造成許多殘酷行為，論述德軍這樣極端的軍事文化，影響納粹德國的失敗：
https://bit.ly/4aQUx6R
然而helldog你卻把作者的論述用兩句話帶過，調頭大談特談日軍佔領政策、
德國軍事教育，強調作者態度偏頗。但是你沒有針對作者的論述好好討論。
→ helldog: 能用空軍炸毀默茲河的鐵橋，為何你就不提? 04/25 16:42
→ helldog: 我上一行打錯，是作者覺得德國沒有派飛機炸默茲河鐵橋是 04/25 16:43
→ helldog: 失誤，問題是在當時根本就辦不到。 04/25 16:44
關於默茲河的橋樑是在第12章。作者在這一章的討論重點是一戰的消耗戰；
這一章的主要核心是凡爾登戰役的慘烈消耗，作者探討了德軍與法軍在此的
長期大規模消耗戰，對於雙方整體情勢的劇烈影響。許多內容是敘述戰役中
火砲的殺傷威力。而作者在這一章提到飛機效用的4個段落中，全部都提到了
飛機指引火砲的優勢，包含默茲河橋樑的段落也是如此：
The key to French success at Verdun was resupply. Fresh corps,
food and shells, fodder and horses, everything traveled
the last 50 miles on a single-track railway or by light trucks
on a narrow second-class road, though one quickly widened to
handle more traffic. The internal combustion engine came of
age and went to war at Verdun as trucks rolled night and day.
At the height of the effort, 6,000 trucks and cars arrived at
the terminus every 24 hours, or one every 14 seconds.
Discipline was ruthlessly enforced on a no-stops lifeline
French called the Voie Sacrée—the Holy Road. For ten months
it was the pulsing jugular of the French Army:
cut it and France would bleed to death. German air power
proved not up to the job, as not one bridge over the Meuse was
bombed, and the trucks and trains rolled on. Verdun was all
about logistics. The Germans missed the point, and the
bridges. French air power, on the other hand, played a key
role. Once air superiority was established over the battlefield
the accuracy of massed artillery (nearly 3,000 French guns by
June) markedly improved. ......
法軍在凡爾登的成功關鍵在於補給。增援部隊、糧食、砲彈、草料、馬匹，
所有的物資都要靠單線鐵路，或狹窄公路上的輕型卡車運送50英里到前線，
然而這條公路很快就拓寬，加強車輛通行能力。卡車不停地晝夜行駛，在
凡爾登戰場展現內燃機引擎的戰爭效用。到了戰役最激烈的關頭，每天有
6千輛卡車與汽車抵達，每14秒就有1輛。交通紀律無情地執行，讓法國人
稱為「神聖之路」的生命線毫不停歇。長達十個月，這一直是法軍的命脈：
切斷它，法軍會流血至死。但德軍空中力量無法達成任務，沒有任何一座
默茲河的橋樑被炸毀，卡車與汽車持續運補。凡爾登戰役的關鍵在於後勤，
德國人錯過這一點，也錯過了橋樑。另一方面，法軍的空中力量則發揮了
關鍵作用。當戰場上擁有空優時，法軍大規模火砲（到6月時有將近3千門）
的精準度就會顯著提升。……
關於默茲河橋樑的段落，作者是引述自Paul Jankowski的《Verdun》，在該書
的第77頁，Jankowski討論當時的軍事空中力量尚處於起步階段，還無法大力
發展戰略轟炸，因而德軍對於凡爾登的後勤攻擊不足。
No one knew how to employ their fledgling air power or their
lumbering long-range artillery to close down a 50-mile roadway
or destroy the bridges across the Meuse. Shells landed on the
road, and trucks were hit, but the 380 mm guns were inadequate
in number and range to interdict such intense traffic on such
a long stretch. Along its ditches over 8,000 men worked day and
night to maintain it. German airships and fighter squadrons
bombed the stations and cut the rail line and damaged the roads
out of Verdun. But visibility was too poor and the loss rate
too high to deflect them from the primary tasks of
reconnaissance, artillery observation, and control of the air,
and to allow the nascent science of strategic bombing to take
flight. Of the 34 bridges over the Meuse, not one fell to bombs
from the air. No one yet knew, in short, how to attack
the enemy’s logistics instead of his defenses.
沒有人知道該如何運用他們剛剛起步的空中力量，或是笨重的長程砲火
來封鎖50英里的道路，或摧毀默茲河上的橋樑。砲彈擊中了道路和卡車，
但380公釐火砲的數量和射程不足，無法阻斷如此密集的交通。8千多人
日夜不停地工作，沿著壕溝來維修道路。德國飛艇和戰鬥機轟炸了車站，
切斷了鐵路，並破壞凡爾登的道路。但能見度太差，以及損失率太高，
他們忙於偵察、砲兵觀測、爭奪制空權，無法積極發展新興的戰略轟炸。
在默茲河上的34座橋樑，沒有任何一座是被空襲炸彈摧毀。簡而言之，
還沒有人知道該如何攻擊敵人的後勤而不是防禦。
於凡爾登戰役時，德軍或許應該運用更多空中力量來攻擊後勤，這樣的檢討，
參考Alistair Horne《The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916》第17章，可回溯
一戰時擔任無線電員與飛行員，參加了凡爾登戰役的Hans Ritter，於1926年
出版的《空戰》（Der luftkrieg），其中提到德軍當時擁有足夠的轟炸機，
但卻重複運用在砲兵火砲已經有效攻擊的鐵路樞紐上，而沒有更加重視攻擊
「神聖之路」，一舉削弱法軍的後勤。
What disruption carefully organised and constantly renewed
bomb attacks would have wreaked upon this communications’
artery (i.e. the Voie Sacrée), crammed to the most extreme
limits of its capacity, requires no details. Even after the
first attacks numerous destroyed, burning vehicles would have
blocked the road. Exploding munitions’ transports would have
increased the confusion. Craters of heavy bombs would have cut
the road in many places. A chaos that could not be
disentangled must have arisen….
He goes on to point out that the Germans had standing by three
squadrons of heavy ‘C-Machines’, seventy-two in number,
each capable of dropping a 200-lb. bomb, which could reach
their targets after half an hour’s flying. Thus twenty tons of
explosives could have been rained down on the Voie Sacrée each
day, not to mention demoralising night attacks. But for some
extraordinary reason these bombers were wasted on attacking
rail junctions that were already under effective artillery
bombardment.
〔Hans Ritter〕這條已經過度飽和的交通要道（即「神聖之路」）
若遭到精心組織並持續轟炸的破壞，其嚴重程度不必贅述。首波襲擊後，
大量被摧毀的燃燒車輛將會堵住道路，運送的彈藥爆炸時會加劇混亂，
重型炸彈的彈坑會切斷多處道路，造成無法收拾的混亂。……
他又指出，德軍有三個「Rumpler C」的中隊，共有72架，每架能搭載一枚
200磅的炸彈，半小時就能飛到目標上空。這樣一來，每天可以對神聖之路
投下20噸的炸彈，還能夜間襲擊，讓敵軍士氣更低落。但出於某些原因，
這些轟炸機被浪費在攻擊已遭到有效砲擊的鐵路交會樞紐上。
→ leptoneta: 我比較好奇不公平的點在哪 04/25 17:52
→ helldog: 動不動就說別人斷章取義，公平在哪？ 04/25 19:09
推 detonator: 老毛病果然又犯了 04/25 19:12
推 articlebear: 先去跟作者道歉如何？ 04/25 19:44
→ helldog: 笑死，那作者在書裏胡說的部份，要不要跟讀者道歉？ 04/25 19:55
※ 編輯: carsen (114.44.48.57 臺灣), 04/25/2024 22:37:59